JUDGMENT 1. - Aggrieved of the award dated 10th December, 1997, passed by the Labour Court, Jaipur, the petitioners have approached this Court with the prayer to quash and set aside the impugned award. 2. Briefly outlined, the indispensable skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised in the instant writ application are required to be first noticed. The respondent-workman (hereinafter referred to as the 'workman', for short), raised an industrial dispute pleading that he was engaged on 1st January, 1982, to work as Milk Tester and Fat Tester at Dausa Branch of the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the 'employer', for short), but he was paid only minimum of the daily wages of the post of Helper. It is pleaded case of the workman that he was initially appointed on 1st January, 1982 and worked continuously upto 22nd June, 1984. His services were terminated orally without any notice, notice pay and retrenchment compensation. Further, on the same day, another person was appointed. The nature of work performed by the workman was of permanent in nature, but with an oblique intention to deprive the workman of regularisation and benefits thereon, adopting an anti-labour policy, he was shown as temporary and for some period in interregnum, and was paid wages on contractual basis. The workman was not paid wages for the month of June, 1984, and thus, the action of the employer in terminating his services even after completion of 240 days in 12 calender months preceding his termination, is violative of mandate of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1947', for short). As a sequel of an industrial dispute raised, a reference was made by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court. The statement of claim filed by the workman was responded by the employer raising preliminary objections to the effect that the workman was not engaged as stated by him, rather his work contract was to come to an end on 30th June, 1984, but before that on 18th June, 1984, the workman himself abandoned the work, and therefore, the matter was not within the ambit of the Act of 1947. Further, neither the workman was appointed as Milk Tester and Fat Tester nor he was appointed in the grade of 'Helper' in the establishment of the employer. Further, neither the workman was appointed as Milk Tester and Fat Tester nor he was appointed in the grade of 'Helper' in the establishment of the employer. The contract entered into between the parties i.e., the employer and the workman, cannot be a subject matter of adjudication under the Act of 1947, and therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. Hence, the provisions of Section 25F, 25G and 25H, are not attracted to the facts of the instant case at hand and the employer was not obliged to ensure compliance of the mandate of the provisions of Section of the Act of 1947, as aforesaid. The learned Labour Court taking into consideration the pleaded facts, evidence produced by the parties and materials brought on record, concluded that the action of the employer as illegal and invalid, and therefore, the workman was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service along with 30% on account of back wages from the date of termination till the date of passing of the impugned award. Further, the workman had been held to be entitled for the same wages, which were being paid to the workman, who was junior to him. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners reiterating the pleaded facts and referring to the communication dated 7th January, 1984 (Annexure-3), pointed out that the workman himself submitted an application to the Managing Director of the petitioners' establishment for having learnt about the need for a labour on contract basis. The endorsement on the application of the workman would further fortify the fact that the prayer of the workman was entertained for awarding him work of contract. In pursuance thereof, the terms and conditions of contract were reduced to writing, as is evident from the contract executed and placed on record as Annexure-4, which bears signatures of the workman. The learned counsel would further submit that the workman himself abandoned the contract, informing the employer, through a written communication (Annexure-5) dated 18th June, 1984, with a request to terminate his contract as he found work elsewhere. The learned counsel would further submit that the workman himself abandoned the contract, informing the employer, through a written communication (Annexure-5) dated 18th June, 1984, with a request to terminate his contract as he found work elsewhere. Referring to the affidavit filed by the workman before the learned Labour Court, it is pointed out that according to the workman himself, his engagement was terminated on 26th June, 1984, whereas there is no reference made by the appropriate Government indicating any date of termination as would be reflected from the terms reference made under Section 10 of the Act of 1947, as extracted in the impugned award dated 10th December, 1997. Thus, the Labour Court could not have adjudicated upon the reference, by accepting a date of termination, as suggested by the workman and hence, the impugned award is without jurisdiction as has been held by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mahaveer Conductor v. Nand Kishore: 2003 WLC (Raj.) UC 424 . Furthermore, even the date as indicated by the workman in his affidavit i.e., 26th June, 1984, is a contradictory date, with reference to his termination for what has been conveyed by the workman vide communication dated 18th June, 1984 (Annexure-5), informing the employer to terminate his contract as he found work elsewhere. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the finding recorded by the learned Labour Court to the effect that the workman worked with effect from 1st January, 1982 to 22nd June, 1984, is also perverse and contrary to the materials available on record for the purpose of determination of the workman having worked for 240 days from the alleged date of termination in preceding 12 calender months in view of the terms and conditions of the contract reduced to writing for the period with effect from 8th January, 1984 to 30th June, 1984 (Annexure-4). The learned Labour Court completely lost sight of the fact that the petitioners themselves detailed out the alleged termination in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim as 22nd June, 1984, whereas in the cross-examination, the workman admitted that he was removed from service on 18th June, 1984. 4. The learned Labour Court completely lost sight of the fact that the petitioners themselves detailed out the alleged termination in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim as 22nd June, 1984, whereas in the cross-examination, the workman admitted that he was removed from service on 18th June, 1984. 4. Per contra; the learned counsel for the workman reiterating the pleaded facts and supporting the impugned award passed by the learned Labour Court, has argued that the learned Labour Court after a careful analysis of the facts, evidence laid by the parties and on the basis of materials available on record, has arrived at correct findings, which needs no re-appreciation by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. On being queried specifically as to how there is a difference in the date(s) of termination of services of the workman, which is sharply pointed out in his affidavit, wherein the date of termination is mentioned as 22nd June, 1984, but in the cross-examination, the workman admits his termination from service with effect from 18th June, 1984. The learned counsel could not furnish any satisfactory reason for the sharp discrepancy in the date(s) of termination of service. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the materials available on record as well as carefully examined the impugned award passed by the learned Labour Court. 6. As would be evident from a bare perusal of the reference made by the appropriate Government, there is no specific date detailed out in the reference made. The workman in his affidavit has stated his date of termination as 22nd June, 1984, whereas in his cross-examination admits the date of removal from service to be 18th June, 1984. There cannot be two views on the issue that any order passed by the Court of law without jurisdiction is nullity, and such an order is in executable and unenforceable. Further, jurisdiction to deal with a case is a creation of statute and can neither be conferred nor ousted by the consent of the parties or by the order of the Court as has been held by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen:, AIR 1951 SC 230 . 7. 7. In the case Union of India v. Devki Nandan Aggarwal:, AIR 1992 SC 96 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that 'the Court cannot usurp legislative functions. The Court cannot re-write, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason for it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts. 8. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mahaveer Conductor (supra), dealing with somewhat similar controversy held that the learned Labour Court has no competence to correct, amend or modify the terms of the reference by accepting date of termination as suggested by the workman and the award was held to be without jurisdiction. In the instant case at hand, there is no date mentioned in the terms of the reference made and the dates suggested by the workman, are contradictory according to his own affidavit and cross-examination thereon. 9. For the reasons and discussions herein above, I have no hesitation in concluding that the learned Labour Court had no competence to correct, modify, amend and alter the terms of reference or proceed with the reference, accepting the dates of termination, as suggested by the workman, which are contradictory. In such a case, as one at hand, in my opinion, the impugned award dated 10th December, 1997, is a nullity being without jurisdiction, based on a reference without any date of termination incorporated therein. 10. In the result, the impugned award dated 10th December, 1997, is hereby quashed and set aside with liberty to the workman to approach the appropriate Government, if so advised, to make a proper reference. In case, such a reference is made, the Labour Court is requested to decide the same as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. 11. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******