S.C. Das, J. Hemendra Kumar Deb (since deceased), husband of the petitioner herein, during his life time secured two life insurance policies from the respondent Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd. (for short, the Corporation) and the policy certificates were issued by the Corporation in favour of Hemendra Kumar Deb. The first policy was issued on 07.11.2001 vide policy No. 491174475. The amount assured was ` 50,000/-. Hemendra Kumar Deb appointed his nephew Arnab Deb as the nominee of the said life insurance policy. The second policy was issued on 28.08.2002 vide Police No. 491273653 for an amount of ` 5,00,000/- having a yearly premium of ` 5262/. In the said policy Hemendra Kumar Deb appointed the petitioner, his wife, as the nominee. The said Hemendra Kumar Deb died on 16.03.2003. Immediately after his death, for the first policy in which sum assured was ` 50,000/-, the nominee Arnab Deb presented a claim to the Corporation and the Corporation in due course settled the claim and made payment of ` 54947/- by cheque in the name of the nominee Arnab Deb. 2. For the second policy in which sum assured was ` 5,00,000/- and the petitioner was the nominee, the petitioner presented her claim for settlement and payment on 20.04.2003. The petitioner submitted all documents to settle the claim but the respondents were causing delay in settling the claim of the petitioner on this or that plea. The petitioner submitted several representations demanding settlement of her claim but the Sr. Divisional Manager of the Corporation by writing letter dated 07.05.2004 (Annexure P/13 to the writ petition) repudiated the claim on the ground that the deceased withheld correct information regarding his health and age at the time of effecting the assurance with the Corporation. 3. On 08.05.2004, the petitioner made representation citing the other case of her husband in which Arnab Deb was the nominee and since similarly situated she again pursued her claim for payment of the sum assured. 4. Since she received no positive response, she issued a notice through her engaged lawyer and in response to the lawyer's notice, the respondent-Corporation reiterated to their earlier decision of repudiation of the claim dated 07.05.2004. The said communication has been annexed as Annexure P/18 to the writ petition. 4. Since she received no positive response, she issued a notice through her engaged lawyer and in response to the lawyer's notice, the respondent-Corporation reiterated to their earlier decision of repudiation of the claim dated 07.05.2004. The said communication has been annexed as Annexure P/18 to the writ petition. The petitioner even thereafter consistently made approach to the Corporation and even to the respondent No. 5 and the respondent No. 5 by letter dated 27.06.2006 (Annexure-P/21 to the writ petition) informed the petitioner that the claim of the petitioner cannot be entertained since one year time had already been elapsed from the date of repudiation. It is, therefore, alleged by the petitioner that the action of the respondent-Corporation suffer from arbitrariness and discrimination and is, therefore, liable to be interfered by this Court and the respondents may be directed to settle the claim of the petitioner and to make payment of the sum assured in view of the settlement of another claim of the sum assured through the nominee Arnab Deb. The petitioner, therefore, approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 5. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 contested the case by filing written statement, inter alia, contending that the deceased Hemendra Kumar Deb proposed for life insurance policy under "ANMOL JEEVAN", a pure term assurance plan and the policy was restricted for age group between 18 years and 50 years. It is contended by the respondents Corporation that the petitioner did not advance her claim for settlement immediately after the death of Hemendra Kumar Deb who admittedly died on 16.03.2003 and she presented her claim only on 25.03.2004. On the other hand, Arnab Deb, for the other policy, submitted claim immediately after death of Hemendra Kumar Deb and that claim was wrongly settled without verification of the necessary requirements and that was a wrong decision of the Corporation. It is further contended that the deceased Hemendra Kumar Deb suppressed material facts/information about his health, habit and age in the proposal seeking the life assurance and thereby misrepresented the Corporation. He has stated that he was not suffering from any disease whereas he was suffering from respiratory disease. He has stated his age was 49 years and a fake age proof certificate was also submitted in support of his proposal showing his age as 49 years whereas, at that relevant point of time, he was aged 61 years. He has stated that he was not suffering from any disease whereas he was suffering from respiratory disease. He has stated his age was 49 years and a fake age proof certificate was also submitted in support of his proposal showing his age as 49 years whereas, at that relevant point of time, he was aged 61 years. The voter list prepared in the year 2001 clearly shows his age as 61 years and, further, in course of verification, the Corporation enquired about the age proof certificate which is produced by the deceased Hemendra Kumar Deb and found that D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School of Kathaltali, Karimganj was established in the year 1986 whereas the deceased obtained a fake certificate alleged to have issued by that School. It is also contended that the said School has issued a certificate stating that D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School was not at all established in the year 1963-64 and therefore, there was no question of Hemendra Kumar Deb having his studies in the said School at that relevant point of time. Since the deceased Hemendra Kumar Deb suppressed the relevant materials in respect of his age and health, the Corporation rightly repudiated the claim which does not call for interference in the writ petition. 6. Respondent No. 5 also submitted a counter affidavit substantially supporting the contentions of the other respondents. 7. A contract of insurance is a contract "uberrima fides" (mutual good faith between persons in a particular relationship) and there must be a complete good faith on the part of the parties to the contract. The life assured is thus under a solemn obligation to make full disclosure of material facts which may be relevant for the insurer to take into account while deciding whether the proposal should be accepted or not. 8. The question posed for decision of this case is-- (i) Whether the petitioner suppressed material facts/information in respect of his health and age for the proposal made for the life assurance. 9. Indisputably "ANMOL JEEVAN", an insurance plan of the Corporation was meant for the people of the age group of 18 years and 50 years. If a person crossed 50 years according to the assurance plan, such person was not entitled to get a life assurance under said plan. 10. Learned counsel, Mr. 9. Indisputably "ANMOL JEEVAN", an insurance plan of the Corporation was meant for the people of the age group of 18 years and 50 years. If a person crossed 50 years according to the assurance plan, such person was not entitled to get a life assurance under said plan. 10. Learned counsel, Mr. Somik Deb appearing on behalf of the petitioner made a very strenuous argument contending that all the actions of the Corporation were/are perpetuated with arbitrariness and discrimination. The present insurance in which the petitioner was the nominee commenced on 28.08.2002. The other insurance in which Arnab Deb, the nephew of the deceased was the nominee commenced on 07.11.2001. The deceased Hemendra Kumar Deb submitted same set of documents and same statement in the proposal made for the assurance of both the policy while the Corporation could settle the claim in which Arnab Deb was nominee, they cannot have any reason to repudiate the claim of the petitioner. It is, therefore, evident that the respondents taken an arbitrary stand and discriminatory treatment and to justify their arbitrary and discriminatory stand, the points relating to age, health etc. has been raised which was afterthought and admittedly was not raised at the time of settling the claim made by Arnab Deb. 11. Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder on the contrary has contended that a wrong decision in one case cannot be an instance for taking further wrong decision in future cases. Had both the claims made at a time, the inquiry could have been made but the clever petitioner remained silent till the other claim made by Arnab was settled. The Corporation took a wrong decision settling the claim in which Arnab Deb was nominee and the Corporation is likely to take appropriate step to make good the wrong decision. It is seriously contended by learned counsel, Mr. Majumder that there is serious disputed question of facts involved in this writ case which cannot be decided without taking evidence. Hemendra Kumar Deb at the time of securing the life assurance, submitted a School Certificate issued by D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School, P.O. Kathaltali, District Karimganj and that School Certificate which was issued on 30.05.1990 was showing the date of birth of the deceased as 09.05.1953. Hemendra Kumar Deb at the time of securing the life assurance, submitted a School Certificate issued by D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School, P.O. Kathaltali, District Karimganj and that School Certificate which was issued on 30.05.1990 was showing the date of birth of the deceased as 09.05.1953. That certificate is absolutely a fake certificate and it was never issued by D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School since that School was not established during the period from the year 1953 to 1963. The Corporation put implicit reliance on that School certificate and admitted him in "ANMOL JEEVAN" plan since it was showing that he was aged 49 years but actually that School certificate was a fake certificate and that was not issued by the said School. The Corporation obtained a Certificate from the Said School dated 17.03.2004 (Annexure-R/11 to the counter affidavit) which shows that Hemendra Kumar Deb never studied in that School since the School was not at all established in the year 1963-64. He has also referred to Annexure R/10 to the counter affidavit, another certificate issued by the Headmaster of the School dated 27.05.2004 showing that the said School was established in the year 1986. He has also referred to a voter list of Assembly Constituency No. 54, Kurti Assembly Constituency of the year 2001 published on 22.01.2001, base date 01.01.2001, wherein at Sl. No. 391 the name of Hemendra Kumar Deb reflects with his age 60 years. These documents have been considered by the Corporation and the Corporation arrived at a conclusion that the deceased Hemendra Kumar Deb suppressed material facts and information and hence, the claim was rightly repudiated. Since there are conflicting documents placed on record by affidavit, without taking evidence no decision can be taken by this writ Court and the petitioner with a view to avoid the normal Court taken an easy course of approaching this Court with this high prerogative writ and this Court may in exercise of its discretion reject the writ petition since efficacious relief is available in the competent Civil Court as well as before other legal forum. 12. Learned counsel, Mr. Somik Deb has submitted that the respondents Corporation made a discreet inquiry and collected those age proof certificate and contradictory School certificate from D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School but afforded no scope to the petitioner to controvert it. 12. Learned counsel, Mr. Somik Deb has submitted that the respondents Corporation made a discreet inquiry and collected those age proof certificate and contradictory School certificate from D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School but afforded no scope to the petitioner to controvert it. Since no opportunity of being heard was given before taking the decision of repudiation of claim, this Court is well empowered to interfere in the decision. It is further contended by Mr. Deb, learned counsel that the respondent Corporation submitted two School Certificates from D.N. Singh High School. The certificate dated 17.03.2004 was obtained before repudiation of claim which is marked as Annexure R/11 to the counter affidavit. But the other certificate dated 27.05.2004 was obtained after repudiation of claim. So, there remains confusion about the action taken by the Corporation. I find no force in this argument of learned counsel Mr. Deb since it is clear that decision was taken by the Corporation taking into consideration the certificate obtained on 17.03.2004 (Annexure R/11 to the counter affidavit) and the other certificate (Annexure-R/10 to the counter affidavit) may be obtained subsequently for the future purpose and for that reason there cannot be any confusion. 13. Learned counsel, Mr. Deb further argued that writ petition is maintainable even in cases where equally efficacious reliefs are available otherwise than a writ Court. He has also contended that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition, if it is found that injustice has been caused because of some actions taken by a State instrumentality and even in contractual matters, writ petitions are maintainable. In support of his contentions, learned counsel, Mr. Deb referred the following case laws:-- (i) Life Insurance Corpn. of India & Ors. v. Asha Goel (Smt.) & Anr. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 160 ; (ii) Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. G.M. Channabasamma reported in (1991) 1 SCC 357 ; (iii) Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; (iv) State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 ; (v) Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 ; (vi) ABL International Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; (iv) State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors. reported in AIR 1967 SC 1269 ; (v) Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 ; (vi) ABL International Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 ; (vii) Union of India & Ors. v. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 697 ; 14. Learned counsel, Mr. Majumder also referred the following cases of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission:-- (i) Revision Petition Nos. 692 of 2006 (Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Yogendra Prasad Singh); (ii) Revision Petition No. 1548 of 2000 (Panni Devi v. LIC & Ors.); (iii) Revision Petition No. 209 of 2007 (Smt. Pushpa Chauhan v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors.). 15. The claim of the petitioner has been repudiated by the Corporation on the ground of suppression of material facts/information by the deceased life assured, Hemendra Kumar Deb. In course of argument learned counsel of the respondents put stress on the age proof certificate of the deceased life assured. Annexure-P/20 to the writ petition was the school certificate submitted by the life assured at the time of the proposal for assurance which has been showing his date of birth as 09.05.1953. The respondents seriously disputed this certificate and stressed that it was completely a fake certificate. According to the respondents, D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School was only set up/established in the year 1986 and there was no existence of the School before that date. The deceased life assured being a resident of Dharmanagar brought the certificate from Assam and placed it at the time of making the proposal for life assurance. Annexure-R/10 and R/11 to the counter affidavit are directly in conflict with Annexure P/20 in respect of age of the deceased life assured. If Annexure-R/10 and Annexure R/11 to the counter affidavit are taken as genuine then definitely Annexure-P/20 to the writ petition is a fake one or vise versa. Annexure-R/7 to the counter affidavit is a voter list of the year 2001 and is a public document which is showing the age of the deceased as 60 years in the year 2001. If Annexure-R/10 and Annexure R/11 to the counter affidavit are taken as genuine then definitely Annexure-P/20 to the writ petition is a fake one or vise versa. Annexure-R/7 to the counter affidavit is a voter list of the year 2001 and is a public document which is showing the age of the deceased as 60 years in the year 2001. While fraud has been alleged and conflicting documentary evidence placed on record, which require evidence to decide, writ Court perhaps cannot take a decision in such a case of fact. 16. In ordinary course the petitioner would approach a competent Civil Court. The word 'Court' has been defined in Section 2(6) of the Insurance Act, 1938 which means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the District and includes the High court in exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction. The petitioner did not approach the Civil Court and there is also no averment in the writ petition as to why the petitioner has not approached the civil Court. 17. The petitioner also would approach the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, under the Consumer Protection Act, for the relief claimed but the petitioner chosen to avoid it, reasons thereof not explained in the writ petition. 18. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 by filing counter affidavit raised a serious question that the age certificate submitted by the life assured was fake and that D.N. Singh Chowdhury High School did not even was established at the relevant point of time. The writ petitioner did not counter those facts by filing any rejoinder affidavit. Those facts brought on record by the respondents by filing affidavit, therefore, remained un-rebutted. Since alternative statutory relief was available to the petitioner, a writ petition should not be entertained in such cases and if it is entertained, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, in my considered opinion, it will be sheer abuse of the power of prerogative writ, exercised by the High Court and the Supreme Court. 19. In the case of Asha Goel (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that the writ Court should carefully weigh the pros and cons of fact situation of the case. 19. In the case of Asha Goel (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that the writ Court should carefully weigh the pros and cons of fact situation of the case. If the Court finds (i) that the dispute raised is bonafide, or (ii) that a plea of fraud raised by insurer has prima facie merit, and find that oral and documentary evidence would be necessary for determination of the issues, held, writ petition would not be proper remedy. The Court has however held that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a claim under the Insurance Policy Act never be enforced under Article 226. 20. Learned counsel, Mr. Deb referred Para 10 and 11 of the judgment of Asha Goel (supra), which reads as follows:-- 10. Article 226 of the Constitution confers extra-ordinary jurisdiction on the High Court to issue high prerogative writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. It is wide and expansive. The Constitution does not place any fetter on exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction. It is left to the discretion of the High Court. Therefore it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that in no case the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a life insurance policy. It is neither possible nor proper to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in which such a claim can or cannot be enforced by filing a writ petition. The determination of the question depends on consideration of several factors, like, whether a writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her contractual rights or the case raises important questions of law and constitutional issues; the nature of the dispute raised; the nature of inquiry necessary for determination of the dispute etc. The matter is to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. While the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be denied altogether, Courts must bear in mind the self-imposed restriction consistently followed by High Courts all these years after the constitutional power came into existence in not entertaining writ petitions filed for enforcement of purely contractual rights and obligations which involve disputed questions of facts. The Courts have consistently taken the view that in a case where for determination of the dispute raised, it is necessary to inquire into facts for determination of which it may become necessary to record oral evidence a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not the appropriate forum. The position is also well settled that if the contract entered between the parties provide an alternate forum for resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the parties should approach the forum agreed by them and the High Court in writ jurisdiction should not permit them to by-pass the agreed forum of dispute resolution. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that in the above discussions we have only indicated some of the circumstances in which the High Court have declined to entertain petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of contractual rights and obligation; the discussions are not intended to be exhaustive. This Court from time to time disapproved of a High Court entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of enforcement of contractual rights and obligation particularly where the claim by one party is contested by the other and adjudication of the dispute requires inquiry into facts. We may notice a few such cases; Mohammed Hanif v. The State of Assam (1969) 2 SCC 782 ; Banchhanidhi Rath v. The State of Orissa and Ors. (1972) 4 SCC 781 ; Smt. Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector, Jabalpur and others ( 1980 (4) SCC 556 ; Food Corporation of India and others v. Jagannath Dutta and others (1993 (Suppl.) (3) SCC 635; and State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Pal and others (1999) 4 SCC 43 . 11. The position that emerges from the discussions in the decided cases is that ordinarily the High Court should not entertain a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for mere enforcement of a claim under a contract of insurance. Where an insurer has repudiated the claim, in case such a writ petition is filed the High Court has to consider the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the dispute raised and the nature of the inquiry necessary to be made for determination of the questions raised and other relevant factors before taking a decision whether it should entertain the writ petition or reject it as not maintainable. It has also to be kept in mind that in case an insured or nominee of the deceased insured is refused relief merely on the ground that the claim relates to contractual rights and obligations and he/she is driven to a long drawn litigation in the civil court it will cause serious prejudice to the claimant/other beneficiaries of the policy. The pros and cons of the matter in the context of the fact situation of the case should be carefully weighed and appropriate decision should be taken. In a case where claim by an insured or a nominee is repudiated raising a serious dispute and the Court finds the dispute to be a bona fide one which requires oral and documentary evidence for its determination then the appropriate remedy is a civil suit and not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Similarly, where a plea of fraud is pleaded by the insurer and on examination is found prima facie to have merit and oral and documentary evidence may become necessary for determination of the issue raised, then a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy. 21. In the present case at hand, the respondents raised a plea of fraud in respect of age proof certificate of the deceased life assured. That plea has not been controverted by filing any rejoinder affidavit. While contradictory age proof certificate filed by both side, the claim cannot be decided by the writ Court and the petitioner, therefore, may approach the competent civil Court or the Consumer Court seeking appropriate relief. 22. Learned counsel, Mr. Deb while referring the case of Smt. G.M. Channabasamma (supra), drawn my attention to Para 7, 8 and 10 of the Judgment. The gist of Para 7, 8 and 10 has been noted under the head note which reads as follows:-- A contract of insurance is contract uberrima fides and there must be complete good faith on the part of the assured. The assured is thus under a solemn obligation to make full disclosure of material facts which may be relevant for the insurer to take into account while deciding whether the proposal should be accepted or not. While making a disclosure of the relevant facts, the duty of the insured to state them correctly cannot be diluted. The assured is thus under a solemn obligation to make full disclosure of material facts which may be relevant for the insurer to take into account while deciding whether the proposal should be accepted or not. While making a disclosure of the relevant facts, the duty of the insured to state them correctly cannot be diluted. Section 45 of the Act has made special provisions for a life insurance policy; it cannot be called in questions by the insurer after the expiry of two years from the date on which it was effected "unless the insurer shows that such statement was on a material matter or suppressed facts which it was material to disclose and that it was fraudulently made by the policy holder and that the policy holder knew at the time of making it that the statement was false or that it suppressed facts which it was material to disclose". The burden of proving that the insured had made false representations and suppressed material facts is undoubtedly on the Corporation. Having gone through the entire evidence in this case it is not possible to take a view different from the High Court that the appellant LIC has failed to discharge the burden of proving the defence story about the serious illness of the insured at the time of taking out the insurance policies and knowingly suppressing the material information. 23. This reported case in my considered opinion is not at all of the help of the petitioner since here the respondents raised a point of not only suppression of material facts but also of fraud i.e. the submission of a fake school certificate. 24. Learned counsel, Mr. Deb has referred the para 15 of the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra). I would like to quote here paras, 14 to 20 of the judgment which reads as follows:-- 14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the Writ Petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 16. Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board, kairana, AIR 1960 SC 163, laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting Writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however, qualified by the significant words, "unless there are good grounds therefor", which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that Writ Petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional circumstances. 17. A Specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. This proposition was, however, qualified by the significant words, "unless there are good grounds therefor", which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that Writ Petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional circumstances. 17. A Specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh 1958 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 , as under: But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the Writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. 18. This proposition was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1506 and was affirmed and followed in the following words: The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus per-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court. 19. Another Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, Companies Distt. AIR 1961 SC 372 laid down: Though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. 19. Another Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, Companies Distt. AIR 1961 SC 372 laid down: Though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari and prohibition can issue against Income Tax Officer acting without jurisdiction under Section 34, Income Tax Act. 20. Much water has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the Writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. 25. What emerges from a careful reading of the above part of the judgment is that the High Court has to impose upon itself certain restrictions where effective and efficacious remedy is otherwise available. The alternative remedy, has been held by the Apex Court, not to operate as a bar in at least In 3 (three) contingencies namely (1) where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of the fundamental rights or (ii) where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without the jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 26. There is no point of violation of any fundamental rights or that of acting without jurisdiction or vires of any Act is challenged. The only question is whether the principles of natural justice violated. 27. Here a life assured died leaving behind his other legal representatives who actually entitled to the benefit of the life insurance. The petitioner, no doubt claimed to be the wife, but, is the nominee of the life assured. She presented the claim for making payment. The only question is whether the principles of natural justice violated. 27. Here a life assured died leaving behind his other legal representatives who actually entitled to the benefit of the life insurance. The petitioner, no doubt claimed to be the wife, but, is the nominee of the life assured. She presented the claim for making payment. For the purpose of settlement of claim there is no statutory obligation for calling the petitioner and to hear her again. At least the petitioner did not institute this writ case as a legal representative of the deceased but simply as a nominee of the deceased. In the particular facts and circumstances, I find nothing to arrive at a conclusion that the principles of natural justice have been violated by the respondents-Corporation in repudiating the claim. 28. The Case of Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei (supra) is on different context and I find no justification at all to discuss the decision in this case for appreciation. 29. In the case of Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) the Supreme Court has held that in an appropriate case in respect of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court may well exercise its writ jurisdiction on the same grounds as held by the Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool (supra). Learned counsel, Mr. Deb referred para. 7 of the judgment which reads as follows:-- 7. It is common ground between the parties that no enquiry in accordance with the provisions of Art. 311 was made by the State Government. It was the plea of the State in the High Court that Art. 311 has no application to the case of the first respondent, because she has not been dismissed or removed from service. The State contended that the true date of birth of the first respondent was April 16, 1907, and she had been properly declared superannuated in consonance with the finding arrived at in an enquiry, held for that purpose by the State. 30. In the case of ABL International Ltd. (supra) also same principle reiterated. In para 23 and 27 of the judgment, the Court has held thus:-- 23. 30. In the case of ABL International Ltd. (supra) also same principle reiterated. In para 23 and 27 of the judgment, the Court has held thus:-- 23. It is clear from the above observations of this Court, once the State or an instrumentality of State is a party of the contract, it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if by the impugned repudiation of the claim of the appellants the first respondent as an instrumentality of the State has acted in contravention of the abovesaid requirement of Article 14, then we have no hesitation that a writ court can issue suitable directions to set right the arbitrary actions of the first respondent. In this context, we may note that though the first respondent is a company registered under the Companies Act, it is wholly owned by the Government of India. The total subscribed share capital of this company is 2,50,000 shares out of which 2,49,998 shares are held by the President of India while one share each is held by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Officer on Special Duty, Ministry of Commerce and Industry respectively. The objects enumerated in the Memorandum of Association of the first respondent at Para 10 read: To undertake such functions as may be entrusted to it by the Government from time to time, including grant of credits and guarantees in foreign currency for the purpose of facilitating the import of raw materials and semi-finished goods for manufacture or processing goods for export. Para 11 of the said object reads thus: To act as agent of the Government, or with the sanction of the Government on its own account, to give the guarantees, undertake such responsibilities and discharge such functions as are considered by the Government as necessary in national interest. 27. From the above discussion of ours, following legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of a writ petition:-- (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of facts arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of facts arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable. 31. In the case of Tantia Construction Private Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court reiterated the same principle that the constitutional power vested in the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be fettered by any alternative remedy available to the authorities. Injustice, whenever and wherever it takes place, has to be struck down as an anathema to the rule of law and the provisions of the constitution. 32. I have also meticulously gone through the decisions referred by the learned counsel, Mr. Majumder but I find no justification to discuss those decisions for arriving at a finding in this case. 33. I fully agree with the submission of learned counsel, Mr. Deb that in a given case where alternative remedy is available still a writ petition may survive but where a serious disputed question of fact and specially an allegation of fraud has been raised, the writ Court cannot decide the issue since it require recording of evidence to be adduced by both side. The writ Court, therefore, in my considered opinion cannot decide the present writ petition and the writ petitioner, if so advised, may approach a competent Civil Court or a Consumer Court seeking appropriate relief. 34. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of. The parties are to bear their own costs. __