JUDGMENT B.R. Gavai, J. 1. Rule, made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned Counsel for the parties. In the fact and circumstance of the case, we discharge the notice issued to the Managing Director, Indian Oil Corporation dated 20-6-2014. The petitioner has approached this Court being aggrieved by the order passed by the Scrutiny Committee dated 13-11-2013 thereby invalidating the caste claim of the petitioner and the order of termination dated 8-1-2014 passed by the respondent No. 2-Indian Oil Corporation. 2. Though the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order of the Scrutiny Committee, during the pendency of the petition, he has given up the challenge to the order of the Scrutiny Committee and restricted his claim in the petition only for grant of protection of his services on account of his long standing service. 3. Shri Manish Bhat, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 states that even the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Milind, 2001(1) Mh. L.J. (SC)], which has been followed by the Apex Court in the cases of Kavita Solunke vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2012(5) Mh. L.J. 921 and Shalini vs. New English High School Association and others, 2014(2) Mh. L.J. 913, would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the protection that has been granted is granted only to such appointments, which had become final. The learned Senior Counsel, relying on the order dated 1-12-1997, which is the initial appointment, states that the petitioner's appointment was subject to the decision of the Scrutiny Committee. He submits that unless the petitioner had submitted the validity claim certifying the petitioner to be belonging to the Scheduled Tribe, his appointment could have never become final and as such the petitioner would not be entitled to the protection of service as his appointment has not become final. 4. As already discussed by us in catena of judgments, an issue regarding the question as to whether the Halba-Koshtis were entitled to the benefits of Scheduled Tribe or not was under a limbo for considerable time right from 1984 to 2000. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abhay Parate vs. State of Maharashtra, 1984 Mh. L.J. 289 has held that the Halba-Koshtis are entitled to the benefits of Scheduled Tribe. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abhay Parate vs. State of Maharashtra, 1984 Mh. L.J. 289 has held that the Halba-Koshtis are entitled to the benefits of Scheduled Tribe. Not only that, even in the case of Milind Katware, the Division Bench of this Court upheld the said view. For the first time, on 28-11-2000, the confusion was cleared and it was held by the Apex Court relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Palghat Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Samithi and another vs. State of Kerala and another, (1994) 1 SCC 359 , held that no alteration or modification is permissible in Presidential Order and as such, Halba Koshtis are not entitled to the benefits of Scheduled Tribe. 5. However, while delivering the said judgment, the Apex Court held that all such appointments and the educational degrees, which had become final, should not be disturbed. What had weighed with the Apex Court was that, insofar as the educational degrees are concerned, no purpose will be served by upsetting the degrees inasmuch as valuable amount spent by the State exchequer on the educational career of such students would go into waste. 6. In the last week in the judgment in Writ Petition. No. 2683 of 2014, Anil Tulshiram Sonkusle vs. State of Maharashtra and others, delivered on 11th June, 2014 1 2014(4) Mh. L.J. 614], we had elaborately dealt with the facts that weighed in granting protection insofar as the employment is concerned. We had specifically observed that what weighed while granting protection to the initial appointment is that by passage of time, it will not be possible for an employee to find an alternate employment at the fag end of his career and the entire family would come on the street. The similar view in several cases has been followed by us while holding that for what an employee is entitled to get by protection is only initial employment and not the promotional benefit. 7. No doubt, the learned Senior Counsel is technically right in holding that the appointment of the petitioner had not become final but was subject to submission of caste validity certificate. 7. No doubt, the learned Senior Counsel is technically right in holding that the appointment of the petitioner had not become final but was subject to submission of caste validity certificate. However, we put a question to ourselves on a common sense as to whether the employee, who has rendered services for a period more than eighteen years, could be considered to be not holding an appointment, which had become final. Besides going into those technical aspects, we find that on humanitarian ground, the petitioner's services need to be protected. 8. The petitioner is working continuously with the respondent since 1997. The petitioner at any rate, by now, would have been overage to get any employment. In that view of the matter, we find that though we appreciate the technical submissions made by the Senior Advocate, purely on humanitarian grounds having taken recourse to our earlier judgments, we are inclined to reject the said contention. In that view of the matter, we reject the said contention. 9. The petitioner has been continued in service from 1997. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the petitioner's services were adverse or not satisfactory. We, therefore, find that the petitioner's probationary period shall be deemed to be confirmed and he shall be deemed to be confirmed and will be continued as a candidate who has completed his probation. It is further to be noted that there is not even a whisper in the order of the Scrutiny Committee that the petitioner has played fraud or has either misrepresented or suppressed something to get the benefit of Scheduled Tribe. In the above backdrop, we hold that: I. The petitioner's initial appointment of the year 1997 shall stand protected. However, it is made clear that the petitioner would be entitled only for protection of his initial appointment and if he has got any promotional benefit on the basis of his claim to be belonging to Scheduled Tribe, the respondents would be entitled to withdraw the same. II. The petitioner shall be hereinafter considered to be a candidate belonging to Open category for all the purposes. III. Though the petitioner would not be entitled for any backwages for the period during which he was out of employment, he shall be entitled for continuity in service for all consequential benefits. IV. II. The petitioner shall be hereinafter considered to be a candidate belonging to Open category for all the purposes. III. Though the petitioner would not be entitled for any backwages for the period during which he was out of employment, he shall be entitled for continuity in service for all consequential benefits. IV. The petitioner shall file an undertaking stating therein that he shall not take any benefit of belonging to 'Halba' Scheduled Tribe either for himself or for progeny. V. The interim applications stand disposed of as not pressed.