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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 138 (MP)

State of M. P. v. Chironjilal(d)

2014-01-29

M.K.MUDGAL

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. The appellant/plaintiff has filed this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 8.4.1994 passed by the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Morena in Civil Appeal No.41A of 1982 confirming the judgment and decree dated 22.7.1982 passed by the Court of Civil Judge Class II, Sabalgarh, District Morena in Civil Suit No.6A of 1979 whereby, the suit filed by the plaintiff for mandatory injunction and permanent injunction was dismissed. However, the learned appellate Court has held that the disputed agricultural land belonged to the endowment made to the temple of Lord Ram Chandra. In this appeal, the appellant is referred to as “plaintiff” ad the respondents No.1(1-6) as “defendants”. 2. Heard I.A. No.2289 of 2013, an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 3. The appeal is drastically barred by 6965 days. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the limitation to prefer the appeal has already expired on 7.11.1994 way back. The information of the order dated 31.5.2012 for restriction passed by the High Court in W.P. No.3814 of 2012 could reach the appellant authorities, thereafter, immediately on receiving the said information, the authorities concerned requested the Collector to seek sanction to file appeal in the matter, who in turn wrote to the Secretary of the State of M.P., Department of Revenue on 8.10.2012 for according sanction. In response to the aforesaid letter, vide order dated 19.11.2012, OIC was appointed who after collecting relevant information and documents from the office Additional Advocate General, Gwalior, got an appeal drafted and immediately thereafter, this second appeal has been filed. The delay caused in filing of this appeal is based on non-receipt of the information of the impugned judgment and decree so the appeal could not be filed in time. The counsel further argued that the time spent over the official proceedings in getting sanction from Secretary of State of M.P., Department of Revenue is bona fide itself. The limitation law is procedural law so liberal approach has to be adopted in considering the condonation of delay, hence, keeping in view the legal question involved in the matter and the fact that the delay if bona fide, the limitation for filing the appeal, deserves to be condoned. 5. The limitation law is procedural law so liberal approach has to be adopted in considering the condonation of delay, hence, keeping in view the legal question involved in the matter and the fact that the delay if bona fide, the limitation for filing the appeal, deserves to be condoned. 5. Opposing the application, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants submits that the impugned judgment was bi parte and passed in presence of the appellant’s counsel. Even before the first appellate Court, detailed arguments were advanced on behalf of the appellants, hence, the appellants were having knowledge about the passing of the judgment. Since, the respondents were not party to the W.P. No.3814 of 2012 and the judgment and decree of learned first appellate Court was not under challenge in it, hence, it does not give free hand to the appellants to file this hopelessly time barred appeal. The fact that remains is that the judgment and decree of learned first appellate Court was just and lawful, so, the appellants could not dare to file appeal challenging it hence, pretending that they were not having knowledge of passing of the impugned judgment and decree did not take any action. This time barred appeal has been filed with hopeless inordinate delay which cannot be condoned looking to the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below. Even no explanation has been tendered by the appellant for the duration from 1994 to 2012 as to why the steps for filing of the appeal were not taken by the appellant during this period. The counsel further pleaded that the condonation of inordinate delay in filing the appeal should not be given to the appellant on account of its being Government one. Hence, relying upon the judgment delivered by Hon’ble apex Court in Amalendu Kumar Bera and ors. v. State of West Bengal (2013) 4 SCC 52 and Union of India and others v. Nripen Sharma (2013) 4 SCC 57 , it was prayed that the application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay be rejected. 6. The arguments were considered. 7. The delay in filing the appeal is of 19 years which cannot be overlooked as it is an extremely inordinate delay. 6. The arguments were considered. 7. The delay in filing the appeal is of 19 years which cannot be overlooked as it is an extremely inordinate delay. It is true that a liberal approach should be adopted in condonation of delay as the limitation law is a procedural law and opportunity should be given to a party on merit of the case but if the delay is inordinate and is of mala fide nature and for which no adequate reason exists, which appears to be on the face of it to be of highly negligent nature, it should not be condoned. 8. In this regard, in Amlendu Kumar Bera (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient cause” for explaining every day’s delay. However, it is equally well settled that the Courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the Court may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India v. Nripen Sharma the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant Union of India”. 9. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India v. Nripen Sharma the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant Union of India”. 9. Following the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case, a bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Rajaram ILR (2013) MP 1947 has relied upon the latest judgment of apex Court passed in the matter of Maniben Devraj Sah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai 2012 AIR SCW 2412, in which, it was held as under :- “In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest”. 10. Further this Court in State of M.P. and others v. Ram Kunwar Bai and others 2013 (IV) MPJR SN 12, it has been held as under :- “It is apt to quote a dictum and principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with reference to and in the context of section 5 of the Limitation Act way back in the year 1962 in the matter of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd ( AIR 1962 SC 361 ), this Court held that : “In construing section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay if shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay if shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. It is further necessary to emphasis that even if the sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by section 5. This aspect of the matter, naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage, the diligence of the party or its bonafides may call for consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Ltd and another (2012) 3 SCC 563 , has made an observation which are of universal application in the matters concerning delay and latches as regards consideration of applications for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The observations made have direct applicability to the case in hand. Pragraphs 28 and 29 are reproduced as under : 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few”. 11. In the instant case, first appeal was filed in the year 1982 which was decided on 8.4.1994. From the date of passing the judgment, no concrete steps were taken for long 19 years for filing the appeal in the matter as also no specific reason has been assigned for not filing of the appeal for such a long time of 19 years and the sole reason shown as non-receipt of information about passing of the impugned judgment is highly inadequate for condoning the delay as the appellant had knowledge regarding impugned judgment and decree from the date of it’s passing. 12. Having taken into account the aforesaid facts and the judgments, it is concluded that no sufficient ground has been found for condoning the delay of 19 years made by the appellant in filing the appeal. Therefore, the application I.A.No.2289 of 2013 being meritless and devoid of credence is hereby dismissed. 13. Consequently, the second appeal filed by the appellant also stands dismissed barred by limitation.