Pamula Nagamani v. General Manager, APSRTC, Musheerabad, Hyderabad
2014-11-14
A.SHANKAR NARAYANA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT: The appellant - petitioner preferred the instant appeal aggrieved of the dismissal of her claim for Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation laid under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, the Act) read with Rule 455 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, by order dated 29.11.2003 in O.P.No.331 of 1997 on the file of the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-II Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Nizamabad (for short, the Tribunal). 2. The appellant herein is petitioner before the Tribunal in the O.P., while the respondent Nos.1 and 2, who are Officials of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short the Corporation) respectively, are respondents. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed before the Tribunal in the original petition. 4. The facts in brief are that on 31.01.1997, the petitioner boarded the bus bearing registration No.AP 9Z 5026 belonging to the respondents Corporation to go to Navipet village from Dharmaram village and when it reached railway level crossing of Jankampet village at 5-30 p.m., since the driver of the bus drove it in a rash and negligent manner dashed a running train, resulting the petitioner sustaining injuries to her head, right leg backbone and both hands and fracture to skull, she was immediately shifted to the Government Hospital, Nizamabad for treatment and spent Rs.30,000/- towards medical expenses and she became disabled and lost earning capacity. Therefore, claiming that she is entitled to Rs.10,10,000/- but restricting her claim to Rs.1,00,000/- from both the respondents, laid the instant petition. 5. Both the respondents contested the claim by filing a common written statement denying the age, income and her disability mentioned by the petitioner. While contending that the compensation sought is excessive and arbitrary, disputed the negligence attributed to the driver of the R.T.C. bus and sought to dismiss the claim. 6. The Tribunal framed three issues basing on the pleadings put forth by the parties about the responsibility for the accident. During enquiry before the Tribunal, the petitioner besides examining herself as P.W.1, examined Dr.T.Narsing Rao as P.W.2 through commission and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5 to substantiate her claim for compensation. On behalf of the respondents, no witnesses were examined and no documents were marked. 7.
During enquiry before the Tribunal, the petitioner besides examining herself as P.W.1, examined Dr.T.Narsing Rao as P.W.2 through commission and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5 to substantiate her claim for compensation. On behalf of the respondents, no witnesses were examined and no documents were marked. 7. The Tribunal, on appraisal of evidence let in by the petitioner, tendered finding on issue No.1 that the accident in question had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the R.T.C. bus. On issue No.2, disbelieving Ex.A.5 case sheet on the ground that Ex.A.5 did not see the light of the day till 10.04.2003 on which day it was filed into Court and P.W.2 doctor also did not file any X-ray report to prove the alleged mal-united fracture of both the bones of right leg of the petitioner and no scanning report is filed pertaining to the right leg of the petitioner to prove the existence of alleged mal-united fracture and even discarding Ex.A.3, discharge summary since the same also did not see the light till 04.03.2003, and observing that there was no basis whatsoever for issuance of disability certificate covered by Ex.A.4 by P.W.2 besides observing that the outpatient ticket does not contain the surname of the petitioner and so also Ex.A.5, disbelieved the case set up by the petitioner in toto and dismissed the claim. 8. It is that order which is challenged in this appeal contending that the Tribunal was not right in arriving at the conclusion that the documents do not pertain to her merely on the ground that her surname was not found therein and the Tribunal was also wrong in discarding the evidence of P.W.2 by observing that Exs.A.3 and A.5 were not filed earlier when the evidence of P.W.2 is categorical that the appellant was admitted in Tirumala Orthopaedic Hospital, Nizamabad for treatment to fracture of both bones of right leg and head injury and, therefore, sought to set aside the order and to grant compensation sought for by the petitioner. 9. Heard Sri P. Radhive Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri N. Vasudeva Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Tribunal ought to have granted compensation, as the medical record would establish the name of the petitioner, though, it does not disclose the surname of the petitioner.
9. Heard Sri P. Radhive Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri N. Vasudeva Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Tribunal ought to have granted compensation, as the medical record would establish the name of the petitioner, though, it does not disclose the surname of the petitioner. That has been the only ground agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant, and no other grounds were insisted as to the observations made by the Tribunal in disbelieving the evidence of PW.2, a private Practitioner and as to how PW.2 came into custody of case-sheet which was marked as Ex.A-5 when the Advocate Commissioner examined him as a witness, as the case-sheet was supposed to be in the custody of Government Hospital, where the petitioner was treated. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents Corporation submits that the reasons assigned by the Tribunal in support of the findings tendered in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to any compensation cannot be faulted with, since it is glaring, that based on fabricated documents, a false claim is laid by examining PW.2, a doctor by name T. Narsing Rao from Nizamabad on commission. 12. Perused the order under challenge and the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and documentary evidence through Exs.A-1 to A-5 let in by the petitioner. 13. No doubt, on behalf of the respondents, none was examined. However, at the outset, it is to be observed that absolutely there is no merit in the appeal. The reasons assigned by the Tribunal in dismissing the claim are well founded and based on appreciation of evidence on record in accordance with the evidentiary rule for the following reasons. i) It is a case, where the petitioner projected that as if she sustained fracture of both bones of her right leg, besides a head injury in the alleged afore-narrated road accident. The first reason assigned by the Tribunal is that, PW.2 is not the custodian of the case sheet covered by Ex.A-5, and that the case sheet did not see the light of the day till 10-04-2003, on which date it was filed into Court and, even PW.2 did not file any X-ray reports to prove the existence of mal-united fracture of both bones of right leg of the petitioner.
Further, scanning report pertaining to the right leg of the petitioner is not filed at all. The Tribunal also disbelieved the existence of Ex.A-3 discharge summary certificate which also did not see the light of the day till it was filed into Court on 04-03-2003. The petitioner did not mention in her petition that she was treated in the hospital of PW.2. In fact, it accounts for a vital circumstance to entitle her for the claim. These are the circumstances, which constrained the Tribunal to make a definite observation that Ex.A-3 discharge certificate was brought into existence with an ulterior motive by the concerned vested interests in a vain bid to lay a false claim. ii) The Tribunal has also disbelieved the disability certificate covered by Ex.A-4 by assigning convincing reasons in the order which warrant no interference at all. iii) The next reason assigned by the Tribunal in disbelieving the claim of the petitioner is that, the petitioner has not taken any steps to get the doctor concerned summoned from the Government Hospital at Nizamabad, though, she was treated, in the first instance, in Government Hospital at Nizamabad. Even, she did not take any steps to procure or secure the required wound certificate from the Government Hospital at Nizamabad. It is true, the claim of the petitioner is that, she was immediately shifted to Government Hospital at Nizamabad for treatment for the injuries said to have sustained by her in a motor accident. But, the very fact that she did not submit the wound certificate or summon the doctor or at least the wound certificate from the Government Hospital at Nizamabad, would all give rise to draw an inference adverse to her case. This apart, even the Tribunal observed that in Ex.A-5, surname of the petitioner is not mentioned at all. The surname of petitioner is Pamula. It is true, on perusal of Ex.A-5, the Tribunal has rightly observed that Ex.A-5 does not contain the surname of petitioner and it contains only the name of patient written as Nagamani, which was mentioned in the out-patient ticket, dated 01-02-1997, affixed to the case sheet covered by Ex.A-5. The Tribunal has, therefore, observed that OP ticket belonging to a person by name Nagamani was, somehow, pressed into service so as to give colour of reality that the petitioner herself was the person mentioned in the said OP ticket.
The Tribunal has, therefore, observed that OP ticket belonging to a person by name Nagamani was, somehow, pressed into service so as to give colour of reality that the petitioner herself was the person mentioned in the said OP ticket. The reason assigned by the Tribunal in discarding Ex.A-5 viewing it with suspicion for the aforesaid reasons, cannot be faulted with. Therefore, absolutely there is no merit in the instant appeal. 14. The Tribunal recorded the finding based on appreciation of evidence on record, both on appraisal of contents of documents and also the probabilities based on proved facts. Therefore, the reasoning of the Tribunal in rejecting the claim is not perverse and, consequently, does not warrant interference at all. 15. In the result, appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 16. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in the appeal, stand disposed of.