Judgment 1. The Notice of Motion is taken out by the Plaintiff for appointment of Court Receiver and injunction restraining any assignment, transfer or grant of development rights by Defendant No.1 in respect of the suit property. 2. Defendant No.1, who is a Co-operative Society of flat owners, is the owner of the property bearing C.T.S. No.444/A at Kandivali (West), Mumbai 400 067 together with six old buildings having 15 wings containing in aggregate 284 residential flats, 12 shops and one commercial unit. Defendant No.1 also owns two adjoining plots together with Defendant No.2, being plots bearing CTS Nos.444/B and 444/C admeasuring respectively 2859.50 sq.mts. 1060.80 sq.mts. Defendant No.1 decided to redevelop the suit property and formulated a comprehensive scheme for utilization and sale of the Floor Space Index and Transferable Development Rights for redevelopment of the suit property. Defendant No.1 invited tenders from builders and developers for undertaking the redevelopment work. The total area for development was 2,76,958-58 sq.mt. after taking into account TDR and recreational area. An area of 1,44,000 sq.ft. out of this area was proposed to be used for rehousing existing residential members occupants and 6440 sq.ft. was proposed to be used for existing commercial occupants, leaving balance FSI of 1,26,578-58 sq.ft. to be utilized and sold by the developer. The Plaintiff submitted a duly completed tender form together with a tender deposit of Rs.25,00,000/-. The Plaintiff's offer contained in its tender was revised and upgraded by subsequent communications. Finally, it is the case of the Plaintiff that in pursuance of negotiations between the parties, the Plaintiff's upgraded offer was accepted by Defendant No.1. It is the case of the Plaintiff that in the Special General Body Meeting of Defendant No.1 held on 23 January 2005, where 225 members of Defendant No.1 (i.e. 76 % of the total number of members) were present and voting, the Plaintiff made a detailed presentation of the project, gave necessary clarifications to the members of Defendant No.1 and the final offer made by the Plaintiff, which was reduced into writing in the form of an addendum, was placed before the members of Defendant No.1. The members of Defendant No.1 passed a resolution by unanimous consent accepting the offer and awarding the contract to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also claims that apart from the resolution, 212 members present at the meeting also signed separate communications accepting the said resolution.
The members of Defendant No.1 passed a resolution by unanimous consent accepting the offer and awarding the contract to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also claims that apart from the resolution, 212 members present at the meeting also signed separate communications accepting the said resolution. By a communication issued by Defendant No.1 on the following day, i.e. 24 January 2005, the Plaintiff was informed about the award of the contract. Subsequent to this resolution and its communication, some members of Defendant No.1 proposed rethinking or reconsideration of the development project. In the meantime drafts of the formal agreement to be entered into between the parties were prepared, exchanged and revised. It is the Plaintiff's case that the third revised draft was approved and finalized between the parties and only formal execution of the document was to follow. No formal agreement was, however, executed between the parties. The parties held certain meetings and exchanged communications. Nothing, however, came out of these meetings and communications. Finally, the Plaintiff issued a notice under Section 164 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and filed the present suit in July 2006. No ad-interim relief could be secured by the Plaintiff in the suit. After filing of the present suit, there were further meetings and communications between the parties for arriving at an agreement. These attempts, however, did not bear any fruit. After these attempts were unsuccessful, Defendant No.1 sought to return the tender deposit. The same, however, was not accepted by the Plaintiff. In the meantime, in or about April 2012, this Court allowed the Plaintiff's Chamber Summons, allowing the Plaintiff to amend its plaint and bring on record subsequent facts. The Plaintiff thereupon filed the present Notice of Motion and sought interim reliefs. At the ad-interim stage a statement of Defendant No.1 not to appoint any other developer was recorded. Now the Notice of Motion is taken up for final hearing. 3. Mr. Sen, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff, submitted that there was a concluded contract between the parties. The learned Counsel submitted that in the Special General Body meeting of Defendant No.1 held on 23 January 2005, the Plaintiffs final offer, which was reduced in the form of an addendum to its tender, was placed before the members and accepted by unanimous consent by the Members, awarding the contract to the Plaintiff.
The learned Counsel submitted that in the Special General Body meeting of Defendant No.1 held on 23 January 2005, the Plaintiffs final offer, which was reduced in the form of an addendum to its tender, was placed before the members and accepted by unanimous consent by the Members, awarding the contract to the Plaintiff. He submitted that Defendant No.1 communicated to the Plaintiff the award of the contract by its letter dated 24 January 2005. The learned Counsel submitted that with the acceptance of the final offer in the Special General Body Meeting and communication of such acceptance to the Plaintiff, the contract between the parties stood concluded. The learned Counsel submitted that the proposed agreement between the parties was only to give a formal expression to the contract already concluded between the parties, since all essential terms of the bargain were already settled between the parties. The learned Counsel submitted that the formal agreement itself was not an essential term of the bargain and was really a matter of performance of the contract already arrived at and not a matter relating to the making of the contract. The learned Counsel relied on the decisions of Supreme Court in the case of B. C. Mohindra Vs The Municipal Board, Saharanpur (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 729) Kollipara Sriramulu Vs. T. Aswatha Narayana, (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 1028) the decision of Privy Council in the case of Currimbhoy & Co. Vs L. A. Creet and others (AIR 1933 Privy Council 29) and the decision of Madras High Court in the case of Maheshwari Metals and Metal Refinery Bangalore-2 Vs. The Madras State Small Industries Corporation Ltd. (AIR 1974 Madras 39). It was further submitted by the learned Counsel that subsequent negotiations between the parties did not alter the fact of there being a concluded contract already existing between the parties. The learned Counsel relied on the decision of Perry V. Suffields, Ltd. Vs. Perry V. Suffields Ltd (1996) 2 Ch. 187) and the decision of Federal Court in the case of Jainarain Ram Lunbia Vs Surajmull Sagarmull and Ors (AIR (36) 1949 Federal Court 211) in this behalf. The learned Counsel also submitted that in terms of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Cheda Housing Dev. Corporations Bibijan Shaikh Farid & Ors, (2007(2) Bom.
187) and the decision of Federal Court in the case of Jainarain Ram Lunbia Vs Surajmull Sagarmull and Ors (AIR (36) 1949 Federal Court 211) in this behalf. The learned Counsel also submitted that in terms of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Cheda Housing Dev. Corporations Bibijan Shaikh Farid & Ors, (2007(2) Bom. C.R. 587) the suit Development Agreement, which sought to create an interest in immovable property in favour of the Plaintiff, was a development agreement combined with an agreement to sell and was prima-facie capable of being specifically enforced. 4. Mr. Mehta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Defendant No.1, opposed the Plaintiff's application by contending that there was no concluded contract between the parties. The learned Counsel relied upon the Judgment of our Court in the case of Heritage Lifestyle & Developers Ltd Vs Cool Breeze Co-operative Housing Society Ltd & Ors. (2014 (2) Bom. C.R. 693). The learned Counsel further submitted that ordinarily a contract of this nature has to be strictly interpreted by giving literal meaning to its terms. The learned Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part of the contract and, therefore, not entitled to specific performance of the agreement between the parties, assuming without admitting that such an agreement was actually entered into. The learned Counsel relied on the Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation & Anr. Vs Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited (2013) 5 Supreme Court Cases 470) in this behalf. The learned Counsel further submitted that this being a redevelopment scheme for a housing society, it was essential that the members of the society must have confidence in the developers. He submitted that the members having lost trust, faith and confidence in the developer on account of violation of the development agreement by the latter, the society could not be forced to get the redevelopment work done through the Plaintiff Developer. He relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Gopi Gorwani Vs. Ideal Cooperative Housing Society Ltd (AIR 2013 Bombay 133) in this behalf. 5. The law laid down by this Court in the case of Chheda Housing Development Corporation (supra) and its application to the development agreement in question, are not seriously disputed at the bar.
He relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Gopi Gorwani Vs. Ideal Cooperative Housing Society Ltd (AIR 2013 Bombay 133) in this behalf. 5. The law laid down by this Court in the case of Chheda Housing Development Corporation (supra) and its application to the development agreement in question, are not seriously disputed at the bar. The development agreement does seek to create an interest in immovable property and is prima facie capable of being specifically enforced. 6. The main controversy in the Notice of Motion is, whether or not there is a concluded contract between the parties. It is admitted by both parties that the parties did contemplate a formal agreement to be executed between the parties. The controversy concerns the effect of such contemplation. The question is: Can it be said that because the parties contemplated execution of a formal agreement, there was no contract till such agreement was executed? The Privy Council and Supreme Court have enunciated the principles of formation of a contract and the significance of a reference to a formal contract for the bargain in a number of cases. A mere reference to a future formal contract will not prevent a binding bargain between the parties. The fact that the parties refer to the preparation of an agreement by which the terms agreed upon between the parties are to be put in a more formal shape, does not by itself rule out the existence of a binding contract. There may, however, be cases where the reference to future contract is made in such terms as to show that the parties did not intend to be bound until a formal contract was signed between them. The question, as noted by the Supreme Court in the case of Kollipara Sriramulu (supra), always depends upon the intention of the parties and special circumstances of each particular case. The fact of the subsequent agreement being under preparation may itself be evidence that what was carried on earlier was merely a negotiation and no concluded agreement was arrived at. These are principles which are well established by judgments of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. The essence of the legal proposition, as noted by Privy Council in the case of Currimbhoy & Co.
These are principles which are well established by judgments of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. The essence of the legal proposition, as noted by Privy Council in the case of Currimbhoy & Co. (supra), is this; “It appears to be well settled by the authorities that if the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract contemplate the execution of a further contract between the parties, it is a question of construction whether the execution of the further contract is a condition of term of the bargain or whether it is a mere expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction already agreed to will in fact go through. In the former case there is no enforceable contract either because the condition is unfulfilled or because the law does not recognize a contract to enter into a contract. In the latter case there is a binding contract and the reference to the more formal document may be ignored.” 7. Now let us examine the facts of our case on the touchstone of the legal principles enunciated above. In the first place, it must be noted that in the very tender document which marks the beginning of the relationship between the parties, the contract is defined as follows; “The “CONTRACT” shall mean the tender a d acceptance thereof and formal agreement executed between the Developers and Society together with the documents referred to therein including these conditions and appendices and any special conditions and specification, design, drawings, price schedules, bills of quantities and schedules of rates. All these documents taken together shall be deemed to form one contract and shall be complementary to one another.” The tender document further indicates that the successful tenderer was required to submit a security deposit and furnish a bank guarantee as specified in the tender documents within 15 days after receiving notice of the award of contract. Failure to do so would result into forfeiture of the tender deposit and disqualification of the tenderer. This is a further indication to show that mere award of the contract by communicating acceptance of the tender was not sufficient to result into a concluded contractual relationship between the parties.
Failure to do so would result into forfeiture of the tender deposit and disqualification of the tenderer. This is a further indication to show that mere award of the contract by communicating acceptance of the tender was not sufficient to result into a concluded contractual relationship between the parties. There was a further requirement of payment of security deposit and furnishing of bank guarantee in terms of the tender before a concluded contractual relationship came about between the parties. The mode of making of the security deposit is stipulated in the tender document as follows; “(A) (i) Tender Deposit of Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs deposited with the Society will be adjusted in the said Security Deposit. (ii) Balance amount of Rupees One Crore Seventy Five Lakhs to be submitted as Security Deposit. (B) In addition to Security Deposit of Rupees Two Crores as mentioned above an unconditional irrevocable bank guarantee of Rs. Two Crores which shall remain in force until a period of two years after completion of the project.” This position is further fortified when we take into account the Drafts of Development Agreements exchanged between the parties. The Draft Development Agreement envisages that on the date of execution of the agreement the developer has already paid to the society a security deposit of Rs.2 crores (after adjusting the tender deposit of Rs.25 lac) and furnished a bank guarantee in the sum of Rs.2 crores in terms of the tender documents. That the understanding between the parties was that the contract would stand concluded only upon a development agreement being signed between the parties, is further clear from the communication of the Plaintiff itself, which is addressed on behalf of the Plaintiff by its Advocates to the Advocates of Defendant No.1. The admissions of the Plaintiff in this communication dated 10 May 2005, relevant in this context, are noted below; “In this regard we would like to inform you that we had worked upon your earlier draft dated April 15, 2005 delivered to us earlier (on floppy) and had forwarded the same to our client Kalpataru Construction Overseas Private Limited for their comments.
May we therefore request that we use the earlier draft as a working draft and discuss the same at the meeting to be held at our office on 13th May, 2005 at 4.30 p.m. Accordingly the further changes made by you to the first draft and incorporated in the second draft (sent to us yesterday) may accordingly be also discussed and incorporated within the earlier draft so as to save time. As regards the payment of the security deposit by your client, we would like to draw your attention to the definition of “Contract” contained in the Tender Documents issued by your client, which definition specifies that “the contract shall mean the tender and acceptance thereof and the formal agreement executed between the Developers and the Society together with the documents referred to therein...” In light of the definition, it would appear that the award of the contract by your client would be complete upon the execution of the Development Agreement and related development documents in favour of our client, and our client would have to make payment of the Security Deposit at such time. Needless to say that our client is ready and willing and shall make payment of the Security Deposit simultaneously with the execution of such documents.” Apart from these documents and admissions, the very fact that a formal agreement, providing for various terms and conditions which do not find place in the tender document, was under preparation between the parties, as evidenced by three successive drafts exchanged between the parties, revised and reworked from time to time, clearly goes to show that the parties treated a formal Development Agreement as a concluded contract between them and intended to be bound in a contractual relationship only when such Agreement was signed between them. 8. Even the communication of Defendant No.1 of the acceptance of the Plaintiff's tender on 24 January 2005 is a further indication that the contract was yet to be concluded between the parties. After extracting a portion of the resolution passed by its members, Defendant No.1 wrote as follows; “Your negotiated offer for Redevelopment of the properties of the society in continuation of the offer made pursuant to the Tender Document and the Tender Notice issued on behalf of the Society is enclosed herewith, which will be marked as Amendment/Addendum No.2 to the Tender Document.
Execution of appropriate development agreement shall follow.” The contention of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the reference to “appropriate development agreement” which was to follow, was only a reference to a formal document unconnected with the making of a contract, cannot be accepted. The conduct of the parties and their inter se communications prima facie establish that the parties agreed to be bound only when an appropriate development agreement was executed between them. 9. The negotiations between the parties subsequent to the resolution of 23 January 2005 and its communication on the following day i.e. 24 January 2005, have to be seen in this light. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that further negotiations after the conclusion of the contract and settlement of its terms, ought not to prevent a full effect being given to the contract already existing between the parties unless it was established as a fact that the contract was rescinded or varied with the consent of both the parties or that both the parties treated it as incomplete or inconclusive. The essential element of this argument is the factum of conclusion of the contract and settlement of its terms. As observed by me earlier, the contract cannot be said to be concluded. On the other hand, its terms were being settled by communications between the parties during which successive drafts were exchanged between them. In the light of this exchange of drafts and their various revised versions between the parties, the parties clearly appear to be in the midst of negotiations with a view to arrive at the terms of the agreement rather than further negotiations with respect to new matters arising after a concluded contract. The Judgments cited by Mr. Sen in support of his case that subsequent negotiations between the parties did not affect the contract already entered into, thus, do not support the Plaintiff. In all these Judgments, the Courts found as a matter of fact that the contract was already concluded earlier and the negotiations were post contract and related to new matters subsequently arising. 10.
Sen in support of his case that subsequent negotiations between the parties did not affect the contract already entered into, thus, do not support the Plaintiff. In all these Judgments, the Courts found as a matter of fact that the contract was already concluded earlier and the negotiations were post contract and related to new matters subsequently arising. 10. Lastly, it may be noticed that the Plaintiff itself is conscious of the fact that the resolution of 23 January 2005 and its communication of 24 January 2005 are not sufficient to spell out the contract and relies upon the so called agreed draft of development agreement (Exhibit “GG” to the plaint) as together constituting the agreement between the parties and accordingly prays for specific performance. This is really a clincher to show that the agreement was not concluded by the resolution and its communication, as sought to be submitted at the bar. 11. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the interim application. The Notice of Motion is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 12. In view of the fact that there is an undertaking given by Defendant No.1 society that it shall not appoint any developer for redevelopment of the suit property and this undertaking is operating since 7 May 2012 till today, the interests of justice require that such undertaking shall continue to bind the society for a further period of four weeks from today. It is ordered accordingly.