JUDGMENT L. Narasimha Reddy, J. 1. This is second round of litigation in relation to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the appellant. 2. The appellant was initially appointed as a Clerk in the 1st respondent - Bank, in the year 1978. He earned promotions as J.M.G. Grade-I and II, in 1986 and 2000, respectively. During the year 2002, he worked as Assistant Manager in the Branch of the 1st respondent at Rajahmundry. At the relevant point of time, a scheme known as "UCO Mega Cash Loans" was entrusted to the appellant. 3. In the year 2003, the appellant was working in a branch at Husnabad. A charge sheet, dated 02.09.2003, was issued to him, wherein 8 charges were framed. All the charges, related to the alleged irregularities said to have been committed by the appellant, while he was working in the branch at Rajahmundry. The appellant submitted the explanation and not satisfied with the same, the 1st respondent ordered disciplinary enquiry. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 14.05.2004, holding that all the charges are proved. The Disciplinary Authority i.e. the 1st respondent, accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer. He passed an order, dated 28.06.2004, imposing separate punishments for each charge, the highest being the one, of dismissal from service. On appeal, the appellate authority reduced the punishment to that of compulsory retirement. The same was challenged in W.P. No. 13052 of 2007 (reported in J. Srinivasa Rao v. UCO Bank, Kolkata 2008 (6) ALD 199 ). This Court allowed the writ petition, on 01.08.2008, holding that imposition of separate punishment for each of the charges cannot be sustained in law. Serious defects were found in the report of the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, the order of punishment was set aside, and the matter was relegated to the stage, preceding the submission of the report by the Enquiry Officer. 4. The 1st respondent appointed another Enquiry Officer i.e. the 2nd respondent, in compliance with the order in W.P. No. 13052 of 2007, and conducted disciplinary enquiry. In his report, dated 24.11.2008, the 2nd respondent held that charges 2, 3 and 8 are not proved and remaining charges i.e. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are proved. 4. The 1st respondent appointed another Enquiry Officer i.e. the 2nd respondent, in compliance with the order in W.P. No. 13052 of 2007, and conducted disciplinary enquiry. In his report, dated 24.11.2008, the 2nd respondent held that charges 2, 3 and 8 are not proved and remaining charges i.e. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are proved. The 1st respondent passed an order, dated 04.08.2009, taking all the charges as proved and differing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer on charges 2, 3 and 8 and imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement. 5. The appellant filed W.P. No. 20245 of 2009 challenging the said order. It was pleaded that the action of the 1st respondent in disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer without issuing show cause notice in that behalf, and straightaway imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement is contrary to law and the service regulations. Other grounds were also urged. The respondents pleaded that even if the findings on charges 2, 3 and 8 recorded by the Enquiry Officer, are accepted, the same punishment deserves to be imposed and that no exception can be taken to the order of punishment. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, through order, dated 30.01.2013. Hence, this writ appeal. 6. Sri K. Suresh Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submits that after thorough discussion, the Enquiry Officer i.e. the 2nd respondent held that charges 2, 3 and 8 are not proved and if the 1st respondent intended to treat those charges also as proved, it was fundamental that a notice proposing such an action, ought to have been issued. He contends that treating charges 2, 3 and 8 as proved, straightaway by the 1st respondent, is contrary to the settled principles of law and that the order of punishment is liable to be set aside. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in D. Bal Raj v. Registrar, A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad 2014 (1) ALD 244 (DB) and that of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai AIR 1999 SC 22 , and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and another AIR 1999 SC 3734 . 7. 7. Sri E. Sambhasiva Pratap, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submits that charges 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are so grave that the punishment of compulsory retirement can be sustained on the findings recorded thereon, and that it would not have made much of difference, even if the findings of the Enquiry Officer under charges 2, 3 and 8 are taken as not proved. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC 364 . 8. Initially the appellant was imposed the punishment of dismissal from service through order, dated 28.06.2004. In the appeal, the said punishment was reduced to the one of compulsory retirement by the appellate authority. In W.P. No. 13052 of 2007, the basic irregularity that was crept into the order of punishment was pointed out. This Court observed as under: "It is only in criminal proceedings, that every charge is dealt with separately, and separate conviction and sentences are imposed for each of them. Such a procedure is totally foreign to service law. The disciplinary authority has to assess the gravity of the situation and decide the punishment that is to be imposed. Once a particular punishment is chosen, that is deemed to take care of the entire situation. Imposition of minor penalties, even while dismissing an employee from service, is unheard of. Apart from the propriety of such an exercise, it tells upon the frame of the mind of the authority imposing such punishments. Such a course would manifest, either lack of clarity, or basic understanding, on his part. The argument that the minor punishments can be ignored, cannot be accepted, just like that. If the authority was determined not only to impose the punishments that vary in degrees, but also directed that such punishments must run concurrently, he can safely be said to be reeling under a misconception about the powers and obligations of the disciplinary authority. The course adopted by the 2nd respondent is totally untenable and impermissible, in law. This answers the second question." 9. The nature of disposal given to the writ petition is as under: "For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed, and the order, dated 28.06.2004 passed by the 2nd respondent and confirmed by the 1st respondent, vide his order, dated 09.05.2006, are set aside. This answers the second question." 9. The nature of disposal given to the writ petition is as under: "For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed, and the order, dated 28.06.2004 passed by the 2nd respondent and confirmed by the 1st respondent, vide his order, dated 09.05.2006, are set aside. The petitioner shall be, forthwith, reinstated into service, and extended the consequential benefits. It shall, however, be open to the 2nd respondent, to continue the proceedings from the stage, preceding the submission of report of the enquiry officer." 10. It is in this context that the 2nd respondent herein was appointed as an Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry into those very charges. In his report, dated 24.11.2008, the 2nd respondent held that charges 2, 3 and 8 are not proved. 11. In case the 1st respondent wanted to treat those charges also as proved, it was expected of him, to issue notice to the appellant directing him to explain as to why those three charges also shall not be treated as proved, duly indicating the basic reasons. That, however, was not done. The last paragraph of the order reads as under: "I have considered in great detail the report and findings of the Enquiry Officer and all other documentary evidence and other material in connection with the present Charge Sheet. I find that he had submitted his report based on the proceedings of the Enquiry, taking into account the documents and arguments put forth by both parties during the enquiry, besides written submissions of both the parties. After proper application of mind and considering the above aspects in all its ramifications, I am convinced that all charges from Charge No. 1 to Charge No. 8 levelled against Sri J. Srinivasa Rao are proved. I find that the above acts of Sri J. Srinivasa Rao are grave and serious in nature, and in violation of Bank's laid down procedures and norms. In view of the above, I hereby award the following punishment to Sri J. Srinivasa Rao in terms of Regulation 4 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, as amended." 12. From this, it is clear that the 1st respondent treated charges 2, 3 and 8 also, as proved and proceeded to impose the punishment straightaway. 13. From this, it is clear that the 1st respondent treated charges 2, 3 and 8 also, as proved and proceeded to impose the punishment straightaway. 13. The manner in which a disciplinary authority must take action based upon the report of the Enquiry Officer was dealt with by the Supreme Court as well as this Court in several cases. 14. In Punjab National Bank and others v. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84 , the Supreme Court held at para 19 as under: "Para-19: The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer." 15. In Ram Kishan v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 157 , the Supreme Court held as under: "The purpose of the show-cause notice, in case of disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer, is to enable the delinquent to show that the disciplinary authority is persuaded not to disagree with the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer for the reasons given in the enquiry report or he may offer additional reasons in support of the finding by the enquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show-cause on the basis of which the findings of the enquiry officer in that behalf is based, if would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer. In that situation, unless the disciplinary authority gives specific reasons in the show-cause on the basis of which the findings of the enquiry officer in that behalf is based, if would be difficult for the delinquent to satisfactorily give reasons to persuade the disciplinary authority to agree with the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer. In the absence of any ground or reason in the show-cause notice it amounts to an empty formality which would cause grave prejudice to the delinquent officer and would result in injustice to him. The mere fact that in the final order some reasons have been given to disagree with the conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority cannot cure the defect." 16. Further, in Yoginath D. Bagde's case (supra), the Supreme Court has this to say: "In view of the provisions contained in the statutory Rule extracted above, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the Inquiring Authority, it may record its own findings. Where the Inquiring Authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the Disciplinary Authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the Inquiring Authority has held the charges proved, but the Disciplinary Authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would raise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the Inquiring Authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be punished. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the Disciplinary Authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the Disciplinary Authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. Where the Rules are in this regard silent, and the Disciplinary Authority also does not give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer and records findings, different from those of the Inquiring Authority that the charges were established, "an opportunity of hearing" may have to be read into the Rule by which the procedure for dealing with the Inquiring Authority's report is provided principally because it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer, who has already been held to be 'not guilty' by the Inquiring Authority, is found 'guilty' without being afforded an opportunity of hearing on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of "not guilty" has already been recorded." 17. Identical situation was dealt with by this Court in D. Bal Raj's case (supra). That was also a case where the disciplinary authority straightaway differed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and imposed the punishment. It was held: "A basic fallacy has crept into the entire proceedings. If the respondent took the view that both the charges are proved, there was nothing, which the petitioner was expected to. The issue was pre-judged and the explanation invited from the petitioner was reduced to an empty formality. The respondent ought to have required the petitioner to explain as to why, a different view be not taken on the second charge. Unfortunately, the Tribunal, on its judicial side did not take note of this basic infirmity in the entire proceedings, and the punishment of reversion against the petitioner was upheld." 18. The principles that are extracted in the preceding paragraphs straightaway get attracted to the facts of the case. It was competent for the 1st respondent to differ with the finding recorded by the 2nd respondent, only after issuing notice as well as an opportunity of being heard to the appellant. That not having been done, a serious infirmity has crept into the order of punishment. 19. It was competent for the 1st respondent to differ with the finding recorded by the 2nd respondent, only after issuing notice as well as an opportunity of being heard to the appellant. That not having been done, a serious infirmity has crept into the order of punishment. 19. The order impugned in the writ petition is sought to be sustained by placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 . In that judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the concept of 'prejudice'. It was held that an order of punishment can be set aside, if only the employee is able to establish the prejudice caused to him, on account of the lapse in the course of proceedings. However, their Lordships added a note of caution to the effect that where a lapse is as to an important requirement under law, the employee would not be under obligation to establish prejudice at all. 20. In W.A. No. 2331 of 2005, this Court held: "With the finding of an Enquiry Officer, that a particular charge or a facet thereof is not proved, valuable right accrues to the concerned employee. Such a finding can be differed by the disciplinary authority, firstly by indicating the relevant reasons, and secondly by requiring the employee to show cause as to why a different view be not taken. If the disciplinary authority straightaway differs with the findings of the enquiry officer, the very purpose of conducting the departmental enquiry is defeated." 21. The inescapable conclusion is that the order of punishment suffers from serious violation of the requirement under law, namely issuing notice to the charged employee, before the Disciplinary Authority differs with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. 22. The learned Single Judge, in a way, accepted the contention of the respondent that the punishment of compulsory retirement can be sustained on each and every charge and even if the findings on charges 2, 3 and 8 are ignored, the same result would ensue. With great respect to the learned Single Judge, we do not approve of the same. 23. A Court cannot step into the mind of an authority, who is conferred with the power to pass an order, and read the situation that arises on a different set of facts. With great respect to the learned Single Judge, we do not approve of the same. 23. A Court cannot step into the mind of an authority, who is conferred with the power to pass an order, and read the situation that arises on a different set of facts. If the order has been passed on a set of facts, and it emerges that some of the facts that prompted the decision are either non-existent or not correct, it is impermissible even for the concerned authority to plead that the same result would have ensued on the basis of the remaining facts, much less for the Court to take such a view. 24. Hence, the writ appeal is allowed and the order of punishment, dated 04.08.2009, is set aside. It is left open to the 1st respondent to take necessary steps in accordance with law. To be precise, we direct that, "a) if the 1st respondent accepts the report of the 2nd respondent as it is, it shall be open to him to impose any punishment other than the one of compulsory retirement; and b) if the 1st respondent intends to disagree with the findings of the 2nd respondent, on charges 2, 3 and 8, he shall be under obligation to issue notice to the appellant and if necessary, an opportunity of being heard, and then take further steps in accordance with law." 25. There shall be no order as to costs. 26. The miscellaneous petitions filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of. Appeal allowed