JUDGMENT 1. - With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the matter has been taken up for final disposal at this stage. 2. From the order-sheet dated 9th August, 2011, it is reflected that the counsel for the petitioner sought time to place on record necessary documents on which he intended to rely upon, which were filed before the learned Tribunal. This Court granted permission to do so with an advance copy to the learned counsel for the workman. On being queried, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the workman admitted the fact that the copy of the application with affidavit and annexures as detailed out therein, has been furnished to him. A copy of the same was handed over to the Court by the learned counsel for the petitioners, which is taken on record. 3. The petitioners, aggrieved of the impugned award dated 13th November, 2007, passed by the learned Labour Court, Kota, on a reference made by the Government of India, have approached this Court with a prayer to quash and set aside the impugned award. 4. Briefly, the skeleton material facts indispensable for appreciation of the controversy raised in the instant writ application, needs to be first noticed. The respondent-workman (for short 'workman'), raised an industrial dispute assailing the action of the petitioners in terminating his services with effect from 1st December, 1987, illegally without any notice, notice pay and retrenchment compensation, and therefore, the action was assailed as violative of mandate of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1947', for short). It is pleaded case of the workman that he was appointed with effect from 8th December, 1986, as would be evident from the communication dated 25th February, 1987, issued by the Assistant Engineer, Microwave Project, Kota, wherein his name found place at serial number 4. 5. In response to the statement of the claim, the petitioners filed their reply specifically pleading that the workman was engaged as Casual Labour on the Microwave Project, Borawas, for fixing the nuts and bolts in the Microwave Towers. On completion of the work and commission of the Microwave Project; the workman was relieved of the job on 1st December, 1987, and the office of Microwave Project, Kota, was also closed. On completion of the work and commission of the Microwave Project; the workman was relieved of the job on 1st December, 1987, and the office of Microwave Project, Kota, was also closed. Thus, in view of cessation of the work on completion of the Project, his services were no more required. The Ministry of Labour, Government of India, made a reference of the industrial dispute raised by the workman, to the Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota, Rajasthan (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal', for short), vide order dated 30th September, 1991, which reads thus:- "Whether the action of the AEN Microwave Project, Kota & LET, Jaipur in terminating the services of Shri Ramesh Chand, S/o Jankidas, Casual Labour under AEN Microwave Project, Kota at Rawatbhata w.e.f. 1.12.1987 is justified If not, to what relief the concerned workman is entitled? 6. The learned Tribunal, taking into consideration the statement of claim, its counter/reply by the petitioners and the evidence produced by the parties as well as the materials available on record; concluded that the workman did work for 240 days in the 12 calender months preceding the alleged termination, and made an award holding that the workman was entitled to be reinstated with continuity of service along with 30% back wages. A writ petition as well as D.B. Special Appeal was also unsuccessfully preferred by the petitioners assailing the award dated 17th March, 1999. Ultimately, the matter reached the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Number 2851/2005, and was decided vide order dated 18th July, 2007 observing thus:- "6. We find that the Tribunal failed to consider the issues in proper perspective. The effect of Section 2(oo)(bb) has been completely lost sight of. There was no dispute that the employment was for a specific project. There was no discussion of the various materials produced before the Tribunal. The orders of the High Court proceeded on the basis that because there was noncompliance with the requirements of Section 25-F, the Award was justified. The question of the applicability of Section 25-F of the Act would be dependent upon the basic question relating to applicability of Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act. That aspect has been lost sight of. We, therefore, think it appropriate to remit the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Parties will be permitted to place material in support of their respective stand. That aspect has been lost sight of. We, therefore, think it appropriate to remit the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. Parties will be permitted to place material in support of their respective stand. As the matter is pending since long, we request the Tribunal to dispose of the matter within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment. 7. Appeal is allowed with no orders to as to costs." 7. The learned Tribunal in compliance of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has passed the impugned award dated 13th November, 2007, which is impugned in the instant writ application. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners reiterating the pleaded facts and evidence laid before the learned Tribunal as well as materials brought on record, has vehemently argued that the learned Tribunal committed serious error of law and fact for it totally lost sight of the terms and conditions on which the workman was engaged as would be reflected from the communication/order dated 25th February, 1987, wherein specific terms and conditions of engagement of the workman, have been detailed out specifically stipulating the recruitment of the workman as Casual Labour on daily wages basis @ Rs. 13/- (Rupees : Thirteen) per day; he was called as and when required, it was further stipulated that there shall be no guarantee of employment in the regular service and permanency in the department and the workman was required to work at Borawas and Rawatbhata Atomic Power Centre, at the distance of 34 and 60 km away from Kota. Learned counsel would further submit that a bare perusal of the statement in evidence, deposed by the Divisional Engineer, before the learned Tribunal, would reveal that the project was completed and commissioned in view of Ex.M3, brought on record; and the Microwave Project was closed on completion in the month of November, 1987. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, having regard to the nature of engagement, terms and conditions of engagement and the short duration of engagement on a specific project, which has already been completed, commissioned and concluded; the claim of the workman is not sustainable as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, and therefore, the impugned award deserves to be quashed and set aside. Further, in view of the specific terms and conditions of the engagement of the workman as detailed out in communication/order dated 25th February, 1987, the fact that the workman worked for more than 240 days, is immaterial as the engagement of the workman falls within the exclusion clause as carved out under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947. In order to fortify his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Batala Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Sowaran Singh, 2006 SCC (L&S) 11 : (2005) 8 SCC 481 ; State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot, 1996 (1) WLR 595 , and Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Kishan and others etc., (1995) 5 SCC 653 , as well as Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Anr. v. Bipinchandra N. Ramanuj, 2010 (127) FLR 350 . 9. Per contra; the learned counsel for the workman reiterating the pleaded facts and supporting the impugned award, has argued that the learned Tribunal on the basis of the pleaded facts and the evidence brought on record, has exercised its discretion and rightly arrived at the conclusion of holding the action of the petitioners as invalid and violative of the mandate of the provisions of the Act of 1947. The termination of the workman falls within the definition of 'retrenchment', as defined under Section 2(oo), and therefore, he is entitled for reinstatement without back wages in terms of the impugned award. Further, having regard to the fact that the engagement of the workman was not for a specific period and termination of engagement of the workman was not a result of non-renewal of the contract, therefore, the provisions of Section 2(oo) (bb) of the Act of 1947, are not attracted to the facts of the instant case at hand, and hence, no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. In order to reinforce his submissions, the learned counsel for the workman has placed reliance on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. In order to reinforce his submissions, the learned counsel for the workman has placed reliance on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., (2003) 3 SCC 524 ; Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation, AIR 1984 SC 1467 ; Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopal Singh & Anr., 1997 (1) RLR 721 , and The State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. The Labour Court, Jodhpur & Anr., 2001(1) WLC (Raj.) 715 . 10. According to the learned counsel for the workman, there was neither any order passed by the petitioners nor there is any order for closure of the microwave project and further, one identically situated worker, namely, Shri Sampat Singh, is being continued under the orders of the Court/Tribunal. Therefore, the writ petition merits rejection on that count as well. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the materials available on record. 12. A bare perusal of the communication dated 25th February, 1987, detailing out the terms and conditions of engagement as Casual Labour(s) on daily wages basis, wherein the name of the workman finds place at serial number 4; would reveal that the engagement was on specific and defined terms and conditions, specifically stipulated therein, which reads thus:- "(1) They will be paid Rs. 13.00 per day. (2) They shall be called as and when required. (3) There shall be no guarantee of Employment in the regular service and permanency in the Department. (4) The will work at BORABAS & RAPP at a distance of 34 km. & 60 km. away from Kota." 13. Further, from the statement in evidence, deposed by the Assistant Engineer, it is evident that Microwave Project was completed in November, 1987 and was commissioned in December, 1987. The offer of the engagement specifically stipulated condition of engagement of the workman @ Rs. 13/- per day and the workmen were to be called as and when required. Furthermore, it was stipulated in unequivocal terms that there shall be no guarantee of employment in the regular service and permanency in the service as well as place of work was detailed out to be at BORABAS & RAPP, at a distance of 34 km. & 60 km. away from Kota. Furthermore, it was stipulated in unequivocal terms that there shall be no guarantee of employment in the regular service and permanency in the service as well as place of work was detailed out to be at BORABAS & RAPP, at a distance of 34 km. & 60 km. away from Kota. Therefore, the workman after having accepted the terms and conditions as aforesaid, is estopped to take a contrary stand. 14. In the peculiar facts and circumstances as detailed out herein above, the moot question is whether the cessation of work on completion and commissioning of the project would amount to retrenchment, Since, the project of Microwave Towers was completed and commissioned; and the workman was engaged to fix nuts and bolts in that process, with the specific terms and conditions stipulated while employing the workman; by no stretch of imagination, the workman can be said to be 'retrenched' in view of what is contained in the text of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947. 15. Further, the terms and conditions of the engagement were held out to the workman in unequivocal terms, which included the amount of wages to be paid to him per day, and he was to be called as and when required. Further, his engagement, as aforesaid, would not guarantee regular or permanency of engagement to him as well as place of work was also specified being a distance of 34 km. & 60 km. from Kota. From the materials available on record as well as in view of submissions made by the learned counsel for the workman before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Number 285 of 2005, it is an admitted fact that the project has been completed and commissioned. 16. There cannot be any dispute, in view of the facts and materials available on record that the employment of the workman was for specific project and therefore, the fact that the workman was in employment of the petitioners for more than 240 days, is immaterial. 17. It is also not in dispute that the workman was engaged on daily wages basis with the condition that he was to be called only as and when required. The project in which he was engaged, has been completed and commissioned, therefore, in such circumstances, the workman cannot be said to be 'retrenched', within the meaning of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. The project in which he was engaged, has been completed and commissioned, therefore, in such circumstances, the workman cannot be said to be 'retrenched', within the meaning of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. From the materials available on record and as admitted, the workman was a temporary employee working on daily wages basis as detailed out in the communication dated 25th February, 1987. 18. In the peculiar facts and circumstances attendant in the instant case at hand, the disengagement/ termination of the services of the workman, cannot be said to be within the concept of 'retrenchment' as defined under the Act of 1947. Furthermore, the workman was not appointed against any post and he was only a daily wage employee and therefore, no right of engagement. 19. It needs no reiteration that the status of the workman in the instant case at hand, was that of a daily wager on a specific project and when the project is completed and commissioned, the employees have to go along with its closure. Moreover, the learned Tribunal has made an award to the effect that the workman is entitled for reinstatement on the same nature of work and on the same conditions preceding his alleged termination whereas the fact remains that neither nature of work nor the specific project is in operation, in view of the fact that the project has been completed and commissioned. Thus, his services are no more required in view of condition number 2 stipulated vide communication dated 25th February, 1987 (Ex.2), subject to which he was engaged. 20. In the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 1 , the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with somewhat identical issue under paragraph 2, 4, 6 and 43 and held as under:- "1. Public employment in a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic, has to be as set down by the Constitution and the laws made thereunder. Our constitutional scheme envisages employment by the Government and its instrumentalities on the basis of a procedure established in that behalf. Equality of opportunity is the hallmark, and the Constitution has provided also for affirmative action to ensure that unequals are not treated equals. Thus, any public employment has to be in terms of the constitutional scheme. 3. Our constitutional scheme envisages employment by the Government and its instrumentalities on the basis of a procedure established in that behalf. Equality of opportunity is the hallmark, and the Constitution has provided also for affirmative action to ensure that unequals are not treated equals. Thus, any public employment has to be in terms of the constitutional scheme. 3. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is bypassed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognised by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasised that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten. 5. The power of a State as an employer is more limited than that of a private employer inasmuch as it is subjected to constitutional limitations and cannot be exercised arbitrarily (See Basu's Shorter Constitution of India). Article 309 of the Constitution gives the Government the power to frame rules for the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and recruitment of persons to be appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any of the States. That Article contemplates the drawing up of a procedure and rules to regulate the recruitment and regulate the service conditions of appointees appointed to public posts. It is well acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of appointment etc. If rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules. The State is meant to be a model employer. The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 was enacted to ensure equal opportunity for employment seekers. Though this Act may not oblige an employer to employ only those persons who have been sponsored by employment exchanges, it places an obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may arise in the various departments and for filling up of those vacancies, based on a procedure. Normally, statutory rules are framed under the authority of law governing employment. Normally, statutory rules are framed under the authority of law governing employment. It is recognised that no Government order, notification or circular can be substituted for the statutory rules framed under the authority of law. This is because, following any other course could be disastrous inasmuch as it will deprive the security of tenure and the right of equality conferred on civil servants under the Constitutional scheme. It may even amount to negating the accepted service jurisprudence. Therefore, when statutory rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution which are exhaustive, the only fair means to adopt is to make appointments based on the rules so framed. 43. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employees when they approach the court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College, (1962) 1 LLJ 247 SC . That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent." 21. The learned Tribunal has misdirected itself while considering the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 27 , for what has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under paragraph 11 of the judgment, which reads thus:- "11. The learned Tribunal has misdirected itself while considering the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom, District Manager, Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 27 , for what has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under paragraph 11 of the judgment, which reads thus:- "11. It is common knowledge that the Government as a welfare State floats several schemes and projects generating employment opportunities, though they are short-lived. The objective is to meet the need of the moment. The benefit of such schemes and projects is that for the duration they exist, they provide employment and livelihood to such persons as would not have been able to secure the same but for such schemes or projects. If the workmen employed for fulfilling the need of such passing-phase-projects or schemes were to become a liability on the employer State by too liberally interpreting the labour laws in favour of the workmen, then the same may well act as a disincentive to the State for floating such schemes and the State may opt to keep away from initiating such schemes and projects even in times of dire need, because it may feel that by opening the gates of welfare it would be letting-in onerous obligations entailed upon it by extended application of the labour laws. Sub-clause (bb) in the definition of retrenchment was introduced to take care of such like-situations by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 with effect from 18.8.1984." 22. In a situation where the termination of employment or disengagement is occasioned by fulfillment of the need of a particular project or scheme limited in its duration, come to an end for the reason that need for the project comes to an end, and therefore, in such circumstances, the employer cannot be directed to continue the employees, who have been dislodged as a consequence of abolition or completion of the project or scheme since the very purpose of the project or the scheme comes to an end. From the peculiar facts, evidence and materials available on record, it is evident that the workman, in the instant case at hand, was a daily wager in a project and had complete knowledge of the terms and conditions of his engagement/employment; cannot claim any relief after completion of the project, a fact which is not in dispute. 23. From the peculiar facts, evidence and materials available on record, it is evident that the workman, in the instant case at hand, was a daily wager in a project and had complete knowledge of the terms and conditions of his engagement/employment; cannot claim any relief after completion of the project, a fact which is not in dispute. 23. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ petition succeeds. The impugned award dated 13th November, 2007, passed by the learned Labour Court, is hereby quashed and set aside. 24. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******