JUDGMENT Kalimullah Khan, J. This Government Appeal has been filed under Section 378 Cr.P.C. by State of Uttar Pradesh against accused-respondents Lakhan Singh s/o Shyam Lal, Ramji Singh s/o Lala Ram Singh, Krishna Autar s/o Ram Gopal, Lala Ram Singh s/o Guljari Singh, Laxman Singh s/o Lakhan Singh and Virendra Singh s/o Atbal Singh, all r/o village Pithaupur, P.S. Churkhi, District Jalaun challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 9.12.1983 passed by the then Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area), Jalaun ' State Vs. Lakhan Singh and five others' under Sections 147, 148, 449, 302/149, Police Station Churkhi, District Jalaun in S.T. No 109 of 1982 whereas he has acquitted all the accused-respondents in the aforesaid Sessions Trial. 2. Lakhan Singh, Krishna Autar & Virendra Singh as accused-respondents no.1, 3 & 6 have died and the appeal against them abated vide orders dated 3.9.2011 & 13.3.2014 hence, this judgment pertains only in regard to accused-respondents no. 2, 4, & 5 only. 3. The aforesaid impugned judgment and order dated 9.12.1983 has been challenged on the ground that it is against the law and facts of the case. 4. Informant, Babu Ram s/o Raja Ram, r/o village Pithaupur, P.S. Churkhi, District Jalaun lodged written report with police station Churkhi, District Jalaun with an accusation that accused Lakhan Singh has enmity with him and his nephew Sarman Singh (deceased) who belongs to another party. Sarman Singh, had contested the Gram Pradhan election against Lakhan Singh a fortnight prior to this incident. Sarman Singh lost the election by few votes. In the morning on 17.6.1982 Sarman Singh was running Bakhar in his plot of 'Kudarai'. Lakhan Singh reached there and started hurling abuses to Sarman Singh and asked him to run away from the plot otherwise he would be killed. Sarman Singh retorted that the plot does not belong to the father of Lakhan Singh and so far Lakhan Singh was cultivating this plot by force but now he would not tolerate. Hot altercations exchanged. Lakhan Singh was also abused by Sarman Singh in retaliation. Lakhan Singh returned to his house. After running the Bakhar, Sarman Singh also came to his house and narrated the episode to the first informant, Babu Ram, his uncle. In the mids of the day, Sarman Singh was going to get his 'Datuwa' repaired at the house of carpenter, in his village. Babu Ram accompanied him. Lakhan Singh returned to his house. After running the Bakhar, Sarman Singh also came to his house and narrated the episode to the first informant, Babu Ram, his uncle. In the mids of the day, Sarman Singh was going to get his 'Datuwa' repaired at the house of carpenter, in his village. Babu Ram accompanied him. In the way, Sarman Singh asked Babu Ram to get his 'Datuwa' repaired by the carpenter as he was to take the price of his bullocks from Dasharath Baba s/o Shankar. Sarman Singh went to the house of Dasharath and sat on a cot inside his Barotha. Babu Ram reached to the house of carpenter. After sometime, he heard the commotion towards the house of Dasharath. He ran towards the house of Dasharath and saw accused Lakhan Singh s/o Shyam Lal Singh armed with lathi, Ramji Singh son of Lala Ram and Krishna Autar s/o Ram Gopal with their licensed gun, Laxman Singh s/o Lakhan Singh and Lala Ram s/o Guljari Singh armed with Axe and Virendra Singh s/o Atbal Singh armed with Kanta there. Lakhan Singh made exhortation to rest of the accused to commit the murder of Sarman Singh as he poses himself to be a Gunda and he would face the consequences. On the aforesaid exhortation, Ramji Singh and Krishna Autar accused fired three shots each from the door of Dasharath at Sarman Singh. Laxman Singh and Lala Ram gave axe blows whereas Virendra Singh gave Kanta blow on him. Sarman Singh died at spot on the cot of Dasharath in his Barotha. Nand Kishor s/o Bhola Nath, Gaya Prasad s/o Ujagar, Takhta Singh s/o Gore Lal, Bhagwanta wife of Dasharath Singh and so many other persons of the village came there and saw the incident. After extending threats for dire consequences to the informant and witnesses, in case either of them would dare to intervene, accused fled away towards south in the village. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, chik F.I.R. was drawn and case was registered in the general diary at crime no. 66 of 1982 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302 I.P.C. against all the aforesaid six accused on 17.6.1982 at 2: 00 p.m. after covering a distance of 8 miles from the scene of incident to the police station concerned. Investigation followed. Inquest was prepared. 66 of 1982 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302 I.P.C. against all the aforesaid six accused on 17.6.1982 at 2: 00 p.m. after covering a distance of 8 miles from the scene of incident to the police station concerned. Investigation followed. Inquest was prepared. Dead body was sent to mortuary for post-mortem examination. Blood stained earth was taken from the spot. Empty cartridges etc. were recovered. Prosecution witnesses were interrogated, site plan was prepared and after completing the investigation, I.O. submitted the charge-sheet against all the six accused. 6. Case was committed to the court of Sessions. 7. Accused Lakhan Singh was charged for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 449, 302/149 I.P.C. whereas Ramji Singh, Krishna Autar, Laxman Singh, Lala Ram and Virendra Singh were charged for the offence punishable under Sections 148, 302/149, 449 I.P.C. All the accused denied the charge and claimed their trial. 8. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined Babu Ram, P.W. 1, Nand Kishor, P.W. 2 as witnesses of fact. Rest of the witness Constable 202 Siya Ram, P.W. 3 deposed that he had taken the sealed dead body to mortuary for post-mortem examination. Ram Lakhan Pathak, P.W. 4 has proved the panchayatnama, recovery of blood stained earth, recovery of cartridges, tikli and pellets found under the cot. He scribed the report and has proved it as Exhibit Ka-1. He has further proved Exhibits Ka-2, Ka-3 & Ka-4. Dr. G.C. Mishra, P.W. 5 has conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of deceased Sarman Singh and proved the injuries. S.P. Singh, is the I.O. of the case and has proved the investigation. Constable 57 Atar Singh, P.W. 7 has proved the chik report and G.D. entry and deposed that special reports was sent to higher authorities. Param Sukh, Constable 406, P.W. 8 deposed that he had handed-over the police report to higher authorities concerned. 9. Accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied the veracity of evidence and prosecution allegations made against them. They stated that Babu Ram, first informant is inimical to him and that is why they have been falsely implicated by him. They were called upon to enter into their defence, but as it appears, they have not adduced any evidence in their defence. 10. They stated that Babu Ram, first informant is inimical to him and that is why they have been falsely implicated by him. They were called upon to enter into their defence, but as it appears, they have not adduced any evidence in their defence. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, learned trial court vide impugned judgment and order dated 9.12.1983 acquitted all the accused-respondents on the ground that prosecution has failed to prove the case against them beyond all reasonable doubt. 11. Feeling aggrieved this Government Appeal has been preferred. 12. We have heard learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for the accused-respondents at length. 13. Learned A.G.A. has argued that prosecution has fully proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The presence of prosecution witnesses Babu Ram, P.W. 1 and Nand Kishor, P.W. 2 is natural and probable. They are residents of same locality. Their ocular testimony is fully corroborated by medical evidence in letter and spirit. The date and time of the incident have not been challenged by the respondents. Learned trial court has disbelieved the testimony of Babu Ram, P.W.1 and Nand Kishor, P.W. 2 simply on the ground that they are inimical and interested witnesses. The manner of appraisal of evidence by the trial court is against the settled principles of appreciation of evidence. His appreciation is based on conjecture and surmises. Much weight has been given by learned trial court on the site plan which is not admissible in evidence as being hearsay. According to learned A.G.A. even the site plan does not undermine the correctness of the prosecution story but the learned trial court has thrown out the prosecution case like anything. The fire arms have not been recovered at spot from the possession of accused-respondents and, therefore, if the recovered cartridges etc. are not found tallied with them, it is not fatal to prosecution because the possibility of tampering with the pin of the trigger and barrel of the gun in between the time of incident and date and time of its recovery cannot be ruled out. 14. are not found tallied with them, it is not fatal to prosecution because the possibility of tampering with the pin of the trigger and barrel of the gun in between the time of incident and date and time of its recovery cannot be ruled out. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused-respondents has submitted that motive assigned is not proved; medical evidence is inconsistent with the ocular testimony; both the prosecution witnesses are highly inimical and interested; no independent witness has been examined in this case to support the prosecution case; the ballistic expert opinion is against the prosecution and that is why prosecution has not placed reliance on it, therefore, the conduct of prosecution is not free from doubt inasmuch as neither it examined independent witness nor placed reliance on ballistic expert opinion; F.I.R. is anti-time; both the witnesses on fact are the chance witness; learned trial court has rightly disbelieved the testimony of informant, Babu Ram P.W. 1 and Nand Kishor, P.W. 2 and; he submitted that learned trial court has recorded a finding of acquittal in favour of accused which further fortifies the presumption that accused are innocent. Lastly, he submitted that the view taken by the learned trial court is quite possible and, therefore, this Appellate Court need not reverse the finding of acquittal even if it is of different view. 15. The perusal of impugned judgment and order dated 9.12.1983 makes it clear that learned trial court has recorded a finding of acquittal mainly on following grounds: - (i) medical evidence does not support the oral testimony of the witnesses on fact (ii) material witness has been withheld by the prosecution (iii) independent witnesses have not been produced (iv) motive assigned against accused is not proved (v) witnesses examined on fact are inimical and highly interested and lastly (vi) prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. 16. Babu Ram, P.W. 1 informant of the case has deposed that the incident has taken place in the noon of 17.6.1982 at the house of Dasharath. He and Nand Kishor, P.W. 2 witnessed the incident from their own naked eyes. 16. Babu Ram, P.W. 1 informant of the case has deposed that the incident has taken place in the noon of 17.6.1982 at the house of Dasharath. He and Nand Kishor, P.W. 2 witnessed the incident from their own naked eyes. Both the aforesaid witnesses have testified that on the exhortation of Lakhan Singh, who was armed with lathi, rest of accused Ramji Singh and Krishna Autar fired with their guns causing fire arm injuries on the person of Sarman Singh, who was sitting on the cot in the Barotha of Dasharath whereas Laxman Singh as well as Lala Ram assaulted with axe and Virendra Singh assaulted with Kanta (a sharp cutting weapon) on his person, who sustained fire arm injuries as well as incised wounds and received instantaneous death at spot. Blood, empty cartridges and pellets were recovered from underneath the cot. The incident was witnessed by these witnesses and others. When the incident was over, accused persons, left towards east in the village after extending threats to the witnesses. Babu Ram, P.W. 1 claimed that he lodged the F.I.R. with the police station whereupon police machinery was set into motion. 17. The dead body was subjected to post-mortem examination by Dr. G.C. Mishra, who had noticed following ante-mortem injuries at the person of Sarman Singh, hereinafter called the 'deceased'. i. Incised wound 12 x 2 cm x bone deep on left side of forehead extending to left on exilla tailing towards left. ii. Incised wound 3 cm x 1 cm x bone deep on left side of face 2 cm below injury no. 1 tailing towards left. iii. Incised wound 13 cm x 3 cm x bone deep starting from bone of nose going at the side of medial angle of left eye to mandible left tailing towards left. iv. Incised wound 5 cm x 1 cm x bone deep starting from nose and going left side of face tailing towards left. v. Incised wound 14 cm x 3 cm x bone deep tailing towards left starting from lateral orbital margins of right eyes and going up to mandible. vi. Incised wound 5 cm x 0.5 cm x muscle deep starting from left angle of mouth going towards downwards and lateral of cheek left tailing towards left. vii. Incised wound 2.5 cm x 2 cm x bone deep on lateral side of right eye brow. viii. vi. Incised wound 5 cm x 0.5 cm x muscle deep starting from left angle of mouth going towards downwards and lateral of cheek left tailing towards left. vii. Incised wound 2.5 cm x 2 cm x bone deep on lateral side of right eye brow. viii. F.A. Entry wound 1 cm x 1 cm on anterior axillary fold 2 cm away the right upper arm. No tattooing charing etc. present. ix. Fire arm entry wound 1.2 cm x 1 cm on the upper part medial aspect of right upper arm 2 cm lateral to injury no.8. No tattooing charing etc. present. x. Incised wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm x muscles deep on dorsal aspect middle joint of index finger of right hand. xi. Incised wound 6 x 2 cm x muscles deep on dorsal of left hand adjacent to wrist joint. xii. Incised wound 5 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep on durum of left hand. 2 cm below a injury no.11. xiii. Fire arm exit wound 3x2 cm on left scapula region about middle. xiv. Fire arm exit wound 2 x 1.6 cm on right scapular region medial border 6 cm above the infangle. xv. Fire arm entry wound 2 x 1.8 cm on left side of abdomen upper part 20 cm above and lateral to umbilicus intestine comes out. xvi. Entry wound fire arm 1.2x1.2 cm on left thigh 10 cm from penis no tattooing charing etc present. xvii. Fire arm entry wound 20 cm x 1.6 cm, 2 cm above and lateral to injury no. 16 tattooing charing etc. present. xviii. Fire arm entry wound 4 x 2 cm , oblique 1.5 cm lat to injury no. 16 and 1.2 below the injury no. 17 tattooing charing etc present. xix. Exit wound (fire arm) 6 x 6 cm on left thigh margins adjacent to out sup-Iliac spin. xx. Exist wound 8 x 4 cm on lateral side of left thigh 2 cm below the injury no. 19. xxi. Fire arm exit wound 4 cm x 4 cm on left lat side of thigh 3 cm below the injury no. 20. xxii. Exit wound 4 x 4 cm on post aspect left thigh 4 cm below and medial to injury no. 21. xxiii. 19. xxi. Fire arm exit wound 4 cm x 4 cm on left lat side of thigh 3 cm below the injury no. 20. xxii. Exit wound 4 x 4 cm on post aspect left thigh 4 cm below and medial to injury no. 21. xxiii. Six fire arm exit wound in area of 10 cm x 5 cm x on medial side upper part of left thigh adjacent to the penis size varying from 0.3 cm to 0.8 cm. xxiv. 3 fire arm exit wound in an area of 2 x 2 cm size diameter 0.4 cm to 0.8 cm on upper lat left part of scrotum. xxv. 3 fire arms wound in an area of 6 x 4 cm on right side of scrotum upper part adjacent to base of scrotum size diameter 0.3 cm to 0.6 cm. 18. The perusal of the seat of injuries of the deceased makes it crystal clear that almost all the injuries barring few are towards his left side of the body, which according to the trial court, may be caused from his left side, but the doctor has not given definite opinion about the same. He has deposed that he cannot give exact opinion as to how and from which direction, the firearm injuries have been caused to the deceased. According to him, unless particular weapon and exact position of the assailant from where fire was opened and the direction of the victim is known, no definite opinion can be given as to from which side, the victim was attacked. Still, learned trial court disbelieved both the witnesses of the fact and held that they were not present at spot because some of the injuries on the person of deceased could not have been caused by the assailants from the places they fired as shown in the site plan with letters 'B' and 'B-1', if the deceased was sitting at a place marked by I.O. with letter 'C' in the site plan. 19. As regards admissibility of site plan, the legal position is that only those things in the site plan are admissible in evidence, which is based on the personal knowledge of the I.O. as to what he sees and observes. In this case, I.O. has not seen from his own eyes as to from which place assailants fired at the deceased. As regards admissibility of site plan, the legal position is that only those things in the site plan are admissible in evidence, which is based on the personal knowledge of the I.O. as to what he sees and observes. In this case, I.O. has not seen from his own eyes as to from which place assailants fired at the deceased. The aforesaid place of assailants shown with the letters 'B' and 'B-1; have been pointed out by the I.O. on the basis of the information of P.W.1 and P.W.2 as deposed by him, but none of the aforesaid P.Ws. have supported the contention of I.O. on this issue. Babu Ram (P.W.1) has clearly deposed that he has not pointed out to the I.O. that from the place marked with the letter 'B' and 'B1' shown in the sketch map, assailants fired at deceased Sarman rather he has told that they had fired at him from the door of Dashrath, when deceased was sitting in his Barotha. Nand Kishor (P.W.2) has flatly refused to have pointed out the exact place of each and every accused from where they fired at the victim or assaulted him. Therefore, the contention of I.O. that he prepared the site plan showing the exact place from where assailants fired or assaulted the victim on the basis of information of P.W.1 and P.W.2 does not find corroboration. In any case, the aforesaid place marked with letters 'B' and 'B-1' is hearsay, which is not admissible in evidence. It is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. Learned trial court has erred in relying on the aforesaid here-say evidence, on the basis of which, he has held that medical evidence is inconsistent with the ocular testimony. 20. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in case of Jagdish Narain and another Vs. State of U.P. 1996 (33) A.C.C. 495 as under : - "In responding to the next criticism of the trial court regarding the failure of the Investigating Officer to indicate in the site plan prepared by him the spot where from the shots were allegedly fired by the appellants and its resultant effect upon the investigation itself, the High Court observed that such failure did not detract from the truthfulness of the eye-witnesses and only amounted to an omission on the part of the Investigating Officer. In our opinion neither the criticism of the trial court nor the reason ascribed by the High Court in its rebuttal can be legally sustained. While preparing a site plan an Investigating Officer can certainly record what he sees and observes, for that will be direct and substantive evidence being based on his personal knowledge; but as, he was not obviously present when the incident took place, he has to derive knowledge as to when, where and how it happened from persons who had seen the incident. When a witness testifies about what he heard from somebody else it is ordinarily not admissible in evidence being hearsay, but if the person from whom he heard is examined to give direct evidence within the meaning of section 60 of the Evidence Act, the farmer's evidence would be admissible to corroborate the latter in accordance with Section 157 Cr.P.C. However, such a statement made to a police officer, when he is investigating into an offence in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be used to even corroborate the maker thereof in view of the embargo in Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C. appearing in that chapter and can be used only to contradict him (the maker) in accordance with the proviso thereof, except in those cases where sub section (2) of the section applies. That necessarily means that if in the site plan P.W.6 has even shown the place from which the shots were allegedly fired after ascertaining the same from the eye witnesses it could not have been admitted in evidence being hit by section 162 Cr.P.C. The law on this subject has been succinctly laid down by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Tori Singh v. State of U.P. In that case it was contended on behalf of the appellant therein that if one looked at the sketch map, on which the place where the deceased was said to have been hit was marked, and compared it with the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the medical evidence, it would be extremely improbable for the injury which was received by the deceased to have been caused on that part of the body where it had been actually caused if the deceased was at the place marked on the map. In repelling the above contention this Court observed, inter alia : - ".... In repelling the above contention this Court observed, inter alia : - ".... the mark on the sketch-map was put by the sub inspector who was obviously not an eye witness to the incident. He could only have put it there after taking the statements of the eyewitnesses. The marking of the spot on the sketch map is really bringing on record the conclusion on the sub inspector on the basis of the statements made by the witnesses to him. This in our opinion would not be admissible in view of the provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for it is in effect nothing more than the statement of the sub inspector that the eyewitnesses told him that the deceased was at such and such place at the time when he was hit. The sketch-map would be admissible so far it indicates all that the sub inspector saw himself at the spot; but any mark put on the sketch-map based on the statements made by the witnesses to the sub inspector would be inadmissible in view of the clear provisions of S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it will be no more than a statement made to the police during investigation." 21. Both the witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2, have deposed that on the exhortation of Lakhan Singh accused, co-accused Ramji Singh and Krishna Autar, fired three shots each with their guns and Luxman Singh and Lala Ram accused assaulted with kulhari while accused Virendra Singh assaulted with kanta on the person of Sarman, as a result of which, he sustained injuries and died at spot. Lakhan Singh was armed with lathi, but he is not said to have used the same in the incident. The autopsy shows that there was no lathi injury on the person of deceased, but he has received in as much as 25 ante- mortem injuries at his person, out of which, injury nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 appear to have been caused with kulhari and kanta while injury nos. 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 appear to have been caused by firearm weapon as proved by doctor, who conducted the post-mortem examination. 22. 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 appear to have been caused by firearm weapon as proved by doctor, who conducted the post-mortem examination. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent does not challenge the fact that the injuries sustained by the deceased were caused by gun, kulhari and kanta. Even the learned trial court has not disbelieved the aforesaid fact. Both the witnesses on fact have been cross-examined at length to disbelieve their presence, but they remained intact throughout and have deposed clearly and categorically by assigning specific weapon, specific role to particular accused. Both these witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2, are residents of the same place very near to the scene of the incident. P.W.1 has claimed that he was accompanying the deceased, when he was going to carpenter to repair his 'Datuwa'. After handing over 'datuwa' to the carpenter, he sat down at nearby chabutara under the tree-shed. He saw all these accused persons armed with weapons going towards the house of Dashrath where Sarman Singh was already sitting. Earlier, at the time of breakfast on the same day, the hot exchange of words with abuses and threatenings had already taken place in between Lakhan Singh and the deceased. The aforesaid fact was also in the knowledge of Babu Ram (P.W.1), who happened to be the real uncle of deceased Sarman Singh, therefore, it was but natural for him to follow these accused under the apprehension of some miss-happening with the deceased at the hands of these accused. Therefore, his presence cannot be disbelieved on the basis of conjecture and surmises especially when his evidence has been tested by respondent accused on the anvil of cross-examination at length. Their relation with accused were, admittedly, strained for a considerable length of time on account of number of litigations i.e. civil, revenue and criminal. Admittedly, in the case of murder of Shiv Dayal, uncle of the deceased, Sarman Singh, the father of accused/respondent Lakhan Singh and family members of number of remaining accused were already prosecuted. Under these scenario of facts, there is nothing improbable for Babu Ram (P.W.1) in following the armed accused going towards the house of Dashrath. 23. Likewise, the presence of Nand Kishore (P.W.2) at spot cannot be doubted. He is next door neighbour of Dashrath. Under these scenario of facts, there is nothing improbable for Babu Ram (P.W.1) in following the armed accused going towards the house of Dashrath. 23. Likewise, the presence of Nand Kishore (P.W.2) at spot cannot be doubted. He is next door neighbour of Dashrath. His house is situated hardly at a distance of 50-60 steps from the house of Dashrath. He claimed to have gone as usual for worship and prayer in the Ram Janki Mandir situated just in front of the house of Dashrath i.e. the place of incident. He used to remain in the temple right since 8.30 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. There are three temples in that locality within 150-200 steps from each other and the witness claims that he used to worship daily in all the temples and live like hermit. The cross-examiner has left no stone unturned to shake the credit of this witness on the point of his presence at spot, but he did not succeed. The witness has claimed that on the commotion made by accused, he came out from the temple, which is adjacent to the thoroughfare leading to the house of Dashrath and saw all these aforesaid accused armed with deadly weapons on the said thoroughfare going towards the scene of incident and he has assigned the specific role of exhortation, firing and assault with axe and kanta and supported the prosecution story as embedded in the FIR. The defence tried its level best to fetch out from his mouth something to prove his late arrival at the scene of incident, but miserably failed. The evidence of P.W.1 is corroborated by the contents of the FIR and medical evidence. The evidence of P.W.2 fully corroborates the testimony of P.W.1. There is no inconsistency in between the medical evidence and the ocular testimony of aforesaid two witnesses of fact, therefore, the finding of trial court that medical evidence is inconsistent with the ocular testimony is perverse, which deserves to be set aside. 24. Learned trial court has wrongly held that the FIR is anti-timed and the special report was not dispatched well in time. 24. Learned trial court has wrongly held that the FIR is anti-timed and the special report was not dispatched well in time. The prosecution has come forward with a definite case that the incident took place in the noon of 17.6.1982 and the FIR was registered on the same day i.e. on 17.6.1982, at 02.00 p.m. The distance in between the place of incident and the police station Churkhi is 08 miles. H.C.No.57 Atar Singh, (P.W.7) has deposed that he was posted as Head Moharrir, P.S. Churkhi on 17.6.1982. At about 02.00 p.m., on that day, he drew the check report on the basis of written report lodged by first informant, Babu Ram, and registered the case in the general diary dated 17.6.1982, vide Rapat No.19. The half of the general diary entry is in his handwriting while rest of the entry is in the handwriting of Constable, Nand Kishor. He has proved check report (Ext.Ka-17) and copy of the G.D. entry (Ext.Ka-18). He has further deposed that special report was sent by him to higher authorities on 17.6.1982, vide G.D. Rapat No.22 at 03.10 p.m. on 17.6.1982 (EX.Ka-19). The witness deposed that Constable Paramsukh returned on 18.6.1982 after handing over the special report to the concerned authorities. His return has been entered in the general diary, vide Rapat No.18, dated 18.6.1982. He has proved the said copy of the entry as Ex.Ka-20. At the time of his deposition, he has brought original general diary with him in the trial court. He deposed that Babu Ram (P.W.1) has brought his written report (Ex.Ka-1) bearing his signature. The witness has been cross-examined at length, but nothing adverse has been fetched out to undermine the sanctity of his deposition. 25. The aforesaid evidence of Head Moharrir, Atar Singh (P.W.7), is corroborated by the evidence of Constable No.406 Paramsukh (P.W.8), who has deposed that he had taken the special report from police station Churkhi on 17.6.1982, at 3.10 p.m. First of all, he had to handover the special report to the Circle Officer, Churkhi and S.D.M. Kalpi, therefore, he went there on bicycle. He reached there at 8.00 p.m. and handed over the special report to the Ahalmad of S.D.M. Circle Officer was not available and due to the fact that he too did not feel well in the night, therefore, he stayed there and in the morning, he travelled for Orai, where he handed over the special report to the authority concerned. He has been cross-examined at length, but there is nothing in it to discredit his evidence. 26. First informant has also been probed much during his cross-examination to find out as to when the FIR was lodged. He remained intact that it was lodged at 02.00 p.m., on the day of the incident. The crime number, sections of the offence, the time of lodging the FIR, the time of starting the preparation of inquest and the date and time of its completion have been mentioned in the inquest report, therefore, there is no substance in the finding recorded by learned trial court that FIR is ante-timed. Hence, the aforesaid finding of the court below deserves to be set aside. 27. The prompt lodging of the FIR, as in this case, naming the accused with a full detail of the mode and manner of the incident is a guarantee by itself of its truthfulness. It has already been observed above that there is nothing on record to hold that FIR lodged in this case against accused persons is either anti-timed or belated or manipulated or concocted or fabricated or after thought. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Kripal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2010 (69) ACC 322 and in Dharamveer and others vs. State of U.P. 2010 (69) ACC 347 that if the FIR has been lodged promptly, it cannot be said to be an outcome of maneuvering, manipulation, concoction, fabrication or after thought. Veracity of the prosecution story cannot be doubted and the possibility of false implication of accused is ruled out. The aforesaid case laws are fully applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and, therefore, the finding of acquittal recorded by learned trial court deserves to be set aside. 28. Proof of motive is not necessary in cases based on direct evidence. However, when prosecution brings forward a motive that should be proved by prosecution because motive is a corroborative circumstance. 28. Proof of motive is not necessary in cases based on direct evidence. However, when prosecution brings forward a motive that should be proved by prosecution because motive is a corroborative circumstance. In State of U.P. vs. Surendra Singh and another 2004 (2) Allahabad Criminal Ruling 1226, the Division Bench of this Court held that motive, though not evidence, but it satisfies judicial mind about authorship of crime. We are of the view that when motive is suggested, it must be proved by the prosecution because it becomes relevant to enquire whether the pattern of the crime fits in the motive, but it does not mean that if motive is not established, the evidence of an eyewitness is rendered untrustworthy. It is settled legal position that even if the absence of motive as alleged is accepted that is of no consequence and pales into insignificance when direct evidence establishes the crime. Therefore, in case, there is direct trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to commission of an offence, the motive part loses its significance. Therefore, if the genesis of the motive of the occurrence is not proved, the ocular testimony of the witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only by the reason of the absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence is worthy of reliance. (Vide Hari Shankar Vs. State of U.P., (1996) 9 SCC 40 ; Bikau Pandey & amp; Ors. Vs. State of Bihar, (2003) 12 SCC 616 ; and Abu Thakir & amp; Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 5 SCC 91 ). 29. In this case, motive alleged by the prosecution is fully proved by the witnesses of facts. They proved the motive remote as well as immediate. All the accused are inimical to the victim. Their ancestors had already been prosecuted for the murder of the uncle of the present deceased. Long drawn enmity and strained relations in between the parties are admitted to them. The motive alleged to commit the murder of the deceased is very well mentioned in clear words in the FIR itself. All the contents of the FIR including the motive and the part played by each accused by their respective weapons, have been mentioned therein, which was promptly lodged, therefore, the finding of learned trial court that prosecution have failed to prove the motive is perverse and deserves to be set aside. All the contents of the FIR including the motive and the part played by each accused by their respective weapons, have been mentioned therein, which was promptly lodged, therefore, the finding of learned trial court that prosecution have failed to prove the motive is perverse and deserves to be set aside. Regarding motive for commission of crime, the Apex Court of India has observed as under in the case of Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. state of Bihar, AIR 1994 (SC) 2420 , in para 21 of the report at page 2429 : - "Sometimes motive plays an important role and becomes a compelling force to commit a crime and, therefore, motive behind the crime is a relevant factor for which evidence may be adduced. A motive is something which prompts a person to form an opinion or intention to do certain illegal act or even a legal act but with illegal means with a view to achieve that intention. In a case where there is clear proof of motive for the commission of the crime, it affords added support to the finding of the Court that the accused was guilty for the offence charged with. But it has to be remembered that the absence of proof of motive does not render the evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused nonetheless untrustworthy or unreliable because most often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone, who knows as to what circumstances prompted to a certain course of action leading to the commission of the crime". The non-examination of Dashrath and his wife as well as other witnesses do not appear to be fatal to prosecution in the facts and circumstances of the case. There is no evidence on record that Dashrath himself was physically present at his house on the date and time of the incident. So far as the wife of Dashrath, Smt. Bhagwanta, is concerned, a question arises as to why, after all, she should come forward to support the cause of prosecution. Similar is the case with prosecution witnesses, Gaya Prasad and Takhta Singh. It is known to all concerned that no independent witness wants to put his life in danger by deposing a truth against either of the faction in the village. Moreover, it is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity, which is required under the law to prove the case. It is known to all concerned that no independent witness wants to put his life in danger by deposing a truth against either of the faction in the village. Moreover, it is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity, which is required under the law to prove the case. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. 30. In Namdeo Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150 , this Court re-iterated the similar view observing that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence, which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witness. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. 31. In Kunju @ Balachandran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2008 SC 1381 , a similar view has been re-iterated placing reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court including Jagdish Prasad Vs. State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1251 ; and Vadivelu Thevar Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 . 32. Learned counsel for the accused then argued that prosecution has not produced the independent witnesses in this case and it has examined only related and interested witnesses, whose testimony should not be relied upon. 33. There does not appear any substance in his contention. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Hukum Singh & another vs. State of Rajasthan, 2000(41) ACC 662 held as under : - "The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the Court that he did not propose to examine the remaining persons in that category. This will help not only the prosecution for relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also helps the court considerably in lessening the work-load. This will help not only the prosecution for relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also helps the court considerably in lessening the work-load. Time has come to make every effort possible to lessen the work-load, particularly those courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice." 34. Learned A.G.A. has argued that close relatives cannot be characterised as interested witnesses. They are natural witnesses and can be relied on, as has been held by Hon'ble Suprme Court in Namdeo Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2007(2) CCSC 634 (SC), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under : - "A close relative cannot be characterised as an interested witness. He is a 'natural' witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinized carefully. If on such scrutiny, his evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable and wholly trustworthy, conviction can be based on the sole testimony of such witness. Close relationship of witness with the deceased or victim is no ground to reject his evidence. On the contrary, close relative of the deceased would normally be most reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent one." 35. Therefore, the rejection of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses examined on facts was uncalled for and learned trial court has erred in disbelieving their evidence on the ground of their being interested or inimical witnesses. 36. Section 149 IPC reads as under,"Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.--If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence." 37. The above provision makes it clear that before convicting the accused with the aid of Section 149 IPC, the Court must give clear finding regarding nature of common object and that the object was unlawful. In the absence of such finding as also any overt act on the part of the accused persons, mere fact that they were armed would not be sufficient to prove common object. Section 149 creates a specific offence and deals with punishment of that offence. In the absence of such finding as also any overt act on the part of the accused persons, mere fact that they were armed would not be sufficient to prove common object. Section 149 creates a specific offence and deals with punishment of that offence. Whenever the court convicts any person or persons of an offence with the aid of Section 149 , a clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly must be given and the evidence discussed must show not only the nature of the common object but also that the object was unlawful. Before recording a conviction under Section 149 IPC, the essential ingredients of Section 141 IPC must be established. The above principles have been reiterated in Bhudeo Mandal v. State of Bihar (1981) 2 SCC 755 : 38. In Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392 this Court highlighted that where there are party factions, there is a tendency to include the innocent with the guilty and it is extremely difficult for the court to guard against such a danger. It was pointed out that the only real safeguard against the risk of condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting on acceptable evidence which in some measure implicates such accused and satisfies the conscience of the court. 39. In Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 this Court held: (SCC pp. 16-17, para 8) "8. ... Therefore, in order to fasten vicarious responsibility on any member of an unlawful assembly the prosecution must prove that the act constituting an offence was done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or the act done is such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. Under this section, therefore, every member of an unlawful assembly renders himself liable for the criminal act or acts of any other member or members of that assembly provided the same isre done in prosecution of the common object or isre such as every member of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Under this section, therefore, every member of an unlawful assembly renders himself liable for the criminal act or acts of any other member or members of that assembly provided the same isre done in prosecution of the common object or isre such as every member of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. This section creates a specific offence and makes every member of the unlawful assembly liable for the offence or offences committed in the course of the occurrence provided the same was/were committed in prosecution of the common object or was/were such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Since this section imposes a constructive penal liability, it must be strictly construed as it seeks to punish members of an unlawful assembly for the offence or offences committed by their associate or associates in carrying out the common object of the assembly. What is important in each case is to find out if the offence was committed to accomplish the common object of the assembly or was one which the members knew to be likely to be committed. There must be a nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it is found that the same was committed to accomplish the common object every member of the assembly will become liable for the same. Therefore, any offence committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of any one or more of the five objects mentioned in Section 141 will render his companions constituting the unlawful assembly liable for that offence with the aid of Section 149 IPC." 40. It is not the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 149 to render every member of unlawful assembly liable to punishment for every offence committed by one or more of its members. In order to attract Section 149 , it must be shown that the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of unlawful assembly and it must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. If the members of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of the common object, they would be liable for the same under Section 149 IPC. 41. If the members of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of a particular offence being committed in prosecution of the common object, they would be liable for the same under Section 149 IPC. 41. In Rajendra Shantaram Todankar v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 2 SCC 257 this Court has once again explained Section 149 and held as under: (SCC pp. 263-64, para 14) "14. Section 149 of the Penal Code provides that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly is guilty of that offence. The two clauses of Section 149 vary in degree of certainty. The first clause contemplates the commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly which can be held to have been committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly. The second clause embraces within its fold the commission of an act which may not necessarily be the common object of the assembly, nevertheless, the members of the assembly had knowledge of likelihood of the commission of that offence in prosecution of the common object. The common object may be commission of one offence while there may be likelihood of the commission of yet another offence, the knowledge whereof is capable of being safely attributable to the members of the unlawful assembly. In either case, every member of the assembly would be vicariously liable for the offence actually committed by any other member of the assembly. A mere possibility of the commission of the offence would not necessarily enable the court to draw an inference that the likelihood of commission of such offence was within the knowledge of every member of the unlawful assembly. It is difficult indeed, though not impossible, to collect direct evidence of such knowledge. An inference may be drawn from circumstances such as the background of the incident, the motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the arms carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and the behaviour of the members soon before, at or after the actual commission of the crime. An inference may be drawn from circumstances such as the background of the incident, the motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the arms carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and the behaviour of the members soon before, at or after the actual commission of the crime. Unless the applicability of Section 149 --either clause--is attracted and the court is convinced, on facts and in law, both, of liability capable of being fastened vicariously by reference to either clause of Section 149 IPC, merely because a criminal act was committed by a member of the assembly every other member thereof would not necessarily become liable for such criminal act. The inference as to likelihood of the commission of the given criminal act must be capable of being held to be within the knowledge of another member of the assembly who is sought to be held vicariously liable for the said criminal act.". 42. The same principles have been reiterated in State of Punjab Vs. Sanjiv Kumar (2007) 9 SCC 791 . 43. The aforesaid legal position has been followed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kuldip Yadav and others Vs. State of Bihar (2011) 5 SCC 324 . 44. Date, time, place, mode, manner of the incident have fully been proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt and the view taken by learned trail court acquitting the accused is perverse, which was not possible at all. The findings recorded by learned trial court are erroneous and wrong, unreasonable and not possible rather the entire judgment impugned is based on conjecture and surmises. No legal weight to the evidence of reliable eye witnesses have been given by the learned trial court. It is a case where no two views are possible. The only view possible in the light of evidence on record is the view of conviction of accused. There has been manifest illegality in the approach of the trial court to the case and appreciation of evidence, the finding recorded by the trial court is wholly unreasonable and there has been a resultant miscarriage of justice in acquitting the accused. The finding of acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court deserves to be set aside and the impugned judgment is liable to be reversed. 45. Government appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 9.12.1983 is hereby set aside. 46. The finding of acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court deserves to be set aside and the impugned judgment is liable to be reversed. 45. Government appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 9.12.1983 is hereby set aside. 46. In the case in hand, all the six accused had formed an unlawful assembly and each of them were the member of that assembly. All of them were in know of the fact that the common object of that assembly was to commit the murder of Sarman Singh. Being, a member of the said unlawful assembly, in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, they did overt act and committed the murder of Sarman Singh and, therefore, each one of the six accused-respondents are guilty for the murder of Sarman Singh, punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 IPC. Since, the appeal against accused-respondents, Lakhan Singh, Krishna Autar and Virendra Singh, has abated, therefore, rest accused Lalji Singh, Lala Ram Singh and Laxman Singh are found guilty under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 I.P.C. They are convicted and sentenced under Section 147 I.P.C. to go rigorous imprisonment for one year, under Section 148 I.P.C. to go rigorous imprisonment for two years and R.I. for life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each under Sections 302/149 I.P.C. In case of default of payment of fine they are to further undergo a sentence of one year. However, all the sentences shall run concurrently. 47. Accused Lalji Singh, Lala Ram Singh and Laxman Singh are directed to surrender before the court of learned C.J.M., Jalaun within a month. In case they do not surrender within the aforesaid period, learned C.J.M. shall commit them to jail, by adopting a procedure established by law, to serve out the sentence awarded to them. 48. Registry is directed to send the copy of this judgment forthwith to learned C.J.M., Jalaun to comply the order under its intimation within reasonable period.