Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 140 (AP)

Pulugoru Gopal Reddy v. Mandal Revenue Officer

2014-01-31

G.CHANDRAIAH, K.G.SHANKAR

body2014
Judgment Dr. K.G. Shankar, J. 1. What is the scope of a review? Whether a review lies in this case? Whether the impugned order is liable to be reviewed? If so, to what extent? -these are the questions that arise for consideration in this case. 2. The primary question is whether Survey No.46, Akkrampally Village, admeasuring Ac.23-83 cents of land is a tank known as Polavani Kunta or Polavari Gunta is a village wherein a small tank by the same name exists. Government declared Akkrampally as Inam Estate and had taken over the same on 07-01-1959 under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Abolition Act, 1948 (Estates Abolition Act, for short). One Tirupathi Doraswami Iyengar owned Ac.23-83 cts. of land in R.S.No.46 as a pattedar. The property was purchased on 14-7-1930 by P. Munuswamy Reddy as a member of the joint family consisting of himself and his brother P.Ramakrishna Reddy. 3. P. Ramakrishna Reddy and 6 others filed W.P.No.5121 of 1979 apprehending assignment of Survey No.46 in favour of M.S. Reddy. The writ petition was dismissed on 18-11-1985. During the pendency of W.P.No.5121 of 1979, Puligoru Gopal Reddy filed an application before the Settlement Officer, Nellore under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act contending that the land covered by Survey No.46, Akkrampally Village originally belonged to Tirupathi Doraswami Iyengar and that P. Munuswamy Reddy purchased the same as a member of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) consisting of himself and his brother P. Ramakrishna Reddy through a registered sale deed dated 14-7-1930. 4. The Settlement Officer, who is the Primary Authority took the application of P. Gopal Reddy on file as SR No.65/11(a)/81 C.G.R. He ordered notice to the Tahsildar, Chandragiri who was the respondent in those proceedings. The Tahsildar entered appearance and filed counter. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri claimed that the admission of the claim of P. Gopal Reddy without any application to condone the delay and without notice and opportunity to the Tahsildar to oppose the same was unjustified as violative of principles of natural justice. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri also took the stand that the land in question was required for future public purpose. The Settlement Officer conducted enquiry at Kalahasti and at Tirupathi. Through orders dated 25-10-1982, the claim petition of P. Gopal Reddy was allowed. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri also took the stand that the land in question was required for future public purpose. The Settlement Officer conducted enquiry at Kalahasti and at Tirupathi. Through orders dated 25-10-1982, the claim petition of P. Gopal Reddy was allowed. Ryotwari Patta in favour of Puligoru Gopal Reddy, P. Sivanarayana Reddy; the vendors of Gopal Reddy by name Y. Bala Chandraiah, G. Satyanarayana Rao, A. Padmavathamma, P. Chandravathi, Karanam Chalapathi, M. Munikrishna Reddy and P. Bharathi were granted ryotwari pattas with specified extents of land mentioned in the Schedule. 5. The Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement cum took up suo motu revision on the orders of Settlement Officer-Primary Authority through proceedings in R.P.186/83/(H1) in exercise of the powers under Section 5(2) of the Estates Abolition Act. The Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement, however, confirmed the orders of the Settlement Officer through orders dated 30-9-1999. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi Urban Mandal preferred a revision under Section 7(d) of the Estates Abolition Act on the orders of the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement dated 30-9-1999. The Commissioner of Appeals took the revision of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi Urban Mandal on file as P.3/639/99 but dismissed the same. Questioning the same, W.P.No.22868 of 2002 was laid by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupathi Urban Mandal. P.Gopal Reddy and 17 others filed W.P.No.22656 of 2002 praying for a direction to the Government to implement the orders of the Settlement Officer dated 25-10-1982 as confirmed by the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement and by the Commissioner of Appeals. The learned single Judge passed a common order in W.P.Nos.22868 and 22656 of 2002 on 08-8-2005. He dismissed W.P.No.22868 of 2002 filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer as meritless. He allowed W.P.No.22656 of 2002 filed by P.Gopal Reddy and others directing the respondents therein to implement the orders passed by the Settlement Officer. The respondents in W.P.No.22656 of 2002 filed W.A.No.1802 of 2005. The Mandal Revenue Officer filed W.A.No.1817 of 2005. A 3rd party filedW.A.No.731 of 2006 questioning the orders in W.P.No.22656 of 2002. Another writ petition in W.P.No.8346 of 2000 was laid by 3 individuals to declare that they are the pattedars of land covered by R.S.No.46 in an extent of Ac.23-83 cts. Of Akkrampally Village. The Division Bench delivered a common judgment in the 3 writ appeals and the writ petition on 30-4-2011. The writ appeals were allowed. Another writ petition in W.P.No.8346 of 2000 was laid by 3 individuals to declare that they are the pattedars of land covered by R.S.No.46 in an extent of Ac.23-83 cts. Of Akkrampally Village. The Division Bench delivered a common judgment in the 3 writ appeals and the writ petition on 30-4-2011. The writ appeals were allowed. The orders passed by the Settlement Officer on 25-10-1982 were set aside. Consequently, W.P.No.8346 of 2000 was dismissed. 6. Puligoru Gopal Reddy and others preferred Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) before the Supreme Court which were numbered as Civil Appeal Nos.13881 to 13884 of 2011. Before the Supreme Court, the counsel for Puligoru Gopal Reddy and others submitted that many documents in the shape of Revenue Records including the Field Map relating to the property in dispute were not considered by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court held that the proper remedy in such circumstances was to move the Division Bench by way of a review. The SLPs consequently were disposed of granting liberty to Puligoru Gopal Reddy and others to move the High Court. The appeals were disposed of on 26-9-2011. The Supreme Court made it clear that they were not expressing any view on the merits of the claim of both sides. Consequently, the present review petition was laid. 7. The learned Special Government Pleader representing the Government contended that this review petition is not maintainable as there was no error apparent on the face of the record for review. Section 114 CPC deals with review powers. However, Order XLVII is more elaborate. Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC dealing with the review reads: "1. 7. The learned Special Government Pleader representing the Government contended that this review petition is not maintainable as there was no error apparent on the face of the record for review. Section 114 CPC deals with review powers. However, Order XLVII is more elaborate. Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC dealing with the review reads: "1. Application for review of judgment:-- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation:-- The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment." 8. It is contended by the learned Special Government Pleader that the discovery of new and important matter or evidence or mistake or error apparent on the face of the record are the grounds on which a review can be laid. In HARIDAS DAS v. USHA RANI BANIK (2006) 4 SCC 78 , on the basis of an agreement of sale, the agreement holder took possession of the property after paying the entire sale consideration. In HARIDAS DAS v. USHA RANI BANIK (2006) 4 SCC 78 , on the basis of an agreement of sale, the agreement holder took possession of the property after paying the entire sale consideration. He subsequently laid a suit for confirmation of his possession and to restrain the vendor from dispossessing him and from selling the property to any other person. The plaintiff reserved the right to file a suit for specific performance or for a direction to direct the vendor to execute the sale deed. Later, the plaintiff filed another suit for a direction to the vendor to execute the sale deed. Before the suit for execution of the sale deed was filed by the plaintiff, the vendor of the plaintiff sold away the property to third party and executed the sale deed in favour of such a third party. The plaintiff then filed the third suit for annulment of the subsequent sale deed executed by the vendor in favour of the third party. 9. The Supreme Court considered that the question whether the second suit seeking for a direction to execute the sale deed was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC was irrelevant to the third suit and that the High Court erred in holding that the second suit was hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in holding that the earlier view of the High Court that the suit was hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC was a mistake or error apparent to enable the High Court to review its earlier order. The Supreme Court held that the view of the High Court that the earlier order was a mistake or error apparent for the purpose of review was incorrect. It clarified that review on the ground that the review petitioner had not highlighted all aspects of the case or could have argued forcefully or cited binding precedent to get a favourable judgment was not permissible and that where the remedy of appeal was available, the power of review should be exercised by the courts with circumspection. 10. In MEERA BHANJA v. NIRMALA KUMARI CHOUDHURY (1995) 1 SCC 170 , the Supreme Court referred to Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [ (1979) 4 SCC 389 ] with approval. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma, the Supreme Court said: "... ... ... 10. In MEERA BHANJA v. NIRMALA KUMARI CHOUDHURY (1995) 1 SCC 170 , the Supreme Court referred to Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [ (1979) 4 SCC 389 ] with approval. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma, the Supreme Court said: "... ... ... it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court." 11. In MEERA BHANJA (2 supra), the Supreme Court noted: "... ... ... an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. ... ... ..." 12. The Supreme Court considered that when a judgment of the Division Bench has become final rightly or wrongly so far as the High Court is concerned, the same could not be reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to find out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of the review power. 13. In PARSION DEVI v. SUMITRI DEVI (1997) 8 SCC 715 , it was said: "10. ... ... ... There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. ... ... ..." 14. In UNION OF INDIA v. B.VALLUVAN (2006) 8 SCC 686 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court shall exercise the power of review within the limitations as provided under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC and that the High Court cannot go into the merits of the case while exercising its review jurisdiction without first arriving at a finding as to how error apparent on the face of the record was committed. 15. Sri E.Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners did not dispute the stand of the learned Special Government Pleader. 15. Sri E.Manohar, learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners did not dispute the stand of the learned Special Government Pleader. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 , the Supreme Court held: "If the court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error." 16. In BCCI v. NETAJI CRICKET CLUB (2005) 4 SCC 41, it was pointed out: "90. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefore. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words "sufficient reason" in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit"." 17. The review petitioners did not contend that additional evidence was unearthed, which could not be produced earlier for the court to consider the same, so much so, the case shall be reviewed. The review petitioners contended that there was error apparent on the face of record, which needs rectification. In view of various decisions referred to by both sides, there is unanimity between the parties that the review is permissible only when there is error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment to be reviewed in view of Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC. It therefore has to be examined whether there is any apparent error on the face of record. While doing so, the dictum of the court shall be kept in mind that the error apparent must strike the court at once and not on a prolonged sequential logical interpretation. 18. In DOKA SAMUEL V. DR. It therefore has to be examined whether there is any apparent error on the face of record. While doing so, the dictum of the court shall be kept in mind that the error apparent must strike the court at once and not on a prolonged sequential logical interpretation. 18. In DOKA SAMUEL V. DR. JACOB (199) 4 SCC 478 it was held that the omission of the counsel to cite an authority of law does not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record so as to furnish a ground of review. The Karnataka High Court clarified in B. SHARMA RAO V. H.Q. ASSISTANT 1997 AIHC 911 (Kant) that possibility of two interpretations of a provision of law is no ground of review. 19. In HARIDAS DAS (1 supra), the Supreme Court considered that there were only three circumstances in which review of a judgment or order is permissible, viz., i) discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the appellant; ii) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and iii) on account of some mistakes or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason. 20. Karnataka High Court had succinctly put it in G. VENKATESH V. C. GANGAIAH (2008) 3 ICC 435 that review was permissible under five circumstances viz., i) review can be made only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record, ii) if a party has not highlighted all aspects of the case, it is not a ground on the basis of HARIDAS DAS (1 supra); iii) review of its order can be made only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Omission on the part of the learned counsel for the review petitioners to cite an authority of law does not amount to error apparent on the face of the record (on the basis of DOKA SAMUEL (7 supra); iv) review court shall not act as an appellate Court, as noticed in MEERA BHANJA (2 supra); and v) counsel's failure to cite authorities does not amount to error apparent on the face of the record. 21. In RAJA SHATRUNJIT V. MOHD. 21. In RAJA SHATRUNJIT V. MOHD. AZMAT (2008) 3 ICC 435, it was noticed that a review would lie if a judgment was rendered erroneously on account of an amendment of an act which was brought out with retrospective effect. In GULAM ABBAS V. MULLA ABDUL (1970) 3 SCC 643 when court did not consider a circular having the force of law, the Supreme Court considered it to be a ground to review its earlier judgment. It STATE OF WEST BENGAL V. KAMAL (2008) 8 SCC 612 it was noticed that an order or a decision or judgment could not be corrected merely because it was erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the Court on a point of fact or law and that the review court could not sit in appeal over the decision under review. However, in GREEN VIEW TEA AND INDUSTRIES V. COLLECTOR (2004) 4 SCC 122 , the Supreme Court held that review was permissible where the High Court did not consider the material evidence on record on the ground that it would constitute an error apparent on the face of the record. 22. It is the contention of the senior counsel for the review petitioners that the Division Bench committed patent errors which are errors on the face of the record, so much so, it is a fit case to review the order. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners contended that the very approach of the Division Bench was erroneous and did not confirm to the legal principles. It may be noticed that one Sri A.D.V. Reddy, Settlement Officer passed orders as a primary authority on 25.10.1982 in favour of Puligoru Gopal Reddy against the Tahsildar, Chandragiri. The learned Special Government Pleader representing the learned Advocate General inter alia attacked the findings of the Settlement Officer contending that the Settlement Officer passed orders deliberately with a view to help the claimant who is one of the review petitioners. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners submitted that in the appeal, Government filed a memo casting aspirations against the Settlement Officer in general prejudicing the mind of the Division Bench. 23. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners submitted that in the appeal, Government filed a memo casting aspirations against the Settlement Officer in general prejudicing the mind of the Division Bench. 23. He further submitted that although such a plea was not taken in the writ appeal, the learned Advocate General submitted before the Division Bench about the misconduct of the Settlement Officer; and contended that the Division Bench had taken note of the same. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners submitted that the claim about the misconduct of the then Settlement Officer prejudiced the minds of the learned Judges of the Division Bench. We are afraid that we cannot accept this submission of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. The submission of the learned Advocate General certainly cannot prejudice the mind of the court to judge the whole issue prejudicially. 24. At any rate, from a reading of the common judgment of the Division Bench, it does not appear that the Division Bench reversed the finding of the learned Single Judge in view of the misconduct of the Settlement Officer in disposing the application under Section 11 (a) of the Estate Abolition Act, through orders dated 25.10.1982. 25. The Division Bench sat in judgment over the decision of the learned Single Judge and not over the orders of the Settlement Officer in the application under Section 11 (a) of the Estate Abolition Act. The Settlement Officer, the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement, the Commissioner of Appeals and ultimately a learned Single Judge reached identical conclusions that the review petitioners herein were entitled to ryotwari pattas in respect of Survey No.46, Akkrampalli village. When the learned Single Judge could not be prejudiced by the alleged misconduct of the Special Officer, it may not be correct to consider that the Division Bench was prejudiced by the allegation that the Special Officer committed misconduct in the disposal of the application of the review petitioners. Further, we are unable to agree with the claim of prejudice; assuming that the learned judges of the Division Bench were prejudiced, it would not be a good ground for review, whether it would be a good ground for appeal or not. Viewed in any angle, we are not impressed with this contention of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. Viewed in any angle, we are not impressed with this contention of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners. We consequently reject this contention of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners that the Division Bench was prejudiced by the fact that the Settlement Officer allegedly committed misconduct in passing orders in application under Section 11(a) of the Estate Abolition Act. 26. The review petitioners were grantees of ryotwari pattas, apart from other survey numbers in respect of Sy.No.46 also. The Settlement Officer granted pattas in their favour through orders dated 25.10.1982. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri, who was the respondent before the Settlement Officer, did not prefer any appeal to the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement from the orders of the Settlement Officer. The Special Commissioner-cum-Director of the Settlement took up suo motu review under Section 5 (2) of the Estate Abolition Act on the basis of the report of the District Collector. The learned senior counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Special Commissioner-cum- Director of Settlement heard the counsel for the District Collector and grantees and dismissed the appeal as he did not find any mistake in the order of the Settlement Officer. The Tahsildar, Chandragiri then preferred a revision before the Commissioner of Appeals questioning the orders of the Special Commissioner-cum-Director of Settlement. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners contended that the revision under Section 7 (d) of the Estate Abolition Act was not maintainable. 27. Section 7 (d) of the Estate Abolition Act empowers the Board of Review to cancel or revise any order, act or proceeding of the Director or the District Collector. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the learned senior counsel that the Commissioner of Appeals had no authority to entertain the revision. Added to it, the review petitioners participated in the revision before the Commissioner of Appeals. Indeed, the order of the learned Commissioner of Appeals went in favour of the review petitioners herein. It would appear that the District Collector addressed the Government through letter dated 21.05.2002 seeking permission of the Government to file a writ petition challenging the orders of the Commissioner of Police. Curiously, Government passed orders on 27.09.2002 rejecting the request of the District Collector. Curious because, despite such rejection, the Tahsildar, Chandragiri, filed Writ Petition No.22868 of 2002 before this Court challenging the order of the learned Commissioner of Appeals. Curiously, Government passed orders on 27.09.2002 rejecting the request of the District Collector. Curious because, despite such rejection, the Tahsildar, Chandragiri, filed Writ Petition No.22868 of 2002 before this Court challenging the order of the learned Commissioner of Appeals. The fate of W.P.No.22868 of 2002 together with W.P.No.22656 of 2002 had already been noticed. It may be clarified that although common orders were passed in Writ Appeal Nos.1802 and 1817 of 2005 and 731 of 2006 as well as W.P.No.8346 of 2000 on 30.04.2011, this review is only in respect of W.A.No.1817 of 2005 which was an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.22868 of 2002 dated 08.08.2005. 28. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners submitted that the Division Bench took into account several facts which did not fall for consideration and which were not argued before the learned Single Judge both on question of fact and question of law. He contended that the learned Single Judge was hearing W.P.No.22868 of 2002 exercising jurisdiction under Writ of Certiorari examining the order of the learned Commissioner of Appeals. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners submitted that the main contention before the learned Single Judge was that the delay in filing an application under Section 11 (a) of the Estate Abolition Act before the Settlement Officer was condoned without adequate opportunity to the Tahsildar, Chandragiri and that the learned Single Judge repelled the contention on the ground that the Tahsildar filed counter and participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer. He also pointed out that the learned Single Judge held that there was no illegality in condoning the delay in filing application under Section 11 (a) of the Estate Abolition Act. The learned senior counsel submitted that the scope of the writ appeal could not be beyond the very scope of Certiorari jurisdiction. He submitted that Certiorari jurisdiction is not akin to the jurisdiction in appeal unless there are errors of fact and law. The learned counsel for the review petitioners referred to the observation of the Division Bench. The Division Bench held (in para 17 of the judgment under review) that in exercise of jurisdiction under Clause-15 of Letters Patent, the Division Bench could go into all questions of fact and law as a first appellate Court. The learned counsel for the review petitioners referred to the observation of the Division Bench. The Division Bench held (in para 17 of the judgment under review) that in exercise of jurisdiction under Clause-15 of Letters Patent, the Division Bench could go into all questions of fact and law as a first appellate Court. The Division Bench placed reliance upon ASHA DEVI V. DUKHI SAO ( AIR 1974 SC 2048 ) where the Court approved its earlier unreported decision in ALAPATI KASI VISWANATHAM V. A. SIVARAMA KRISHNAYYA, Wanchoo, J as he then was observed that in ALAPATI KASI VISWANATHAM that a Letters Patient Appeal from the judgment of a learned Single Judge in first appeal to the High Court is not exactly equivalent to a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, it cannot be held that a Letters Patient Appeal of this kind can only lie on a question of law and not otherwise. The matter would have been different if the Letters Patent Appeal was from a decision of a learned Single Judge in a second appeal to the High Court. 30. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners contended that the Division Bench held that it could examine the factual aspects in the Letters Patent Appeal and decided the controversy by examining the facts of the case. He submitted that when a Letters Patent Appeal arises from a Writ of Certiorari, the Division Bench as the appellate Court cannot go beyond the powers conferred upon by the writ court. The powers of Court under a Writ of Certiorari are no more res integra. Well settled principles have been developed by the courts of record as to the circumstances in which a Writ of Certiorari could be issued. Certainly, questions of fact are beyond the pale of a Writ of Certiorari unless the findings are perverse. We agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners that the appellate Court should not go beyond the powers of the primary court in deciding the appeal. What powers the learned Single Judge could not exercise in a Writ of Certiorari certainly cannot be exercised by the Division Bench as an appellate Court in a Letters Patent Appeal. 31. What powers the learned Single Judge could not exercise in a Writ of Certiorari certainly cannot be exercised by the Division Bench as an appellate Court in a Letters Patent Appeal. 31. However, assuming that the Division Bench did not have powers which it had exercised, can it be rectified under the review jurisdiction of the Court is the question before us. We recall the view of the Supreme Court in KAMAL (12 supra) that a decision of the Court cannot be corrected by exercising powers under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC merely because the decision was erroneous in law. The Division Bench perhaps went beyond its powers; but if the Division Bench went beyond its powers in the writ appeal, such an error would be an erroneous decision but not an error apparent on the face of the record and cannot be rectified through review jurisdiction. 32. The Division Bench also referred to BADDULA LAKSHMAIAH V. ANJANEYA SWAMI TEMPLE [ (1996) 3 SCC 52 ]. In the cited case, the Supreme Court held that the Court in a Letters Patent Appeal has the same powers as that of the Single Judge and that the Letters Patent Appeal is merely a process of rectification by court of its own order. It is again contended by the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners that in spite of the view of the Supreme Court in BADDULA LAXMAIAH, the Division Benchwent into all questions of controversy which were not before the learned Single Judge and that it is a patent error apparent on the face of record. We consider that the non-application of or erroneous application of the view of the Supreme Court cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record. It would indeed be an erroneous decision which can be rectified only by a superior court. 33. Both sides went into the question of merits of the decision of the Division Bench. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners indeed submitted that the decision of the Division Bench was erroneous and needs to be reviewed. He consequently has taken us through the legal position with reference to the Estate Abolition Act and submitted that the finding of the learned Single Judge was in accordance with the law. The learned senior counsel for the review petitioners indeed submitted that the decision of the Division Bench was erroneous and needs to be reviewed. He consequently has taken us through the legal position with reference to the Estate Abolition Act and submitted that the finding of the learned Single Judge was in accordance with the law. The learned Special Government Pleader, however, also argued on the facts of the case and supported the decision of the Division Bench apart from contending that the decision of the High Court was not subject to review. 34. A fundamental question was raised whether the very review petition was not maintainable after the disposal of the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. In NATIONAL HOUSING COOPERATIVE SOCIETY V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN (2005) 12 SCC 149, it was noticed that when the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition in limine by a non-speaking order during the pendnecy of a review application before the High Court, it would be competent for the High Court to review the matter. In KUNHAYAMMED v. STATE OF KERALA (2000) 6 SCC 359 , the Supreme Court noted that when it dismissed a Special Leave Petition through a non-speaking and non-reasoned order, the order of the High Court would not stand merged in the non-speaking and non-reasoned order in the Special Leave Petition and that in such circumstances, the order in question can still be reviewed before the High Court. Consequently, merely because civil appeals filed through Special Leave Petitions were disposed of by the Supreme Court on 26.09.2011, this review petition cannot be rejected as not maintainable. Another question that may be clarified is that this Court held in. In re SRINADHAN AIR 1963 AP 18 that Letters Patent Judgments are reviewable. Consequently, the present review application is maintainable. 35. Regarding the merits of the review, it may be pointed out at the outset that before the Supreme Court, what would appear to have been contended as can be culled out from the order of the Supreme Court dated 26.09.2011 is that revenue records including field map were not considered by the Division Bench. The Supreme Court left it open for the review petitioners to move appropriate forum. Indeed, it is settled law that if the court did not consider the case of a party, that party may seek for a review. The Supreme Court left it open for the review petitioners to move appropriate forum. Indeed, it is settled law that if the court did not consider the case of a party, that party may seek for a review. However, a perusal of the grounds of review would show that it is not about the failure of the Division Bench to consider revenue record that is taken as a ground of review. We make it clear that it is not necessary for the review petitioners to raise the ground that the earlier Division Bench did not consider the documents as the only ground for review. The petitioners may raise other ground permissible under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. We merely point out that what representation the petitioners made before the Supreme Court is not what they have been canvassing before us. 36. The 1st ground raised by the review petitioners is that the finding of the Division Bench in para 22 of the judgment under review was not correct since Sections 15(1) and 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act are exclusive provisions and that the Division Bench did not consider these submissions. The Court refers to various submissions of the counsel and answers the same. When the Court did not refer to a submission as having been made by a counsel, we take it that such a submission was not advanced before the Court. We cannot accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners that the submission was made and had not been referred to by the Division Bench. It is settled law that what is recorded in the proceedings sheet as well as in the judgment had occurred and cannot be questioned as incorrect. We therefore cannot consider ground No.1 as reasonable and justifiable. 37. The 2nd ground is that the finding of the Division Bench that the Settlement Officer had no power to admit any claim after 08-3-1974 in view of G.O.Ms.No.50, dated 16-01-1974 cannot be accepted where it was contended before the learned single Judge that the delay was condoned by the Settlement Officer, Nellore without hearing the Tahsildar, Chandragiri. 37. The 2nd ground is that the finding of the Division Bench that the Settlement Officer had no power to admit any claim after 08-3-1974 in view of G.O.Ms.No.50, dated 16-01-1974 cannot be accepted where it was contended before the learned single Judge that the delay was condoned by the Settlement Officer, Nellore without hearing the Tahsildar, Chandragiri. Indeed, the contention before the learned single Judge would appear to be that the delay in the petition under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act was condoned by the Settlement Officer without any formal petition from the review petitioners herein and without notice to the Tahsildar, Chandragiri. The learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners and the learned Special Government Pleader for the learned Advocate General have advanced submissions regarding this issue. The learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners submitted that the Tahsildar, Chandragiri, who participated in the proceedings under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act before the Settlement Officer could not subsequently question the condonation of delay by the Settlement Officer since the Tahsildar, Chandragiri participated in the proceedings. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that there was no petition to condone delay and albeit the order reads as if the delay was condoned, the proceedings sheet does not even whisper about the condonation of the delay, let alone the date on which the delay was condoned and that the reference to the condonation of delay in the order in the proceedings dated 25-10-1982 under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act was not correct. In any view of the matter, the condonation of delay by the Settlement Officer without according opportunity to the Tahsildar, Chandragiri is not the ground on which the Division Bench set aside the orders of the learned single Judge. We therefore consider that ground No.2 cannot be accepted to undertake review of the judgment of the Division Bench. Ground Nos.3 and 4 of the review petition also deal with the condonation of delay of petition under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act which has already been referred to by us. 38. Ground No.5 relates to the extent of Paradulagunta being in an extent of Ac.4-00 cts. in Survey No.46 as can be seen from the Field Measurement Book (FMB) is a question of fact where the finding of the Division Bench cannot be reconsidered through a review petition. 38. Ground No.5 relates to the extent of Paradulagunta being in an extent of Ac.4-00 cts. in Survey No.46 as can be seen from the Field Measurement Book (FMB) is a question of fact where the finding of the Division Bench cannot be reconsidered through a review petition. We consequently see no merits in this review petition in respect of ground No.5. 39. Ground No.6 is that the Division Bench did not refer to Exs.P-1 to P-10 exhibited before the Settlement Officer. We are afraid that they do not affect the judgment of the Division Bench in any manner. At any rate, these documents had not even been referred before us except by way of a passing remark, so much so, non-consideration of these documents by the Division Bench cannot be a ground to review the judgment of the Division Bench. 40. The Division Bench indeed referred to the failure of the review petitioners in submitting declarations under the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holding) Act, 1973 (the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, for short). Admittedly, this is a plea which had not been raised either before the learned single Judge or before the Primary Tribunal, Appellate Body or Revisional Body. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners that the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act has no application or reference to the grant or non-grant of pattas under the Estates Abolition Act. The Agricultural Land Ceiling Act deals with the extent of agricultural land held by the family unit as on the cut off date of the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act whereas the Estates Abolition Act deals with grant of pattas as on the date of the abolition of the estates. They are two totally different aspects. The question of the review petitioners declaring the properties covered by Survey No.46 under the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act has no relevance for the issuance of ryotwari patta in favour of the review petitioners. However, the reference to the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act by the Division Bench was considered as one of the circumstances to disbelieve the case of the review petitioners. However, the reference to the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act by the Division Bench was considered as one of the circumstances to disbelieve the case of the review petitioners. We do not deem it appropriate to review the judgment of the Division Bench merely on the ground that the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act has no relevance to the subject matter of the dispute; it has no bearing on the result of the appeal before the Division Bench. We therefore consider that ground No.8 would not entitle the review petitioners to seek for the review of the judgment. 41. Ground No.7 is that the Division Bench ignored grounds Nos.1 and 2 in the notice for suo motu enquiry by the Special Commissioner and Director of Settlement and that the findings of the Special Commissioner and Director of Settlement remained unchallenged. The finding of the Division Bench in this regard cannot be considered to be an error apparent on the face of record by any stretch of argument. We do not find it a ground to consider reviewing the judgment of the Division Bench. 42. Ground No.9 is that the Division Bench failed to refer and consider the judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners. We have gone through the judgment of the Division Bench. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have thoroughly considered the case and arrived at conclusions. Merely non-referring a couple of judgments cited by the review petitioners cannot unsettle the judgment of the Division Bench. 43. Thus, we do not find any ground to review the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.Nos.1802 and 1817 of 2005 and 73 of 2006 and W.P.No.8346 of 2000, dated 30-4-2011. This review petition consequently is dismissed. No costs.