ORDER 1. By invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 8.10.2013 passed in Case No.170-A/2013 by Third Civil Judge Class-II, Gwalior. 2. The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for eviction on the grounds available under section 12 (1) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short, the “1961 Act”). The Court below by order dated 15.5.2013 decided the application preferred by the petitioner/defendant under section 13(1)(2) of the 1961 Act. The Court below opined that there is no dispute between the parties about rate of rent. The dispute is only on the quantum/amount of the rent. Accordingly, the application preferred under section 13(1)(2) of the 1961 Act, filed by the petitioner, is rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an application under sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Annexure P/6). In the said application, the petitioner prayed for condonation of delay in depositing the rent and prayed for permission to deposit the rent. This application is opposed by the plaintiff/respondent. The Court below rejected the said application by the impugned order dated 8.10.2013. 3. Interestingly, Shri Abhishek Bhadoriya and Shri U.K.Jain, learned counsel for the parties, relied on the same judgment of Supreme Court, i.e., (2003) 7 SCC 52 (Sayeda Akhtar v. Abdul Ahad) in support of their rival contentions. 4. It will not be out of place to mention that Shri Abhishek Bhadoriya, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on various Single Bench judgments of this High Court. However, since the judgment of Supreme Court covers the field, I deem it proper to examine the contentions on the anvil of the judgment in Sayeda Akhtar (supra). 5. Before dealing with the said aspect, it is apt to mention that the petitioner has assigned detailed reasons in his application (Annexure P/6) seeking condonation of delay in depositing the rent. However, the Court below has rejected the said contention solely on the ground that under section 148 CPC, the time can be extended when such time is provided or fixed by the Court but under section 13(1) of the 1961 Act, the statutory period/time for depositing the rent is fixed by the Statute itself and not by the Court and, therefore, the said period cannot be extended under section 148 CPC. 6. 6. A bare perusal of this reason makes it clear that the Court below is of the opinion that the statutory time fixed under section 13 (1) of the 1961 Act cannot be extended under section 148 CPC. This matter needs to be examined from two angles. Firstly, whether section 13 (1) of the 1961 Act at all prohibits the Court to extend the time limit. Secondly, if section 13(1), for any reason, permits the Court to exercise the jurisdiction to extend time, whether such prayer can be rejected merely because the application is captioned as one preferred under section 148 CPC. 7. This is settled in law that wrong quoting of provision does not debar/preclude the Courts to exercise the jurisdiction if it can be otherwise traced. See, (2011) 2 SCC 591 (State of Jharkhand and others v. Pakur Jagran Manch and others) (Para 22). 8. Now the basic question is that whether under section 13 (1) of the 1961 Act, the Court has jurisdiction to consider the prayer of condonation of delay in depositing the rent ? 9. Shri Abhishek Bhadoriya, on the one hand, contended that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the time whereas Shri Jain submits that the Court does not have. In the opinion of this Court, this point has already been decided by the apex Court in Sayeda Akhtar (supra). Para 6 reads as under:- “6. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly go to show that although the Court has the jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the rent both for the period during which the tenant had defaulted as well as the period subsequent thereto but an application is to be made therefor. The provision requiring an application to be made is indisputably necessary for the purpose of showing sufficient cause as to why such deposit could not be made within the time granted by the Court. The Court does not extend time or condone the delay on mere sympathy. It will exercise its discretion judicially and on a finding of existence of sufficient cause.” A bare perusal of this law laid down by the Supreme Court makes it clear that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the rent but such power has to be exercised on showing sufficient cause and on an application made by the party. The extension of time or condonation of delay cannot be based on any misplaced sympathy. 10. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that under section 13(1) of the 1961 Act, the Court below had no jurisdiction to extend the time. 11. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, it is clear that the Court below has rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that under section 148 CPC, no such power of condonation can be exercised by the Court. Since wrong quoting of provision cannot be a ground for not exercising the power and Court below has not considered the application (Annexure P/6) on merits, I deem it proper to set aside the order dated 8.10.2013 and remit the matter back to the Court below to consider Annexure P-6 on merits and after hearing the parties pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any view on merits based on Annexure P-6 and it will be open for the Court below to consider and decide Annexure P-6 in accordance with law. 12. Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.