JUDGMENT : - Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—The matter comes up for final disposal at admission stage as per orders passed by this Court on 26th of May 2014. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. On 26th of May 2014, learned counsel for the petitioner made a request seeking permission of the Court to withdraw the writ petition. The prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was opposed by learned counsel for the respondents and thereunder following order was passed: "Heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner wants to withdraw this writ petition but learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent vehemently opposed the prayer and submits that there is fining of misleading this court in the order dated 7.4.2014 therefore, petitioner is not entitled for any relief prayed for. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the matter is required to be decided on merit, therefore matter may be heard if not then the stay may be vacated. It is true that co-ordinate Bench of this Court passed an order on 7.4.2014 in which, certain observations are made with regard to conduct of the petitioner Association but upon raising objection by the respondents' counsel, I deem it appropriate to hear this matter finally because this writ petition is pending since 2011, therefore, list this matter on 10.7.2014 in first ten cases on this date, matter may be decided finally. The stay order granted by this court shall remain in force till text date of hearing." 3. Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, has submitted that petitioner is well within his right to seek permission of the Court to withdraw the writ petition and therefore permission be granted for withdrawal of the writ petition. Mr. Joshi has urged that an aggrieved party, who has approached this Court, can withdraw the petition at any stage and Order 23 Rule 1 Sub-rule (1) give unqualified right to the suitor to withdraw suit or the proceedings. In support of his contention, Mr. Joshi has placed reliance on a verdict of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of M/s. Hulas Rai Baij Nath vs. Firm K.B. Bass & Co. In support of his contention, Mr. Joshi has placed reliance on a verdict of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of M/s. Hulas Rai Baij Nath vs. Firm K.B. Bass & Co. ( AIR 1968 SC 111 ), wherein while examining the true purport of Order 23 Rule 1 sub-rule (1) of CPC, Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "In any case, we do not think that any defendant in a suit for rendition of accounts can insist that the plaintiff must be compelled to proceed with the suit at such a stage as the one at which the respondent in the present case applied for withdrawal of the suit. 4. Mr. Joshi has also placed reliance on yet another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shaik Hussain & Sons vs. M.G. Kannaiah & Anr. (1981) 3 SCC 71 ). In this verdict on the right of an aggrieved individual to withdraw petition, Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "...It is not necessary for us to go into the merits of the case when the respondent himself did not want to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court or having invoked the same did not want to press this writ petition. For these reasons, therefore, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court in appeal as also that of the single Judge allowing the writ petition. The result of our order would be that the writ petition before the High Court would be treated as having been withdrawn and not pressed. The appeal is accordingly allowed but as the respondent has not appeared, there will be no orders as to costs." 5. Vehemently opposing the prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Kamal Dave, has submitted that looking to the conduct of the petitioner permission to withdraw the writ petition cannot be granted. Mr. Dave has argued that petition has been filed by an unauthorized person by projecting himself as Secretary of the society whereas in fact no such society is in existence, therefore, permission cannot be granted. Mr. Kamal Dave, has submitted that looking to the conduct of the petitioner permission to withdraw the writ petition cannot be granted. Mr. Dave has argued that petition has been filed by an unauthorized person by projecting himself as Secretary of the society whereas in fact no such society is in existence, therefore, permission cannot be granted. Mr. Dave would contend that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands, clean mind and clean object and the entire petition is founded on false and misleading facts, and therefore, looking to the conduct of the petitioner, permission to withdraw the same is liable to be declined and petition merits dismissal with costs. For substantiating his contentions, Mr. Dave has also placed reliance on the order passed by this Court on 7th of April 2014 whereby application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC laid on behalf of petitioner was rejected while deploring the conduct of the petitioner. Mr. Dave has also contended that by filing this petition, the petitioner has abused the process of law, therefore, no indulgence can be granted and the petition is liable to be thrown away. In support of his arguments, Mr. Dave has placed reliance on the following verdicts of the Hon'ble Apex Court. 1. Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 114 ) 2. Prestiage Lights Limited vs. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC 449 ) 3. Rakesh Kumar Goel & Ors. vs. Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 263) 4. Agricultural and Processed Food Products vs. Oswal Agro Furane & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 297 ) 5. South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. vs. State of M.P. & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 648 ) 6. Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Limited vs. Indian Railway Major and Minor Caterers Association & Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 792). 6. In Dalip Singh's case (supra), while deprecating the practice of a litigant to abuse the process of law, Hon'ble Apex Court made following observations: 1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa" (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. 6. In Dalip Singh's case (supra), while deprecating the practice of a litigant to abuse the process of law, Hon'ble Apex Court made following observations: 1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa" (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has been drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. 2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. 7. Ultimately, the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the appeal while observing as under: 10. In K.D. Sharma vs. Sail the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayashree vs. Bhagwandas S. Patel. 8. In Prestige Lights Limited's case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has held that prerogative remedy is not available as a matter of course. The same rule was reiterated in G. Jayashree vs. Bhagwandas S. Patel. 8. In Prestige Lights Limited's case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has held that prerogative remedy is not available as a matter of course. While exercising such jurisdiction, conduct of litigant is to be looked into. The Court ultimately held in Para 33 as under: 33. It is thus clear that though the appellant Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a court of law is also a court of equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the writ court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. 9. In Rakesh Kumar Goel's case (supra), while seriously deprecating the conduct of a litigant for abusing process of law/Court and practicing fraud on the Court, Hon'ble Apex Court imposed exemplary costs by observing that Court is not for manipulators. Court held in Para 48 as under: 48. But this case certainly calls for exemplary costs to the appellants. We wish to make it absolutely clear that this Court is not for manipulators, speculators and land grabbers. The litigation in this Court is not like buying a lottery ticket that, if luck favours, might bring a windfall (even though illegitimate) but would cost no more than the expenses of litigation. That is not the way of this Court. We, accordingly, impose costs of Rs. 2 lakhs on each of the two appellants. The amount of cost must be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee within 12 weeks from today. In case receipts showing payment of the cost is not filed within the time as directed, the amount of cost shall be realised from the appellants as fine under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. The amount of cost must be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee within 12 weeks from today. In case receipts showing payment of the cost is not filed within the time as directed, the amount of cost shall be realised from the appellants as fine under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. In Agricultural and Processed Food Products' case (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court disapproved the practice of a litigant who obtains an incorrect order, by observing that he cannot gain any profit from the infraction of law. The Court made following observations in Para 49 & 50: 49. Neither in the writ petition nor in the application for stay, was there any prayer with regard to non-payment of excise duty by Oswal Agro. Even if the impugned clause (vi) in the amended licence, which made it obligatory for Oswal Agro to export its entire quantity of edible rice bran oil, had been quashed even then for the purposes of removing the oil from the bonded warehouse for sale in the domestic market, excise duty in any case was payable. Under no circumstances, was Oswal Agro entitled to any order, interim or final, which could have allowed it to clear the goods without payment of excise duty. The High Court clearly overlooked the statutory provisions of Sections 3 and 5-A of the Act and Oswal Agro got an unfair and undue advantage as a reason thereof. It is, therefore, not only liable to pay the amount of excise duty which was due and payable but it also has to pay interest thereon. 50. What is the rate of interest which should be paid on the amount of excise duty payable is the next question. In a case like the present, Oswal Agro has clearly gained an undue advantage by obtaining an order which it was not entitled to get in accordance with law. Oswal Agro which is a commercial organisation had approached the High Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India purportedly to get justice. In actual fact it sought and obtained interim orders which resulted in its not becoming liable to pay excise duty which, under no circumstances, could have been a matter of dispute. In actual fact it sought and obtained interim orders which resulted in its not becoming liable to pay excise duty which, under no circumstances, could have been a matter of dispute. A litigant who obtains an incorrect order and does not pay the statutory dues should not be allowed to make any profit or gain from the infraction of law. The money which was legitimately due to the Government has been utilised by Oswal Agro in its business. Dealing with such cases which have financial implications involving business houses or companies it is the commercial principles which must be applied by the court while ordering payment of interest. Had Oswal Agro, instead of using the government money, obtained the said amount of loan from a bank, it would have had to pay interest thereon at the bank rate then prevailing. A lending institution like a bank would normally have advanced money for the purposes of business at the bank rate which is fixed with periodical rest. In addition thereto, a bank would normally also obtain a collateral security so as to safeguard the loan advanced by it. Oswal Agro has, on the other hand, not paid the excise dues to the Government and the government money has presumably been used in its business. No collateral security has been furnished by them because none was ordered by the court. Under these circumstances, there is no reason as to why Oswal Agro should not be required to pay at least that rate or interest, and on such terms, as it would have to pay to a bank if that amount of money had been obtained by it on loan. Keeping this principle in mind, it would be just and proper that Oswal Agro be directed to pay, in addition to the exercise duty payable, interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 11. In South Eastern Coalfields Limited (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that no party can suffer by an act of the Court, more particularly when Court has acted on certain facts which were not correctly apprised to it by a litigant. The Court held in Para 28 as under: 28. 11. In South Eastern Coalfields Limited (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that no party can suffer by an act of the Court, more particularly when Court has acted on certain facts which were not correctly apprised to it by a litigant. The Court held in Para 28 as under: 28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule confined on an erroneous act of the court; the "act of the court" embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not only what the party excluded would have made but also what the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in the same position in which they would have been had the court not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction with what is real and substantial justice. The injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding the release of money had remained in operation. 12. I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made at Bar and perused the legal precedents on which the reliance is placed. 13. Before examining the prayer of the petitioner for withdrawal of writ petition, some of the facts which are relevant and germane to the matter deserve due credence. 14. At the threshold, this petition was laid by Mewar Railway Staff & Trolley Sangh by depicting it as a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and one Mr. Bhawani Singh Rajawat has sworn affidavit as Secretary of the society. In the entire petition, as a matter of fact, there is no whisper about the date of registration of the society or the registration number of the society. 15. After service of notice, on behalf of respondents, reply is submitted raising certain preliminary objections about maintainability of the writ petition. Subsequently, on behalf of respondents IA No. 3484 of 2013 was submitted for vacation of stay order and dismissal of the writ petition. In this application, respondents have seriously disputed the status of the petitioner as society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Subsequently, on behalf of respondents IA No. 3484 of 2013 was submitted for vacation of stay order and dismissal of the writ petition. In this application, respondents have seriously disputed the status of the petitioner as society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Along with the application, a letter dated 24th of June 2013 is also annexed, which was addressed to Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, Divisional Office, Ajmer by the Deputy Registrar, Societies, Udaipur with a clear recital that no society like Mewar Railway Staff & Trolley Contractor Sangh is registered as society or NGO. Complete text of letter dated 24th of June 2013 reads as under: ^^dk;kZy; mi-jftLVªkj] lgdkjh lfefr;ka] mn;iqj Øekad&1798 fnukad 24-6-13 Jh ofj"B e.My okf.kT; izcU/kd] e.My dk;kZy;] vtesj fo"k;& esokM+ jsYkos LVky ,.M Vªksyh dkUVsDVlZ la?k ckcr tkudkjhA izlax & vkidk i= fnukad 24-6-13 && * * * * * * * && egksn;] mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr izkalfxd i= }kjk pkgh xbZ lwpuk ds laca/k esa ys[k gS fd dk;kZy; fjdkMZ vuqlkj ^^esokM+ jsyos LVky ,.M Vªksyh dkUVsDVlZ la?k uke ls dksbZ laLFkk ¼,u-th-vks-½ iathd`r ugha gSA lwfpr gksosA Sd/- mi jftLVªkj lgdkjh lfefr;ka mn;iqj** 16. Petitioner submitted its reply to IA No. 3484 of 2013 taking a stand that petitioner is not a society but a registered trade union having registration No. 2/99/vlkVs;w/Udr dated 9th of February 1999. In the reply, it was also averred that individual petitioners are prepared to tender additional court-fees as per Rule 375(4) & (5) of the Rajasthan High Court Rules and by allowing individual members to tender individual court-fees proceedings in the writ petition be allowed to continue. Interestingly, with this reply also affidavit of Bhawani Singh Rajawat was submitted wherein he has shown his status as General Secretary of the society and not trade union. 17. Faced with this awkward situation, petitioner society filed IA No.1590 of 2014 u/Art. 226 of the Constitution of India read with O. 1 R. 10 CPC seeking permission of this Court to implead the individuals mentioned in the applica-tion as petitioners and to permit them to pursue this writ petition jointly. 18. While rejecting IA No. 1590 of 2014, this Court has made following observations on 7th of April 2014: "As a matter of fact, the writ petition was preferred by the Society with the prayer to quash the demand notices issued to the individuals on 12.11.2010 cumulatively as Annex. 3. 18. While rejecting IA No. 1590 of 2014, this Court has made following observations on 7th of April 2014: "As a matter of fact, the writ petition was preferred by the Society with the prayer to quash the demand notices issued to the individuals on 12.11.2010 cumulatively as Annex. 3. Further direction is also sought by the petitioner Society for renewal of license granted to its alleged members to allow their stalls at the Railway Station in adherence of clause 12.2.3 and clause 18.1 of the Catering Policy framed by the Railway Administration in the year 2010. Without entering into the merits into the case at this stage, the fact remains that the petition at the threshold was filed in the name of a Society with a specific averment that the Society is registered under the Societies Registration Act. The affidavit in support of the writ petition was also submitted by one Mr. Bhanwani Singh Ranawat, wherein he has stated on oath that he is the Secretary of Society. There is no material placed on record by the petitioner to show that the Society was registered with the Registrar of Societies. It is further noticed that the petitioner has subsequently pleaded that it is a Trade Union. Now by changing the stand, the petitioner-Society is seeking leave of this Court to permit individuals to pursue this writ petition jointly. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the requisites Court fee on behalf of all the individuals has already been filed, and therefore, they may be permitted to pursue the writ petition. It is trite that extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable jurisdiction and incumbent approaching the court must come with clean hands, clean mind and clean objects. Any individual, or a Society, or a group of individuals, if has made an attempt to mislead the Court, or to plead an averment which turned out to be false, clearly reflects the conduct of the petitioner. Such a conduct cannot be appreciated more particularly when the Court is exercising extraordinary jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to accept this application. Consequently, the application (I.A. No. 1590/2014) is rejected." 19. Such a conduct cannot be appreciated more particularly when the Court is exercising extraordinary jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to accept this application. Consequently, the application (I.A. No. 1590/2014) is rejected." 19. Upon evaluation of the factual matrix of the case, there remains no quarrel that petitioner had changed its stand from time to time and has made an affirmative attempt to mislead this Court inasmuch as at the threshold it has asserted that it was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and when it was unearthed that no such society is in existence, it has switched on to its stand by depicting it as a trade union registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926. In the considered opinion of this Court, status of the petitioner as trade union is also under serious clouds because so called members of the petitioner are licence holders from North Western Railway for Tea Stall, Tea Trolley and Food Trolleys at Udaipur City Station. 20. Section 2(h) of the Trade Union Act 1926, defines "Trade Union", which reads as under: (h) "Trade Union" means any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employees, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions. 21. Therefore, such a trade union is not conceivable. 22. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and it is guilty of suppressing material facts and making patent misstatement of facts. The writ jurisdiction of this Court is discretionary and the law courts are meant for imparting justice between the parties and one who approaches the Court must come with clean hands. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised on equitable considerations and it bounden duty of this Court to prevent perpetration of the legal fraud. Equity is always known to prevent the law from crafty evasion and subtleties invented to evade the law. 23. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised on equitable considerations and it bounden duty of this Court to prevent perpetration of the legal fraud. Equity is always known to prevent the law from crafty evasion and subtleties invented to evade the law. 23. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that a litigant has got right to withdraw the petition, cannot be questioned but once it is noticed by the Court that a litigant has suppressed material facts or has pleaded false and concocted facts to mislead the Court on the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, Court is not loathed to decline the permission for withdrawal of the petition. The legal precedents on which the learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance, and the principles enunciated therein, are applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 24. As the writ petition in the name of alleged society is filed by one Bhawani Singh Rajawat projecting himself as Secretary/General Secretary of the society and there is no semblance of proof about existence of the society, petition has been filed unauthorizedly by Mr. Rajawat to mislead this Court, a request for withdrawal of the writ petition is not entertainable. Accordingly, the prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for withdrawal of writ petition is declined and keeping in view the conduct of the petitioner, it is liable to be non-suited in its pursuit for relief by taking shelter of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction of this Court. 25. Resultantly, this writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/-. Mr. Bhawani Singh Rajawat, the so called Secretary/General Secretary of the petitioner society, shall deposit the amount of costs with the Deputy Registrar, Legal Services Authority, Jodhpur within a fortnight from today. 26. The requisite compliance report be submitted on or before 1.8.2014.