Judgment The 1st respondent filed O.S.No.44 of 1991 against the 2nd respondent in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Ponnur, for recovery of certain amount. The suit was decreed, and after the decree became final, the 1st respondent filed E.P.No.15 of 1997 against the 2nd respondent for enforcement of the decree. Attachment before judgment was obtained in respect of an item of immovable property. Thereafter, the property was put to sale on 04-08-1999. The petitioner emerged as the highest bidder. The sale in favour of the petitioner was confirmed and a sale certificate was issued on 15-12-1999 on deposit of the entire sale consideration. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the 2nd respondent died. Therefore, his legal representatives i.e. respondents 3 to 6 were brought on record. The 6th respondent filed E.A.No.191 of 1997 under Rule 58 of Order XXI C.P.C., with a prayer to raise the attachment. That application was dismissed for default on 16-06-1997. She filed E.A.No.128 of 1999 for restoration of the E.A.No.191 of 1997. The said E.A was dismissed on 08-12-1999. Thereupon, the 6th respondent filed C.M.A.No.1 of 2000 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Bapatla. The C.M.A was allowed on 19-09-2001 on condition that the 6th respondent shall deposit certain amount, equivalent to the one deposited by the petitioner towards stamp duty, etc. On account of non-compliance with those conditions, the C.M.A stood dismissed. The 6th respondent filed O.S.No.89 of 2001 against the 1st respondent in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Bapatla with a prayer to declare that herself and her husband are the absolute owners of the property, which was sold in auction, in E.P.15 of 1997. The petitioner herein is said to have been made as party to the suit. The suit was dismissed on 02-07-2007. Thereupon, the 6th respondent and her husband, filed A.S.No.216 of 2007 in the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Guntur. The appeal was dismissed with costs on 24-03-2009. After this ordeal, the petitioner filed E.A.No.555 of 2010, under Rule 92 of Order XXI C.P.C., with a prayer to deliver the vacant possession of the E.P schedule property. Thereupon, the 6th respondent and her husband, filed A.S.No.216 of 2007 in the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge, Guntur. The appeal was dismissed with costs on 24-03-2009. After this ordeal, the petitioner filed E.A.No.555 of 2010, under Rule 92 of Order XXI C.P.C., with a prayer to deliver the vacant possession of the E.P schedule property. On receipt of notice in the E.A., the respondents 3 to 6 filed counter, raising an objection as to the maintainability of the E.A. According to them, the E.A. for delivery of possession of a property, which is sold in execution of a decree, can be filed within one year from the date on which, the sale became absolute, and in the instant case, it was filed long thereafter. The petitioner, on the other hand, pleaded that the sale did not become absolute, till the disposal of A.S.No.216 of 2007, and in that view of the matter, the E.A is very much within limitation. Through order under revision, the Executing Court dismissed the E.A. Hence, this revision. Sri D.V. Chalapathi Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the limitation prescribed under Article 134 of Schedule to the Limitation Act, the limitation for filing an application for delivery of possession of the property, sold in execution of the decree, is one year, the starting point, namely, ‘the date on which, the sale became absolute’, is subject to the finalization of the adjudication of the claim petition and other related proceedings. He submits that the claims vis-à-vis the petition schedule property stood finally disposed of, only with the dismissal of A.S.No.216 of 2007, on 24-03-2009, and the E.A was filed within one year from that date. He contends that the trial Court ought not to have dismissed the E.A. He relied upon certain precedents. The decree in O.S. 44 of 1991, obtained by the 1st respondent against the deceased 2nd respondent became final. The record discloses that an item of immovable property was attached before judgment, under Rule 5 of Order XXXVIII C.P.C. After the decree became final, the 1st respondent filed the E.P. 15 of 1997 for sale of the property. The sale was conducted on 04-08-1999, and the petitioner became the successful bidder. On compliance with the relevant formalities, the sale certificate was issued on 15-12-1999. The sale was conducted on 04-08-1999, and the petitioner became the successful bidder. On compliance with the relevant formalities, the sale certificate was issued on 15-12-1999. The application under Rule 97 of Order 41 C.P.C for delivery of possession, however, was filed on 04-12-2009, i.e. one decade after the sale certificate was issued. The respondents, naturally raised an objection based upon limitation. Article 134 of the Limitation Act reads: The starting point for computation of limitation is the date on which, ‘the sale becomes absolute’. Rules 92 and 94 of Order XXI C.P.C would indicate the date on which, an auction sale can be said to have become absolute. The relevant portion of Rule 92 reads: Description of application Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 134. For delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree. One year When the sale becomes absolute “Rule 92. Salewhen to become absolute or be set aside:- (1) Where no application is made under Rules 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute: Provided that, where any property is sold in execution of a decree pending the final disposal of any claim to, or any objection to the attachment of, such property, the Court shall not confirm such sale until the final disposal of such claim or objection.” From this it is clear that once a sale is confirmed, it shall become absolute. This, however, is subject to there not being any claim or objection to the attachment of the property, by the time the sale is confirmed. In other words, if an application under Rule 58 of Order XXI or other similar proceedings are pending, the Court cannot confirm the sale and thereby, the sale does not become absolute. Rule 92 further provides the procedure to be followed for determining applications filed for setting aside the auction sale, etc. Rule 94 mandates that where a sale of immovable property becomes absolute, the Court shall grant a certificate, specifying that the property is sold. In other words, a sale can become absolute, even before a sale certificate is issued, but once such a certificate is issued, it is a proof of the sale becoming absolute. Rule 94 mandates that where a sale of immovable property becomes absolute, the Court shall grant a certificate, specifying that the property is sold. In other words, a sale can become absolute, even before a sale certificate is issued, but once such a certificate is issued, it is a proof of the sale becoming absolute. Here itself, it needs to be mentioned that, the date of a sale certificate has no relevance, in the context of reckoning the limitation for filing an application for delivery of possession. It is only the date on which, the sale has become absolute, that becomes relevant. The confirmation or issuance of certificates take place on the specific orders passed in that behalf. However, the sale becomes absolute only when no applications are filed, raising objections to the attachment, or sale etc., and even if filed, such applications are rejected, and the rejection assumes finality. Revering to the facts of the case, the sale certificate in favour of the petitioner was given on 15-12-1999. That would certainly indicate that the sale has become absolute on a day, anterior to that date, which, of course, cannot be before 04-08-1999, the date on which the sale has held. If one takes into account, the entire scheme under Rules 92 and 93, the sale certificate cannot be issued as long as the claim petitions in relation to the attachment or auction of the property are pending. E.ANo.191 of 1997, no doubt, was filed by the 6th respondent. However, it was dismissed for default. E.A. 128 of 1999, filed with a prayer to set aside the order of dismissal; was dismissed on 08-12-1999. One week thereafter, the sale certificate was issued. Therefore, no irregularity can be said to have been committed by the Executing Court in issuing the sale certificate. Notwithstanding the fact that a sale certificate was issued on dismissal of a claim petition, if the judgment-debtor carries the matter in appeal, the certificate so issued, would naturally, be subject to the result of the appeal. C.M.A.1 of 2000 filed by the 6th respondent was allowed on 19-09-2001 subject to certain conditions. However, she has not chosen to comply with the conditions. Thereby, C.M.A stood dismissed. Had the 6th respondent complied with the conditions, the sale would have stood set aside, in which case, the sale certificate would become redundant. That did not happen. C.M.A.1 of 2000 filed by the 6th respondent was allowed on 19-09-2001 subject to certain conditions. However, she has not chosen to comply with the conditions. Thereby, C.M.A stood dismissed. Had the 6th respondent complied with the conditions, the sale would have stood set aside, in which case, the sale certificate would become redundant. That did not happen. There would have been every justification for the petitioner to file an application for delivery of possession within one year from 19-09-2001, the date on which the C.M.A 1 of 2001 was dismissed. For reasons best known to him, he did not do so. It was only on 04-12-2009, that the application was filed. The reason stated by the petitioner for filing the E.A at that stage is that the 6th respondent and her husband filed O.S.No.89 of 2001 for declaration to the effect that they are absolute owners of the suit schedule property. On dismissal of the suit, on 02-07-2007, the matter was carried in A.S.No.216 of 2007 and that the appeal was dismissed only on 24-03-2009. In other words, he wanted to exclude the period during which, O.S.No.89 of 2001 and A.S.No.216 of 2007 were pending, in the matter of calculating the period of limitation. The contention of the petitioner can not at all be accepted. What would arrest the period of limitation for filing of an application for delivery of possession from running is the pendency of the applications in the claim petitions, filed under Rule 58 or other similar provisions of Order XXI C.P.C. An independent suit for declaration, which is totally unconnected with the decree under execution can not at all be a factor, to be taken into account, in computation of limitation. The very mandate of Section 47 of C.P.C is that all questions pertaining to execution must be decided in the same suit, and not through a separate suit. An independent suit filed by third parties or the persons, who are parties to the decree, which is under execution, in relation to the property which is brought to sale, in execution of a decree, cannot stop the execution proceedings, unless any specific interim order was passed to that effect. In Second Appeal No.512 of 2013, almost similar question has arisen for consideration before this Court. In that case, the auction sale became absolute on 21-04-2008, but E.A for delivery of possession was filed in 2012. In Second Appeal No.512 of 2013, almost similar question has arisen for consideration before this Court. In that case, the auction sale became absolute on 21-04-2008, but E.A for delivery of possession was filed in 2012. The plea raised by the auction-purchaser was that there was delay in issuance of sale certificate, and that the EA was filed within 10 days from the date of issuing the certificate. That contention was repelled with the following observation: “The sale in the instant case became absolute on 21.04.2008 the E.A. for delivery of possession was filed in 2012. It is clearly beyond the time stipulated under Article 134. The appellant sought to overcome the objection by stating that the sale certificate was issued to him only on 03.02.2012 and hardly within 10 days from that date, he filed the E.A. However, the date of sale certificate becomes hardly of any significance in the context of calculating the limitation. The starting point is the date of confirmation of the sale. The lower Appellate Court has taken note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pattam Khadar Khan v. Pattam Sardar Khan[ (1996)5 SCC 48 ]. Though this Court in Pattan Sardar Khan v. Pattan Rasool Khan [ 1994 (1) ALT 15 ] took the view that the period of limitation must be reckoned from the date of sale certificate, it cannot be said to be correct proposition, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pattam Khadar Khan’s case [ (1996)5 SCC 48 ]. Added to that, in the recent past, this Court in Gampa Srinivasa Ramesh Kumar v. Punagani Venkataramaiah [2002 (4) ALT 639] held that the starting point for limitation is the date of confirmation i.e. when the sale became absolute. The lower Appellate Court has taken correct view of the matter and this Court does not find any substantial question of law in the second appeal.” The same principle gets attracted to the facts of this case. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Kerala High Court in Narayana Pillai Krishna Pillai v. Damodaran Pillai Velayudhan Pillai (AIR 1967 Kerala 159), Karnataka High Court in Rama Nagappa Mahar v. Nagappa Mallappa Mahar & Ors. (AIR 2006 Karnataka 31) and Bombay High Court in Govindrao Sompanrao Kadam v. Gopinath (AIR 1994 Bombay 183). Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Kerala High Court in Narayana Pillai Krishna Pillai v. Damodaran Pillai Velayudhan Pillai (AIR 1967 Kerala 159), Karnataka High Court in Rama Nagappa Mahar v. Nagappa Mallappa Mahar & Ors. (AIR 2006 Karnataka 31) and Bombay High Court in Govindrao Sompanrao Kadam v. Gopinath (AIR 1994 Bombay 183). A perusal of those judgments reveals that they are substantially different from the facts of the present case. The C.R.P is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.