JUDGMENT : AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant - husband against the judgment and decree dated 7.3.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge (FTC), Karnal, whereby the petition filed by him under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short, "the Act") for dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce has been dismissed. 2. A few facts relevant for the decision of the controversy involved as available on the record may be noticed. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 14.4.2000 as per Hindu rites and ceremonies at Karnal. Both the husband and wife lived together at Karnal and out of the wedlock, one child namely Pranshu was born on 29.11.2002. According to the appellant, from the very beginning, the respondent wife was of quarrelsome nature. She was in the habit of going to the house of her parents of and on without the consent and permission of the appellant and his parents. On 20.6.2002, the parents of the respondent again came to the house of the appellant, took the respondent with them and threatened the appellant not to come to their house to take her. In the month of December 2002, the parents of the appellant had convened a panchayat at the house of the parents of the respondent wife which was attended by his mamma, father and other relations. Father of the respondent wife did not permit the family members of the appellant to see the child and the respondent despite persuasion did not come back to her matrimonial home and had rather refused to cohabit with the appellant or to return to the matrimonial home. Ultimately, the appellant filed petition under Section 13 of the Act on the ground of cruelty. The trial court after considering the entire evidence on record dismissed the petition vide judgment and decree dated 7.3.2011 impugned herein. Hence the instant appeal by the appellant husband. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition under Section 13 of the Act. It failed to consider the evidence produced by the appellant regarding the efforts made by him and his family members to resettle the parties.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition under Section 13 of the Act. It failed to consider the evidence produced by the appellant regarding the efforts made by him and his family members to resettle the parties. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and submitted that it was the appellant and his family members who were torturing her at the matrimonial home and did not want to keep her. 5. The trial court after considering the evidence on record and following the proposition of law enunciated by the Apex Court recorded the following findings :- "Applying the above settled proposition of law to the facts in the case in hand and on comprehensive appraisal of the evidence led by both the parties and the matrimonial life of the parties, it comes out that it was the duty of the petitioner to prove that the respondent had committed any act which may amount to cruelty and desertion but the evidence led by the petitioner itself is self contradictory as the petitioner himself has admitted in his ocular evidence that he does not know the reason as to why the baby was dead in the womb and even he did not try to know about the reason of miscarriage. At the same time, it is also deposed by the petitioner that he did not know regarding pregnancy of his wife and even after having two miscarriages he did not make any effort to take the respondent to medical expert. It is also admitted by the petitioner that after the birth of his son, he did not meet either his son or wife. He also did not know about the date of birth of his son and even he met his son after about one or two years of his birth and even he did not try to know about the health of his son. 34.
He also did not know about the date of birth of his son and even he met his son after about one or two years of his birth and even he did not try to know about the health of his son. 34. So far as the corroboration of the evidence of the petitioner is concerned, the petitioner and the examined witnesses have pointed out that dates for leaving the matrimonial house by the respondent or for convening the panchayats just on the guess basis and they were not confirmed at all in which month or on which date they had gone to the house of the respondent to bring her back. The alleged date for convening last panachyat i.e. December 2002 seems to be false one because in the month of December 2002, the respondent and his family members were in PGI Chandigarh and for that purpose the discharge summary of the respondent from PGIMER Chandigarh has been placed on the file which proves and corroborates the version of statement of RW2 who has categorically deposed that on 29.11.2002 the respondent was admitted in PGI Chandigarh where a son was born to her and she was discharged on 22.12.2002, so the statement and stand taken by the petitioner stands falsified that in the month of December 2002 they had convened the panachyat in the house of the respondent. 35. The other contention of the petitioner that the panchayat was convened twice on different dates has no merits because neither any respectable person who might have attended the panchayat has been examined by the petitioner nor any instance or photographs or writing in the panchayat has been produced on the file, rather the respondent has led convincing evidence to prove that the father of the respondent had tried many times to settle the family life of the respondent in the house of the petitioner but the petitioner and his family members did not allow the respondent or her father to enter their house.
The examined witnesses by the petitioner have denied regarding any specific date or time of convening panchayat and even the relatives of the petitioner has also stated that no disturbance was found in the matrimonial house of the petitioner and respondent in their presence and even the conduct of the respondent has been duly proved by the examined witnesses of the petitioner that the respondent heard the advice of them very patiently and peacefully. Once it is established by the respondent that she never deserted the petitioner, rather it is the petitioner who has treated the respondent with utmost cruelty and has deserted her without any rhyme and reason. 36. The admission in the statement of the petitioner that he did not see his son upto one or two years and he also did not take the respondent to any medical expert to know the reason of miscarriage and even he did not get consulted any gynecologist and his conduct in itself is proved for committing cruelty towards the wife and even newly born baby also and there is force in the stand taken by the respondent that she was shunted out from the house of the petitioner in the year 2002 and it is the respondent and her father who tried many times to get the matter settled but all the time it was the fault of the petitioner who did not care for the wishes either of the respondent or her father. 37. Having heard the rival contentions raised by the counsel for the parties and after going through the record available on the file, this court is of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to prove the ground of cruelty or desertion, rather the same are proved against him at the instance of the respondent. Once the ground of cruelty and desertion remain unproved, then certainly the petitioner is not entitled to seek a decree for divorce on false and baseless grounds and accordingly issue No. 1 is hereby returned against the petitioner husband and in favour of the respondent wife." 6. It has been categorically recorded by the trial court that the appellant did not know about the pregnancy of his wife and even after having two miscarriages, he did not make any effort to take the respondent to medical expert. He did not meet either his son or wife.
It has been categorically recorded by the trial court that the appellant did not know about the pregnancy of his wife and even after having two miscarriages, he did not make any effort to take the respondent to medical expert. He did not meet either his son or wife. He did not know about the date of birth of his son. He met his son after about one or two years of his birth. He did no even try to know about the health of his son. It was the respondent and her father who tried many times to get the matter settled but all the times, it was the appellant who did not care for the wishes of the respondent or her family. The trial court after considering the entire evidence on record came to the conclusion that the appellant failed to prove the allegation of cruelty against the respondent wife. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that the findings recorded by the trial court are erroneous or perverse in any manner. 7. Vide order dated September 8, 2014 the entire arrears of maintenance as per the order passed by this Court on 12.12.2011 were ordered to be paid on or before 10.10.2014 failing which the appeal was ordered to be dismissed. The appellant failed to comply with the said order and additionally is not entitled for hearing of the appeal on merits. Consequently, finding no merit in the appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. As a result, CMM No. 73 of 2014 also stands disposed of accordingly.