Judgment : This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to declare the action of respondent No.3 in not completing the enquiry and passing an order, despite lapse of nearly one year from the date of suspension of the petitioners fair price shop authorisation as illegal and arbitrary. The petitioner has pleaded that following the order of suspension, respondent No.3 has issued show-cause notice, dated 18.11.2013, to which he has submitted his explanation on 22.11.2013, and that since then, there is no progress in the enquiry. At the hearing, Sri A.V.V.S.N. Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in D. Sambasiva Rao v. Joint Collector, Guntur ( 2005 (1) ALD 847 ), in support of his submission that if the enquiry is not concluded by the licensing authority within 90 days, the suspension has to be revoked or set aside. I have carefully considered the said judgment. A perusal of the said judgment shows that the learned Judge has observed that in Joint Collector, Kurnool v. A. Neelima ( 1996 (1) APLJ 285 ), a Division Bench of this Court has held that the maximum period of suspension of a dealer can be 90 days and that consequently, if the proceedings are not concluded by the Revenue Divisional Officer within 90 days, suspension has to be revoked or set aside. I have perused the judgment of the Division Bench in Joint Collector (2 supra). In that case, a learned Single Judge of this Court has set aside the order of suspension based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1982 (SC) 65 ) by holding that as per the ratio laid down in the said judgment, if the enquiry is not completed within 90 days, the suspension shall stand automatically revoked. The Division Bench analysed the facts in M/s. Sukwinder Pal Bipal Kumar (3 supra) and observed that in that case, the licence itself contained a clause that the suspension can be made for a maximum period of 90 days. The Division Bench analysed the facts in M/s. Sukwinder Pal Bipal Kumar (3 supra) and observed that in that case, the licence itself contained a clause that the suspension can be made for a maximum period of 90 days. The Division Bench has accordingly clarified the order of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the order passed by him did not lay down the general proposition of law that the maximum period of suspension can only be for a period of 90 days. In that context, the Division Bench has made the following observation - But we must also rush to add that what is reasonable period of suspension will vary from case to case depending upon various factors, though more often than not, a period of 90 days should ordinarily be sufficient to conclude the enquiry. On a careful analysis of the judgments in M/s. Sukwinder Pal Bipal Kumar (3 supra) and Joint Collector (2 supra), I respectfully disagree with the view of the learned Judge in D. Sambasiva Rao (1 supra). As noted hereinbefore, the Division Bench itself has clarified that no general proposition could be laid down that in every case, the maximum period of suspension could be only 90 days and that what is reasonable period of suspension may vary from case to case depending upon various factors. With the above clarification, if the facts of this case are considered, I do not find any reason whatsoever to prolong the enquiry nearly for one year when the allegations on which the impugned order of suspension was passed do not consume substantial time for completion of enquiry and passing a final order. Viewed from this perspective, there is absolutely no justification for respondent No.3 to keep the petitioners authorisation under suspension for more than one year. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. The petitioners authorisation shall stand restored. Respondent No.3 is directed to hold an enquiry, in which he shall given an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard, and pass a final order making an objective and rational approach expeditiously. Subject to the above observations and directions, the writ petition is allowed. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.45121 of 2014 shall stand disposed of as infructuous.