JUDGMENT Hon’ble Suneet Kumar, J.—Heard Sri Amit Bose, Advocate for the appellant and Sri R.K. Chaudhary for the opposite parties. 2. This intra-Court appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 1.9.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 2368 (SS) of 2000 (Ramesh Chandra v. U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Boards and others). The appellant had challenged the order dated 7th March, 2000 dismissing the petitioner from service of the bank on various charges. The petitioner has pleaded violation of principle of natural justice, as he was not provided with appropriate opportunity of hearing. Neither the documents demanded in support of the charges was provided nor he was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses, further no time and place was fixed for enquiry. 3. Learned Single Judge after considering the rival submissions opined that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner and that the appellant failed to produce any substantial evidence in his defence. The writ petition was dismissed as no procedural irregularity in departmental proceedings was found. 4. The submission of Sri Amit Bose, learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner is that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the appellant was prejudiced as no document was supplied alongwith the charge-sheet. Further the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, Senior Manager (Development) District Co-operative Bank Ltd., Bareilly shows that no oral evidence of any kind was led in support of the charges levelled against the appellant, and only a reply was submitted by the appellant to the charge-sheet was taken into consideration. The appellant was found guilty of the charges. There was no discussion by the enquiry officer before drawing the conclusion. 5. The other limb of argument of Sri Amit Bose is that the impugned order with regard to dismissal of service has not been passed after obtaining prior concurrence from the U.P. Co-operative Institutional Service Board, Lucknow (herein after referred to as the Board). The Board had earlier opined vide order dated 16.5.1998 that the appellant was not guilty of the charges levelled against him on the basis of material on record and as such the punishment of dismissal from service proposed against the appellant was harsh and had directed the bank to propose any other punishment. The Board had earlier opined vide order dated 16.5.1998 that the appellant was not guilty of the charges levelled against him on the basis of material on record and as such the punishment of dismissal from service proposed against the appellant was harsh and had directed the bank to propose any other punishment. It was not open for the Board to have reconsidered its opinion/concurrence, under Regulation 87 of the Regulations, as the power to concur could be exercised only once. 6. In rebuttal, Sri Chaudhary learned counsel for the respondent-bank states that the bank had appraised the Board of the seriousness of the misconduct of the appellant/petitioner and on which the Board vide letter dated 16.9.1999 directed the bank to supply copies of the documents to the appellant in the presence of District Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bareilly or an Officer nominated by him and in pursuance thereof, the appellant was directed to appear at the Headquarter of the Bank to inspect/receive the documents requested by him and in response to the said letter the appellant appeared before the authorities and submitted a representation demanding further documents. The said representation was followed by subsequent representations. 7. After providing opportunity of hearing, the bank vide its letter dated 21.10.1999 requested the Secretary of the Board to accord concurrence to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon the appellant/petitioner. The Board vide letter dated 1.3.2000 accorded concurrence under Regulation 87 of the 1975 Regulations. The bank had followed the entire procedure and ample opportunity was given to the petitioner. After considering the documentary evidence available on record, the charges against appellant stood proved and accordingly the appellant was dismissed from service after obtaining prior concurrence of the Board. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is lawful and valid. 8. The appellant/petitioner’s contention that he was not given opportunity cannot be accepted as the appellant/petitioner appeared and participated in the enquiry process after the show-cause notice was issued to him alongwith the enquiry report and was given an opportunity to defend himself. The bank again gave an opportunity on the direction of the Board dated 21.10.1999. 9. The contention of the appellant/petitioner that he was not provided documents as demanded by him is not sufficient to say that the principle of natural justice were violated, as the petitioner did not plead nor demonstrated, as to how, he was prejudiced. The bank again gave an opportunity on the direction of the Board dated 21.10.1999. 9. The contention of the appellant/petitioner that he was not provided documents as demanded by him is not sufficient to say that the principle of natural justice were violated, as the petitioner did not plead nor demonstrated, as to how, he was prejudiced. It is admitted by the appellant that an opportunity was given to him to peruse and inspect the documents. The plea that no oral evidence was taken nor any witness examined, also cannot be accepted as the charges have been sought to be proved on the basis of the documents/ledgers of the bank. One of the main charges against the appellant/petitioner was that under the Liberation of Manual Scavenger and their Rehabilitation Scheme the District Co-operative Banks of the State of Uttar Pradesh could not distribute any loans and the Ram Nagar Branch i.e. the respondent/bank in spite of the prohibition had distributed the loans to the tune of Rs. 1,21,40,000/- between the period 17.1.1995 to 19.10.1995. The appellant/petitioner was the Cashier of the said Branch. The plea that petitioner had only disbursed the loan which was sanctioned by the Branch Manager and the appellant had only carried out the orders of the Branch Manager for disbursement of the loan did not find favour with the enquiry officer and disciplinary authority. The factum that the petitioner being the cashier of the Bank and being a party to the disbursement of loan is not in dispute. This Court in exercise of its power of judicial review cannot go into the sufficiency of the evidence and substitute the findings of the enquiry officer with its own findings. 10. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras v. G. Sundaram, AIR 1965 SC 1103 , has held that : “7. It is well-settled now that a High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in a properly conducted departmental enquiry except when it be shown that the impugned findings were not supported by any evidence. It is well-settled now that a High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in a properly conducted departmental enquiry except when it be shown that the impugned findings were not supported by any evidence. It was so held in State of Orissa v. Murlidhar, AIR 1963 SC 404 , where it was said at p. 408: “Whether or not the evidence on which the Tribunal relied was satisfactory and sufficient for justifying its conclusion would not fall to be considered in a writ petition. That in effect is the approach initially adopted by the High Court at the beginning of its judgment. However, in the subsequent part of the judgment the High Court appears to have been persuaded to appreciate the evidence for itself, and that, in our opinion, is not reasonable or legitimate.” 8. Similar view was emphatically expressed in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR1968 SC 1728, wherein it was said at p. 1726: “The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 9. It is, therefore, clear that the High Court was not competent to consider the question whether the evidence before the Tribunal and the Government was insufficient or unreliable to establish the charge against the respondent. It could have considered only the fact whether there was any evidence at all which, if believed by the Tribunal, would establish the charge against the respondent. Adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge is not a question before the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This view was reiterated in Union of India v. H.C. Goel,.” 11. In State Bank of India v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “13. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the High Court was erred both in law and on facts in interfering with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority by acting as a Court of appeal and re-appreciating the evidence. 22. In the case of T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and others (appellants) v. K. Meerabai (respondent), (2006) 2 SCC 255 , such plea had been rejected by this Court. It was pointed out at page SCC 267 para 29 as under: “29. Mr. Francis also submitted that a sum of Rs. 34,436.85 being 5% of the total loss of Rs. 6,88,735/- is sought to be recovered from the respondent and that the present departmental proceedings is the only known allegation against the respondent and there was no such allegation earlier and, therefore, a lenient view should be taken by this Court and relief prayed for by both the parties can be suitably moulded by this Court. We are unable to agree with the above submission which, in our opinion, has no force. The scope of judicial review is very limited. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. In our view, loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated. In the instant case, respondent employee is found guilty of mis-appropriating the Corporation funds. There is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. In our view, loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated. In the instant case, respondent employee is found guilty of mis-appropriating the Corporation funds. There is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or mis-placed sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefor with the quantum of punishment awarded by the disciplinary and Appellate Authority.” 12. The Supreme Court recently in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and another, (2013) 4 SCC 301 , after considering all the previous judgments has again reiterated the principle of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings and has held that in the departmental enquiry, the nature and standard of proof is not at par with the quasi-judicial and quasi-criminal proceedings; the principle of preponderance is applicable and not the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further considered the parameter of the Court’s power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. The relevant portion of the judgment of Nirmala J. Jhala (supra) is reproduced below : “The decisions referred to hereinabove highlights clearly, the parameter of the Court’s power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. An order can be set-aside if it is based on extraneous grounds, or when there are no grounds at all for passing it or when the grounds are such that, no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but, it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from malafides, dishonest/corrupt practice. In other words, the authority must act in good faith. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined, nor the question of re-appreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct, and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct, and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. The jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. This apart, even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest and only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene.” 14. The appellant/petitioner was given an opportunity to defend himself and lead evidence and the enquiry officer has proved the charges on the basis of the documents available with the bank. He has clearly found that the petitioner had connived with the Branch Manager in disbursing large amount of money in spite of the prohibition of the Head Quarter. 15. This Court does not ordinarily sit in appeal over the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and nor can it interfere with the quantum of punishment unless its conscience is shaken. 16. In Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane, (2005) 3 SCC 254 , Supreme Court has held : “12. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating the corporation’s funds, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal. 13. This Court in the case of Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti, (2001)2 SCC 574 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 469, held in similar circumstances that the act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent therein was not fit to be retained as a conductor. It also held that in such cases there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and thereby interfere with the quantum of punishment. 17. It also held that in such cases there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and thereby interfere with the quantum of punishment. 17. In State Bank of India v. Bela Bagchi and others, (2005) 7 SCC 435 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that : “15. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, [1996] 9 SCC 68, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charge against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance.” 18. The word “prior concurrence” in Regulations 87 would require a consultation process. It is always open to the bank to persuade and impress upon the Board about the seriousness of the matter and seek re-concurrence of the proposed penalty. The concurrence has to be based on objective considerations on the material available on record. It cannot be the subjective satisfaction of the Board. The Board had earlier advised the bank to impose a lesser punishment upon the petitioner but the bank impressed upon the Board of the seriousness of the charge and the involvement of the petitioner, on which the Board vide letter dated 21.10.1999 directed the Bank to again provide opportunity to the petitioner. In compliance of the directions of the Board the petitioner was provided opportunity and the Bank thereafter again sought concurrence from the Board on the proposed punishment of dismissal which was accorded by the Board. In compliance of the directions of the Board the petitioner was provided opportunity and the Bank thereafter again sought concurrence from the Board on the proposed punishment of dismissal which was accorded by the Board. The events clearly show that concurrence was arrived at after consultative process. The Board was not acting as an Appellate Authority. The plea that the Board had reviewed its earlier decision is not correct as concurrence under regulations 87 is an agreement with a decision already taken by the competent authority. There is no finality attached to any step in the process unless a final decision is arrived at by the competent authority. 19. In banking matters once the bank looses faith and confidence in its employee, the bank can chose not to retain such employee. 20. We are of the opinion that there is no palpable illegality in the impugned judgment and order dated 10.9.2012. 21. For the reasons and law stated herein above, the special appeal is devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed.