JUDGMENT (PER ANOOP V. MOHTA, J.) The Petitioners/tenants have essentially challenged the acquisition of land acquired for Respondent No.2“ Shree Siddhivinayak Ganpati Mandir Trust” (for short, “the Siddhivinayak Trust”), constituted under the provisions of “Shree Siddhi Vinayak Ganpati Temple Trust (Prabhadevi) Act, 1980” (for short, “Siddhi Vinayak Trust Act”), though the owner has never challenged the acquisition till this date. 2. It is the case of the Petitioners that they are tenants of Plot No. 901 admeasuring 769 sq. yards: 642.98 sq. meters. According to the Petitioners they were occupying a garage building of 2500 sq. ft, a mezzanine of 800 sq. ft. on the plot and an open area of the plot. Respondent No.2Siddhivinayak Trust owns plot No.904 and has constructed a temple structure of ground + 5 upper floors thereon. Plot No.902 is adjacent to the Temple Plot No.904. Respondent No.3the then owner had entered into Agreement of Sale in respect of Plot No.901 with Century Developers Private Limited, who had undertaken to develop Plot No.901 and had entered into various Agreements including with the Petitioners. Plot No. 901 was even offered for sale on “as is where is” basis by Respondent No.3 to Respondent No.2 Siddhivinayak Trust. Siddhivinayak Trust entered into Agreement with Respondent No.3Owners subject to Respondent No.3 removing all encumbrances including the claim of Century Developers Private Limited, the Petitioners and others. On 10 March 1998, the Siddhivinayak Trust, based upon a resolution, entered into an Agreement with the Petitioners and agreed to pay the compensation of Rs.2,73,50,000/within six months for surrendering of the Petitioners' right, but despite execution of the Agreement, the transaction did not fortify. The Siddhivinayak Trust again expressed their willingness to purchase the final plot with garage standing thereon in 2001. Siddhivinayak Trust, however, could not purchase Plot No. 901. Siddhivinayak Trust ultimately, wrote a letter to the Land and Revenue Ministry for acquisition of Plot No.901 (wrongly described as Plot No.905 and corrected lateron as Plot No. 901). The proposal was accordingly forwarded to the Collector, which was rejected with direction to move the proposal for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act1894 (for short, “LA Act”). 3. Report under Section 5A was submitted to Respondent No.5Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division by Respondent No.4 the Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short, “SLAO”). Substantial amount was deposited accordingly. The proposal was accordingly forwarded to the Collector, which was rejected with direction to move the proposal for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act1894 (for short, “LA Act”). 3. Report under Section 5A was submitted to Respondent No.5Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division by Respondent No.4 the Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short, “SLAO”). Substantial amount was deposited accordingly. By letter dated 9 May 2002, the State Government granted approval under Clause 3 sub Clause (f) (vii) of the LA Act for acquisition of property under Mahim Division. It was also mentioned that a nominal grant of Rs.100/would be paid by the Government as part payment of the compensation amount. The SLAO was appointed in 2002. 4. A Notification under Section 4 issued on 12 September 2002 for acquiring the land/plot in question for “public purpose waiting hall and rest house for the devotees”. After measurement procedure was over, the SLAO issued notice to the Petitioners to appear with objection before 23 December 2002. On 21 December 2002, the Petitioners filed objections and challenged the acquisition. After inspection, the Petitioners filed further objections with the SLAO on 28 December 2002. The Petitioners thereafter, on 8 January 2003, requested for the personal hearing and filed other documents including the Agreement with Respondent No.2the Siddhivinayak Trust of Rs.2,73,50,000/whereby, as alleged, the Siddhivinayak Trust had agreed to pay the compensation for surrendering their rights but that transaction could not fortify. The fact of agreement to receive the compensation by the Petitioners, was never in dispute. The Petitioners received notice from the SLAO for hearing on 17 February 2003. The Petitioners asked for time. 5. Writ Petition No. 551 of 2003 was filed by the Petitioners in February 2003, thereby challenging the sanction of May 2002 and Section 4 Notification. Another notice was given to the Petitioners on 27 February 2003, to attend before the SLAO for personal hearing. The Petitioners filed additional objections with the SLAO on 10 March 2003. The plot number was corrected from 905 to 901 on 29 May 2003 and the corrigendum was issued accordingly. The Petitioners withdrew Writ Petition No. 551 of 2003 on 20 June 2003 with liberty to approach the Court, if the SLAO overruled the Petitioners' objections and issued Section 6 Notification. All the contentions were kept open. The plot number was corrected from 905 to 901 on 29 May 2003 and the corrigendum was issued accordingly. The Petitioners withdrew Writ Petition No. 551 of 2003 on 20 June 2003 with liberty to approach the Court, if the SLAO overruled the Petitioners' objections and issued Section 6 Notification. All the contentions were kept open. The SLAO intimated to the Siddhivinayak Trust/temple to deposit money by communication dated 2 July 2003, which was deposited accordingly. 6. After deciding Section 5A objections, a Notification under Section 6 of the LA Act was issued on 9 July 2003. Respondent No.4the SLAO issued notice under Section 9(3) and (4) on 8 August 2003, calling upon “persons interested” to lodge claims for compensation. On 14 August 2003, the Petitioners filed the present Writ Petition. The Award came to be passed by the SLAO on 16/21 February 2004. A sum of Rs.43,30,360/was awarded to the Petitioners and Rs.1,38,07,302/awarded to the Ambekarsowner of the property. As indicated earlier, the owners never objected to this acquisition, at any point of time. On 17 February 2004, the Siddhivinayak Trust forwarded four cheques, as per the award, aggregating to Rs.2,07,41,792/. The owner accepted and encashed the cheques of Rs.1,38,07,302/. 7. A Notice of Motion was taken out in the Writ Petition for an injunction against the Respondents from taking physical possession of the property without declaring the award under Section 11 of the LA Act by the Petitioners. The possession remained with the Petitioners in view of the statement made by the SLAO on 20 February 2004. The same was confirmed by the Division Bench till further orders on 24 February 2004 and a suggestion for settlement was made with direction to submit the report on the same. 8. Prior thereto, on 16 February 2004 award/order was passed under Section 11 of the LA Act, which was apparently received by the Petitioners, on 3 March 2004. The matter could not be settled. The Petitioners filed reply before the SLAO on 3 March 2004. 9. On 10 March 2005, this Court dismissed the Notice of Motion, as the award was already passed under Section 11 of the LA Act and as the Petitioners had already applied for Reference under Section 18 of the LA Act. On 10 March 2005, the Siddhivinayak Trust, through its agents and security personnel had taken possession of the property. 9. On 10 March 2005, this Court dismissed the Notice of Motion, as the award was already passed under Section 11 of the LA Act and as the Petitioners had already applied for Reference under Section 18 of the LA Act. On 10 March 2005, the Siddhivinayak Trust, through its agents and security personnel had taken possession of the property. Therefore, another Notice of Motion was taken out by the Petitioners on 21 March 2005. On 11 August 2006, the said Notice of Motion was disposed of with directions to Respondent No.2the Siddhivinayak Trust to return the articles of the Petitioners. The Supreme Court in the SLP filed by the Petitioners, by order dated 8 January 2007 directed the Respondents to hand over the articles belonging to the Petitioners and by order dated 7 April 2008, while disposing of the Appeal, directed the High Court to hear the Petition expeditiously. On 10 November 2008, the Chamber Summons of the Petitioners was allowed and thereby permitted to challenge the Award. 10. The matter was adjourned from time to time but, could not be heard finally. In view of the order passed by the Supreme Court, the matter is taken for hearing from the final hearing Board. All the Respondents have filed their affidavits. The rejoinders are also filed, apart from additional affidavits during the period from 19 March 2004 till 25 February 2010. The respective learned Senior Counsel, in support of their contentions, have read and referred various Judgments of the Supreme Court, as well as, of the High Courts. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners has relied upon a compilation of authorities dealing with the issues raised revolving around, “malafides”, “Section5A hearing”, “Natural Justice”, “Public purpose”, “Government Contribution” and “power of Court to mould reliefs under Article 226”. The principles so laid down and reflected in those Judgments are settled, therefore, we are not dealing with those cases so far as the law is concerned. 11 The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondents opposed the prayers of the Petitioners and strongly relied upon the respective affidavits, opposing the Petition. They also relied upon Bajirao T. Kote Vs. State of Maharashtra [ 1995 (2) SCC 442 ] , a Supreme Court Judgment dealing with the similarly situated land acquisition for “Saibaba Sansthan, Shirdi” (for short, “Saibaba Trust”) a similar Public Trust in State of Maharashtra. They also relied upon Bajirao T. Kote Vs. State of Maharashtra [ 1995 (2) SCC 442 ] , a Supreme Court Judgment dealing with the similarly situated land acquisition for “Saibaba Sansthan, Shirdi” (for short, “Saibaba Trust”) a similar Public Trust in State of Maharashtra. The learned Senior Counsel has also relied upon the provisions of the Siddhi Vinayak Trust Act. 12. The Petitioners have filed a written notes in support of their submissions referred to above. We have gone through the pleadings on record and so also the judgments referred by the parties, apart from the provisions of law. We are inclined to dismiss the present Writ Petition after taking note of all the submissions so raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties, mainly for the reasons, which we shall presently indicate. 13. The Petitioners tenant's entitlement to challenge the acquisition and prayer for restoration and compensation, specifically when the owners never objected at any point of time and in fact received the compensation and the References are pending of owner, as well as, of the Petitioners for enhancement of compensation, is no way sufficient to set aside the acquisition proceedings in question. It is relevant to note that the Petitioners' case, including the submissions/written notes are also ultimately for the reasonable compensation and/or enhanced compensation. There is an ample material on record to show that the Petitioners tenants themselves agreed to settle the matter by entering into the agreement for compensation. The amount itself was fixed. The Petitioners were willing to surrender the property on the basis of compensation so agreed upon. The reason though not necessary to be dealt with why the agreement could not be finalized and/or implemented, the fact of agreement itself shows that the Petitioners throughout was interested and entitled only for the compensation. 14. The filing of the Petition at the instance of tenants person interested, is not the issue. But considering the scope and purpose of the LA Act and the Siddhi Vinayak Trust Act the Petitioners' entitlement is not more than compensation. 14. The filing of the Petition at the instance of tenants person interested, is not the issue. But considering the scope and purpose of the LA Act and the Siddhi Vinayak Trust Act the Petitioners' entitlement is not more than compensation. Therefore, the scope and entitlement, even if any, is quite limited, and we are inclined to observe that it is difficult to accept the submission so made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners tenant that such acquisition proceedings can be quashed and set aside and the possession can be restored to the tenant, though the landlord never objected the acquisition and/or never asked for restoration of the plot/land in question. 15. Therefore, merely because the Petition is admitted and listed for final hearing and/or the liberty was granted to the Petitioners to challenge the acquisition after rejection of 5(A) objection, that itself cannot be the reason to accept the case/submission revolving around the contentions so raised by the Petitioners. 16. Another factor is that the statutory provisions so read by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioners referring to the various Supreme Court Judgments including; (i) Radhy Shyam (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [ (2011) 5 SCC 553 ] (ii) Dev Sharan & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. [ (2011) 4 SCC 769 ] (iii) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar & Ors . [(2011) 12 SCC 375] (iv) Prakash Ratan Sinha Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (2009) 14 SCC 690 ] (v) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai &Ors .[ (2005) 7 SCC 627 =AIR 2005 SC 3520] , nowhere specifically deal with and/or consider such challenge, at the instance of such tenants. The challenge by the owner of the property being person interested needs to be placed on different footing than the challenge of such acquisition by the tenants specially when the landlordowner has never objected to such acquisition and in fact accepted the compensation, but praying for enhanced compensation. 17. The writ petition filed by the Petitioner/tenant is not maintainable in view of observation made in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The Industrial Development Investment Co. 17. The writ petition filed by the Petitioner/tenant is not maintainable in view of observation made in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt.Ltd and others , [ (1996) 11 SCC 501 ] , wherein it is held that “It is an equally settled law that a tenant cannot challenge the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act when the landlord himself had accepted the award and received compensation”. However, in the same judgment, it is observed that “In appropriate case such acquisition can be challenged by the tenant”. The same view is expressed in Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja [ (2004) 8 SCC 453 ] . It means the Court needs to consider the above legal position, based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, whether appropriate case is made out by the tenant for such challenge. In the present case, in view of the provisions of law, though we are inclined to observe that as the Petitioner is entitled to claim interest in terms of compensation, we are considering this Petition accordingly. Therefore, having noted above, in the present facts, we are inclined to observe that this is not appropriate case where, at the instance of the tenant/Petitioner, when there is no challenge of any kind raised by the owner to such acquisition, the acquisition proceedings can be quashed and set aside after so many years. This Court has permitted and admitted the Petition, therefore, we have heard the matter, but we are inclined to reject the prayers so made in this Petition by the tenants, but not disturbing his right or entitlement of compensation which he even otherwise entitled to claim in accordance with law. The Petitioners' application for enhancement of compensation is already pending. 18. In Krishan Lal Arneja's case (Supra) at the instance of others, including the owner, the acquisition was set aside and, therefore, challenge at the instance of tenant was entertained by the Supreme Court in that case. The facts in question are totally different and distinguishable. We are inclined to observe that this is not appropriate case to accept the contention of the Petitioner/tenant to quash and set aside acquisition proceedings so initiated for the public purpose i.e. Siddhivinayak Temple Trust. In our view, Saibaba Trust (supra) covers the case of Siddhivinayak Trust in every aspect. 19. The facts in question are totally different and distinguishable. We are inclined to observe that this is not appropriate case to accept the contention of the Petitioner/tenant to quash and set aside acquisition proceedings so initiated for the public purpose i.e. Siddhivinayak Temple Trust. In our view, Saibaba Trust (supra) covers the case of Siddhivinayak Trust in every aspect. 19. The fact about offer of compensation by the Trust/owner/developer to the Petitioners is also not in dispute. This itself means an additional reason to dismiss the Petition as it shows the conduct of Petitioners who, throughout, was interested in compensation. As the same could not materialise, therefore, he continued with his halfhearted challenge to the acquisition in question. The Petitioners itself accepted the mode of settlement as averred, but as compensation amount could not be settled as demanded, therefore, even challenge to award dated 16 February 2004 is made by amendment in 2008 in this Petition. The aspect of delay, latches, conduct, equity, balance of convenience and limitation including subsequent developments, in our view, are additional factors which are against the Petitioners. 20. The tenant's compensation claim, even if any, that itself in our view, cannot be the reason to interfere with the acquisition proceedings so initiated, though at the instance of Siddhivinayak Trust, but it is definitely for “public purpose” as read and referred and held by the Supreme Court in case of “Saibaba Trust”(Supra). The following are the clear findings of the Supreme Court: “(8) IT is seen that the public trust Saibaba Sansthan, Shirdi, needs the land for the public purpose, namely, two temples are needed to be connected by a road though the land occupied by the house sought to be acquired. It is true that Saibaba Temple at Shirdi is run by a public trust maintaining Saibaba Temple at Shirdi and other temples and Dharamshala and prayer hall. Thousands of pilgrims daily visit Saibaba Temple at Shiridi to pay their homage and seek blessings of the mystic secular saint Sri Saibaba. Each religion claims that he belongs to their faith but the great saint never proclaimed himself to be of a particular faith. Therefore, all S. of the people in India have great unflinching faith, devotion and absolute belief in him and every day thousands of pilgrims throng Shirdi to pay their homage and seek his blessings. Each religion claims that he belongs to their faith but the great saint never proclaimed himself to be of a particular faith. Therefore, all S. of the people in India have great unflinching faith, devotion and absolute belief in him and every day thousands of pilgrims throng Shirdi to pay their homage and seek his blessings. (10) BE that as it may, it cannot be gainsaid that providing access to the temples is not a public purpose. The exercise of the power under Section 4 (1) of the Act, therefore, is neither colourable nor mala fide. It is true that this court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, by a bench of three Judges, considering the scope of judicial review of the administrative action (grant of licence by tenders) held that the administrative actions of the State or its instrumentalities are amenable to judicial review. As mentioned earlier when the State governments have exercised the power under Section 4(1) for a public purpose and the public purpose was mentioned therein, the exercise of the power cannot be invalidated on grounds of mala fides or colourable exercise of power so long as the public purpose is shown and the land is needed or is likely to be needed and the purpose subsists at the time of a exercise of the power. It is primarily for the State government to decide whether there exists public purpose or not, and it is not for this court or the High courts to evaluate the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether or not there is public purpose unless it comes to the conclusion that it is a malafide or colourable exercise of the power. In other words the exercise of the power serves no public purpose or it serves a private purpose. (11) IT is true that an attempt was made on an earlier occasion to purchase the property by negotiation but it was turned down by the Charity Commissioner and he refused to grant permission. Consequently, the trust was constrained to approach the government requesting it to acquire the land. The government did consider the circumstances and exercised that power. (11) IT is true that an attempt was made on an earlier occasion to purchase the property by negotiation but it was turned down by the Charity Commissioner and he refused to grant permission. Consequently, the trust was constrained to approach the government requesting it to acquire the land. The government did consider the circumstances and exercised that power. The Act does give the power to negotiate by private sale or even during pending acquisition proceedings negotiations by private sale could be made in which event the need to determine the market value under the Act would be obviated and the compensation would be determined in terms of the agreement reached between the Land Acquisition Officer and the owner of the land or person having an interest in the land, subject to the prior approval of the government. Therefore, the failure to purchase the land by negotiation and the exercise of the power under Section 4(1) thereafter, by no stretch of imagination, be considered to be a mala fide or colourable exercise of the power. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the notification published under Section 4(1) warranting interference. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed but without costs. 21. In this case itself, as averred in the affidavit and as called upon, the Siddhivinayak Trust has placed on record the numbers of devotees who have been visiting for Darshan of Lord Ganesh on different days of the year, are as under:Everyday 45000 to 55000 Tuesday 3.5 to 4.25 lakh Saturday and Sunday 1 to 1.5 lakh Sankashti, Vinayaki Chaturthi 1.5 to 2 lakh Angarika Sankashti Chaturthi 17 to 20 lakh 1st January 10 to 12 lakh Diwali/ Gudi Padwa 3 to 4 lakh 22. Therefore, as rightly contended, the Petitioners' case and the Respondents' defence, in the present facts and circumstances, is governed by and is covered by the case of “ Saibaba Trust” (Supra). The submission that the whole acquisition procedure is malafide and colourable exercise of powers and/or arbitrary, is unacceptable. We are inclined to observe that in the present facts and circumstances, the acquisition was “for the public purpose” and in the “interest of public”. The submission that the whole acquisition procedure is malafide and colourable exercise of powers and/or arbitrary, is unacceptable. We are inclined to observe that in the present facts and circumstances, the acquisition was “for the public purpose” and in the “interest of public”. We are also inclined to observe that in view of above, the present acquisition, though not for State and/or Local Authority and though it is for public charitable trust, it is well within the framework of law, power and the authority. 23. This is also for the reason that there is no dispute that the Management and control of the Trust is based upon the Committee appointed by the Government under the Siddhi Vinayak Trust Act. There is no dispute that Respondent No.2the Siddhivinayak Trust is Public Charitable Trust. Merely because, as contended that Respondent No.2the Siddhivinayak Trust is registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act1950 (for short, “the Public Trusts Act”) also and the Charity Commissioner and/or such Authority has jurisdiction to control and supervise the Trust's management, is no way sufficient to accept the case of the Petitioners that the acquisition is not for “public purpose”. The evidence and material on record support the case of Siddhivinayak Trust. 24. The acquisition was to achieve the aims and objects of Siddhivinayak Trust apart from charitable and public purpose. We have to consider the totality of the matter including the Trust requirement of to use and utilise the temple and its surrounding area/plots. There is no denial to the fact of composite use of all the adjacent plots/properties being used since long, by putting the requisite construction of buildings for the people at large including devotees of all communities. 25. Such acquisition mode, for such public purpose, is recognized and accepted outside of Maharashtra, apart from famous temple of “Thirupati Balaji Trust”. In Maharashtra also similar examples are “Saibaba Trust” and “Pandharpur Trust”. Therefore, to say that such acquisition is not in the interest of public at large and the action is malafide by breaching the provisions of law is unacceptable. The whole proceedings including acquisition, in our view, is in accordance with law. 26. Mere allegation of malafide acquisition is not sufficient to set aside the acquisition. It requires substantial supporting material which are missing in this case. The whole proceedings including acquisition, in our view, is in accordance with law. 26. Mere allegation of malafide acquisition is not sufficient to set aside the acquisition. It requires substantial supporting material which are missing in this case. The disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into at this stage in this proceedings at the instance of Petitioners/tenants. The owner never raised such objection. 27. We are inclined to observe that no case of malafide is made out, though various Judgments are cited in support of their case for the above reasons and undisputed position on record. The plea of malafide is liable to be rejected accordingly. 28. The issue with regard to the Government minimal contribution is also of no assistance, at the instance of the Petitioners tenants, to set aside the acquisition and/or the award. 29. The submission is also made that no hearing under Section 5A of the LA Act was given and therefore, apart from principle of natural justice, noncompliance of this mandatory provisions itself should be the reason to set aside the Notifications and the award in question. We decline to accept even this submission as the affidavit placed on record based upon the material to show that the Petitioners tenant did appear before the concerned officer and filed various objections. It is not the case of no opportunity whatsoever was given. 30. The SLAO, as recorded, had considered the objections filed by all the parties including the Petitioners. The SLAO, after due inquiry, upon receipt of objections forwarded recommendation on the objection filed. The authority after considering the recommendation, on its own merits, decided and made the declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act. As recorded above, we are not inclined to accept the contention so raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioners that no opportunity was given to the Petitioners. The Petitioners, in fact, filed number of objections from time to time in support of their case apart from writ petition so referred above. The submission, therefore, revolving around the principle of natural justice and/or alleged nongrant of hearing, in the present facts and circumstances, specially at the instance of tenant, when landlord and others have not raised any objection in this regard, is unacceptable and can be no reason to set aside the acquisition proceedings so initiated by following the due procedure of law. 31. 31. It is difficult to restore the possession back in view of subsequent development and construction of temple surrounding area for the public at large. The Petitioners tenant in no way can be denied and/or disentitled to the claim compensation in accordance with law. Therefore, the judgments so cited and the contentions so raised revolving around Section 5A hearing and/or respective objections, in the present facts and circumstances, at the instance of the Petitioners, in absence of specific challenge and/or objection by the owner, we are inclined to dismiss and/or reject the contention. Section 6 Notification, therefore, issued by the Government after considering the objections and/or material so placed on record, is well within the framework of law and no interference, at the instance of Petitioners tenant, is called for. 32 For the reasons recorded above, the present Writ Petition is dismissed.