JUDGMENT Heard Mr. Menezes, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Mangeshkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent heard forthwith. 3. By this petition, the petitioners, who are the defendants in Regular Civil Suit no. 46/2011/C, filed against them by the respondents (plaintiffs) have challenged the order dated 10/10/2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, “C” Court at Panaji in the said Suit, thereby granting the application dated 20/09/2013 filed by the respondents for taking on record notarized copy of the declaration dated 06/07/1994 and to exhibit the same and read the same in evidence. 4. Issues were framed in the said suit and the matter was pending for evidence. The plaintiffs filed the said application dated 20/09/2013 for leave to produce the secondary evidence in the form of notarized copy of the declaration dated 06/07/1994, alleging that at the time of finalizing the affidavit-in-evidence to be filed before the trial Court, the plaintiffs realized that the original declaration dated 06/07/1994 was not found in the file. It was further alleged that the original declaration dated 06/07/1994 was misplaced and was not traceable and therefore, the plaintiffs wish to rely upon the secondary evidence. 5. By way of reply dated 03/10/2013, supported by affidavit of the petitioner no. 1, the petitioners had objected to the said application for production of secondary evidence on various grounds. It was alleged by the petitioners that the said declaration is a false and fabricated document and the plaintiffs before producing secondary evidence should prove the existence and execution of the said original document. They denied the existence of the original. It was alleged by the petitioners that the respondents had not proved as to how the said documents were misplaced or lost. 6. By impugned order dated 10/10/2013, the learned trial Court, while granting the said application, did not at all consider the provision of Section 65(C) of the Indian Evidence Act, in its right import. Though the Notary had not certified that he had compared the same with the original, the trial Court observed that it cannot be imputed that the notary had certified the copy to be true copy without seeing the original. Though the Notary had not certified that he had compared the same with the original, the trial Court observed that it cannot be imputed that the notary had certified the copy to be true copy without seeing the original. It observed that Section 79 of the Evidence Act raises a presumption of genuineness of certified copies and that the genuineness of the said document, executed before a notary, otherwise can be decided on merits. 7. Mr. Menezes, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the learned trial Court has not been given any reasons as to why secondary evidence relating to the said declaration is allowed. He read out the provision of Section 65(C) of the Evidence Act. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of “J. Yashoda v/s. K. Shobha Rani”, [ (2007) 5 SCC 730 ] and the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of “Jaldu Ananta Raghuram Arya and others v/s. Rajah Bommadevara Naga Chayadevamma and others” [AIR 1958 Andh. Pra. 418 (V 45 C 122)]. According to the learned Counsel, these judgments were also cited before the trial Judge but they have not at all been considered nor even referred to by the trial Judge. He, therefore, urged that the petition deserves to be allowed. 8. Per contra, Mr. Mangeshkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs submitted that there is mention of the said declaration dated 06/07/1994 made by the petitioner no. 1, in paragraph 15 of the plaint and the copy of the same was annexed to the plaint as Exhibit “D”. According to the learned Counsel, since the notarized copy of the said declaration was on record, the genuineness of the same could not be disputed on account of the provision of Section 79 of the Evidence Act and that even otherwise genuineness of the same can be decided on merits. He further submitted that the plaintiffs had clearly stated in the application as to why the plaintiffs wanted to produce the secondary evidence. 9. I have considered the material produced by the petitioners on record. I have also considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and also have considered the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 10. 9. I have considered the material produced by the petitioners on record. I have also considered the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and also have considered the judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 10. In terms of Section 64 of the Evidence Act, documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the seven cases as mentioned in Section 65, in which cases secondary evidence can be given. Section 65(c) of the Evidence Act provides as under: “65(c) Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;” 11. In view of the above provision, it becomes necessary for the parties seeking to produce secondary evidence to establish that the original has been destroyed or lost. 12. No secondary evidence of a document can be received unless a reason, as deemed sufficient by law, is given for non-production of the primary evidence. The first part of clause (c) of Section 65 of the Evidence Act, permits a party to produce secondary evidence when the document had been destroyed or lost. The second part of said clause (c) comes into play when the party offering secondary evidence of the contents of the document cannot, for any other reason, not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time. Conditions laid down in Section 65 of the Evidence Act must be fulfilled before secondary evidence can be adduced. In the case of “J. Yashoda” (supra), the Apex Court has observed that secondary evidence, as a general rule, is admissible only in the absence of primary evidence in order to enable a party to produce secondary evidence. It is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. It is further observed by Apex Court that if the original, itself, is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents. It is necessary for the party to prove existence and execution of the original document. It is further observed by Apex Court that if the original, itself, is found to be inadmissible through failure of the party, who files it to prove it to be valid, the same party is not entitled to introduce secondary evidence of its contents. In the case of “Jaldu Anant Raghuram Arya and ors.” (supra), it has been held by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court that Section 65 permits reading of secondary evidence only where the original has been destroyed or lost. It is further observed that there must be a sufficient proof of the search for the original to render secondary evidence admissible. It must be established that the party has exhausted all the sources and links for the search of the documents which were available to him. 13. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the learned trial Judge has not at all considered whether the plaintiffs were entitled to produce secondary evidence on record. There is no finding about the satisfaction of the trial Court that the original was destroyed or lost. There is also no finding about the satisfaction regarding existence and execution of the original declaration. Also there is no finding whether the plaintiffs had made appropriate search for the original in order to render secondary evidence admissible. It should be kept in mind that what has been averred by the plaintiffs is only that the original is misplaced and not traceable, which averment is as vague as vagueness can be. As contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, the judgments which were cited before the trial Court have not been considered by the trial Court. 14. In such circumstances, the impugned order is not sustainable. Matter requires to be relegated to the trial Court for fresh decision on the said application for production of secondary evidence, in the light of the above observations. 15. In view of the above, the petition is partly allowed. (a) The impugned order dated 10/10/2013 is quashed and set aside. (b) the Trial Court shall decide the said application dated 20/09/2013 afresh in the light of the observations made above. (c) Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms. 16. The Petition stands disposed of accordingly.