JUDGMENT We have heard Sri C.L. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Ashish Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the States respondents. 2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. Although rejoinder affidavit is not available on record, Sri C.L. Pandey has very fairly supplied the office copy of the same. 3. By means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order dated 21.05.2004 passed by the State Government and as contained in Annexure-15 to the writ petition and the order dated 07.06.2004 passed by the District Magistrate, Sonebhadra as contained in Annexure-16 to the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to the impugned orders has submitted that the application made by the petitioner for renewal of his lease was erroneously rejected and as a consequence thereof the District Magistrate has passed the order dated 07.06.2004 and rejected the application of the petitioner for extension of his lease period. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner had applied for mining lease of lime stone under the provisions of Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1957), wherein Section 8 clearly provides that the maximum period for which a mining lease may be granted shall not exceed 30 years, however, the proviso to Section 8(1) of the Act further provides that the minimum period for which any such mining lease may be granted shall not be of less than 20 years. He has referred to the mining lease filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition and states that clearly the grant of mining lease under the provisions of U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 1963 Rules) was erroneous hence the grant of mining lease for the period of 5 years was illegal. He submits that the said period had expired and the petitioner had filed an application for renewal which was illegally rejected by the impugned order. He has further stated that in the absence of a notification under the Wild Life Protection Act the lease of the petitioner could not be canceled hence was liable to be renewed. According to him there is no notification even under the Forest Act and the Settlement Officer has excluded this area from the Forest Act. 5. He has further stated that in the absence of a notification under the Wild Life Protection Act the lease of the petitioner could not be canceled hence was liable to be renewed. According to him there is no notification even under the Forest Act and the Settlement Officer has excluded this area from the Forest Act. 5. Learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the petitioner has himself applied under the provisions of 1963 U.P. Rules and under those Rules the period of grant of mining lease is for five years which can be renewed from time to time. He, therefore, states that the application of the petitioner to the effect that his mining lease ought to have been in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 of the Act is incorrect. He states that the adjacent plot has been notified under Section 4 of the Forest Act hence the non renewal was in accordance with law. Learned Standing Counsel has further stated that the lease granted to the petitioner was under the U.P. Minor Mineral (Concession) Rules, 1963 as is clear from the lease deed itself. He therefore justifies the impugned orders. However he has submitted that the petitioner has enjoyed mining rights from 11.02.1994 till his interim order dated 17.06.2004 was not extended on 13.03.2014. According to him the petitioner has enjoyed mining rights from 11.02.1994 to 13.03.2014 which is slightly more than 20 years. He states that the submission of the petitioner on Section 8 of the Act of 1957 is academic and does not require any consideration in the facts and circumstances of this case. 6. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. When the petitioner's application for renewal of his lease was rejected on 21.05.2004 and 07.06.2004 by the impugned orders, he preferred this writ petition and on 17.06.2004 the following interim order was granted: - "Shri S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Chief Standing Counsel takes notices on behalf of respondents. He may file counter affidavit within two weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within one week thereafter. List the matter on 12th July, 2004. Meanwhile, status quo as on the date of first impugned order, shall be maintained regarding excavation" 8. He may file counter affidavit within two weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within one week thereafter. List the matter on 12th July, 2004. Meanwhile, status quo as on the date of first impugned order, shall be maintained regarding excavation" 8. It is not in dispute that the interim order was operating till 17.04.2014 when it was not extended due to absence of learned counsel for the petitioner. An Application No.162436 of 2014 has been made by the petitioner for extension of the said interim order. 9. While going through the record we find that Annexure-1 is the mining lease granted to the petitioner dated 11.02.1994. It is under the 1963 Rules and not under the 1957 Act. Twenty years and a couple of months have already passed and the petitioner admittedly has continued with his mining lease from 11.02.1994 upto date. Firstly, by virtue of the lease itself and its first renewal after five years and secondly by virtue of the interim order dated 17.06.2004 passed by this Court. 10. Under such circumstances, the question raised by learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of Section 8 of the Act of 1957 that the mining lease cannot be less than 20 years is totally misconceived hence does not require further adjudication in this writ petition. The reason being that it would be purely academic inasmuch as the petitioner's lease was under the 1963 Rules and he has already enjoyed the mining rights for more than 20 years by virtue of an interim order. Hence we find that insofar as the prayer for quashing the impugned order is concerned no ground has been made out since the land is reserved forest area under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and the permission of the Central Government has not been given. It is also covered under the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 as also the directions of the Supreme Court in Writ Petition No.202 of 1995 (T.N. Godavardhan Vs. Union of India) dated 12.12.21996. 11. At this stage, Sri C.L. Pandey has submitted that on the date when the mining lease was executed the petitioner was not issued Form-Ka but it was issued subsequently. Union of India) dated 12.12.21996. 11. At this stage, Sri C.L. Pandey has submitted that on the date when the mining lease was executed the petitioner was not issued Form-Ka but it was issued subsequently. He further states that when his renewal application was rejected in the year 2004 and till the date of passing the interim order the petitioner was not issued Form-Ka which was issued only after passing of the interim order dated 17.06.2004. 12. The sum and substance of the submission is that although he has got mining lease rights there were periods for which he was denied mining operations by default of the respondent authority in not issuing From-Ka promptly. 13. We have considered this submission of learned Senior Counsel. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Beg Raj Singh Vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2003 SC 833 has held in paragraphs 6 & 7 as quoted hereunder: - “6. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the learned counsel for the State and the private respondent, we are satisfied that the petition deserves to be allowed. The ordinary rule of litigation is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of commencement of litigation and right to relief should be decided by reference to the date on which the petitioner entered the portals of the Court. A petitioner, though entitled to relief in law, may yet be denied relief in equity because of subsequent or intervening events, i.e., the events between the commencement of litigation and the date of decision. The relief to which the petitioner is held entitled may have been rendered redundant by lapse of time or may have been rendered incapable of being granted by change in law. There may be other circumstances which render it inequitable to grant the petitioner any relief over the respondents because of the balance tilting against the petitioner on weighing inequities pitted against equities on the date of judgments. Third party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. Third party interests may have been created or allowing relief to the claimant may result in unjust enrichment on account of events happening in between. Else the relief may not be denied solely on account of time lost in prosecuting proceedings in judicial or quasi-judicial forum and for no fault of the petitioner. A plaintiff or petitioner having been found entitled to a right to relief, the Court would as an ordinary rule try to place the successful party in the same position in which he would have been if the wrong complained against would not have been done to him. The present one is such a case. The delay in final decision cannot, in any manner, be attributed to the petitioner. No auction has taken place. No third party interest has been created. The sand mine has remained un-operated for the period for which the period of operation falls short of three years. The operation had to be stopped because of the order of the State Government intervening which order has been found unsustainable in accordance with stipulations contained in the mining lease consistently with the G.O. issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Merely because a little higher revenue can be earned by the State Government that cannot be a ground for not enforcing the obligation of the State Government which it has incurred in accordance with its own policy decision. 7. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed with costs. The impugned order of the High Court, dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner, is set aside. Instead, it is directed that the petitioner shall be allowed to operate mine for a full period of three years subject to adjustment for the period for which he has already operated. The petitioner shall remain liable to pay royalty and make other payments to the State Government in accordance with the terms of the lease. The petition stands disposed of in the abovesaid terms. 14. In the instant case details as to for what periods the petitioner was denied mining rights under his lease deed (Annexure-1) or was denied mining rights under the interim order dated 17.06.2004 passed in this writ petition are not available. Hence such a circumstance cannot be considered in this petition nor any order can be issued herein to allow the petitioner to operate the mine for that period. 15. Hence such a circumstance cannot be considered in this petition nor any order can be issued herein to allow the petitioner to operate the mine for that period. 15. Therefore it would be appropriate that the petitioner if he so desires, may apply before the Competent Authority under the 1963 Rules for being given the benefit of mining operations to the extent of those periods when he was prevented from such operations during the subsistence of his lease from 11.02.1994 to 07.06.2004 in light of the judgment in the case of Beg Raj Singh (Supra). 16. This writ petition is accordingly finally disposed of by providing that the petitioner may make his application before the Competent Authority within two weeks where after the Competent Authority may make necessary inquiry to find out the period when the petitioner was prevented mining operations during his lease period and pass a reasoned order within four weeks thereafter. 17. In the event the Competent Authority concludes that for some period between 11.02.1994 to 07.06.2004 the petitioner was illegally denied his mining rights then it should consider the grievance of the petitioner in case there is no other legal impediment under the various Statutes applicable and the Orders of the Supreme Court issued from time to time in Godavardhan case. 18. We make it clear that we have not at all interfered in the impugned orders. 19. The interim order is vacated. 20. No order is passed as to costs.