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2014 DIGILAW 1438 (PNJ)

Subhash Chander v. Managing Committee Gurudwara

2014-10-16

BHARAT BHUSHAN PARSOON

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Dr. Bharat Bhushan Parsoon, J. 1. Notwithstanding the fact that ground of personal bona-fide necessity of the landlord has concurrently been adjudicated by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the Act) against the tenant, petitioner herein, and there being very meagre scope of interference in view of the Full Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 27.8.2014 passed in Civil Appeal No.6177 of 2004 (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh), Counsel for the tenant/petitioner herein is insistent that it is a case calling for interference on the point of law and as also there being complete omission by both the authorities under the Act to consider vital evidence qua the ground of personal necessity. 2. So far as the legal ground projected by the tenant is concerned, it is claimed that the landlord was neither properly represented nor the petition for eviction of the tenant was competent. Landlord is Gurdwara Guru Nanak Darbar, Shivaji Colony, Rohtak. Petition for eviction was preferred by the landlord through its President S. Raminderjit Singh. It is claimed that there should have been written resolution of the Gurdwara to the effect that eviction petition was to be filed and then further resolution was required authorising a particular person to institute the eviction petition. 3. Reference has been made to Municipal Committee, Sirhand v. Ishar Dass and another, (2001) PLR 691. It was a case of filing of regular second appeal before this Court by Municipal Committee, Sirhand, where provisions of Order XLI Rule 1 CPC, 1908 had come up for interpretation. Observations made in Garibd Chand v. Municipal Committee, Budladha, (1979) PLJ 478, which were also reproduced therein, for quick reference are reproduced here as well:- "The Municipal Committee had to pass the resolution giving authority to file appeal on its behalf against the judgment and decree of the trial court. Local Bodies, Corporate Bodies or Registered Bodies of Associations are independent legal entities and are capable of holding property and of suing and to be sued. Local bodies like a Municipal Committee can only act through resolutions and unless by a resolution it authorises somebody to file appeal on its behalf, no appeal could be presented on behalf of the Committee. The provision of Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are mandatory." 4. Local bodies like a Municipal Committee can only act through resolutions and unless by a resolution it authorises somebody to file appeal on its behalf, no appeal could be presented on behalf of the Committee. The provision of Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are mandatory." 4. In the present case, neither interpretation of Order XLI Rule 1 CPC is involved nor the landlord is either a local body or a Corporation or a registered body or the like. Landlord Gurudwara cannot be likened to a Municipal Committee or such like statutory or local body as was the case in the cited authority. 5. Counsel for the respondent-landlord, on the other hand, has urged that landlord Gurdwara was not required to pass any resolution particularly when its President S. Raminderjit Singh had himself entered the witness box fully justifying the ground of personal necessity of the landlord and his competence to file the petition and had faced lengthy and scrutinizing cross examination. It is also claimed that no analogy of body corporate or a registered society can be merged into the provisions of the Act. Support has been sought from Farmers Forum, Punjab, Chandigarh through its Assistant Secretary and another v. Shri Ram Lal Gandhi, 1984(2) RCR (Rent) 170. In this authority, premises had been let to a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1980. Petition for ejectment against the society was filed through its Assistant Secretary. Holding that Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1980 was not applicable as it was petition for ejectment and not a suit, the petition was held to be maintainable. 6. Seeking support from Punjab State Warehousing Corporation and others v. M/s Amar Nath Vinod Kumar, : 2003(4) RCR (Civil) 37 (P&H), it is contended by counsel for the respondent/landlord that there may be express or even implied authority by virtue of which an officer holds his office, signs and verifies the pleadings on behalf of some entity. To the same effect is M/s Subh Timb Steel Ltd. v. Inder Paul Dua, : 1999(2) RCR (Rent) 596. 7. In the present case, S. Raminderjit Singh PW appeared as President of the landlord Gurdwara wherein he clearly explained his authority to file the eviction petition against the tenant. To the same effect is M/s Subh Timb Steel Ltd. v. Inder Paul Dua, : 1999(2) RCR (Rent) 596. 7. In the present case, S. Raminderjit Singh PW appeared as President of the landlord Gurdwara wherein he clearly explained his authority to file the eviction petition against the tenant. It would be of relevance to mention that even when tenant Subhash Chander appeared in the witness box as RW1, not even a whisper was made by him that S. Raminderjit Singh was not the President of the landlord Gurdwara or that he was not duly authorized person to file the petition for his eviction. Observations of the Rent Controller, affirmed by the Appellate Authority, are reproduced as below:- "... Though the respondent in the reply alleged that the present petition was not filed by duly authorized person but when examined as RW-1, respondent tendered into evidence his duly attested affidavit Ex.RW-1/A and the said affidavit of the respondent was silent about the fact that Raminderjit Singh was not the President of the petitioner Committee and was also silent about the fact that the present petition was not filed by any duly authorized person. Thus, under these facts and circumstances, it is evident that the respondent admitted the fact that Raminderjit Singh was the President of the petitioner committee. Hence, the present petition was filed by authorized person." 8. At this stage, reference may be made to United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar and others, : AIR 1997 SC 3 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaint is not signed and verified by a competent person, is not proper. 9. Viewed from any angle, neither the petitioner-tenant himself has supported and sustained his plea of non-filing of the petition by a competent person for the landlord nor the law, as discussed above, is supportive of his claim, particularly when relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is not even disputed by him. 10. 9. Viewed from any angle, neither the petitioner-tenant himself has supported and sustained his plea of non-filing of the petition by a competent person for the landlord nor the law, as discussed above, is supportive of his claim, particularly when relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is not even disputed by him. 10. So far as the plea regarding omission of alleged vital evidence by the Rent Controller as also by the Appellate Authority, taken by the petitioner-tenant is concerned, reference has been made to site plan Ex.P2, claiming that there are other gates of the landlord Gurdwara and there is in fact no need of any bigger gate at the entrance where the shop in dispute is located. Site plan Ex.P-2 proved by Architect J.K. Jain PW3 has nowhere depicted any gate bigger than the proposed one at the entrance of the Gurdwara. 11. Even if pleadings of the petitioner-tenant that there is a large gate on the western side of Gurdwara, though has not been proved by any acceptable evidence, is taken as such, even then the same does not obviate the necessity of having a bigger gate at the entrance of the Gurudwara for entry and exit of the worshippers and other visitors in and out of the Gurdwara. Necessity of bigger gate at the entrance cannot be satisfied by existence of another large gate on the western side of the Gurdwara, where there is no frontage. 12. The Rent Controller has discussed this aspect in detail and there is concurrence of the finding by the Appellate Authority. Even during the course of arguments, no denial could be offered from the side of the petitioner that gate at the main entrance is small. 13. Affirming the findings of the Rent Controller on the ground, inter-alia, of personal necessity, findings of the Appellate Authority are to the following effect:- "16. In the case in hand, the eviction of respondent was sought by petitioner on the ground that the shop in question along with three other shops are required by the petitioner for construction of the main entrance of larger size because the present main gate which is in existence is short. The site plan Ex.P2 has been relied by petitioner showing the proposed part of the building plan. The site plan Ex.P2 has been relied by petitioner showing the proposed part of the building plan. It has come in evidence that there are other gates also of the gurudwara as also claimed by the respondent, but it is for the petitioner to decide as per its own requirement if the gate of the gurudwara is required to be widened so that the sangat/visitors of the gurudwara do not face any inconvenience in entering the gurdwara. It does not appear that the requirement of the shop by the gurudwara for increasing the width of the gate is fanciful, imaginary or is a mere 'wish' because of the reason that a large number of devotees come to the gurudwara to offer the prayers. 17. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent has been a tenant in the shop for the last several years and it will be a case of great hardship if eviction is ordered. 18. I do not find any merit in the contention raised. It was held in Dinesh Kumar's case (supra) that mere continuation of long tenancy is not a ground to reject the case of bona-fide need. The petitioner has been able to set up a case that the gate of gurudwara which is sought to be widened is not sufficient for their use. Hence, no benefit can be given to the appellant from the contention raised." 14. Need of the landlord is to be visualized and appreciated with vision of the landlord, of course, testing it on the pedestal of bona-fides. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., : 1998(2) RCR 533, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of tenanted premises. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had gone even to the extent of observing that the Rent Controller should proceed with the presumption that the requirement is bona fide. 15. In the present case, there is concurrent finding on facts qua personal necessity of the landlord ad there is no case of omission to consider any evidence by the authorities under the Act. Plea of the tenant in this context is wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. 16. No other point worth consideration has been projected by the tenant/petitioner herein. 17. Plea of the tenant in this context is wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. 16. No other point worth consideration has been projected by the tenant/petitioner herein. 17. Viewing it from any angle, there is no merit in the revision petition and no interference by this Court is called for. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed.