JUDGMENT Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The substantial question of law formulated and to be answered in this plaintiffs' second appeal is as under:- Whether by reversing the finding of the trial Court relating to bona fide need of the appellant for non-residential purpose the appellate Court has committed an illegality? The imperative facts required for determination in this appeal are as under:- For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the plaint before the trial Court. 1.1 Plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction of the defendant-M/s. National Stationery Mart, partnership firm, M.G. Road, Raipur from the scheduled suit accommodation pleading inter alia that they are owners of a double storied building at Mahatma Gandhi Road, Raipur. It is the case of the plaintiffs that for over three decades the defendant is occupying the suit shop in ground floor measuring 20' x 21' a part of the said building at Mahatma Gandhi Road, Raipur. Adjoining suit shop the plaintiffs are in possession of 22' x 6' deep room leading to the rear residential room, angan, etc. as stated by D.W.1-Ramkrishna Bhatia, the defendant proving map Ex. D-6. The remaining house is residential. The portion marked "B" (Ex. D-1 photograph) is being used as a godown for storage of spare motor parts by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' shop under the name and style Saggar Auto Stores is being run in a tenanted accommodation at Mohdapara measuring 270' evidenced by Ex. P-6. 1.2 It was further pleaded that on or about 23-9-1996 the plaintiffs instituted an action claiming eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. In paragraph 6 of the plaint, it was pleaded that the plaintiff's business at Mohdapara has increased and require more shop to run their business. By amending the plaint it was pleaded that the plaintiffs shall continue their business in Mohdapara shop as also carry on business in the suit accommodation. It was further pleaded that the plaintiffs have no other reasonably suitable accommodation of their own in the Raipur town. 1.3 Defendant, by filing written statement, took a specific defence that plaintiffs have alternative reasonably suitable accommodation besides the suit accommodation which is larger in size than the suit accommodation and, therefore, the plaintiffs do not require suit accommodation for non-residential purpose and, therefore, the suit be dismissed. 1.3 Defendant, by filing written statement, took a specific defence that plaintiffs have alternative reasonably suitable accommodation besides the suit accommodation which is larger in size than the suit accommodation and, therefore, the plaintiffs do not require suit accommodation for non-residential purpose and, therefore, the suit be dismissed. 1.4 The trial Court framed as many as five issues on the basis of pleadings of the parties. 1.5 The plaintiffs examined five witnesses in support of their case and exhibited 28 documents whereas defendant examined five witnesses and exhibited 11 documents in support of his case. 2. The trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 26-4-2000 upholding the need, negativing the defence that plaintiffs are desirous of enhancing the rent, a decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act of 1961 was passed finding that they are not possessed of any other alternative reasonably suitable accommodation of their own in the Raipur town. 3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial Court, decreeing the suit, the first appeal was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the respondents/defendants. The First Appellate Court, by its judgment and decree, allowed the appeal and negatived the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, 1961 holding inter alia that: (a) That the plaintiffs have pleaded inconsistent need and have led evidence at variance with plea negativing their bona fides. (b) That plaintiffs business is prospering/increasing at Mohdapara shop. (c) Drew an unwarranted inference on plaintiffs declining to let out portion "B" in lieu of suit shop. (d) That the plaintiffs led no evidence that their landlord at Mohdapara shop is likely to evict them. (e) That the plaintiffs are desirous of enhancing the rent. (f) That the plaintiffs have failed to establish bona fide need for their business. (g) That the plaintiffs are possessed of alternative accommodation of their own (portion marked "B" (22' x 6' = 132 sq. ft.) being used as godown vis-a-vis a part of residential house) 4. Mr. (e) That the plaintiffs are desirous of enhancing the rent. (f) That the plaintiffs have failed to establish bona fide need for their business. (g) That the plaintiffs are possessed of alternative accommodation of their own (portion marked "B" (22' x 6' = 132 sq. ft.) being used as godown vis-a-vis a part of residential house) 4. Mr. B.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs would submit that the appellate decree passed by the first appellate Court dismissing the suit holding that the plaintiffs' business has increased in the tenanted shop at Mohdapara committed palpable error of jurisdiction and the first appellate Court has misconstrued the plea and illegally held that the evidence is at variance with pleadings has been led. He would further submit that the landlord's choice ought to have been respected by the first appellate Court as the plaintiffs were carrying on their business in the tenanted suit accommodation and, therefore Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court be set aside and judgment and decree of the trial Court be restored. 5. Per contra, Shri Raja Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 (B)/ defendant would submit that the first appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiffs have other reasonably suitable accommodation besides scheduled suit accommodation and further justified in holding that the plaintiffs do not require the suit accommodation bona fidely and they are desirous of enhancing the rent and, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court be upheld. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records of both the courts below including judgment and decree of the first appellate Court with utmost circumspection. 7. In order to consider the respective submission of the parties, it would be profitable to notice section 12(1)(f) of the Act, 1961, which reads thus: "12. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records of both the courts below including judgment and decree of the first appellate Court with utmost circumspection. 7. In order to consider the respective submission of the parties, it would be profitable to notice section 12(1)(f) of the Act, 1961, which reads thus: "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- 12(1)(f) - That the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purposes of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned." 8. A close reading of Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, 1961 would show that if the accommodation let out for non-residential purpose is required bona fidely by landlord for the purpose of continuing and starting his business, the landlord should be the owner of the suit accommodation thereof; and secondly the landlord must not have other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the town or city concerned. 9. In order to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the question as to whether the plaintiffs are the owner of the suit accommodation, a brief survey of the plaint and the written statement filed by the defendants would be necessary. 10. In the opening paragraph of plaint, plaintiffs have pleaded that the double storied building situated at Mahatma Gandhi Road bearing Municipal No. 4/17, in which defendant is in possession in the capacity of tenant on the ground floor and carrying on his business. 10. In the opening paragraph of plaint, plaintiffs have pleaded that the double storied building situated at Mahatma Gandhi Road bearing Municipal No. 4/17, in which defendant is in possession in the capacity of tenant on the ground floor and carrying on his business. It was further pleaded that the said suit accommodation was firstly let out to the defendant by Shri Gurudeo Das Saggar, after his death, his widow and mother of plaintiffs let out the suit accommodation to the defendant, and thereafter, by registered Kirayanama dated 16-12-1981, defendant is in possession of the suit accommodation as tenant on the monthly tenancy of Rs. 684/-. 11. Defendants, while filing their written statement, did not dispute the fact that plaintiffs are the owner of the suit accommodation thereof; and also they are the tenant of the plaintiff of the suit accommodation and admitted the execution of the lease dated 14-12-1981 between plaintiff No. 2 and defendant-Ms. National Stationary Mart vide Ex. P-3 and payment of rent to plaintiff No. 2-Sudesh Kumar is also admitted in the paragraph 3 of their written statement; and the aforesaid facts have also been reiterated and deposed by the parties before the trial Court, which clearly establishes that the plaintiffs are owner of the suit accommodation situated at Mahatma Gandhi Road bearing Municipal No. 14/7 and in which the defendant-National Stationery Mart is in possession in the capacity of tenant. 12. Thus, the findings recorded by both the courts below holding the plaintiffs to be the owner of suit accommodation and the defendant No. 1 is tenant is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record and I do not find any illegality in the same and it is hereby affirmed. 13. The determination of the questions that the plaintiffs are the owner of suit accommodation and relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the parties brings me to the next question as to whether the plaintiffs have proved their bona fide need for starting business in the suit accommodation and; whether the plaintiffs have no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the Raipur town. 14. The defendants, in their written statement, have pleaded that adjoining the suit accommodation the shop ad-measuring 1500 sq. 14. The defendants, in their written statement, have pleaded that adjoining the suit accommodation the shop ad-measuring 1500 sq. ft., which is lying vacant with three doors, and which is larger than the suit accommodation and that can be said to the reasonably alternative accommodation within the meaning of Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, 1961, whereas, the plaintiffs have specifically stated that they have no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the township of Raipur and they are continuing their business in the shop of Dr. P.K. Chouhan under the name and style "Saggar Auto Stores" in the tenanted accommodation at Modhapara. 15. Plaintiff No. 2-Sudhesh Kumar has been examined as PW-3, and he has stated in his cross-examination that adjoining the suit accommodation, one old house is there, which is being used for godown as well for the residential purpose; and has further stated that the portion which is being used for godown is smaller than the suit accommodation. Defendant No. 1(B) Ramkrishna Bhatia has been examined as DW-1 and has proved the map (Ex. D-6) and Ex. D-1 the photograph. He has stated in his evidence that in the suit accommodation 400 sq. ft. has been let out to him and the first floor are in possession of the plaintiffs and in the first floor, two rooms are being used by the plaintiffs for keeping motor parts. 16. Thus, there is no evidence on record to hold that there is reasonably suitable accommodation in possession of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the first appellate Court has committed legal error in holding that plaintiffs have other reasonably suitable accommodation in the township at Raipur, therefore, the plaintiffs are not possessed of any other alternative accommodation of their own i.e. portion marked as 'B' 22' x 6'= 132 sq. ft. being used as godown, which is part of residential house. 17. Further question to be considered whether the plaintiffs have established their bona fide need requiring the suit accommodation for non-residential purpose. It is an admitted position on record that plaintiffs are carrying on their business at tenanted accommodation at Mohdapara vide Ex. P-26 in which earlier there was a suit filed for eviction against the plaintiffs and ultimately the suit was compromised and, thereafter, agreement (Ex.-26) entered into between the parties and the plaintiffs are continuing their possession at tenanted suit accommodation at Mohdapara, District Raipur. 18. P-26 in which earlier there was a suit filed for eviction against the plaintiffs and ultimately the suit was compromised and, thereafter, agreement (Ex.-26) entered into between the parties and the plaintiffs are continuing their possession at tenanted suit accommodation at Mohdapara, District Raipur. 18. The Supreme Court in case of Prativa Devi vs. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 has held that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and the courts have no concern to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live. 19. Further, the Supreme Court in case of Dinesh Kumar vs. Uusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740 : AIR 2010 SC 2679 has held as under:- "In Siddalingamma vs. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561 : AIR 2001 SC 2896 this Court held that while determining the case of eviction of the tenant, an approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenant's continued occupation in tenancy premises. However, the bona fide requirement of the landlord must be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. It must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The need should be bona fide and not arbitrary and the requirement pleaded and proved must neither be a pretext nor a ruse adopted by the landlord for evicting the tenant. Therefore, the court must take relevant circumstances into consideration while determining the issue of bona fide need so that the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory of whittled down. 20. The Supreme Court in case of Pratap Rai Tanwani and Another vs. Uttam Chand and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 490 : AIR 2005 SC 1274 has held as under:- 12. One of the grounds for eviction contemplated by all the rent control legislations, which otherwise generally leans heavily in favour of the tenants, is the need of the owner landlord to have his own premises, residential or non-residential for his own use or his own occupation. One of the grounds for eviction contemplated by all the rent control legislations, which otherwise generally leans heavily in favour of the tenants, is the need of the owner landlord to have his own premises, residential or non-residential for his own use or his own occupation. The expressions employed by different legislations may vary such as bona fide requirement, genuine need, requires reasonably and in good faith and so on. Whatever be the expression employed, the underlying legislative intent is one and that has been demonstrated in several judicial pronouncements of which we would like to refer to only three. 13. In Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 : AIR 1988 SC 1422 , M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was speaking for the three-Judge Bench, said: "11. Statutes enacted to afford protection to tenants from eviction on the basis of contractual rights of the parties make the resumption of possession by the landlord subject to the satisfaction of certain statutory conditions. One of them is the bona fide requirements of the landlord, variously described in the statutes as bona fide requirement, reasonable requirement, or, as in the case the present statute, merely referred to as landlord requires for his own use. But the essential idea basic to all such cases is that the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith; and that, further, the court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession however honest it might otherwise be, have inevitably a subjective element in it and that, that desire, to become a requirement in law must have the objective element of a need. It must also be such that the court considers it reasonable and therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded by law to the tenant is not rendered merely illusory or whittled down." 14. In Gulabbai vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra, (1991) 3 SCC 483 : AIR 1991 SC 1760 reiterating the view taken in Bega Begum vs. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273 : AIR 1979 SC 272 it was held that the words reasonable requirement undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. 15. Recently, in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 : AIR 1999 SC 2507 This Court in a detailed judgment, dealing with this aspect, analysed the concept of bona fide requirement and said that the requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the Judge of facts by placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing a question to himself-whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. We do no think that we can usefully add anything to the exposition of law of requirement for self-occupation than what had been already stated in the three precedents. 21. Plaintiffs have brought appropriate legal evidence on record to show that they are running their shop at Modhapara having taken the premises on rent vide Ex. P-26 and they have no other reasonably suitable accommodation at Raipur, Therefore, it cannot be held that plaintiffs did not require the suit accommodation bona fidely and thus, the finding recorded by the first appellate Court is contrary to the record and deserves to be set aside. 22. The Supreme Court in case of Jagdish Singh vs. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497 : AIR 2008 SC 2296 has held as under:- "36. Three requisites should normally be present before an appellate court reverse a finding of the trial Court. (i) It applies its mind to reasons given by the trial court. (ii) It has no advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. (iii) It records cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the trial Court. 37. If the above principles are kept in mind, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court falls short of the grounds which would allow the first appellate court to reverse a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. (iii) It records cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the trial Court. 37. If the above principles are kept in mind, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court falls short of the grounds which would allow the first appellate court to reverse a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. As already adverted earlier, the High Court has virtually reached a conclusion without recording reasons in support of such conclusion. When the court of original jurisdiction has considered oral evidence and recorded findings after seeing the demeanour of witnesses and having applied its mind, the appellate court is enjoined to keep that fact in mind. It has to deal with the reasons recorded and conclusions arrived at by the trial Court. Thereafter, it is certainly open to the appellate Court to come to its own conclusion arrived at were not in consonance with law." 23. Thus, the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred cases kept in mind, for the reasons mentioned here in above, the decision rendered by the first appellate Court falls short of the ground which would allow the first appellate Court to reverse a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. 24. The trial Court has clearly recorded a I finding that suit accommodation is bona fidely required by the plaintiffs. 25. Considering the entire evidence available on record, it is not a case where finding and conclusion arrived at by the trial Court were not consonance in law. Thus, the first appellate Court is unjustified in reversing the well reasoned finding recorded by the trial Court. 26. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, being not sustainable in law, deserves to be and is hereby set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is hereby restored. Suit stands decreed. 27. No order as to costs. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal allowed.