ORDER The present suit is filed by the Plaintiffs for a permanent injunction against the Defendants restraining the Defendants from encroaching and / or trespassing upon the suit property or disturbing or obstructing use and occupation thereof of the Plaintiffs, and also for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from demolishing or damaging a wall enclosing the suit property or obstructing the Plaintiffs from repairing the same. The Notice of Motion is taken out for an interim injunction in terms of the permanent injunction sought. 2. Plaintiff No.1 is a proposed co-operative society of flat purchasers in a sale building “Girnar Tower” constructed as part of a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. The building stands on a plot bearing CTS No.125. The said plot was originally occupied by a chawl and a slum. Defendant No.1 is a co-operative society of the rehabilitated tenants / occupants, who were original residents of the chawl existing on this plot. Defendant No.1 is a sub-lessee in respect of the plot. Defendant No.1 entered into a Development Agreement with Defendant No.2 to implement a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme sanctioned by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA). The SRA scheme envisaged rehabilitation of the original occupants of CTS No.125 in three newly constructed rehab buildings. In return, Defendant No.2 was allowed to construct the sale building “Girnar Tower” which was to comprise of ground plus seven floors of A-Wing and 17 floors of B-wing. The scheme envisaged that upon completion of the construction, the property occupied by the sale building would be leased in favour of the society formed by the flat purchasers of Girnar Tower. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that Defendant Nos.1 and 2 were required to execute a lease of a portion of CTS No.125 admeasuring 2109.79 sq.metres on which Girnar Tower was constructed in favour of the society of flat purchasers therein, namely, Plaintiff No.1. 3. The dispute in the present suit mainly concerns the adjacent plot, namely, plot bearing CTS No.2/124. 3. The dispute in the present suit mainly concerns the adjacent plot, namely, plot bearing CTS No.2/124. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that when the building Girnar Tower was being constructed, it did not have a proper access from the main road and as a result, Defendant no.2, who are the builders and developers under the SRA scheme, were unable to sell the flats in Girnar Tower and as a result, approached the owners of the adjacent plot bearing CTS No.2/124 (hereinafter called “the suit plot”) to purchase the same. It is the case of the Plaintiffs that Defendant No.2 represented to, and agreed with, the flat purchasers of Girnar Tower that access would be provided to Girnar Tower from the main road through the suit plot and parking space with the Jain temple would also be provided in the suit plot. It is the Plaintiffs' case that accordingly, the suit plot was acquired by Defendant No.2 and the main entrance of Girnar Tower was constructed from the main road, G.D. Ambedkar Marg, through the suit plot constructing a gate and a watchman’s cabin in the suit plot. It is the Plaintiffs’ case that the Plaintiffs have always been in exclusive possession of the suit plot which provided the main access as well as parking space for the flat-owners members of the Plaintiffs. It is the Plaintiffs’ case that there were attempts of forcible trespass and dispossession of the Plaintiffs from the suit property on the part of Defendant Nos.2 and 3. It is also the Plaintiffs’ case that representatives of the Defendants damaged the wall enclosing the suit plot within the premises of the Plaintiffs. In these premises, the Plaintiffs have approached the Court seeking a permanent injunction against encroachment and trespass upon the suit property as well as for a perpetual order and injunction restraining the Defendants from demolishing and damaging the subject wall or obstructing the Plaintiffs from repairing the same. 4. By an order dated 20 February 2014, this Court noted that the wall which was broken, as could be seen from the photographs annexed to the plaint, would be reconstructed by the Plaintiffs at their own expense. It was clarified that the said wall shall not be demolished by any individual or authority except by following the due process of law. It was clarified that the said wall shall not be demolished by any individual or authority except by following the due process of law. The order also directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property, as of date. 5. In pursuance of the order of this Court dated 20 February 2014, the wall has since been reconstructed by the Plaintiffs. It is, however, the case of the Defendants that the original wall which was 3 to 4 feet wall with an iron grill thereon is now constructed as a wall of 9 feet in height by bricks without any iron grill thereon. 6. Defendant Nos.2 and 3 claim that the suit plot is acquired by, and belongs to, Defendant No.2; that there is no wall shown in the layout plan of the property and the existing wall was constructed without any authority by the Plaintiffs; that the suit plot was never agreed to be transferred to the Plaintiffs; that Defendant No.2 merely agreed to provide access to the Plaintiffs from the suit plot for egress and ingress to CTS No.125 on which the building Girnar Tower stands and that this approach road was to be only of 16 feet; that when the Plaintiffs started parking their cars on the suit plot, Defendant No.2 objected to the same; that upon such objection, the Plaintiffs represented that they would not claim any right in respect of the suit plot and that till Defendant No.2 put the suit plot to use by construction or otherwise, the Plaintiffs' members might be allowed to park their cars in the suit plot and no right would be claimed in respect thereof by the Plaintiffs at any time; that on this express understanding the Plaintiffs were allowed to use the said plot; and that now that the Defendants intend to develop the suit plot, the Plaintiffs could not obstruct the Defendants. 7. At the outset, it may be noted that the present suit is not for enforcement of any agreement to transfer the suit plot to the Plaintiffs. The suit is filed merely to protect the settled possession of the Plaintiffs in respect of the suit plot. It is the Plaintiffs’ case that the Plaintiffs have been lawfully put in possession of the suit plot and such possession cannot be disturbed by the Defendants otherwise than by due process of law. 8. The suit is filed merely to protect the settled possession of the Plaintiffs in respect of the suit plot. It is the Plaintiffs’ case that the Plaintiffs have been lawfully put in possession of the suit plot and such possession cannot be disturbed by the Defendants otherwise than by due process of law. 8. On the other hand, it is claimed by the Defendants that the Plaintiffs are not legally entitled to use and occupy the suit plot and that this suit by the Plaintiffs, which is for protection of their possession, is itself a due process of law and the Plaintiffs’ right to continue to be in possession of the suit plot can very well be considered and adjudicated upon in the present suit itself. This is the major controversy between the parties. 9. Before the facts of the case are discussed for considering the Plaintiffs’ claim, the main legal contest needs to be put in proper perspective. That contest is this: Whether the Plaintiffs’ right to continue to be in possession of the suit plot needs to be adjudicated upon in the present suit or whether by reason of settled possession of the Plaintiffs, the Defendants should be simply prevented from disturbing such possession except by filing a suit for recovery of possession. In other words, whether this suit itself should be treated as a due process of law and the question of title or authority to remain in possession can be adjudicated upon in this suit itself. 10. It has long been settled by a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court that where a person is in settled possession of a property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed even by the true owner of the property except by recourse to law. Even if a trespasser is in such settled possession of property, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law for recovery of possession; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law, our Courts have said, will come to the aid of a person in settled possession. Settled or effective possession of a person without title entitles him to protection even against the true owner. The law, our Courts have said, will come to the aid of a person in settled possession. Settled or effective possession of a person without title entitles him to protection even against the true owner. In the case of Rame Gowda vs. M. Varadappa Naidu [ (2004) 1 SCC 769 ], the Supreme Court held as follows : “9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram v. Delhi Admn., Puran Singh v. State of Punjab and Ram Rattan v. State of U.P. The authorities need not be multiplied. In Munshi Ram case, it was held that no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may reenter and re- instate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh case, the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. In Puran Singh case, the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase 'settled possession' does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a straitjacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of “settled possession” (SCC p. 527, para 12): i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period; ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case; iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; and iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession.” 11 Mr.Madon, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Defendants, does not dispute the legal position enunciated above. He, however, submits that in a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira [ (2012) 5 SCC 370 ], the Supreme Court has explained the concept of due process of law in this behalf. Due process of law simply requires that nobody should be condemned unheard. He, however, submits that in a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira [ (2012) 5 SCC 370 ], the Supreme Court has explained the concept of due process of law in this behalf. Due process of law simply requires that nobody should be condemned unheard. The due process of law means that a person in settled possession will not be dispossessed except by recourse to a court of law. Due process means a liberty to the defendant to file pleadings including a written statement and documents before the court of law. It does not mean the whole trial. The due process of law is satisfied the moment rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a competent court. It is submitted by the learned Counsel that the Supreme Court has affirmed the findings concerning the issue of due process in this behalf of the Delhi High Court in the case of Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. vs. Hotel Imperial [ (2006) 88 DRJ 545 ]. In particular, it is submitted that as long as there is an adjudication of inter se rights between the parties by a court of law, it does not matter who brought the action before the court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful occupation or it could be the person who is sought to be ejected in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. 12. In the first place, the findings of the Delhi High Court in the case of Thomas Cook (supra) need to be seen in the light of the facts of that case to ascertain the correct proposition laid down by that Court or in other words, to understand the true ratio of that judgment. 13. In Thomas Cook (supra), the Delhi High Court was concerned with the case of a plaintiff, who was engaged in the business of tours and travels and who occupied four rooms in a hotel run by the defendants. The plaintiff had filed a suit praying for an injunction against being dispossessed by the defendants from the rooms occupied by the plaintiff. A compromise was arrived at between the parties and a decree was passed in terms thereof. The plaintiff had filed a suit praying for an injunction against being dispossessed by the defendants from the rooms occupied by the plaintiff. A compromise was arrived at between the parties and a decree was passed in terms thereof. Under this compromise decree, the plaintiff was allowed to occupy two rooms of the hotel purely as a licensee on payment of daily tariff less discount. It was the plaintiff’s case that although the plaintiff was occupying the said two rooms in terms of the compromise decree and complying with all the terms and conditions of the decree, the defendants once again threatened the plaintiff with eviction from the said two rooms. It is in this background that the suit before the Delhi High Court was filed inter alia for a declaration that the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the two rooms and was entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from the said two rooms. The plaintiff, in the first place, claimed an irrevocable licence to occupy the said two rooms. This case was negatived by the Delhi High Court inter alia by observing that the licence, such as the one the plaintiff had, was revocable. It was secondly contended by the plaintiff in that case that the plaintiff, being in settled possession of the two rooms, could not be dispossessed by the defendants otherwise than by due process of law. On the other hand, the defendants contended that the plaintiff was not in possession of the rooms in the sense normally understood, much less in settled possession. It was submitted what the plaintiff had merely a privilege to use the said rooms in accordance with the compromise decree and nothing more. It was submitted that the licence being revocable and having been revoked, the plaintiff could not claim any authority under the law to continue in occupation of the two rooms. The Delhi High Court in the context of these facts discussed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rame Gowda’s case (supra). It was submitted that the licence being revocable and having been revoked, the plaintiff could not claim any authority under the law to continue in occupation of the two rooms. The Delhi High Court in the context of these facts discussed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rame Gowda’s case (supra). The Delhi High Court noted the law laid down in Rame Gowda’s case, in particular, paragraph 8 quoted below: “The Law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the Law of Limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force.” The Delhi High Court also noted the observation of the Supreme Court that “It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner and that the possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced in by the true owner." In particular, the Delhi High Court noted that the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Rame Gowda’s case was based on an all-important finding that the plaintiff therein was in “settled possession” of the property. On the other hand, the Delhi High Court noted that the facts of Rame Gowda’s case were palpably different from the facts before the Delhi High Court. In Rame Gowda’s case, it was found as a fact that the plaintiff was in settled possession. On the other hand, in the Delhi case far from being in settled possession, the question was whether the plaintiff was in possession at all being a mere licensee entitled to occupy rooms in a hotel on a daily tariff basis. The Delhi High Court observed that the nature of occupancy in the case before it was clearly permissive and that it did not amount to possession at all. The Delhi High Court observed that the nature of occupancy in the case before it was clearly permissive and that it did not amount to possession at all. The Court particularly noted that in the compromise decree, the plaintiff was obligated to leave the keys of the room at the reception at the close of each day; the plaintiff was charged with daily tariff; the control and possession of the rooms was explicitly retained by the defendants; and the rights of admission were reserved with the defendants. The Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that under these circumstances, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the defendants had parted with possession or that the plaintiff was in “possession” of the said rooms even during the period prior to revocation of the licence and that therefore, the reliance of the plaintiff on the decisions dealing with the question of dispossession without due process, was misplaced. The plaintiff had a mere right to use, it never was in possession of the two rooms, much less, in settled possession in which the defendants had acquiesced. It is in this context that the Delhi High Court considered the concept of due process of law and observed as follows: “28. The expressions `due process of law', `due course of law' and `recourse to law' have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed `forcibly' by the true owner taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the same thing -- ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly, `due process of law' or `due course of law', here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner. Now, this `due process process' or `due course' condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the `bare minimum' requirement of `due process' or `due course' of law would stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e., for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the `recourse to law' stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made with regard to the first party's protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law.” 14. The observations of the Delhi High Court in Thomas Cook (supra) have to be seen in the context of the plaintiff’s failure to establish his settled possession in that case. When a person who is not in settled possession as understood by the law laid down by the Supreme Court in cases leading upto Rame Gowda (supra), comes to the Court and fails to satisfy the Court about his settled possession or secure an order of injunction on that basis, he cannot thereafter be heard to defend his unlawful occupation by citing the requirement of due process of law. The due process of law exists to prevent any person, even a lawful owner, from taking law into his own hands. He must resort to the process of law to recover possession. The due process of law exists to prevent any person, even a lawful owner, from taking law into his own hands. He must resort to the process of law to recover possession. But this argument is not available to a person who is not in settled possession. Such person cannot be heard to say that even in his case, the process of law may have to be adopted to recover possession. The basic requirement of due process, that is to say, the modicum of adjudication by a court of law, has been satisfied in his case, when his so called possession was adjudicated upon and found not to exist as a matter of fact. 15. Even in the case decided by the Supreme Court in Erasmo Jack (supra), the appellant before the Court was a sole owner, in exclusive possession of the suit property. Her title to the suit property was clearly admitted and never disputed by the respondent Erasmo Jack. According to the appellant, the suit property was given to the respondent – her brother – as a caretaker. The respondent had kept the appellant, his own sister, out of her suit property by suppressing relevant material from the court and abusing the process of law. The respondent's case in the suit was that the respondent was permitted to live in the suit premises because of a family arrangement; that the respondent remained in possession of the suit property for several years; and that he could not be dispossessed without following the due process of law. On the other hand, it was the appellant's reply that the respondent was merely a caretaker and could never sue a valid titleholder of the property on whose behalf he occupied the suit premises. In Erasmo Jack case, the Supreme Court found, as a matter of fact, that the respondent was not able to establish the family arrangement by which the house was given to the respondent for his residence. On the other hand, the Court found that the appellant had given the premises to him as a caretaker. As such caretaker, the respondent ought to have given possession of the premises back to the true owner of the suit property on demand. On the other hand, the Court found that the appellant had given the premises to him as a caretaker. As such caretaker, the respondent ought to have given possession of the premises back to the true owner of the suit property on demand. The Court considered the cases of Puran Singh vs. State of Punjab [ (1975) 4 SCC 518 ] and Mahabir rasad Jain vs. Ganga Singh [ (1999) 8 SCC 274 ] which held that occupation of a property by a person as an agent or servant at the instance of a owner will not amount to actual physical possession entitling the former to maintain a suit against the latter on the basis of such possession. The Supreme Court held that the respondent as a caretaker held the property of the principal - the appellant - only on behalf of the principal and his possession was no possession in the eyes of law. It is in the light of these facts, that the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Delhi High Court in Thomas Cook, as noted above. The Supreme Court has not in any way touched the law as settled in Rame Gowda’s case. The Court held that a person who holds possession on behalf of another cannot claim such possession to be a settled possession against such other person and maintain an injunction suit on that basis. It is only in this sense that the Supreme Court has affirmed the proposition concerning the meaning of due process as enunciated by the Delhi High Court in Thomas Cook. 16. The net result of the above discussion is that having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in numerous cases ending with Rame Gowda, the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title entitles him to protection even against the true owner. The question of settled possession is always a question of fact. If, as a matter of fact, the Court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff is in settled possession as understood by law, such possession cannot be disturbed by the defendant, even if the defendant be a true owner, otherwise than by due process of law. 17. All that now remains to be seen is, whether as a matter of fact the Plaintiffs are in settled possession as understood by law. 17. All that now remains to be seen is, whether as a matter of fact the Plaintiffs are in settled possession as understood by law. The Plaintiffs have come to the Court with a specific case that the construction of Girnar Tower was completed in the year 2002. Ever since the construction of Girnar Tower, the suit plot was enclosed in a wall surrounding both the suit plot as well as CTS No.125 comprising of total area of 2109.75 sq.mtrs of CTS No.125 and 313.75 sq.mtrs of the suit plot. It is the Plaintiffs' case that ever since inception, the Plaintiffs were in possession of the entire enclosed area. In particular, the suit plot was exclusively used, occupied, possessed and enjoyed by the members of the Plaintiffs since 2002 inter alia for egress and ingress to the building Girnar Tower from the main road as well as parking of cars and the security cabin. The Plaintiffs have relied upon photographs showing the wall as well as cars parked there by the members of the Plaintiffs. As far as the suit wall is concerned, it is the case of the Defendants that the suit wall was not constructed by Defendant No.2, but that the Plaintiffs themselves constructed the suit wall for which they had no authority. Secondly, Defendant No.2 admits that an access was agreed to be provided to the Plaintiffs through the suit plot for ingress and egress to CTS 125, but that the approach road was to be only of 16 feet in width. As for the parking of cars, the Defendants claim that when the Plaintiffs started parking their cars in the suit plot, Defendant No.2 objected to the same, but that Defendants allowed the Plaintiffs to park their cars in the suit plot on an express understanding that whenever the Defendants required the suit plot for development activities in connection therewith, the Plaintiffs would immediately stop parking of their vehicles in the suit plot. Whether the suit wall was constructed by the Plaintiffs or the Defendants, as a matter of fact it is established that there is a wall constructed enclosing the suit plot with CTS No.125. Whether the suit wall was constructed by the Plaintiffs or the Defendants, as a matter of fact it is established that there is a wall constructed enclosing the suit plot with CTS No.125. Whether approach road given to the Plaintiffs from the suit plot was 16 feet in width or otherwise and whether parking of the cars by the Plaintiffs' members was to be discontinued upon the Defendants undertaking development activities in the suit plot, are matters of trial which will be decided in the suit. It is, however, prima facie clear that the suit plot was meant as an access to be given to the Plaintiffs through it and for all these years, the Plaintiffs' cars were allowed to be parked in the suit plot. The settled possession of the Plaintiff as understood by law is prima facie established. The Plaintiffs being in settled possession of the suit plot for all these years to the knowledge of Defendant No.2 and which possession was acquiesced in by the latter, the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Rame Gowda (supra) stand duly satisfied. The Plaintiffs have clearly made out a prima facie case for protection of their possession. The Defendants cannot dispossess the Plaintiffs otherwise than by due process of law. 18. As far as the suit wall is concerned, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs states that his clients shall restore the suit wall to its original position by restoring its original height and the iron grill over it as it stood before demolition. The learned Counsel, however, submits that there is an action proposed by the SRA for demolition of this wall and that action is challenged by the Plaintiffs in a writ petition before this Court, being Writ Petition (Lodging) No. 1741/2014. The learned Counsel submits that there is an order of status quo granted in the matter. The learned Counsel states that his clients shall restore the suit wall as stated by him subject to orders passed in the writ petition. 19. Accordingly, the following order is passed : (i) The Notice of Motion is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) excepting the bracketed portions, namely, the words “entering and/or” and “and/or in any manner affecting the rights”. 19. Accordingly, the following order is passed : (i) The Notice of Motion is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) excepting the bracketed portions, namely, the words “entering and/or” and “and/or in any manner affecting the rights”. It is clarified that this injunction restrains the Defendants from taking the steps referred to in prayer clause (a) otherwise than by due process of law. It is clarified that bracketing of the words “entering and/or” has been ordered with a view to enabling the partners of Defendant No.2 or their relatives to enter the building Girnar Tower through the suit plot for visiting their relatives in the building; (ii) The Plaintiffs shall restore the suit wall shown at the place indicated in green colour on the plan being Exhibit-E to the plaint. This, however, will be subject to the orders passed by this Court in Writ Petition (Lodging) No.1741/2014; (iii) There shall be no order as to costs.