JUDGMENT Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The substantial question of law formulated on 20-1-2006 and to be answered in this judgment is as under: Whether in absence of all the legal representatives of the deceased Bodhan the suit was liable to be abated? For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred in the instant judgment as were referred in the suit. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the second appeal are that plaintiff Brijmohan Dua filed a suit before the trial Court seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction that he is the title-holder and Bhumiswami of the suit land, the auction dated 3-4-1982 is null and void and the defendants be restrained from interfering with his possession. 2. The trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 15-3-2000, recorded findings that the plaintiff has purchased the suit property by a registered. Sale-deed on 5-6-1968, the auction dated 3-4-1982 held by defendant Nos. 9, 10 and 11 is illegal and the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction, but dismissed the suit holding that all the legal representatives of deceased defendant Bodhan have not been brought on record. 3. The plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth the CPC). The first appellate Court also did not find favour with the plaintiff and dismissed the appeal holding that the suit has abated. 4. The second appeal filed by the plaintiff under Section 100 of the CPC has been admitted for final hearing on the aforestated substantial question of law. 5. Shri Ram Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that one of the legal representatives of deceased defendant Bodhan has already been brought on record and, therefore, the entire suit would not abate. 6. No one has appeared on behalf of the respondents/defendants except the State to oppose the instant appeal and to support the impugned judgment even though notice of this appeal has been served upon them. 7. Deceased Bodhan son of Kashiram was arrayed as defendant No. 17 before the trial Court. It has been pleaded in the plaint that defendant Nos. 16 and 17 have purchased the scheduled suit property on auction held by defendant Nos. 9, 10 and 11 and a decree has been sought by the plaintiff to declare the auction proceeding as null and void and that defendant Nos. It has been pleaded in the plaint that defendant Nos. 16 and 17 have purchased the scheduled suit property on auction held by defendant Nos. 9, 10 and 11 and a decree has been sought by the plaintiff to declare the auction proceeding as null and void and that defendant Nos. 16 and 17 have no right on the suit property. Defendant No. 17 Bodhan died on 17-11-1995 at village Mangla. An application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the C.P.C. was filed on behalf of one of his sons, namely, Chetanram Rajak and leave of the Court representative stating that he has interest in the scheduled suit property. That application was allowed by the trial court on 15-4-1998 and thereafter, Chetanram Rajak was substituted in place of deceased defendant Bodhan in the suit. 8. Chetanram Rajak, who was impleaded as a party-defendant, filed an application under Order 22, Rule 4(3) of the C.P.C. stating inter alia that legal representatives of deceased defendant Bodhan have not been brought on record, therefore, the suit has abated. The trial Court, by order dated 14-7-1998, held that the suit will not abate as a whole and will abate only to the interest of the legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 17 Bodhan. 9. Thus, from the aforesaid narration of the facts, it would emerge that upon the death of defendant No. 17 Bodhan, who was one of the auction purchasers, his one son Chetanram Rajak has been impleaded party defendant in the suit on his application. 10. In Mahabir Prasad vs. Jage Ram and Others, 1971 (1) SCC 265 : AIR 197 LSC 742 the Supreme Court held that where in a proceeding a party dies and one of the legal representatives is already on record in another capacity and even if there are other legal representatives and no application for impleading them is made within the time of limitation, the proceeding will not abate. The relevant portion of the report reads thus: 7. Even on the alternative ground that Mahabir Prasad being one of the heirs of Saroj Devi there can be no abatement merely because no formal application for, showing Mahabir Prasad as an heir and legal representative of Saroj Devi was made. The relevant portion of the report reads thus: 7. Even on the alternative ground that Mahabir Prasad being one of the heirs of Saroj Devi there can be no abatement merely because no formal application for, showing Mahabir Prasad as an heir and legal representative of Saroj Devi was made. Where in a proceeding a party dies and one of the legal representatives is already on the record in another capacity, it is only necessary that he should be described by an appropriate application made in that behalf that he is also on the record, as an heir and legal representative. Even if there are other heirs and legal representatives and no application for impleading. them is made within the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, the proceeding will not abate. On that ground also the order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. 11. In N. Jayaram Reddy and Another vs. Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Kunrool, (1979) 3 SCC 578 the Supreme Court has an occasion to consider that where one of the legal representatives of the deceased-party is already on record, in another capacity failure to bring other legal representatives on record, the suit or proceeding will not abate. The Supreme Court laid down the following principles as under: 39. The following conclusions emerge from these decisions: (1) If all legal representatives are not impleaded after diligent search and some are brought on record and if the Court is satisfied that the estate is adequately represented meaning thereby that the interests of the deceased party are properly represented before the Court, an action would not abate. (2) If the legal representatives is on record in a different capacity, the failure to describe him also in his other capacity as legal representative of the deceased party would not abate the proceeding. (3) If an appeal and cross-objections in the appeal arising from a decree are before the appellate court and the respondent dies, substitution of his legal representatives in the cross-objections being part of the same record, would enure for the benefit of the appeal and the failure of the appellant to implead the legal representatives of the deceased respondent would not have the effect of abating the appeal but not vice versa. (4) A substitution of legal representatives of the deceased party in an appeal or revision even against an interlocutory order would enure for the subsequent stages of the suit on the footing that appeal is a continuation of a suit and introduction of a party at one stage of a suit would enure for all subsequent stages of the suit. (5) In cross-appeals arising from the same decree where parties to a suit adopt rival positions, on the death of a party if his legal representatives are impleaded in one appeal it will not enure for the benefit of cross-appeal and the same would abate. 12. In Dolai Maliko vs. Krushna Chandra Patnaik, AIR 1967 SC 49 , the Supreme Court held that if the estate of the deceased is fully represented and unless there are circumstances like fraud or collusion of non-bringing of other legal representatives of the deceased on record, the proceeding will not abate. The relevant portion of the report reads thus: 11. We are of opinion that these cases have been correctly decided and even where the plaintiff or the appellant has died and all his heirs have not been brought on the record because of oversight or because of some doubt as to who are his heirs, the suit or the appeal, as the case may be, does not abate and the heirs brought on the record fully represent the estate unless there are circumstances like fraud or collusion to which we have already referred above. 13. Thus, having examined the principles laid down with regard to the abatement and on returning back to the facts of the instant : case, I find that one of the legal representatives Chetanram Rajak (son of deceased defendant No. 17 Bodhan) was impleaded as a party-defendant in the suit and he was fully representing the estate of the deceased-Bodhan and further, considering the fact that the trial Court has already passed an order on 14-7-1998 holding that the suit will not abate as a whole, which was not challenged by any of the defendants in the suit and which has attained finality, therefore, it is held that the suit of the plaintiff will not abate as a whole in absence of bringing all the legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 17 Bodhan on record. 14. 14. Order dated 14-7-1998 passed by the trial Court reads thus: (Vernacular matter is omitted--Ed.) Thereafter, while answering issue No. 9 in the judgment dated 15-3-2000, the trial Court, holding the following, dismissed the suit as abated: (Vernacular matter is omitted--Ed.) 15. Thus, there is one more reason for holding that the trial Court has committed an illegality in holding that the suit has abated as a whole. As stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the trial Court, by order dated 14-7-1998, had already held that the suit will not abate as a whole and will abate only to the extent of interest of legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 17 Bodhan. The aforesaid interlocutory order passed by the trial Court had attained finality and the defendants cannot be permitted to re-agitate the question of abatement in subsequent stage of the same proceeding. Once at one stage of proceeding, it has been held by order dated 14-7-1998 that the suit will not abate as a whole and abate only against the legal representative of the deceased Bodhan; accepting the plea of the defendants at later stage of the suit could not have reached to the finding that in absence of other legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 17 Bodhan brought on record, the suit will abate as a whole. The principle of res judicata embodied in relation to the suits under Section 11 of the Code, as the principle of res judicata applied also between the two stages in the same litigation. Once an order is final, it will be binding at the subsequent stage of the same proceeding. 16. In Satyadhyan Ghosal and Others vs. Smt. Deorajin Debi and Another AIR 1960 SC 941 the Supreme Court held thus: 7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter--whether on a question of fact or a question of law--has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. 8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again? 17. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated and followed by the Supreme Court in Y.B. Patil and Others vs. Y.L. Patil, AIR 1977 SC 392 which states thus: 4. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. 18. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. 18. Thus, the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in aforesaid cases separately applies to the facts of the instant case and after recording the finding on 14-7-1998 holding that suit to be partly abated against the legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 17 Bodhan, the trial Court has fallen into error in holding that the suit has abated as a whole in absence of challenge to the order dated 14-7-1998. 19. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the two Courts below holding that the suit has abated as a whole ignoring the binding decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the order of the trial Court dated 14-7-1998 is unsustainable and bad in law and deserves to be and is accordingly set aside. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 20. The instant appeal is allowed. The appellant/plaintiff shall be entitled for a decree in the following terms: It is declared that the plaintiff is title-holder of the properties shown in Schedules A and B attached to the plaint and the auction proceeding dated 3-4-1982 is null and void and the defendants are restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff. 21. Schedule "A" and "B" attached to the plaint be made part of decree. No order as to costs. A decree be drawn-up accordingly. Appeal allowed.