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2014 DIGILAW 146 (TRI)

Basanta Kumar Ghosh v. Premananda Nama

2014-04-10

S.C.DAS

body2014
JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J.:- This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is directed against the judgment and decree, passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Dharmanagar, North Tripura, in Title Appeal No. 08 of 2004, whereunder, the learned Addl. District Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the suit and thereby set aside the judgment and decree dated 30.01.2004 passed by learned Civil Judge(Sr. Division) in Title Suit No. 19 of 2003. The Second appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law:- 1) Whether T.S. 19 of 2003 was barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the decision of the First Appellate Court and the High Court arising out of T.S. 3 of 1988? 2) Whether T.S. 19 of 2003 was barred by limitation? 2. Heard learned counsel Mr. A. Lodh for the defendant-appellant (hereinafter mentioned as the defendant) and learned counsel, Mr. P. Roy Barman for the plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter mentioned as plaintiff). 3. The plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 19 of 2003 seeking declaration of his right, title and interest in the suit land described in the schedule of the plaint and also prayed for recovery of khas possession of the suit land. The plaintiff contended that the suit land along with other lands measuring 0.98 acres was allotted in his name vide allotment order dated 05.12.1981 (Exhibit-1) and Khatian No. 3557 of Mauja Harua was created in his name and the total land of 0.98 acres was recorded in Plot No. 786/7336; 786/7335 and 786/7337. At the time of C.S. settlement the suit land measuring 0.25 acres was recorded in Khatian No. 3087, C.S. Plot No. 1273 and new C.S. Plot No. 1274. It is further contended by the plaintiff that the defendant, as plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 3 of 1988 in the Court of Munsiff, Dharmanagar against the plaintiff (as defendant) seeking permanent injunction in respect of the land recorded in Plot No. 1273 and 1274 and that suit was decreed on 25.08.1993. The present plaintiff who was the defendant in that suit preferred Title Appeal No. 4 of 1993 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Dharmanagar and the appeal was dismissed on 01.04.1997. The present plaintiff who was the defendant in that suit preferred Title Appeal No. 4 of 1993 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Dharmanagar and the appeal was dismissed on 01.04.1997. Thereafter he preferred second appeal No. RSA 21 of 1999 along with a CM Application No. 42 of 1999 seeking condonation of delay and that petition seeking condonation of delay in filing the second appeal was dismissed on 14.03.2000. The plaintiff thereafter filed a review petition of 6 of 2000 in the High Court and the review petition was dismissed by order dated 26.06.2000 with further observing---"the remedy of the appellant may lie in preferring a separate suit for appropriate relief but his prayer for revival of the instant appeal cannot be permitted under the circumstances indicated above. It is also contended by the plaintiff that the plaintiff filed objection case No. 69 and 70 under Section 43of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act (for short, TLR and LR Act) in respect of the wrong record of right of the suit land in the name of the defendant and another premananda Nama, S/o. Pulin Nama and the objection petition of the plaintiff was allowed and accordingly, the record of right was corrected. The order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer was challenged before the Director of Settlement but the Director of Settlement maintained the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer in respect of the correction of record of rights in the name of the plaintiff. It is also contended by the plaintiff that in respect of Plot No. 1273, the Assistant Settlement Officer recorded a comment in Col. No. 24 showing the defendant as the forceful occupier of the land from the year 1995. The plaintiff contended that on 01.01.1995 at about 10.00 a.m. the defendant forcefully occupied the suit land by putting bamboo fencing and hence he filed the suit seeking declaration of right, title interest and for recovery of possession. 4. The defendant contested the suit by filling written statement inter alia contending that the suit was barred by res judicata in view of the decision between the parties in the earlier suit i.e. T.S. 3 of 1988 which holds good and the suit also barred by limitation since the defendant has been in possession of the suit land from 1978, the date of allotment of land in his favour. The correction of the record of rights did not confer any title of the plaintiff on the suit land and that the judgment of T.S. 3 of 1988 has absolutely proved that the defendant has been in uninterrupted possession of the suit land and the plaintiff was restrained by the Court from disturbing possession of the defendant in the suit land and so the plaintiff was not entitled to get any decree of declaration of right, title interest and recovery of possession. It is contended that the plaintiff’s right has been extinguished by elapse of time prescribed under the Limitation Act. 5. The trial Court considering the pleadings of the parties framed following 5 (five) issues:- I. It is the suit barred by limitation? II. Is the suit barred by the provision of res judicata ? III. Whether the plaintiff has any right, title and interest over the suit land? IV. Is the plaintiff entitled to get the recovery of khas possession? V. To what other relief or reliefs the parties are entitled to get? 6. In course of trial, the plaintiff examined himself and two more witnesses and exhibited the following documents:- I. Exhibit 1--Allotment order dated 5.12.81. II. Exhibit 2--Xerox copy of khatian No. 2104. III. Exhibit 3--Copy of Khatian No. 3557. IV. Exhibit 4--Certified copy of Judgment of T.S. 3/88. V. Exhibit 5--Copy of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in R.S.A. 21/99. VI. Exhibit 6--Certified copy of order passed in Revenue Petition No. 6/2000. VII. Exhibit 7--Certified copy of order passed in Case No. 14/96 passed by the Director, Land Records. VIII. Exhibit 8--Certified copy of map of Sheet No. 1 of Mouja-Hurua. 7. The defendant side examined two witnesses and no documentary evidence adduced. 8. The trial Court decided the Issue Nos. II and III in favour of the plaintiff but decided the Issue No. I i.e. issue of limitation against the plaintiff and hence dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred Title Appeal No. 8 of 2004 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Dharmanagar and the appeal was allowed by impugned judgment and decree dated 17.12.2004 which is challenged by the defendant in this second appeal on the above mentioned two substantial questions of law. 9. In course of hearing learned counsel Mr. Arindam Lodh did not seriously insist on the formulated substantial question of law no. 9. In course of hearing learned counsel Mr. Arindam Lodh did not seriously insist on the formulated substantial question of law no. 1 on the point of res judicata . I, therefore, consider it not necessary to discuss at length on the point of res judicata . However, it is found that T.S. 3/1988 was instituted by the defendant on a cause of action arose on 26.02.1988 and the cause of action alleged to have arose in the present suit was on 01.01.1995. The parties to both the suits and the subject matter i.e. the suit land were/are same but the issues framed were/are completely different and so the decision in T.S. 3 of 1988 cannot operate as res judicata in deciding the present suit which is held by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court and I find nothing but to affirm the finding of the Courts below. 10. On the substantial question of law no. 2, learned counsel Mr. Lodh made elaborate submission raising different points. The first point raised by Mr. Lodh is that the plaintiff failed to prove his title over the suit land. According to Mr. Lodh, Exhibit-1, the order of allotment, cannot be treated as a valid document in respect of title since the allotment was given in the year 1981 when the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question. The allotment order itself was invalid since the possession of the defendant has been established in the suit land. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Roy Baraman has submitted that the plaintiff and the defendant both got allotment of khas lands. The plaintiff got allotment in the year 1981 and Khatian No. 3557 was prepared in his name of the allotted land measuring 0.98 acres. It is to be presumed that the plaintiff was in possession of the land when the allotment order was issued by the competent authority. The defendant instituted T.S. 3 of 1988 alleging cause of action as on 26.02.1988 that the present plaintiff who was a defendant in that suit was disturbing the possession of the defendant who was the plaintiff in that suit. Though the defendant claimed that he had been possessing the suit land from 1978, there is no documentary evidence in support thereof. Though the defendant claimed that he had been possessing the suit land from 1978, there is no documentary evidence in support thereof. The oral evidence on record does not establish the fact claimed by the defendant and so, there is nothing to hold that the allotment order was wrong or inoperative. 11. Exhibit 1 is the allotment order issued by the competent authority on 05.12.1981 and thereby 0.98 acres of land was allotted in the name of the plaintiff. The allotment order still stands good and valid. Learned counsel, Mr. Lodh though made a strenuous argument but failed to show any legal position to arrive at a conclusion that the allotment order was invalid and it cannot operate. The defendant instituted Title Suit No. 3 of 1988 seeking permanent injunction against the plaintiff but did neither in the said suit nor filing any suit subsequent thereto challenged that order of allotment to arrive at a conclusion that it was invalid order of allotment. Exhibit 6 and 7 further clearly shows that the plaintiff approached the Assistant Settlement Officer for correction of the record of rights in respect of suit land which was recorded in the name of the defendant in his Khatian No. 3087 and the objection of the plaintiff was allowed and the suit land has been recorded in the name of the plaintiff. The decision of the revenue authority stands good and so I find no merit in the argument advanced by learned counsel Mr. Lodh that the plaintiff acquired no right, title and interest over the suit land by dint of exhibit-1, the order of allotment, rather I find that the trial Court as well as the appellate Court both correctly arrived at a conclusion that the plaintiff had right, title and interest over the suit land. 12. The next point raised by learned counsel Mr. Lodh is that the right, title and interest of the plaintiff, if any, in the suit land has been extinguished because of the continuous uninterrupted possession of the defendant in the suit land. 12. The next point raised by learned counsel Mr. Lodh is that the right, title and interest of the plaintiff, if any, in the suit land has been extinguished because of the continuous uninterrupted possession of the defendant in the suit land. The judgment of T.S. 3/88 (Exhibit 4) clearly shows that the defendant has/had been in possession of the suit land prior to the institution of the suit and since the plaintiff was disturbing the possession of the defendant, the defendant instituted that suit in the year 1988 and the suit was decreed in favour of the defendant and the plaintiff was permanently restrained from disturbing the possession of the defendant. It is contended by Mr. Lodh, learned counsel that the defendant practically had been possessing the suit land from 1978 and the defendant claimed his possession accordingly. So the uninterrupted possession of the defendant has been perfected and it should be presumed that such continuous uninterrupted possession conferred right, title and interest on the defendant. It should be held that the defendant has/had been possessing the suit land denying the right, title and interest of the plaintiff and so, the trial Court rightly held that the suit was barred by limitation. The appellate Court was absolutely wrong in deciding that the defendant failed to prove his claim of adverse possession. 13. Countering the submission of learned counsel Mr. Lodh, Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the defendant at no point of time raised the plea of adverse possession and unless the claim of adverse possession is clearly pleaded and proved, the plaintiff is entitled to get recovery of possession while the title of the plaintiff has been clearly established. Adverse possession cannot be presumed only on mere possession and something else more positive and specific is required to be proved by the person claiming adverse possession. The defendant since neither pleaded nor adduced any evidence, simply because T.S. 3/88 was decreed in favour of the defendant, there cannot be a presumption of adverse possession. 14. The plaintiff instituted the suit claiming recovery of possession based on title and the plaintiff has proved his title over the suit land placing on record the order of allotment and the khatians prepared in his name. 14. The plaintiff instituted the suit claiming recovery of possession based on title and the plaintiff has proved his title over the suit land placing on record the order of allotment and the khatians prepared in his name. The defendant in his written statement simply stated that he instituted T.S. 3 of 1988 alleging that the cause of action arose on 26.02.1988 when the plaintiff threatened to dispossess him from the suit land and the suit was decreed in his favour and the plaintiff was permanently restrained from disturbing the possession of the defendant and that no cause of action arose on 01.01.95 in respect of the present suit and that was a false plea taken by the plaintiff. It is also pleased that the present suit is barred by limitation in view of the continuous peaceful possession of the defendant. There is nothing in the pleading of the defendant that he had been possessing the suit land denying the title of the plaintiff all along. Indisputably, the suit land was recorded at the time of C.S. settlement in khatian No. 3087 of the defendant but it was subsequently corrected by order of the ASO which was affirmed by the Director of Settlement and Land Records and those orders stand good. The defendant did not challenge those orders in any other forum. In his evidence also the defendant nowhere claimed title by adverse possession. T.S. 3 of 1988 was instituted by the defendant seeking permanent injunction and nothing else. If the defendant was in adverse possession of the suit land he would have claimed his right, title and interest in the suit land by adverse possession while he instituted T.S. 3/88. Neither in that suit nor in the present suit, the defendant claimed his right and title by dint of adverse possession and so, the plaintiff would be naturally entitled to get recovery of possession based on title. 15. Possession must be distinguished from mere occupation or detention. Possession in the eye of law consists of the fact of physical occupation and dominion and control as well as the consciousness of mind of the person having dominion over an object that he has it and can exercise it. The unity of two elements, namely, occupation and animus possidendi is recognized as constituting "possession" in the eye of law. Possession is a flexible term and is not restricted to mere occupation. The unity of two elements, namely, occupation and animus possidendi is recognized as constituting "possession" in the eye of law. Possession is a flexible term and is not restricted to mere occupation. Legal possession is occupation with the intention of exercising the right of ownership in respect of it. Mere acts of user which do not interfere and are consistent with the owner’s title, are not sufficient to constitute dispossession of the owner or start adverse possession in favour of the occupant. Whether in particular circumstances, the acts of the occupation means to possession and whether such possession is on behalf of the legal owner or in opposition to his title are matters of inference to be drawn from proved facts. 16. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the others right but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Burden lies on the defendants to prove that their possession is hostile under a colour of title, actual, open, uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Adverse possession is made out by the coexistence of two distinguished ingredients; first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for a full statutory period. 17. Learned counsel Mr. Lodh in course of his argument submitted that the plaintiff in his pleadings clearly stated that in the objection case the ASO has ordered comment in Col. No. 24 of the khatian that the defendant is in forceful occupation of the suit land. Learned counsel, Mr. Roy Barman has submitted that the plaintiff suppressed nothing. 17. Learned counsel Mr. Lodh in course of his argument submitted that the plaintiff in his pleadings clearly stated that in the objection case the ASO has ordered comment in Col. No. 24 of the khatian that the defendant is in forceful occupation of the suit land. Learned counsel, Mr. Roy Barman has submitted that the plaintiff suppressed nothing. He has placed on record the orders passed by the ASO and the Director of Settlement and Land Records which shows that as against Plot No. 1273, the defendant has been shown as forceful occupier from 1995. Exhibit 2 is the khatian No. 2104 in the name of the plaintiff, wherein, as against Plot No. 1273, the defendant has been shown as forceful occupier from 1402 B.S./1405 T.S. Even if, it is taken that the comment recorded in Col. No. 24 of khatian was correctly made it was from the year 1995 and the present suit was instituted in the year 2003. So, it was within the period of limitation i.e. within 12 years from the date of the forceful occupation. Rightly, the defendant was in possession of the suit land on the date of institution of T.S. 3 of 1988 and before, but unless it is claimed that such possession was denying the title of the rightful owner, the possession cannot be termed as adverse possession. No doubt T.S. 3 of 1988 was decreed in favour of the defendant. It shows that at least from 1988, the defendant has/had been possessing the suit land and the plaintiff was restrained from entering into the suit land. Such possession of the defendant cannot debar the plaintiff in instituting the suit for recovery of possession based on title. Possession follows title is the settled principle. The plaintiff acquired title by dint of the order of allotment issued by the competent authority. To oust that title by a claim of adverse possession, burden heavily lies on the defendant to show that the defendant has/had been possessing the suit land denying title of the plaintiff. 18. The trial Court did not discuss in details regarding the claim of adverse possession. While deciding Issue No. I, the trial Court simply taking into account the judgment passed in T.S. 3/88 arrived at a conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit is barred by limitation. 18. The trial Court did not discuss in details regarding the claim of adverse possession. While deciding Issue No. I, the trial Court simply taking into account the judgment passed in T.S. 3/88 arrived at a conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit is barred by limitation. No finding recorded by the trial Court regarding the claim of adverse possession by the defendant. The appellate Court considered that aspect very meticulously and recorded its finding in para 8 of the judgment which reads thus:- 8. The learned court below decided the issue no. (i) i.e. point of limitation against the appellant in favour of the respondent who claimed that he has acquired title by way of adverse possession on the suit land as he is possessing the same since 1973 and his possession was found by the Survey Commissioner during field enquiry in connection with his suit vide No. T.S. 03 of 1988. The appellant denied and disputed the same. Now at the beginning of discussion regarding the limitation i.e. adverse possession it should be noted here that the burden of proof of limitation i.e. adverse possession is on the person who asserted the plea as per provisions of evidence act and in the present case the burden of proof is on the respondent. The adverse possession in case of immovable property as per provisions of Article 65 of the Limitation Act is an acquisition of title by extinguishing the title of the true owner. To acquire title by way of adverse possession a person claiming title on the strength of adverse possession is to prove at least the following factors; his possession in immovable property started from a certain point of time declaring and ascertaining his hostile title of the property denying right, title and interest of the true owner openly, publicly and widely and had successfully retained the said hostile and notorious possession of the immovable property beyond the period of 12 years uninterruptedly. Then only he acquires title by way of adverse possession. Then only he acquires title by way of adverse possession. So, the defendant in the present suit is to assert the starting point of his possession declaring and ascertaining his hostile title against the true owner, the appellant openly and publicly and also against the interest of the true owner and to prove that he has successfully completed said notorious and hostile possession uninterruptedly from the true owner for complete period of 12 years and on that point of completion of 12 years he had acquired the title over the suit land. But on meticulous perusal and consideration of the pleading of the respondent i.e. the written statement in the suit and oral evidence of the witnesses reveals that nothing of the sorts is in the record of the learned court below. It should be noted here that the respondent has examined two PWs including himself but has not produced any documentary evidence to support his version. 19. I find justification in the finding recorded by the appellate Court reproduced above. The plaintiff while instituted the suit for recovery of possession based on title, he was required to prove that he has title in the suit land and the plaintiff discharged his burden by adducing documentary as well as oral evidence. The defendant neither in his pleadings nor in his evidence claimed adverse possession over the suit land. Law is quite settled that claim of the adverse possession must be clearly pleaded and proved. The time when the possession became adverse is to be stated by the defendant in the pleadings and has to be proved. Mere continuous possession cannot automatically convert the possession to adverse possession. The plaintiff’s right to the property will extinguish in the event the plaintiff fail to claim the recovery of possession within 12 years from the date the claim of adverse possession by the defendant is established. 20. Learned counsel Mr. Lodh has referred the decision of Orissa High Court in the case of Laxmi Gouda & Ors. V. Dandasi Goura reported in AIR 1992 Orissa 5 wherein the Division Bench of the High Court has held that where the acts of the person in possession of the property are irreconcilable with the rights of the true owner, it has been often held that such act of the person in possession would constitute ’adverse possession’ as against the true owner. In this suit the defendant neither in his pleading nor in his evidence established the fact that his possession over the suit land were/are irreconcilable with the rights of the true owner and so, the ratio of that decision cannot be applied in the facts of the present case. 21. Learned counsel Mr. Lodh also referred the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal V. The Dalhousie Institute Society, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1778 . That suit was instituted on the claim of the awarded compensation due to acquisition of the land in the occupation of Dalhousie Institute Society. That Society was in possession of the acquired land for 60 years exercising all acts of owner of the land which was actually granted in favour of the Institute but not in the manner required by law. Since uninterrupted continuous possession with all acts of ownership exercised by the institute, the Supreme Court has held that the claim of Dalhousie Institute was established on the amount awarded due to acquisition. The ratio of that decision cannot be applied in the fact of the present case since in that case it has been clearly held that the act of ownership on the part of the Institute was established by continuous uninterrupted possession which was recognized by the Municipal Corporation as well as by the Government. 22. Learned counsel Mr. Roy Barman has referred the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Uttam Kumar Sen & Ors. V. Gita Das Choudhury & Ors. reported in 1998 (3) GLT 299 wherein the Single Bench of the Gauhati High court, Agartala Bench has held that the plea of adverse possession is not always a legal plea. It is always based on facts which must be asserted and proved. A person who claims adverse possession must show on what date he came into possession, what was the nature of his possession, whether the factum of his possession was known to the legal claimants and how long his possession was open and undisturbed. Unless these are asserted and proved, a plea of adverse possession cannot be inferred from them. 23. Learned counsel also referred the decisions of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Jamila Begum & Ors. Unless these are asserted and proved, a plea of adverse possession cannot be inferred from them. 23. Learned counsel also referred the decisions of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Jamila Begum & Ors. V. Sudhir Chandra Paul and Ors., reported in (2013) 1 TLR 896 and the case of Tapasi Rani Das & Ors. V. Sajal Das, reported in (2013) 2 TLR 992. Both the judgments were scribed by me (S.C. Das, J.). In both the cases, it has been held that by "adverse possession" is meant possession which is hostile, under a claim or colour of title, actual, open uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Adverse possession is made out by the co-existence of two distinct ingredients: first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for the full statutory period. In both the reported decisions the nature of possession, which should be considered as adverse possession has been categorically discussed. 24. In the case of Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak & Ors. V. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 376 the Supreme Court has held thus:- To establish ouster in cases involving claim of adverse possession the defendant has to prove three elements namely, hostile intention; long and uninterrupted possession; and exercise of the right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of the owner. In cases of adverse possession, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but it commences from the date when the defendant’s possession became adverse. 25. In the case of S.M. Karim V. Mst. Bibi Sakina, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1254 , the Supreme Court has held that the claim of adverse possession must be clearly pleaded. The Court has held that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. The Court has held that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. In that reported case, there was no evidence when possession became adverse, if at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession "several 12 years" or that the plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea. 26. The Supreme Court in the case of M. Durai V. Muthu & Ors., reported in (2007) 3 SCC 114 has held thus:- 7. The change in the position in law as regards the burden of proof as was obtaining in the Limitation Act, 1908 vis-a-vis the Limitation Act, 1963 is evident. Whereas in terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, the plaintiff was bound to prove his title as also possession within twelve years preceding the date of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act, 1963. Once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession. 27. In the case of Hemaji Waghaji Jat V. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors., reported in (2009) 16 SCC 517 the Supreme Court has observed that the law of adverse possession which ousts a owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law should not place premium on dishonesty by legitimising possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to lose his possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation. Referring to Hemaji Waghaji Jat (supra), the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana V. Mukesh Kumar & Ors. Reported in 2012 AIR SCW 276has seriously criticized the concept of adverse possession. The Court has held that India inherited the law of adverse of possession from the British. The parliament would consider abolishing the law of adverse possession or at least amending and making substantial changes in law in the larger public interest. The Court has held that the parliament must seriously consider at least to abolish "bad faith" adverse possession, i.e. adverse possession achieved through intentional trespassing. Actually believing it to be their own could receive title through adverse possession sends a wrong signal to the society at large. Such a change would ensure that only those who had established attachments to the land through honest means would be entitled to legal relief. The Court has further held--"Adverse possession allows a trespasser a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, in the eyes of law to gain legal title to land which he has illegally possessed for 12 years. How 12 years of illegality can suddenly be converted to legal title is, logically and morally speaking, baffling. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. This outmoded law essentially asks the judiciary to place its stamp of approval upon conduct that the ordinary Indian citizen would find reprehensible. The doctrine of adverse possession has troubled a great many legal minds. We are clearly of the opinion that time has come for change. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country." The Court in paras 14 and 23 has observed that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. The ordinary classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario and the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. 28. In view of the discussions made above, I have no hesitation to hold that the defendant has failed to set up a case of adverse possession and therefore, the suit cannot be said to have barred by limitation and on that score the appellate Court rightly decided Issue No. I in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 29. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court in Title Appeal No. 8 of 2004 is upheld. 30. The second appeal accordingly stands dismissed. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.