Judgment : By the Court: This appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) Code of Civil Procedure (for short, 'CPC') portrays an unsavory legal battle between father and son duo. The appellant (plaintiff son) has laid this appeal assailing the order dated 17th September, 2013 passed by the Additional District Judge No.2, Sriganganagar (for short, 'the learned trial Court'), whereby the learned trial Court has declined the relief of temporary injunction to him in a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction. In the suit, which was initially filed under Order 33 Rules 1 & 2 CPC, appellant-plaintiff claimed the relief that he may be declared owner of House No.1081 measuring 30 X 55 feet situated at Agrasen Nagar, Sriganganagar. A prayer for perpetual injunction was also incorporated for restraining the respondent-defendant to take possession of the house by unlawful means. Learned trial Court on consideration found that the appellant is not an indigent person and accordingly directed him to pay requisite Court fee. In the suit, it was, inter alia, averred by the appellant-plaintiff that his mother, Smt. Indravati Devi, purchased the disputed house from Bhartiya Grih Nirman Shkari Samiti Ltd., Sriganganagar, vide allotment letter dated 23rd April, 1986 and subsequently housing society executed a registered sale-deed in her favour on 26th June, 2008. It is also averred in the plaint that since purchase of house, the appellant is residing in the said house as its owner, which was within the knowledge of his mother, and his possession is hostile/adverse to the rights of the true owner of the house since 1986. According to the version of the appellant, he was asked to vacate the premises by the respondent-defendant and others, but he resisted the same and continued enjoyment of possession of the house and finally in January 1999 his mother and the respondent were forcibly evicted from the house. With all these averments, the appellant has claimed ownership of the house on the strength of principle of adverse possession by asserting that he is in possession of the house for last more than 12 years. In the plaint, appellant has specifically mentioned that his mother passed away on 27th August, 2008 and the alleged Will executed by his mother in favour of respondent on 30th June, 2008 is a spurious document as at the time of death, she was physically and mentally incapable to execute testamentary instrument. In the plaint, appellant has specifically mentioned that his mother passed away on 27th August, 2008 and the alleged Will executed by his mother in favour of respondent on 30th June, 2008 is a spurious document as at the time of death, she was physically and mentally incapable to execute testamentary instrument. With these averments, he has sought relief that he may be declared as owner of the house for enjoying adverse possession over it and also claimed perpetual injunction that respondent may not dispossess him by resorting to unlawful means. Along with the plaint, the appellant also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC for temporary injunction reiterating the averments of the plaint. On behalf of the respondent-defendant, reply to the application was submitted and it was averred that the disputed house was purchased by him from the housing society in his wife's name and after purchase, he made huge investment for construction. It is also submitted in the reply that for raising construction he has incurred debt and also sold his old house as Smt. Indravati Devi had no independent income of her own. Refuting the allegation of the appellant that he is in occupation of the house as an owner since 1986, the respondent has pleaded that in 1986, he was minor and hardly 14 years old, and therefore, he was residing with his parents as a family member. All other averments were also denied and it was specifically pleaded in the return that the appellant-plaintiff has cooked up a concocted story to develop theory of adverse possession without any foundation whatsoever. As regards testamentary instrument, respondent has specifically averred in the return that at the time of execution of Will, Smt. Indravati Devi was sane and fully competent to execute the same. With all these pleadings, the respondent has stated in clear and unequivocal terms that none of the ingredients necessary for grant of temporary injunction are available to the appellant. The learned trial Court after hearing the rival submissions, by the impugned order, declined the prayer of the appellant and rejected his application for temporary injunction. I have perused the impugned order. Upon perusal of the impugned order, it is amply clear that the learned trial Court has examined the matter threadbare, while deciding the question of prima faice case in favour of appellant-plaintiff. I have perused the impugned order. Upon perusal of the impugned order, it is amply clear that the learned trial Court has examined the matter threadbare, while deciding the question of prima faice case in favour of appellant-plaintiff. While, prima faice, repelling the doctrine of adverse possession, the learned Court below has observed that entire edifice of the appellant's claim is based on false, fabricated and concocted facts. The learned trial Court has also taken note of the fact that in 1986, the appellant-plaintiff was minor and 14 years old only and as a minor, he was living with his parents being family member. In totality, the learned Court below, prima facie, repudiated the theory of adverse possession and rightly concluded that there is no prima facie case in favour of appellant-plaintiff. As regards two other ingredients necessary for grant of temporary injunction, the learned Court below has found that both these ingredients are conspicuously missing. In my considered opinion, the learned trial Court has examined the matter thoroughly and, while passing the impugned order, it has exercised its discretion judiciously. The impugned order is neither unconscionable, perverse and nor opposed to the sound principles of law and practice. It is trite that granting or refusing temporary injunction is solely within the discretion of the learned trial Court and appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the discretionary order of the learned trial Court. As the learned trial Court has not acted capriciously or unreasonably in refusing temporary injunction, in my opinion, no interference with the impugned order is called for. My this view is fully fortified by a decision of this Court in case of Smt. Vimla Devi V/s. Jang Bahadur [AIR 1977 Rajasthan 196], wherein the Court has held as under : 10. I have given my earnest consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the defendant-petitioner. The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion passed by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles of without considering all the relevant records. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles of without considering all the relevant records. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. V/s. Antox India P. Ltd. [1990 (Supp) SCC 727], while reiterating this principle, has held as under : 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on material. The appellant court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. vs. Jhanaton '...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case'.” The appellant judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” In yet another decision, this Court in case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board V/s. Mool Chand Jangir [1993 (3) WLC (Raj.) 338] further elaborating the powers of the appellate Court to interfere with an order passed by the trial court in deciding application for temporary injunction held as under : 5. The jurisdiction of an Appellate Court to interfere with an order passed by a trial court in deciding the application for grant of injunction is very limited. The appellate Court can interfere with an order of the trial court granting or refusing to grant injunction only when it is satisfied that the trial court has acted contrary to law or has acted arbitrarily or that the findings of the trial court regarding the three requirements of grant of injunction are perverse or capricious or that there has been a misreading of the pleadings or evidence. Only on satisfaction of the existence of any one or more of these factors, a lower Appellate Court can over turn order of the trial court. The jurisdiction of an appellate Court is not co-extensive with that of the trial court while hearing an appeal against an order made on an application for grant of injunction. The appellate court is under a duty to manifestly show in its order that the trial court has committed some grave error of law or has acted arbitrarily or capriciously while deciding the application for grant of injunction. Without recording such conclusion, which must itself be supported by reasons, an appellate court cannot interfere with the order of the lower court. An appellate court cannot set aside the order of the trial court merely because on an application of the pleadings and the evidence, it may form an opinion other than the one formed by the trial court. Without recording such conclusion, which must itself be supported by reasons, an appellate court cannot interfere with the order of the lower court. An appellate court cannot set aside the order of the trial court merely because on an application of the pleadings and the evidence, it may form an opinion other than the one formed by the trial court. If an appellate court interferes with the order of the trial court passed while deciding an application for temporary injunction, ex debitio justicea, the High court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction not only can but must interfere and nullify the order of the appellate Court. In such a case it becomes the duty of the High Court to correct error of the appellate court. The instant case is a glaring example of dare devilry of a son to grab his mother’s property by resorting to certain ingenuous and uncharitable means reflecting the conduct of the appellant. Therefore, the learned Court below has rightly taken cognizance of prima faice false, concocted and inconstant stand of the appellant in discrediting his ambitious pursuit by rejecting temporary injunction. As the appellant has not approached the Court for seeking equitable relief of temporary injunction with clean hands, clean mind and clean objective, the learned trial Court has rightly declined the relief of temporary injunction by invoking principles of equity, justice and good conscience. Thus, in totality, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order and the instant appeal, therefore, sans merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.