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2014 DIGILAW 148 (CHH)

JAGARNATH v. STATE OF M. P.

2014-04-02

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, YATINDRA SINGH

body2014
Judgment Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 16.7.1997 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Sarguja in ST No. 386/96 whereby learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. 2. The appellant has been convicted for committing murder of deceased Ramdev, aged about 24 years, at 11.30 pm on 11.5.96. 3. As per the FIR (Ex.-P/1) lodged by PW-1 Mansai at 1.30 am on 12.5.96, the informant's co-brother Shivratan Kumhar resides at Chirmiri Kurasia Colliery. At 7 pm on 11.5.96, Shivratan, his son deceased Ramdev and his son-in-law Gopichand came to the informant's house at village Pasla. Ramdev informed the informant that on their way to Pasla, Jagarnath, son-in-law of Sonsai, was riding bicycle ahead of their scooter and was not giving side for overtaking because of which a dispute took place and Jagarnath was slapped by Ramdev. Jagarnath gave a teeth bite to Ramdev over his chest. After having dinner, Mansai, Shivratan, Ramdev and the informant's daughter Gita Bai were asleep in the Varandah. At 11.30 pm, Ramdev shouted on which the informant and Shivratan awoke. Ramdev informed them that Jagarnath has cut his left hand and is fleeing. The informant and his co-brother saw Jagarnath fleeing from the spot and they chased him. However, taking benefit of darkness, the appellant escaped. Hearing the commotion, Shiv Prasad Singh, Ramlal, Nakul Singh and others came to the place. Ramdev's left hand was amputated below the elbow, which was kept in a piece of cloth. 4. After lodging FIR, the injured was taken to Patna Primary Health Centre where PW-16 Dr. A.K. Sharma conducted his MLC and submitted report vide Ex.-P/20A & P/21A. The injured was referred for better treatment to the District Hospital, Ambikapur and was admitted there where he succumbed to the injuries at 7.40 am. Immediately after lodging the report and before shifting him to District Hospital, Ambikapur, the case diary statement of the injured was recorded wherein he informed the police that the appellant has inflicted one Farsa blow and cut his left hand at 11.30 pm. The dead body inquest was prepared vide Ex.-P/4 and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by PW-10 Dr. The dead body inquest was prepared vide Ex.-P/4 and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by PW-10 Dr. B.P. Chandra, who submitted his report Ex.-P/14 opining that the mode of death is syncope caused by extensive (excessive) haemorrhage from the injuries of left forearm. 5. Memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded on 13.5.96 vide Ex.-P/7 which led to recovery of Tabbal (battleaxe) from his house vide Ex.-P/9. The prosecution also recovered bed sheet, blood stained soil and plain soil from the place of occurrence vide Ex.-P/8 and the scooter belonging to Shivratan vide Ex.-P/5. 6. Merg intimation Ex.-P/16 & P/16A was also recorded. 7. In course of further investigation, the prosecution recorded case diary statements of the witnesses and filed the charge sheet against the appellant for committing offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 8. The prosecution examined 20 witnesses in course of trial. The appellant abjured the guilt and stated in his examination under Section 313 CrPC that when he was coming back from the market along with Pitamber and Nandlal and had reached near mango tree near the house of Amharam, they saw that Gopichand and deceased Ramdev were quarreling. Both of them chased the appellant and his friends whereupon they went to their house. The appellant examined 2 defence witnesses namely, DW-l Gita Kumari and DW-2 Ramnarayan. 9. On the basis of evidence available on record, the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in paragraph-1 of this judgment. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. The questions falling for consideration are:- (i) Whether the appellant is guilty of committing crime ? (ii) In case the answer is in affirmative, then what offence has he committed ? 12. PW-1 Mansai is the uncle (Chacha) of the appellant. He is also maternal uncle (Mausa) of the deceased. At the time of the incident, the deceased, his brother-in-law Gopichand and father Shivratan had taken dinner and fallen asleep in the Varandah of the house of this witness. According to this witness, Ramdev informed him that a dispute took place with Jagarnath on the issue of not giving side to overtake the scooter. He also says that at 11.30 pm, Ramdev shouted that his left hand has been cut. However, this witness has not supported the prosecution any further by naming the appellant. According to this witness, Ramdev informed him that a dispute took place with Jagarnath on the issue of not giving side to overtake the scooter. He also says that at 11.30 pm, Ramdev shouted that his left hand has been cut. However, this witness has not supported the prosecution any further by naming the appellant. Therefore, at this stage, he was declared hostile because in his case diary statement he has informed the prosecution that he had seen the appellant running away from the place of occurrence after causing injury to the deceased. This witness is also the informant. This witness has proved FIR (Ex.-P/1) and has admitted his signatures on the document. In para-5 of his cross-examination, he admits that Ramdev had informed him that Jagarnath had cut his hand. 13. PW-2 Gopichand is the brother-in-law of the deceased. He along with Shivratan (PW-3) and the deceased were coming on scooter when the first incident took place in the evening of 11.5.96 where the appellant was riding bicycle ahead of their scooter and refused to give side, on which a quarrel took place and the deceased slapped the appellant. He was present at the place of occurrence in the house of Mansai. He along with PW-3 Shivratan, who was also present in the house, had seen the appellant fleeing from the place of occurrence after causing injury to the deceased. PW-2 Gopichand admits in para-11 of his evidence that despite treatment at Patna Primary Health Centre, bleeding did not stop. There is nothing in the cross-examination of these two witnesses which would dent their credibility. 14. PW-4 Dhanmat is the wife of PW-1 Mansai and as such, she is the aunt (Chachi) of the appellant and Mausi of the deceased. She has not supported the prosecution and has been declared hostile. 15. PW-5 Shivbaran Singh and PW-6 Ganga Singh are witnesses to the memorandum statement Ex.-P/7 and seizure memos Ex.-P/8 & P/9 respectively. They admit their signatures on these documents, however, they have not supported the memorandum and seizure, therefore, they have been declared hostile. PW-7 Shiv Prasad Singh is the villager and reached the place of occurrence after some time. He has not supported the prosecution and has been declared hostile. PW-8 Ramlal reached the house of Mansai after the incident. They admit their signatures on these documents, however, they have not supported the memorandum and seizure, therefore, they have been declared hostile. PW-7 Shiv Prasad Singh is the villager and reached the place of occurrence after some time. He has not supported the prosecution and has been declared hostile. PW-8 Ramlal reached the house of Mansai after the incident. He says that Mansai informed him that Jagarnath has cut left hand of Ramdev, however, since from this stage onwards he did not support the prosecution, he was declared hostile. PW-9 Dr. Ghanshyam Singh had sent death intimation Ex.-P/12 to the police. PW-10 Dr. BP Chandra is the autopsy surgeon. He has proved the autopsy report Ex.-P/14. He found the injuries after removing the bandage which was appended on the wound of the deceased at Patna Primary Health Centre. According to this witness, the cause of death was syncope caused by extensive (excessive) haemorrhage from injury of left forearm. PW-11 NP Upadhyay recorded the memorandum statement and effected seizure vide Ex.-P/7 and P/9. PW-12 SC Shukla has prepared the dead body inquest Ex.-P/4 and had sent the dead body for postmortem. PW -13 Pitamber Singh was accompanying the appellant at the time of first incident. He has been declared hostile. However, in his cross-examination, he admits that one person riding scooter had threatened to kill Jagamath by Gadasa. He also admits that there was dispute about giving side to the scooter for overtaking the bicycle. PW-14 Nandlal was also present at the time of first incident. He has been declared hostile. PW-15 Nakul Singh reached the place of occurrence after the incident. He has been declared hostile. PW-16 Dr. AK Sharma conducted the MLC of the hand as well as on the amputated portion and has submitted the report Ex.-P/20 & P-21. He found the following injuries in his report:- "Ex.-P/20 :- left forearm is cut 23 cms before from the left elbow joint. Both bone, muscles, blood vessels & skin is cut. Profuse bleeding present from the blood vessels, blood stained, red in colour. Ex.-P/21 :- one cut hand above 3" from the left wrist joint for examination on cut end blood clot present. Five finger, thumb, index, middle, ring & litter finger present. Skin is old. This cut hand is due to caused by sharp and cutting object." PW-17 BM Paikra is the IO. Ex.-P/21 :- one cut hand above 3" from the left wrist joint for examination on cut end blood clot present. Five finger, thumb, index, middle, ring & litter finger present. Skin is old. This cut hand is due to caused by sharp and cutting object." PW-17 BM Paikra is the IO. He recorded case diary statement under Section 161 CrPC of the deceased and has proved the same as Ex.P/23. PW-18 Jhitkuram is a witness to the seizure memo Ex.-P/28. He has been declared hostile, however, he admits his signatures on the document. PW-19 Santlal is a witness to the seizure of scooter vide Ex.-P/5. He admits his signatures but has been declared hostile. PW-20 Ramvichar Choubey is the Patwari, who prepared the spot map. DW-1 Gita Kumari is the daughter of Mansai. She was present in the house at the time of occurrence. According to this witness, they were sleeping in the house and somebody injured the deceased by cutting his left hand. DW-2 Ramnarayan is the neighbour of Mansai. He reached the place of occurrence immediately after the incident. He says that the deceased did not inform them as to who assaulted him. 16. From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly ocular version put forth by the eyewitnesses PW-2 and PW-3, it would clearly appear that these witnesses were traveling along with the deceased on scooter and reached the house of Mansai in the evening. On their way to the village where Mansai resides, a dispute occurred with the appellant on the issue of giving side as Jagarnath and his friends were riding bicycle and were moving ahead of the scooter but not allowing the scooter to overtake, on which the deceased and these two witnesses were coming from behind. On this issue, a quarrel took place and the deceased slapped the appellant. These witnesses stayed in the house of Mansai along with the deceased, which is also admitted by PW1 Mansai. Their presence at the place of occurrence is not disputed. They had seen the appellant fleeing from the place of occurrence with battleaxe in his hand after causing injury to the deceased. 17. Although PW-1 Mansai has been declared hostile, but before being declared hostile, he supports the prosecution case that the deceased stayed in his house and was taking rest after dinner along with PW-2 and PW-3. They had seen the appellant fleeing from the place of occurrence with battleaxe in his hand after causing injury to the deceased. 17. Although PW-1 Mansai has been declared hostile, but before being declared hostile, he supports the prosecution case that the deceased stayed in his house and was taking rest after dinner along with PW-2 and PW-3. Thus, to this extent, he corroborates the evidence given by eyewitness PW-2 and PW-3. 18. The IO has recorded case diary statement of the deceased when he was alive and fully conscious during the period between the incident and the time when he was taken to Ambikapur. In his statement under Section 161 CrPC (Ex.-P/23), the deceased narrated the first incident as well as the fact that the appellant has injured him by cutting his hand. The statement under Section 161 CrPC is in the nature of dying declaration as in Patel Hiralal Joitaram Vs. State of Gujarat, (2002) 1 SCC 22 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the statement made by the deceased to the police under Section 161 CrPC can be used as dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. 19. Similarly, the following has been held by the Supreme Court in paragraph-17 of the judgment in the matter of Mukeshbhai Gopalbhai Barot Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 224 :- "17. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision when read with Section 32 of the Evidence Act would reveal that a statement of a person recorded under Section 161 would be treated as a dying declaration after his death. The observation of the High Court that the dying declarations, Exts. 44 and 48 had no evidentiary value, therefore, is erroneous. In this view of the matter, the first dying declaration made to the Magistrate on 14-9-1993 would, in fact, be the first information report in this case." 20. Yet again in the matter of Rafique alias Rauf & others Vs. State of U.P., AIR 2013 SC 2272 it has been held that the statement made by the deceased under Section 161 CrPC is admissible in evidence in view of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. 21. Yet again in the matter of Rafique alias Rauf & others Vs. State of U.P., AIR 2013 SC 2272 it has been held that the statement made by the deceased under Section 161 CrPC is admissible in evidence in view of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. 21. At this stage, we also wish to add that as on date, there is no statutory prescription as to in what manner or the procedure to be followed for recording a dying declaration to fall within the four corners of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The presence of Magistrate; certification of the doctor as to the mental or the physical status of the person making the declaration, were all developed by judicial pronouncements. As has been repeatedly stated in various decisions, it will have to be found out whether in the facts and circumstances of any case the reliance placed upon by the prosecution on a statement alleged to have been made by the deceased prior to his death can be accepted as a dying declaration, will depend upon the facts and circumstances that existed at the time of making the statement. In that case it would mainly depend upon the date and time vis-a-vis the occurrence when the statement was alleged to have been made, the place at which it was made, the person to whom the said statement was made, the sequence of events, which led the person concerned to make the statement, the physical and mental condition of the person who made the statement, the cogency with which any such statement was made, the attending circumstances, whether throw any suspicion as to the factum of the statement said to have been made or any other factor existing in order to contradict the statement said to have been made as claimed by the prosecution, the nexus of the person who made the statement to the alleged crime and the parties involved in the crime, the circumstance which made the person to come forward with the statement and last but not the least, whether the said statement fully support the case of the prosecution. 22. The evidence discussed above clearly proves that it was the appellant who caused injury by cutting left forearm of the deceased. 22. The evidence discussed above clearly proves that it was the appellant who caused injury by cutting left forearm of the deceased. Since the deceased died at 7.30 am at district hospital, Ambikapur as a result of excessive haemorrhage because of the injury caused by the appellant, he is guilty of committing the crime. 23. Now, the question to be considered is whether the offence committed by the appellant would fall under any of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC and is punishable under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC or he is guilty of committing culpable homicide amounting to murder? 24. The question as to when conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted into culpable homicide, not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I & Part II of the IPC has been considered by the Supreme Court in (2008) 9 SCC 707, Bangaru Venkata Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and it has been held thus in paras 10 & 11 : "10.9. The residuary plea [relates to the] applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. 10. For bringing in its operation it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 11. The Fourth Exception to Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the First Exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it; but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the 'provision means 'unfair advantage'. 11. 19. Where the offender takes undue advantage or has acted in a cruel or unusual manner, the benefit of Exception 4 cannot be given to him. If the weapon used or the manner of attack by the assailant is out of all proportion, that circumstance must be taken into consideration to decide whether undue advantage has been taken. In Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan it was held that if the accused used deadly weapons against the unarmed man and struck a blow on the head it must be held that by using the blows with the knowledge that they were likely to cause death he had taken undue advantage. In the instant case blows on vital parts of unarmed persons were given with brutality. The abdomens of two deceased persons were ripped open and internal organs had come out. In view of the aforesaid factual position, Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC has been rightly held to be inapplicable." 25. Yet again the said aspect has been considered by the Supreme Court in Mangesh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011)2 SCC 123 , in the following manner in para 13 : "13. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the State, Pulicherla Nagaraju Vs. State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444 , is quite distinguishable from the present case as in that case the knife-blow that caused death was given with full force and the single injury was found to be 12 cm deep. Even in that case the law has been laid down as under: (SCC p. 458, para 29) "29. ... State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444 , is quite distinguishable from the present case as in that case the knife-blow that caused death was given with full force and the single injury was found to be 12 cm deep. Even in that case the law has been laid down as under: (SCC p. 458, para 29) "29. ... The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. {See Sridhar Bhuyan Vs. State of Orissa, (2004) 11 SCC 395 and Gali Venkataiah Vs. State of A.P., (2007) 14 SCC 475 } 26. The evidence available in the case clearly proves that the first part of the incident occurred in the evening when the appellant and two of his friends were riding bicycle on road and were not giving side to the scooter on which the deceased, PW-2 & PW-3 were coming. This annoyed the deceased and a dispute arose on which he slapped Jagarnath. This annoyed the deceased and a dispute arose on which he slapped Jagarnath. As the evidence suggests, the deceased and the appellant are related inasmuch as PW-1 Mansai in whose house the deceased was sleeping in the night along with PW-2 & PW-3 when the incident took place, happens to be the maternal uncle (Mausa) of the deceased whereas the said PW-1 is the uncle (Chacha) of the appellant. It might have happened that since the appellant was slapped, he felt embarrassed, therefore, since he was aware that the deceased is staying in the house of his maternal uncle (Mausa), he went there at 11.30 pm and cut his left hand by means of Tabbal/Farsa (battleaxe). 27. There is evidence to the effect that at the time of the incident there was sufficient light as one electric bulb was on and since the deceased was sleeping, the appellant had the opportunity to cause injury on any vital part of the body of the deceased. However, he cut his left hand may be because of the reason that he was slapped by the deceased by using his hand. Had the appellant intended to kill the deceased, he would have chosen vital part of the body of the deceased and not the hand. Merely because the deceased died because of excessive haemorrhage from the place of wound, an inference cannot be drawn that he wanted to kill the deceased. 28. In Laxmichand alias Balbutya Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 128 , the Supreme Court, having found that the accused gave only one blow with spade on the head of the deceased that too in a quarrel in his house, held that he had no intention to kill the deceased, therefore, the offence would fall under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 29. In the case in hand, PW-16 Dr. AK Sharma of PHC, Patna, conducted MLC of the deceased. He found the injuries which have been mentioned above. According to this witness, the deceased was restless and was in the state of shock as a result of excessive bleeding and his blood pressure was not measureable. In para-3 of his evidence, he says that although he has not stated as to the nature of the injuries but since left forearm was cut and separated, it was grievous. According to this witness, the deceased was restless and was in the state of shock as a result of excessive bleeding and his blood pressure was not measureable. In para-3 of his evidence, he says that although he has not stated as to the nature of the injuries but since left forearm was cut and separated, it was grievous. He admits in para-11 of his cross-examination that the injury on the left forearm was not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Although he says that in the event of excessive bleeding a person may die of such injury, but in the event immediate treatment is provided, the person sustaining such injury could be saved. 30. The incident has taken place at 11.30 pm. Instead of taking the deceased to the PHC, he was first taken to the police station. PW-16 Dr. AK Sharma has stated that the deceased was brought to him at 4 am i.e. after 5 hours of the incident. 31. In Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 24th Edition, Chapter-26, the author has dealt with the topic causes of death from wounds. The following part of the chapter can be profitably referred:- "Causes of death from wounds.- ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… It should be noted that a person could be convicted of culpable homicide, if he causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity and thereby accelerates the death of that other person. However, the intention or the knowledge with which the act that caused death was committed in a necessary ingredient to bring about a conviction under these offences. In such a case, even if the medical officer has proved from post-mortem examination the existence of the disease that caused the death, and its relation to the injury alleged to have accelerated it, the court will have to be satisfied from the evidence before giving a decision: (a) that the death at the time when it occurred was not caused solely by the disease; and (b) that it was caused by the bodily injury to this extent that it was accelerated by such injury." 32. Modi, thereafter, deals with the topic as to when causes of death from wounds are immediate or direct and remote or indirect. (i) haemorrhage (ii) injury of a vital organ and (iii) shock are considered as immediate or direct causes of death. Modi, thereafter, deals with the topic as to when causes of death from wounds are immediate or direct and remote or indirect. (i) haemorrhage (ii) injury of a vital organ and (iii) shock are considered as immediate or direct causes of death. Haemorrahge is dealt with by Modi in the following manner:- "Haemorrhage.-This may be external or internal. External haemorrhage may produce marked fall of blood pressure and consequent shock causing death either rapidly, if a large blood vessel such as the carotid or femoral artery has been wounded, or slowly, if a number of small vessels have been injured. The amount of haemorrhage required to cause syncope varies according to circumstances. The sudden loss of blood is more dangerous than the same quantity lost slowly. The loss of one-third of the blood of the body is almost enough to cause death, and the total quantity of blood in the body of an adult is on an average about five percent of the body weight of about 750 ml per 10 kg of body weight. Children, women and old persons die from the loss of a much smaller quantity. Persons with haemorrhage diathesis or haemophiliacs may die of haemorrhage even from a trifling injury." Emphasis Supplied 33. When the commentary of Modi's Jurisprudence is considered along with the evidence of PW-16 Dr. Sharma, who conducted MLC of the deceased, it would be apparent that the deceased was not brought to the PHC immediately after the incident but was brought after 5 hours. Dr. Sharma says that the injury sustained by the deceased was not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and in the event immediate treatment was provided and excessive bleeding was stopped, the death could have been avoided. 34. From the entirety of the circumstances and the evidence, it appears, although the appellant had knowledge that if he causes grievous injury, it may complicate the medical condition and if not treated well, the deceased may also die, but at the same time, he had no intention to kill the deceased. Therefore, the offence committed by the appellant squarely falls within IVth exception to Section 300 of the IPC and as such, his guilt is punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 35. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. Therefore, the offence committed by the appellant squarely falls within IVth exception to Section 300 of the IPC and as such, his guilt is punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 35. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. Conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC are set aside and instead thereof, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. The appellant has already remained in jail for more than 7 years, as observed by this Court in its order dated 8.8.2003 when the appellant was released on bail The incident occurred on 11.5.96 i.e. about 18 years back. At that time, the appellant was aged about 18 years. Therefore, considering the entirety of the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the sentence undergone by the appellant would be sufficient punishment and as such, he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall remain in operation for a period of 6 months from today in view of the provisions contained under Section 437-A of the CrPC. He shall appear before the higher Court, as and when directed. Appeal Partly Allowed.