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2014 DIGILAW 148 (KER)

Abdul Khader v. District Collector, Thrissur

2014-02-18

C.T.RAVIKUMAR

body2014
JUDGMENT : C.T. Ravi Kumar, J. 1. An extent of 0.7463 Hectare of land in Survey No. 86/2 of Kadappuram Village in Chavakkad Taluk was acquired for the purpose of rehabilitation of Tsunami victims pursuant to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') dated 10/11/2008. After complying with all the mandatory procedures for acquiring the land under the Act, the land was acquired from the petitioner. Later, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 28/03/1999 fixing the compensation as Rs. 23,02,646/-. The award amount was later, deposited before the Court under Section 31(2) of the Act owing to the failure on the part of the owners to produce documents to prove exclusive title over the property. Subsequently, as per Ext. P5 judgment in LAR 52/2009 the petitioner was found entitled to the aforesaid amount deposited in Court. The petitioner is also having a case that earlier, he submitted an application for reference under Section 18 of the Act and it was rejected on the ground of being barred by limitation. The petitioner was intimated that he could wait till the passing an award and then make an application subject to the provisions under Section 28A of the Act. Though, such an award was passed in respect of properties, belonging to some other persons acquired under the same notification, on applications, in accordance with law, the petitioner had not filed such an application under Section 28A within the time stipulated thereunder before the competent authority adhering to the provisions under Section 28A. At the same time, the petitioner filed Ext. P7 application before the District Legal Services Authority, Thrissur. That application was subsequently considered and rejected as per Ext. P8. It is essentially challenging Ext. P8 that this writ petition has been filed. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the learned Government Pleader. 2. Indisputably, the application filed by the petitioner, earlier, seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Act was rejected on the ground of being belated and he was then intimated that he could prefer appropriate application, in accordance with the provisions under Section 28A at the appropriate time. This is discernible from Ext. P8. Even then, the petitioner had not filed any application in tune with the provisions under Section 28A of the Act within the stipulated time, before the competent authority. This is discernible from Ext. P8. Even then, the petitioner had not filed any application in tune with the provisions under Section 28A of the Act within the stipulated time, before the competent authority. This petition is also not disputed by the petitioner. The petitioner has only filed Ext. P7 petition dated 15/11/2011 that too, before the District Legal Services Authority, Thrissur. In the meanwhile, the compensation awarded earlier deposited in Court under Section 31(2) of the Act was withdrawn by the petitioner pursuant to Ext. P5 judgment in LAR 52/2009. Now, the questions to be decided is whether Ext. P7 could be treated as a valid application under Section 28A of the Act for redetermination of the amount of compensation and whether the challenge against Ext. P8 is sustainable? 2A. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that when the Act prescribes a particular method that too, with time constraint, to seek for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the Act any other method not statutorily prescribed in that regard could not be resorted to or recognised, to overreach the effect and impact of the statutory provision. Obviously, definite time frame has been prescribed therefor under Section 28A of the Act. Evidently, that remedy is available only to a person who failed to make an application for reference within the time prescribed in Section 18(2) proviso of the Act and that too, on an application before the Collector based on an award of the Court in respect of any other land covered by the same acquisition notification, if there is an increase in the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act. {see the decision in Bhagwan Das and Others Vs. State of UP and Others. In this case the petitioner filed an application for reference under Section 18 of the Act only after the period prescribed in Section 18(2) proviso and it was rejected only on the ground of delay. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Greh Nirman Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Another, dismissal of the said application on the aforesaid ground could not set as a legal bar or impediment for applying for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the Act, in accordance with law. In the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Greh Nirman Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and Another, dismissal of the said application on the aforesaid ground could not set as a legal bar or impediment for applying for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the Act, in accordance with law. In fact, it was that position which was duly intimated to the petitioner while rejecting his application for reference under Section 18 of the Act. Despite such an intimation the petitioner had failed to submit an application under Section 28A of the land acquisition Act for redetermination of the compensation based on an award and it was without moving such application that the petitioner submitted Ext. P7 application which was ultimately rejected as per Ext. P8. It is also to be noted in this context that Ext. P8 is dated 10/02/2012 and the petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the same only on 31/10/2013. According to the petitioner, he was informed that Ext. P7 application for enhancement of compensation could not be considered. There is absolutely no case for the petitioner that he moved an application seeking for redetermination under Section 28A of the Act at any point of time. True that, in this case, originally, the petitioner was not identified and recognised as the person eligible to receive the amount of compensation as per the award dated 28/02/1999 passed under Section 11 of the Act and only after Ext. P5 judgment dated 29/07/2011 the petitioner was found entitled to receive the amount awarded as compensation. Even after Ext. P5 judgment the petitioner did not file an application for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the Act. Ext. P7 petition cannot be construed as such an application for redetermination of compensation filed under Section 28Aof the Act. The petitioner who was a claimant in LAR 52/2009 of Sub Court, Thrissur filed Ext. P7 petition before the District Legal Services Authority and it was numbered as PLP No. 3/2012 and the said Authority informed the District Collector, Thrissur as per Notice dated 23/01/2012 in PLP 3/2012 regarding filing of the same by the petitioner and its posting in the adalath which was to be held on 11/02/2012. It is in the said circumstances that the petitioner was served with Ext. P8 intimation dated 10/02/2012. It is in the said circumstances that the petitioner was served with Ext. P8 intimation dated 10/02/2012. A perusal of the same would reveal that Ext. P8 is not an order passed on petitioner's application and it was only an onward copy of the communication from the District Collector, Thrissur to the Secretary, District Legal Services Authority, Thrissur addressed to the petitioner. It is stated in Ext. P8 thus: "As per Section 28(A) of Land Acquisition Act, the applicant has to file petition within three months after the Hon'ble Court passed judgment in the LAR cases. As the claimant has not taken steps to that effect, his petition cannot be considered for enhancement. The above facts are furnished for information and necessary action." The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is an illiterate and therefore he was unaware of the position that his remedy was to file a petition under Section 28A of the Act and that too, within the statutorily prescribed period. I am afraid the said contention cannot be countenanced for twin reasons. It is unsustainable in the light of the specific provision under Section 28A of the Act and the salutary maxim 'Ignorantia legis neminem excusat' which means 'ignorance of the law excuses no one'. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that when a specific statutory remedy alone is prescribed for the redressal of a particular grievance the said remedy prescribed statutorily cannot be permitted to be overreached by any means. Evidently, when Section 28A of the Act prescribed the remedy to a person who failed to make an application for reference under Section 18 within the time limit prescribed in Section 18(2) proviso, by filing a written application to the Collector based on an award of the Court in respect of any other land covered by the same notification and the authority competent to entertain the application and also the time limit within which such application has to be preferred, such a grievance could not be sought to be redressed in any other manner. Even while admitting the failure to apply for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the Act the petitioner seeks a prayer as follows: "Declare that the petitioner is entitled to receive enhanced compensation under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act." The petitioner has not produced any award which he sought to rely, as the basis for the claim for redetermination of compensation and for that purpose to reckon the period of limitation. When a specific time limit has been prescribed in a Statute and when there is no provisions for application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act this Court cannot pass an order condoning the delay and compelling the authorities to entertain such application despite the expiry of the statutorily prescribed period in the light of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Sebastian Chokkattu Vs. District Collector. It is held by the Division Bench that the High Court is not clothed with any such powers, and as such the High Court could not direct an authority to entertain application which is clearly time barred. Above all, in Popat Bahiru Govardhane etc. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another, the Hon'ble Apex Court emphasized the need for strict compliance with the statutory scheme and held that the Land Acquisition Officer is not a Court but only a quasi-judicial body and therefore Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceedings before the Collector under Section 28A of the Act. After referring to the maxim 'Dura lex Sed lex' means 'the law is hard but it is the law' the Apex Court held that it is not permissible to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds if the Statute does not permit the same. In this case, the petitioner has not submitted any application under Section 28A along with an award of the Court in respect of any other land covered by the same notification to compute the period of limitation. Hence, I do not think it appropriate for this Court to make any further observation in this regard. I have referred to the aforesaid decisions and position of law only to hold that the petitioner is not entitled to the declaration as sought for, in this proceedings. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, admittedly, the petitioner did not even file application under Section 28A whilst preferred only Ext. I have referred to the aforesaid decisions and position of law only to hold that the petitioner is not entitled to the declaration as sought for, in this proceedings. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, admittedly, the petitioner did not even file application under Section 28A whilst preferred only Ext. P7 application before the Legal Services Authority, and Ext. P8 is only a communication of the District Legal Services Authority, Thrissur by the District Collector, Thrissur perfectly in tune with the exposition of law on the subject. It is also to be noted that the petitioner has not cared to bring on record the outcome of PLP No. 3/2012. Whatever that be, the petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought for, in this writ petition. Ext. P7, for the reason mentioned hereinbefore, could not be treated as a valid application under Section 28A of the Act for redetermination of the amount of compensation and in the facts and circumstances mentioned hereinbefore, challenge against Ext. P8 is also unsustainable. This writ petition is liable to fail and accordingly it is dismissed.