JUDGMENT Mr. Deepak Sibal, J.: - Shiv Kumar (hereinafter referred to as “the land owner”) was the original land owner of the land in dispute. He was owner of land in two villages namely Rampura and Kullar in district Ferozepur, Punjab. Vide order dated 26.06.1966, Collector Agrarian, Ferozepur, passed an order under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the “1953 Act”) declaring 19 standards acres 10 ½ unit land of the land owner as surplus. Against this order, though the land owner filed no appeal, an appeal was preferred by one Dasa Ram on the ground that he was not given the benefit of tenant permissible area. This appeal filed by Dasa Ram was dismissed by the Commissioner, vide order dated 22.7.1971. On coming into force of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “1972 Act”), the land owner on 4.10.1973 filed declaration under Section 5(1) of the 1972 Act. This declaration filed by him was considered under the 1972 Act and a decision thereupon was taken by the Collector, Abohar on 23.6.1976. Facts on record further reveal that the land owner was then issued notice under Section 9(1) of 1972 Act for delivery of possession of the land in question to the State Government. In pursuance to the notice, the land owner appeared and filed his objections. The main ground taken in his objections was that the land was at present under tenants etc. This objection was considered and rejected vide order dated 24.3.1979 passed by the Collector Agrarian, Abohar and resultantly, warrants of possession were ordered to be issued under Section 9(2) of the 1972 Act. Order dated 24.3.1979 was not challenged by the land owner for over 6 ½ years. In the meanwhile, in pursuance of the order dated 24.3.1979 not only warrants of possession were issued but the State on 8.5.1984 actually took possession of the surplus land in Village Kullar out of which 46 kanals 9 marlas was allotted to the petitioners vide allotment order dated 18.9.1985. The petitioners claimed that they have paid their installments, a sale certificate was also issued in their favour qua the land allotted to them and that they are in possession of the same. The petitioners claimed that they have paid their installments, a sale certificate was also issued in their favour qua the land allotted to them and that they are in possession of the same. After the State had taken possession of the surplus land and out of which 46 kanals 9 marlas had been allotted to the petitioners, the land owner preferred an appeal on 28.11.1985 before the Commissioner Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur to challenge the order dated 24.3.1979. Though, in this appeal order dated 24.3.1979 passed by the Collector ordering issuance of warrants of possession was challenged, the Commissioner vide his order dated 8.1.1992 not only set aside those orders but remanded the matter back to the Collector not just to decide the issue with regard to issuance of warrants of possession but also to redetermine the entire issue with regard to declaration of surplus land of the land owner. The petitioners were not parties before the Commissioner during the proceedings which culminated into the passing of the order dated 8.1.1992. However, in pursuance to the order dated 8.1.1992, when the matter was taken up by the Collector, the petitioners were duly represented. After considering the entire matter afresh, the collector vide his order dated 26.8.1993 redetermined the surplus area of the land owner and further held that on the fresh determination of surplus land of the land owner any earlier allotment earlier made in favour of the petitioners stood automatically cancelled. The petitioners challenged the order dated 26.8.1993 by preferring an appeal before the Commissioner which was dismissed vide order dated 19.7.1994. Being still aggrieved by this order, the petitioners filed a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner Revenue, Punjab which was also dismissed vide order dated 27.9.1994 leading to the filing of the present writ petition. 2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the land of the land owner was declared surplus under the 1953 Act on 26.6.1966. The land owner never challenged this order. Thereafter on coming of the 1972 Act, the land owner filed his declaration in accordance with Section 5(1) of the 1972 Act which was also considered and decided by the Collector vide order dated 23.6.1976. This order was also never challenged by the land owner. The land owner never challenged this order. Thereafter on coming of the 1972 Act, the land owner filed his declaration in accordance with Section 5(1) of the 1972 Act which was also considered and decided by the Collector vide order dated 23.6.1976. This order was also never challenged by the land owner. Learned counsel further submits that the land owner was then issued notice by the Collector under Section 9 (1) of the 1972 Act for taking possession of the land from him to be handed over to the State. The land owner filed his objections to the same which were rejected by the Collector vide order dated 24.3.1979. In pursuance to such rejection of the objections filed by the land owner, warrants of possession were issued and in pursuance thereof, the State took possession of the land in question on 8.5.1984 out of which, on 18.9.1985, 46 kanals 9 marlas were allotted to the petitioners. Only in view of and after the above sequence of events that the land owner then woke up after over 6 ½ years of the passing of the order dated 24.3.1979 to challenge the same in appeal before the Commissioner Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur which was filed on 28.11.1985. Learned counsel submits that since order dated 26.6.1966 and 23.6.1976 were not challenged by the land owner, the issue with regard to declaration of surplus of land both under the 1953 Act and the 1972 Act had attained finality. Learned counsel further submits that the order of the Commissioner dated 8.1.1992 ordering that the issue with regard to declaration of surplus land be redetermined was an order beyond jurisdiction as this was not the issue before him and that the appeal itself having been filed after over 6 ½ years was barred by limitation and could have not been even entertained. In this regard, learned counsel referred to Section 18 of the 1972 Act read with Sections 80 and 81 of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1887 Act”) to say that the limitation to file appeal before the Commissioner was 60 days and that there was no provision conferring any power upon the Commissioner to entertain an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of 60 days. In this regard, learned counsel placed reliance on judgments of the Apex Court in Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab; 2004(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 174; Damodaran Pillai and others v. South Indian Bank Ltd.; 2005(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 132 and Rajeev Hitendra Pathak and others v. AchyutKashinath Karekar and another; [2011(5) Law Herald (SC) 3632] : 2011(4) PLR 274. Learned counsel further submitted that even assuming that the Commissioner could have entertained the appeal only the issue with regard to possession could have been decided. He further submitted that again assuming that the commissioner could entertain the appeal, the direction given by the Commissioner to the Collector was to determine whether the land has been utilized as per the 1972 Act. According to the learned counsel once under the 1953 Act and 1972 Act orders passed by the Collector determining surplus area out of the land held by the land owner and in pursuance thereto possession had been taken by the State, the land would be held to be utilized as provided under Section 8 of the 1972 Act. This aspect was not considered by the Collector while deciding the issue after remand and therefore, even on that count the order of the collector, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, was bad in law. 3. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents submitted that so far as the order declaring the land of the land owner to be surplus under the 1953 Act is concerned, the same was inconsequential as according to the learned counsel on coming of the 1972 Act, the relevant date was 2.4.1973 and if on that date, the land owner was not divested of his land then he had to be granted benefits available under the 1972 Act irrespective of the fact that his land had been earlier declared surplus. Accordingly, it was submitted that as on 2.4.1973, the land owner- Shiv Kumar was in possession of the land in question and therefore, he had not been divested of his land. Resultantly, the entire matter with regard to declaration of surplus land was rightly ordered to be redetermined by the Commissioner and that in pursuance of such order the Collector also rightly decided the matter after giving benefit of the provisions of the 1972 Act to the land owner. Resultantly, the entire matter with regard to declaration of surplus land was rightly ordered to be redetermined by the Commissioner and that in pursuance of such order the Collector also rightly decided the matter after giving benefit of the provisions of the 1972 Act to the land owner. So far as the order dated 23.6.1976 is concerned, the learned counsel would feign ignorance of the same to say that the land owner was never in knowledge of such order. Learned counsel stated that the order dated 23.6.1976 does not mention in the entire proceedings which followed after it had been passed. Learned counsel relies on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ranjit Ram v. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab and others; 1981 PLJ 259 to say that once as on 2.4.1973, the land owner has not been divested of his land, therefore, irrespective of the fact that earlier his land had been declared surplus, the Collector was required to determine the same again. Learned counsel further submitted that the order of the Commissioner dated 8.1.1992 remanding the matter back to the Collector to decide the entire issue afresh was never challenged by the petitioners. Rather, in pursuance to that order, the petitioners appeared before the Collector and took part in the entire proceedings. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the petitioners would be estopped by their conduct to challenge that order in the present writ petition. Learned counsel further brought to my notice that the land owner had died on 5.10.2003. Resultantly, his legal heirs have been brought on record. Learned counsel relying upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Sardara Singh v. Financial Commissioner; 2008(2) Law Herald (P&H) 961 (FB) submitted that after the death of the land owner the entire matter with regard to declaration of the land of the land owner needed to be taken up and decided afresh after taking into account the rights of the legal heirs of the land owner. 4. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties and with their able assistance have scrutinized the record. 5. According to me, the present petition deserves to be allowed and I reach to such a conclusion for the reasons mentioned hereunder: 6. 4. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties and with their able assistance have scrutinized the record. 5. According to me, the present petition deserves to be allowed and I reach to such a conclusion for the reasons mentioned hereunder: 6. The land of the land owner was declared surplus under the 1953 Act as per order of the Collector dated 26.06.1966. This order was never challenged by the land owner and thus, attained finality qua the land owner. On coming of the 1972 Act, the land owner made a fresh declaration under Section 5(1) of the said Act. This declaration made by him was considered and in pursuance thereof an order dated 23.6.1976 was passed by the Collector. This order was also never challenged by the land owner. This was an order which had been passed after coming into force of the 1972 Act and on the declaration made by the land owner in pursuance of the 1972 Act. The plea raised by the land owner that he was ignorant about such an order deserves to be considered only to be rejected. In this regard reference is to be made to para-7 of the writ petition, wherein the petitioners have specifically referred to the order dated 23.6.1976 and in connection thereto have stated that the order having attained finality had to be held against the land owner. In reply thereto, the land owner does deny this fact and further does not say that the order dated 23.6.1976 was passed behind his back and he had no knowledge of the same. Relevant portion of para-7 of the writ and the response to the same by the private respondents is reproduced below: “That the surplus area of the land owner was determined under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the New Act) by the Collector vide order dated 23.6.1976. While determining the surplus area under the New Act, it was held by the Collector that after giving benefit of additional family members and 7 hectares as permissible area of the land owner, no excess area is left in the hands of the land owner and surplus area case under the New Act, was ordered to be consigned to the record room vide order dated 23.6.1976. Copy of the order dated 23.6.1976 is annexed as Annexure P-3. Copy of the order dated 23.6.1976 is annexed as Annexure P-3. The said order dated 23.6.1976 attained finality as the said order was never challenged by the land owner by way of appeal or revision before any competent court. It was specifically mentioned in the order dated 23.6.1976 that any area declared surplus under the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act that shall remain surplus and shall not be effected by the order dated 23.6.1976. Written statement of respondent In reply to para 7 of the civil writ petition, it is submitted that the facts mentioned therein are matter of record. However, it is submitted that the petitioners did not challenge the remand order dated 8.1.1992 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Commissioner, Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur at any stage before any of the Revenue Officers below. On the other hand, they fully participated in the proceedings for re-determination of the surplus area in pursuance of the remand of the case before the Special Collector, Ferozepur, Head Quarter Fazilka, Camp at Abohar who passed the present order dated 26.8.1993 (Annexure P-5) of surplus area regarding the case of Shiv Kumar, the landowner, the answering respondent, and by this order the same land measuring 46 kanals 9 marlas of village Kullar, which was allotted to the petitioners on 18.9.1985 was kept in the surplus area plus one more field No.43M/3 Min (7-10), the total surplus area being 53 Kanals-19 Marlas in village Kullar.” 7. Further, the order dated 23.6.1976 does find mention in the order dated 8.1.1992. In fact, the same has been referred to by the counsel appearing on behalf of the land owner. The relevant portion of the order dated 8.1.1992 is reproduced below for ready reference: “At the time of arguments before me, Shri VP Arora, Advocate, has stated that a perusal of the order dated 23.6.1976 passed by Collector, Abohar, in the surplus area case of Shri Shiv Kumar, appellant-land owner decided under the New Act indicates that an area measuring 6.0368 hectares of firstly quality had been declared surplus under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. While passing this order, it has been stated by the Collector that the total holding of the appellantcomes to 14.1652 hectares out of this holding, the learned Collector deducted 6.0368 hectares of first quality land, already declared surplus under the Old Act, and hence, an area measuring 8.1284 hectares of first quality was left. The learned Collector has held that the land owner was entitled to get the benefit of 11.20 hectares of first quality as per the provisions of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 and since his land was 8.1284 hectares of first quality after deducting the area declared surplus under the old Act, the case was filed.” 8. From the above, it is crystal clear that the land owner was well aware of the order passed on 23.6.1976 under the 1972 Act but chose not to challenge the same. The order, thus, became final. 9. Not only this, after the orders dated 23.6.1976 and 24.3.1979 warrants of possession were issued in favour of the State, the State took possession of the surplus land of the land owner and out of the same on 18.9.1995 allotted 46 kanals 9 marlas to the petitioners. In pursuance to the orders dated 23.6.1976 and 24.3.1979, once the State took possession of the land the same vested in the State and qua the same utilization was complete. In this regard Section 8 of the 1972 Act can usefully be referred to and the same is reproduced below: “8. Vesting of unutilized surplus area in the State Government. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom or usage for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of section 15, the surplus area, declared as such under the Punjab law or the Pepsu law, which has not been utilized till the commencement of this Act and the surplus area declared as such under this Act, shall, on the date on which possession thereof is taken by or on behalf of the State Government, vest in the State Government, free from all encumbrances and in the case of surplus area of a tenant, which is included within the permissible area of the landowner, the right and interest of the tenant in such area shall stand terminated on the aforesaid date. Provided that where any land falling within the surplus area is mortgaged with possession, only the mortgagee rights shall vest in the State Government.” 10. From the above, it stands established that in pursuance to the order dated 23.6.1976, which became final, the utilization of the surplus land was complete after the State took possession of the same and allotted a part thereof in favour of the petitioners. Consequently, the land owner stood divested by his land. By this time, no appeal had been preferred by the land owner neither against the order dated 23.6.1976 nor the order dated 24.3.1979. Once all the above sequence of events were allowed to take place due to inaction on the part of the land owner, the same could have not been interfered with in subsequent proceedings. 11. Still further, the land owner challenged the order dated 24.3.1979 before the Commissioner Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur, after over 6 ½ years. After such an inordinate delay, the Commissioner Ferozepur Division, Ferozepur, could have not entertained the appeal in this regard. Section 18 of the 1972 Act and Section 80 and 81 of the 1887 Act which prescribe the limitation for such proceedings are reproduced below: “18. Appeal, review and revision. The provision in regard to appeal, review and revision under this Act shall, so far as may be, the same as provided in sections 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (Act XVI of 1887). 80. Appeals.— Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules thereunder, an appeal shall lie from an original or appellate order or decree made this Act, by a revenue Officer or Revenue Court, as follows, namely:- (a) to the Collector when the order or decree is made by an Assistant Collector of either grade; (b) to the Commissioner when the order or decree is made by a Collector; (c) to the Financial Commissioner when the order or decree is made by a Commissioner. Provided that- (i) an appeal from an order or decree made by an Assistant Collector of the First grade specially empowered by name in that behalf by the (State) Government in a suit mentioned in the First group of sub-section (3) of section 77 shall lie to the Commissioner and not to the Collector; (ii) when an original order or decree is confirmed on first appeal, a further appeal shall not lie; (iii) when any such order or decree is modified or reversed on appeal by the Collector, the order or decree made by the Commissioner on further appeal, if any, to him shall be final. 81. Limitation for appeals.-- The period of limitation for an appeal under the last foregoing section shall run from the date of the order or decree appealed against, and shall be as follows, that is to say:- (a) when the appeal lies to the Collector-thirty days; (b) when the appeal lies to the Commissioner-sixty days; (c) when the appeal lies to the Financial Commissioner-ninety days.” 12. From the above, it is clear that the appeal, if any, against the order dated 24.3.1979 could have been preferred by the land owner within 60 days. There is no provision granting any power to the Commissioner to condone any delay thereafter. Further, even no application of condonation of delay had been admittedly filed. The appeal was, therefore, clearly time barred. In this regard, I find support from the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of Ajmer Kaur (supra), wherein it was held as under: “4. Regarding the first point it was contended that at the most the respondents (Revenue authorities) could take the benefit of a period of ninety days to file review against the order dated 23.7.1985 whereby declaration of surplus land was redetermined and it was held that there was no surplus land in the hands of Daya Singh. The Collector sought review after about nine months which was clearly barred by time. In reply the learned counsel for respondents submitted that there is power to condone delay with the authorities in exercise of which time to seek review can be extended. In support of the submission, our attention was invited to Section 82 of the Act which contains provision regarding review of orders of revenue authorities. In reply the learned counsel for respondents submitted that there is power to condone delay with the authorities in exercise of which time to seek review can be extended. In support of the submission, our attention was invited to Section 82 of the Act which contains provision regarding review of orders of revenue authorities. According to sub-clause (b) of Section 82(1) “no application for review of an order shall be entertained unless it is made within ninety days from the passing of the order or unless the applicant satisfied the Revenue Officer that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within that period.” We have considered the rival contentions. In our view the bar of limitation does not come in the way of the Collector redetermining the permissible land holding of Daya Singh. A bare reading of clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 82 shows that review can be made even after expiry of period of ninety days where the Revenue Officer is satisfied about cause for delay. The fact that the Commissioner granted permission to the Collector to review his order suggests that the hurdle of limitation had been successfully crossed. 8. In our view, it is not necessary for us to enter into the controversy regarding the alleged conflict between the provisions of sub-section (5) and (7) of Section 11 of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, we feel that these appeals can be decided on the basis of the fact that the initial order whereby the Collector declared 3.12 hectares of land as surplus was passed on 30th September 1976. The appeal against the said order filed by Daya Singh, land owner, was dismissed on 27th march, 1979. Kartar Kaur wife of Daya Singh, along with whom Daya Singh had filed a joint return with respect to the lands, died on 9th October 1980. The surplus lands were mutated in favour of the State Government in the year 1982 and the State Government allotted the same to third parties including the respondents No.5 to 7 herein in the year 1983. Respondent No.7 has filed an affidavit stating that he is in possession of the land allotted to him. The surplus lands were mutated in favour of the State Government in the year 1982 and the State Government allotted the same to third parties including the respondents No.5 to 7 herein in the year 1983. Respondent No.7 has filed an affidavit stating that he is in possession of the land allotted to him. Kartar Kaur is said to have made a Will on 15th October 1979 regarding a portion of land declared surplus in favour of a Gurudawara which has been impleaded as respondent No.8 in this appeal. On 15th October, 1979 when Kartar Kaur made her Will she was left with no interest or title in the land and therefore she could not have made a Will with respect thereto. Daya Singh filed an application for re-determination of the surplus land under Secti8on 11(5) of the Act only 21st June, 1985 on the basis of the fact that Kartar Kaur had died and succession had reopened. This application was made almost 5 years after the death of Kartar Kaur, In our view, this delay in making the application is fatal for Daya Singh and the application for redetermination ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone. Assuming that Daya Singh had a right to make an application under Section 11(5) of the Act but the right had to be exercised within a reasonable time. It cannot be said that the right under Section 11(5) can be exercised at any time at the sweet will of the applicant. The order regarding determination of surplus land by the Collector has serious consequences: 1. So far as the land owner is concerned he is divested of the land. 2. The surplus land vests in the State Government. 3. The State Government utilizes the surplus land in accordance with law which includes allotment of the surplus land to third parties like landless persons for purposes of cultivation etc. 9. Permitting an application under Section 11(5) to be moved at any time would have disastrous consequences. The State Government in which the land vests on being declared as surplus, will not be able to utilize the same. The State Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely before putting the land to use. Where the land is utilized by the State Government a consequence of the order passed subsequently could be of divesting it of the land. The State Government in which the land vests on being declared as surplus, will not be able to utilize the same. The State Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely before putting the land to use. Where the land is utilized by the State Government a consequence of the order passed subsequently could be of divesting it of the land. Taking the facts of present case by way of an illustration, it would mean the land which stood mutated in the State Government in 1982 and which was allotted by the State Government to third parties in 1983, would as a result of reopening the settled position, lead to third parties being asked to restore back the land to the State Government and the State Government in turn would have to be divested of the land. The land will in turn be restored to the land owner. This will be the result of the land being declared by the Collector as not surplus with the land owner. The effect of permitting such a situation will be that the land will remain in a situation of flux. There will be no finality. The very purpose of the legislation will be defeated. The allottee will not be able to utilize the land for fear of being divested in the event of deaths and births in the family of the land owners. Deaths and births are events which are bound to occur. Therefore, it is reasonable to read a time limit in sub-section (5) of Section 11. The concept of reasonable time in the given facts would be most appropriate. An application must be moved within a reasonable time. The facts of the present case demonstrate that redetermination under sub-section (5) of Section 11 almost 5 years after the death of Kartar Kaur and more than 6 years after the order of Collector declaring the land as surplus had become final, has resulted in grave injustice besides defeating the object of the legislation which was envisaged as a socially beneficial piece of legislation. Thus we hold that the application for redetermination filed by Daya Singh under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act on 21st June, 1985 was liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and the Collector was wrong in re-opening the issue declaring the land as not surplus in the hands of Daya Singh and Kartar Kaur. Thus we hold that the application for redetermination filed by Daya Singh under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act on 21st June, 1985 was liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and the Collector was wrong in re-opening the issue declaring the land as not surplus in the hands of Daya Singh and Kartar Kaur. 10. The above reasoning is in consonance with the provision in subsection (7) of Section 11 of the Act. Sub-section (7) uses the words “where succession is opened after the surplus area or any part thereof has been determined by the Collector...”. The words “determined by the Collector” would mean that the order of the Collector has attained finality. The provisions regarding appeals etc. contained in Sections 80-82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as made applicable to proceedings under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, show that the maximum period of limitation in case of appeal or review is ninety days. The appeal against the final order of the Collector dated 30th September, 1976 whereby 3.12 hectares of land had been declared as surplus was dismissed on 27th march, 1979. The order was allowed to become final as it was not challenged any further. Thus, the determination by the Collector became final on 27th March, 1979. the same could not be re-opened after a lapse of more than 6 years by order dated 23rd July, 1985. The subsequent proceedings before the Revenue authorities did not lie. The order dated 23rd July, 1985 is non-est. All the subsequent proceedings therefore fall through. The issue could not have been reopened.” 13. Further in the case of Damodaran Pillai (supra), the Apex Court held in para 10 as under: “10. The learned Judge, however, while arriving at the said finding failed and/or neglected to consider the effect of sub-rule (3) of Rule 106. A bare perusal of the aforementioned rule will clearly go to show that when an application is dismissed for default in terms of Rule 105, the starting period of limitation for filing of a restoration application would be the date of the order and not the knowledge thereabout. As the applicant is represented in the proceeding through his Advocate, his knowledge of the order is presumed. As the applicant is represented in the proceeding through his Advocate, his knowledge of the order is presumed. The starting point of limitation being knowledge about the disposal of the execution petition would arise only in a case where an ex-parte order was passed and that too without proper notice upon the judgment debtor and not otherwise. Thus, if an order has been passed dismissing an application for default, the application for restoration thereof must be filed only within a period of thirty days from the date of the said order and not thereafter. In that view of the matter, the date when the decree holder acquired the knowledge of the order of dismissal of the execution petition was, therefore, wholly irrelevant.” 14. Thus, even the appeal could not have been entertained resulting in the declaration of the order passed in appeal and all subsequent proceedings to be bad in law. 15. I also find merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the only issue in appeal was the issue regarding possession and that being so, the issue regarding re-determination of surplus area could not have been ordered. Still further, a perusal of the order dated 8.1.1992 shows that the direction by the Commissioner to the Collector while remanding the case was to first see whether the land had been utilized or not. A perusal of the order of the Collector and the subsequent orders show that no such exercise was undertaken. Further, the appeal was preferred on 28.11.1985 i.e. after the land had already been utilized. Once the land had been utilized and that too due to the inaction on the part of the land owner, it was not open to the Commissioner to have re-opened the entire issue with regard to declaration of surplus land. 16. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the private respondents on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Ranjit Ram’s case (supra) is misplaced. As per the law laid down by the Full Bench only if a land owner was not divested of his land as on 2.4.1973, he could make a declaration under the 1972 Act and on such declaration made by him on his own enquiry, the Collector was required to pass a fresh order determining surplus area out of the land owned by the land owner. According to the Full Bench decision whether the land had been earlier declared surplus or not was inconsequential. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, after coming into force the 1972 Act, the land owner had made a declaration under that Act which was considered and decided vide order dated 23.6.1976. The land owner never challenged this order. Thereafter the land owner was issued notice under Section 9(1) of the 1972 Act for grant of possession of the surplus land in favour of the State. The land owner filed his objections which were rejected. In pursuance to such rejection, the State took possession of the land and utilized the same. Thus, after coming into force the 1972 Act, redetermination had been made by the Collector through his order dated 23.6.1976 which remained unchallenged by the land owner. Further, much before the filing of the appeal by the land owner on 28.11.1985, the possession of the surplus land had been taken from him and thus he divested of his land even before he had preferred the appeal. Still further, the remedy sought to be availed by the land owner was hopelessly time barred and he was clearly estopped from taking benefit out of his own inaction. The entire issue could not and cannot be allowed to be happened. The observations made by the Apex Court in Ajmer Kaur’s case (supra) can usefully be referred to in the regard: “10. The above reasoning is in consonance with the provision in sub section (7) of Section 11 of the Act. Sub-Section (7) uses the words “where succession is opened after the surplus area or any part thereof has been determined by the Collector ...”. The words “determined by the Collector” would mean that the order of the Collector has attained finality. The provisions regarding appeals etc. contained in Sections 80-82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as made applicable to proceedings under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, show that the maximum period of limitation in case of appeal or review is ninety days. The appeal against the final order of the Collector dated 30th September, 1976 whereby 3.12 hectares of land had been declared as surplus was dismissed on 27th March, 1979. The order was allowed to become final as it was not challenged any further. Thus the determination by the Collector became final on 27th March, 1979. The appeal against the final order of the Collector dated 30th September, 1976 whereby 3.12 hectares of land had been declared as surplus was dismissed on 27th March, 1979. The order was allowed to become final as it was not challenged any further. Thus the determination by the Collector became final on 27th March, 1979. The same could not be re-opened after a lapse of more than 6 years by order dated 23rd July, 1985. The subsequent proceedings before the Revenue authorities did not lie. The order dated 23rd July, 1985 is non-est. All the subsequent proceedings therefore fall through. The issue could not have been reopened.” 17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents has submitted that once the orders passed by the Commissioner dated 8.1.1992 remanding the matter back to the Collector was never challenged by the petitioners and that they took part in the proceedings thereafter, the petitioners would be estopped them from raising a challenge to that order. It may be submitted that order dated 8.1.1992 is under challenge before this Court through the present writ and as observed earlier, the order is palpably illegal and without jurisdiction and this Court would be failing in its duty by sustaining such an illegal order. 18. Reliance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents on the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Sardara Singh (supra) is equally misplaced. As observed earlier, the issue with regard to declaring surplus land of the land owner has already attained finality and therefore, the said case would have not application to the facts of the present case in hand. Sardara Singh (supra) case would apply only in the circumstances where the land owner had not been divested of his land at the time of his death. As observed earlier, the land owner had been actually divested of his land way before he died. That being the position on facts, Sardara Singh’s case would not apply. 19. In view of the above, the present writ is allowed and the impugned orders dated 8.1.1992 (Annexure P-4); 26.8.1993 (Annexure P- 5); 19.7.1994 (Annexure P-6) and 27.9.1994 (Annexure P-8) are quashed. No costs. ---------0.B.S.0------------