JUDGMENT Anis, J. 1. These Civil Miscellaneous Appeals under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.') are directed against the order and decree, dated 01.04.2014, in I.A. No. 601 of 2013 in O.S. No. 155 of 2013, on the file of the Special Judge for trial of cases under Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes (POA) Act-cum-X Additional District & Sessions Judge, East Godavari, at Rajahmundry (for short 'the trial Court'), whereunder and whereby the petition filed by the first respondent/petitioner under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, seeking interim injunction restraining the appellants in both Appeals/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from conducting auction of plaint schedule property, during pendency of the suit was allowed. The appellants in both the Appeals are respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 1 respectively; respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 3 in both the Appeals are the petitioner and respondent No. 3 respectively, in I.A. No. 601 of 2013 in O.S. No. 155 of 2013. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter will be referred to as they are arrayed in the Interlocutory Application. 3. The brief averments made in the petition are that the petitioner Society filed O.S. No. 155 of 2013 for declaration of title to plaint schedule property and for grant of perpetual injunction on the ground that the Society acquired plaint schedule property under a registered Will dated 30.07.1951 executed by Pilli Peda Tatayya and also settlement deed dated 26.11.1964 executed by his wife. But, defendant Nos. 4 to 7 in the Original Suit under a Will dated 14.06.1969 brought into existence the sale deeds in favour of respondent No. 3, though Pilli Bapanamma, relinquished her life interest in the schedule property in favour of petitioner Society on 26.11.1964 itself and she has no title to bequeath the property to defendant Nos. 4 to 7. The Will dated 14.09.1969 executed by Pilli Bapanamma in favour of defendant Nos. 4 to 7 is a forged and fabricated document. The then Managing Trustee of the petitioner Society filed O.P. No. 54 of 2011, claiming title to the plaint schedule property and if Pilli Bapanamma had executed such a Will, he would not have filed the O.P. Respondent Nos. 4 to 7 is a forged and fabricated document. The then Managing Trustee of the petitioner Society filed O.P. No. 54 of 2011, claiming title to the plaint schedule property and if Pilli Bapanamma had executed such a Will, he would not have filed the O.P. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 granted loan to third respondent on the forged and fabricated documents and they are not entitled to invoke the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (for short 'the SARFAESI Act'). The plaint schedule property is an agricultural land and the SARFAESI Act cannot be invoked against it and therefore, prayed the Court to grant interim injunction in his favour. 4. Defendant Nos. 4 to 7 in the Original Suit are not the parties to the Interlocutory Application. 5. The first respondent, who is the appellant in C.M.A. No. 713 of 2014 filed the counter denying the material averments and specifically stated that the first respondent Bank sanctioned financial assistance of Rs. 5.00 Crores to respondent No. 3, when he approached for the purpose of Working Capital, upon furnishing guarantee agreements and upon deposit of registered sale deed dated 08.11.2014 (sic), it created an equitable mortgage on 09.10.2011. The third respondent also produced copies of land title deed book and pattadar passbook in favour of his vendors (defendants 4 to 7) in the suit. Plaint schedule property is not an agricultural land. When third respondent committed default in payment of loan, provisions of the SARFAESI Act were invoked by issuance of Notice under Sections 13(2) and (4) of the SARFAESI Act, its publication in local news papers and also by issuance of possession notice. When no objection was raised by anybody, possession was symbolically obtained and the property was brought for sale. Defendants 4 to 7 are the daughters of Pilli Suryanarayana, who is the son of Pilli Thatayya and Pilli Bapanamma, and the present President of the petitioner Society is Pilli Subrahmanyam, who is the brother of Pilli Suryanarayana and they have knowledge about the third respondent purchasing the schedule mentioned property from defendant Nos. 4 to 7, All the above persons might have colluded and got filed the present petition through the petitioner to gain wrongfully and to prevent this respondent from realizing its debt. 4 to 7, All the above persons might have colluded and got filed the present petition through the petitioner to gain wrongfully and to prevent this respondent from realizing its debt. No revenue records were issued in favour of petitioners regarding their alleged right, title and possession over the schedule mentioned property. There was no collusion or fraud on the part of the first respondent's officials in sanctioning and disbursing financial assistance to third respondent. Jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. A remedy is provided under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to the aggrieved parties to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal and therefore, prayed the Court to dismiss the petition. 6. The brief averments made in the counter filed by the second respondent, who is the appellant in C.M.A. No. 579 of 2014 are as follows. The second respondent Bank initiated proceeding under the SARFAESI. Act, since huge amount was due to it by virtue of default committed by M/s. Maddipoti Consultants Private Limited and necessary procedure was followed and second respondent is to sell properties in open auction. There is no prima-facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner and second respondent would sustain irreparable loss and it cannot be compensated in terms of money and therefore prayed the Court to dismiss the petition. 7. A memo was filed by the petitioner not pressing the petition against the third respondent. Hence, the petition against the third respondent was dismissed. 8. Basing on the pleadings, the trial Court framed four points and to substantiate the case, the petitioner got marked Exs. P1 to P11, while respondent Nos. 1 and 2 got marked Exs. R1 to R34 on their behalf. 9. After considering the pleadings and the documentary evidence produced, the trial Court held that the schedule property is an agricultural dry garden land; that the application of provisions of the SARFAESI Act are exempted under Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act; that in view of the principles laid down in the case law referred by the respondents/appellants Banks, the jurisdiction of civil Courts is limited in case of English mortgages and the mortgage relied upon by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is an equitable mortgage created by deposit of title deeds and hence, the Civil Court cannot entertain in respect of fraud committed other than the English mortgage and granted injunction in favour of the petitioner. 10. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 preferred the present appeals. 11. The learned standing counsel appearing for the appellant Bank in C.M.A. No. 712 of 2014/first respondent argued that the first respondent Bank has sanctioned financial assistance of Rs. 5.00 Crores to the third respondent after verifying the documentary evidence and an equitable mortgage was created on 09.10.2011 upon deposit of the title deeds of the petition schedule property and when the third respondent committed default in paying the loan, the Bank invoked the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and after following the procedure under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the possession was taken. It is also argued that the findings of the trial Court are not in accordance with law, civil Court has no jurisdiction under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act; that if the petitioner is aggrieved, they have to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, and therefore, the suit filed by the petitioner is not maintainable and relied upon the case law reported in Jagdish Singh vs. Heeralal and Others, 2014 (2) SCJ 460: (2014) 1 SCC 479 : 2014 (2) ALT 27 .2 (DN SC), wherein the Apex Court held at para 23 as follows: "23. We are of the view that the civil court jurisdiction is completely barred, so far as the "measure" taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal, to determine as to whether there has been any illegality in the "measures" taken. The bank, in the instant case, has proceeded only against secured assets of the borrowers on which no rights of Respondent Nos. 6 to 8 have been crystalised, before creating security interest in respect of the secured assets. The bank, in the instant case, has proceeded only against secured assets of the borrowers on which no rights of Respondent Nos. 6 to 8 have been crystalised, before creating security interest in respect of the secured assets. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in holding that only civil court has jurisdiction to examine as to whether the "measures" taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act were legal or not. In such circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs." Prayed the Court to set aside the order passed by the trial Court. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant in C.M.A. No. 579 of 2014 argued that the Bank is a Nationalised Bank, have got authority to initiate proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, whenever any loan has become a non-performing asset; that as the third respondent failed to pay the loan amount, the Bank issued notice under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act; that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred under Section 9 of C.P.C. that under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act also, the Civil Court is barred to entertain any suit and the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the appellate Tribunal is empowered to decide the case and relied upon the case law reported in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 2004 (4) ALT 4 (SC): (2004) 4 SCC 311 , wherein it is held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at para 51 as follows: "51. However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or their claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe, whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely V. Narasimhachariar (supra) p.135 at p.141 and 144, a judgment of the learned single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22: "The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor can come to the Court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if there are materials to show that the power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner contrary to the terms of the mortgage. But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of which relief is sought: Adams vs. Scott, (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49). I need not point out that this restraint on the exercise of the power of sale will be exercised by Courts only under the limited circumstances mentioned above because otherwise to grant such an injunction would be to cancel one of the clauses of the deed to which both the parties had agreed and annul one of the chief securities on which persons advancing moneys on mortgages rely." Prayed the Court to set aside the order passed by the trial Court. 13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent in both the appeals i.e., petitioner argued that the plaint schedule property belongs to the petitioner with absolute rights and it is a dry Zeroyiti land situated in Survey No. 199 and the appellants in collusion with the third respondent granted loan basing on the forged, fabricated and created documents and relied on the case law reported in Authorized Officer, Vijaya Bank, Vijayawada and Another vs. Surapaneni Vani Padmavathi, 2013 (6) ALD 194 (DB), wherein it is held by this Court at para 15 as follows: "14. This exactly is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The property, in question, was the subject-matter of an English mortgage. Though the extent mentioned in Ex. A1 was 149.76 Sq. yards, while processing the loan application, the bank obtained a legal opinion. A copy thereof is marked as Ex. A7. This exactly is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The property, in question, was the subject-matter of an English mortgage. Though the extent mentioned in Ex. A1 was 149.76 Sq. yards, while processing the loan application, the bank obtained a legal opinion. A copy thereof is marked as Ex. A7. A perusal of the same discloses that the area was found to be just 96 Sq. yards and not 149.76 Sq. yards. Still, the auction notification was issued, mentioning the area as 149.76 Sq. yards. Either there was fraud on the part of the mortgagor, or indifference on the part of the appellants in mentioning the area of the premises. From the observation of the Supreme Court in the judgments, referred to above, it is evident that the questions of this nature cannot be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, having regard to the limited scope of the jurisdiction of such Tribunal. Therefore, the Point No. 1 is answered against the appellants." Therefore, the appellants cannot invoke the provisions of the SARFAESI Act; that the plaint schedule property is an agricultural land and it cannot be exempted as it is barred under Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act and prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal. 14. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for both parties, the point which is to be decided in these appeals is as follows: "Whether the appellants are entitled to set aside the order dated 01.04.2014 passed by the trial Court in I.A. No. 601 of 2013 in O.S. No. 155 of 2013 or not?" 15. POINT: The main contention of the appellants is that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit and only the Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered to decide the present issue. Further, it is the case of the appellants that an equitable mortgage was created by deposit of title deeds and therefore, the civil Court cannot entertain in respect of the fraud committed other than the English mortgage. 16. On the other hand, the contention of the first respondent/petitioner is that the appellant Banks colluded with the third respondent and sanctioned financial assistance amounting to the tune of Rs. 5.00 Crores basing on the forged and fabricated documents, and therefore, the Civil Court has jurisdiction. 17. Now, it is relevant to refer Sections 17(1) and 34 of the SARFAESI Act. 5.00 Crores basing on the forged and fabricated documents, and therefore, the Civil Court has jurisdiction. 17. Now, it is relevant to refer Sections 17(1) and 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows: "17. Right to appeal: (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this subsection. Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act reads as follows: 34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction: No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993). 18. Admittedly, the appellants sanctioned financial assistance to a tune of Rs. 5.00 Crores to the third respondent, who produced certain title deeds and other documents pertaining to the suit schedule property admeasuring Ac. 18. Admittedly, the appellants sanctioned financial assistance to a tune of Rs. 5.00 Crores to the third respondent, who produced certain title deeds and other documents pertaining to the suit schedule property admeasuring Ac. 2-01 cents in R.S. No. 199/1 Zeroyiti dry land situated at Rajahmundry municipal limits Rural and thereafter, they failed to discharge the said loan and therefore, the Banks declared the said loan as non-performing asset and notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is issued by the secured creditor to the borrower to discharge in full his liabilities within sixty days from the date of notice, failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under sub-section (4). As the borrower failed to pay the debt in full, proceedings under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act was initiated, which is one of the measures, as contemplated in the said provision. When the Banks tried to sell the property by way of auction, the first respondent/petitioner filed the petition and obtained the injunction order against the appellant Banks. Since respondent No. 1/petitioner contended that fraud has been played by the third respondent while obtaining loan basing on the equitable mortgage and further, when the said loan was declared as non-performing asset, the provisions of the SARFAESI Act has been invoked by the Bank. 19. Admittedly, mortgage in favour of the appellant Banks is an equitable mortgage created by deposit of title deeds. Hence, (the trial Court rightly observed that) (sic.) the civil Court cannot entertain in respect of fraud committed other than the English mortgage. 20. As per Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the first respondent/petitioner has an effective alternative remedy available to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. Instead of filing the application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the first respondent/petitioner erroneously invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 21. There is no dispute about the proposition of law stated in the case law in Surapaneni Vani Padmavathi's case (third cited supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the first respondent in both the appeals/petitioner, but it applies to English mortgage. The facts and circumstances of the present case are different as in this case, it is mortgage by deposit of title deeds and the above case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 22. The facts and circumstances of the present case are different as in this case, it is mortgage by deposit of title deeds and the above case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 22. As per Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter, which Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered by or under the SARFAESI Act, to determine under the Act. Filing a suit in a civil Court is expressly barred under the Act. When the Debts Recovery Tribunal is empowered under the Act, it has jurisdiction to pass interim order. When the secured creditor has taken measures under the SARFAESI Act, civil Court cannot interdict by passing interim order. Therefore, the petition filed for injunction by the first respondent/petitioner against the appellant Banks is not maintainable and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. 23. In Jagdish Singh's case (first cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly held that the civil Court is completely barred, so far as the "measure" taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal to determine as to whether there has been any illegality in the "measures" taken. In the present case, the appellant Banks had already issued notices under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. If the contention of the first respondent/petitioner is taken into consideration regarding the fraud played and whether the property mortgaged is an agricultural land or not, has to be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, but not by civil Court. A civil Court is not competent to decide the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Thus, we are of the view that the civil Court has erroneously adjudicated the matter without having jurisdiction and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In view of the above discussion, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are allowed setting aside the order and decree, dated 01.04.2014, in I.A. No. 601 of 2013 in O.S. No. 155 of 2013 on the file of the Special Judge for trial of cases under Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes Act-cum-X Additional District and Sessions Judge, East Godavari, at Rajahmundry, No order as to costs. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals, shall stand closed. Appeal allowed.