JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The petitioner is aggrieved by the award passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-II, Sirmour District at Nahan whereby a sum of Rs.10,74,000/- alongwith interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of petition uptil final realization of the amount has been awarded to the claimant- respondent No. 1. 2. Briefly the case of the claimant-respondent No.1, as set out in the claim petition is that on 5.7.2000 at about 7.00 p.m. on way back from Nahan while riding pillion of scooter bearing registration No. HP-17-4072 owned and being driven by his father (respondent No.2) near village Sainwala in Tehsil Paonta Sahib due to sudden appearance of buffalo on the road in front of the scooter, his father who was driving the scooter in a rash and negligent manner could not control the same and he fell down and sustained injuries on his spinal cord, which was fractured resulting in his permanent disability to the extent of 100%. The claimant alleged that his entire lower part of the body below the belly had become completely useless and he could not independently attend to his daily routine. He was on wheel chair ever since the accident and had to employ an attendant for help and assistance. The injuries sustained had completely marred his future and career as he was totally crippled. That apart even his marriage prospects were totally diminished and the claimant had now become a liability on his parents. On the aforesaid allegations, he claimed compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- from the owner/ insured and or insurance company on the basis of insurance policy. 3. The claim petition was resisted and contested by the owner of the scooter, who in his reply while conceding the factum of accident contested that he was not driving the scooter in a rash and negligent manner as alleged. The respondent No. 2 opposed the grant of compensation to the claimant on the ground that he was not at fault in any manner in the accident of scooter as the same had occurred because of sudden appearance of buffalo on the road in front of the scooter which resulted in the accident. 4. The respondent No. 2 opposed the grant of compensation to the claimant on the ground that he was not at fault in any manner in the accident of scooter as the same had occurred because of sudden appearance of buffalo on the road in front of the scooter which resulted in the accident. 4. The petitioner- insurance company also contested the claim petition by filing the reply, wherein it was specifically contended that there was collusion between the claimant and the owner/ driver/ insured of the scooter as they being related as son and father respectively. It was also alleged that claimant was not covered by the policy of the insurance as no premium was paid for coverage of risk of pillion rider. It was further contended that a false claim was lodged by the claimant that too after seven years of the alleged accident. It was further contended that theory of accident is totally improbable as no FIR was lodged qua the alleged accident. It was also contended that scooter was being plied by respondent No. 2 in violation of terms and conditions of the insurance policy. Once it was maintained that accident did not occur due to rash and negligent driving by respondent No. 2, therefore, the claim petition was not maintainable and deserved to be dismissed. 5. The learned Tribunal after framing issues and recording evidence passed the aforesaid award, which has been impugned before this court on the ground that same is illegal, arbitrary and totally unjustified and cannot sustain the test of judicial scrutiny. It is further alleged that learned Tribunal has not appreciated in proper perspective important factual aspect of the case like (i) the claim petition being preferred after more than seven years of the accident; (ii) no police report or FIR have been lodged qua the alleged accident; (iii) insurance company having not been afforded an opportunity to verify mode and manner as also the veracity of the alleged accident after such a long period of time; (iv) the application of the insurance company under section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act have been illegally rejected by the learned Tribunal below, as prima facie, there was collusion between the owner and claimant, who were closely related to each other being father and son. The claim being ex-facie appears to be fraudulent with an intention to hoodwink the insurance company in an attempt to get huge compensation. 6. It was also contended that the learned Tribunal below could have only passed the award if rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle is established or proved on record. Once respondent No. 2 denied and in fact specifically maintained that he was not in any manner rash or negligent, there was no question of awarding any claim. It was also contended that claimant was not covered by the insurance policy and above all the compensation awarded was highly excessive and the impugned award was liable to be suitably modified as the same suffers from vice of perversity. 7. The petition has been contested by the claimant, who in his reply has raised preliminary objection as to the very maintainability of the petition on the ground that there was suppression of material facts, which had been made with malafide intention in order to deprive the respondent No.1-claimant of the award passed in his favour. It is claimed that petitioner despite having knowledge with respect to the insurance policy, which was admittedly a comprehensive policy was still denying its liability when it was amply proved that a sum of Rs.77/- had been paid as additional premium towards legal liability of the passenger/ pillion rider. The respondent has further contended that serious injuries had been sustained by him during the course of accident, which have been noticed by the learned Tribunal below and it is on this basis that a just and legal award has been passed in his favour. The respondent has also highlighted the fact that after the accident in which the respondent had sustained serious injuries, the respondent No. 2 had filed claim for damages of scooter in the aforesaid accident. The petitioner-insurance company after verifying the factum of accident had itself granted the respondent No. 2 a sum of Rs.2930/- as ODI claim Ex. PW 5/B. Once the respondents themselves had not disputed the factum of accident and in fact had paid the aforesaid compensation, it cannot turn around and question the factum of accident. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 8. PW 5/B. Once the respondents themselves had not disputed the factum of accident and in fact had paid the aforesaid compensation, it cannot turn around and question the factum of accident. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 8. At the very out set it may be observed that writ petition challenging the award would only be maintainable in cases where the award on the face of it is perverse or is based on fraud and the insurance company has no remedy under the Motor Vehicles Act of either challenging the award in appeal or being either to have it recalled or reviewed by the Tribunal itself and further that such exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India becomes imperative in dispensing justice to the parties. It was so held by the learned Full Bench of this court in National Insurance Co. vs. Soma Devi & others Latest HLJ 2003 (HP) (FB) 982 in the following terms: ?It, therefore, becomes abundantly clear that in all such like cases where the Award on the face of it is a perversity, or is based on fraud, and the Insurance Company has no remedy under the Motor Vehicles Act of either challenging the Award in appeal or being either to have it recalled or reviewed by the Tribunal itself, the power of judicial review by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution can always be invoked and exercised by this Court in dispensing justice to the parties.? 9. In the aforesaid judgement, it has further been clarified that the order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal cannot be challenged only on the ground of compensation being high, excessive or unreasonable in view of express provisions contained in section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act. 10. Now, I proceed to determine the point-wise contention raised by the petitioner. (i). Delay: 11. 10. Now, I proceed to determine the point-wise contention raised by the petitioner. (i). Delay: 11. No doubt, the petition has been filed after more than seven years of the alleged accident, but then taking into consideration the nature of injuries and also the fact that claimant was a minor at the time of accident, the mere fact that petition has been filed after seven years of the alleged accident cannot be viewed with suspicion particularly when the statute now does not prescribe any period of limitation. (ii) No police report or FIR: 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that in absence of any police report or FIR having been lodged qua alleged accident, the petitioner could not be held entitled to any compensation, since the accident in question had not been proved. I am afraid that mere fact that an FIR or police report have not been registered cannot be taken to be a ground to hold that no accident had taken place. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi vs. Badrinarayan & ors 2011 (4) SCC 693 , wherein it has been held as follows:- ?19. Lodging of FIR certainly proves factum of accident so that the victim is able to lodge a case for compensation but delay in doing so cannot be the main ground for rejecting the claim petition. In other words, although lodging of FIR is vital in deciding motor accident claim cases, delay in lodging the same should not be treated as fatal for such proceedings, if claimant has been able to demonstrate satisfactory and cogent reasons for it. There could be variety of reasons in genuine cases for delayed lodgment of FIR. Unless kith and kin of the victim are able to regain a certain level of tranquility of mind and are composed to lodge it, even if, there is delay, the same deserves to be condoned. In such circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much more significance than delay in lodging thereof supported by cogent reasons.? 14. Unless kith and kin of the victim are able to regain a certain level of tranquility of mind and are composed to lodge it, even if, there is delay, the same deserves to be condoned. In such circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much more significance than delay in lodging thereof supported by cogent reasons.? 14. The ratio of aforesaid judgement is not applicable to the facts of the present case because in that case there had been a delay in lodging the FIR and the Hon'ble Supreme Court even then had categorically held that this could not be a ground to doubt the claimant's case. While in the present case admittedly no FIR has been lodged. Would that ipso-facto means that the claim set up by the claimant is altogether false. Before proceeding, it has to be remembered that here was a case where the father was driving the scooter, while the son who is the claimant, was the pillion rider. Would the son lodge an FIR against his father for rash and negligent driving simply in order to claim the benefit of insurance. I think this is too far fetched. No son would risk the task of lodging an FIR and seeing the father being not only harassed by the police but even being put behind the bar. Even otherwise, it is settled law that an FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used for the purpose of corroboration. Above all, it has to be remembered that the claimant had sustained such severe and serious injuries that it was not possible for him to have even contemplated or thought of lodging the FIR and above all it has to be remembered that the claimant was a minor at that point of time and would be presumed to have no knowledge regarding intricacies of law. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that on account of delay in filing of the claim petition, the petitioner has been deprived of an opportunity to verify the mode and manner as also the veracity of the alleged accident. I am afraid this ground is equally untenable. Once the Motor Vehicles Act does not lay down any limitation for filing of claim petition, the petitioner cannot be heard to complain in these matters. I am afraid this ground is equally untenable. Once the Motor Vehicles Act does not lay down any limitation for filing of claim petition, the petitioner cannot be heard to complain in these matters. The other reason for rejecting this contention of the petitioner is that admittedly the insurance company has granted a sum of Rs.2930/- as ODI claim vide Ext. PW 5/B to respondent No.2 and therefore, was well aware of the accident. In case there was no accident then where was the question of petitioner's paying ODI claim. In addition to this, it may be observed that petitioner have led no evidence in this case and therefore, cannot be heard to complain in this matter. (iii) Section 170 of Motor Vehicles Act application 16. Application under section 170 of Motor Vehicles Act rejected. The petitioner has vehemently argued that there was collusion between the owner and the claimant being father and son and therefore, the claim ex-facie fraudulently made with a sheer intention of grabbing compensation from the insurance company. I am afraid that such plea is not available to the petitioner particularly when as already observed earlier the petitioner itself paid ODI of Rs.2930/- to respondent No. 2 vide Ex. PW 5/B thereby admitting the accident in question or else this payment would not have been made to respondent No.2, who was the owner of the scooter. The mere fact that the claimant happened to be the son of the owner cannot be a ground to uphold the contention of collusion as raised by the petitioner. After all, a scooter is not a commercial vehicle and is a vehicle meant for a family. (iv) Award being excessive: 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner would then contend that award of Rs.10,74,000/- alongwith interest at the rate of 7.5% was highly excessive. It is well settled law that in disablement cases compensation is always higher than even in cases of death since it is given to the living victim of the accident. It cannot be disputed that bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles the victim to claim damages which vary according to the gravity of the injury. In this case, the claimant has proved on record that he had sustained serious injuries and was treated at PGI, Chandigarh several times and had remained admitted there for several days. In this case, the claimant has proved on record that he had sustained serious injuries and was treated at PGI, Chandigarh several times and had remained admitted there for several days. As per his statement, he spent about Rs.12,00,000/- on his treatment, traveling and for expenses incurred on his relatives and friends. It has come in evidence that he could not be cured due to spinal cord fracture and had been assessed to be suffering from 100% permanent disability. His lower body below the stomach had been rendered totally useless and now he has crippled, leading his vegetative life on a wheel chair. He was unable to do his matters of daily routine and would depend upon the attendant engaged by his parents on a payment of Rs.3,000/- per month. He was unable to walk or do any work and his chances of getting married had completely come to an end and not only this, by sustaining spinal cord injury, he had to abandon his studies though he wanted to become an engineer. 18. The claimant was treated at Nahan hospital and examined by the Board of doctors, who assessed 100% permanent disability and issued certificate Ex. P-1. The certificate has not been disputed before the Tribunal by the petitioner, and, therefore, it can be safely held that petitioner had sustained permanent disability to the extent of 100%. The petitioner was born on 28.12.1983 and accident had occurred when he was hardly 17 years old. The learned tribunal below after applying the multiplier of 18 and assessing his life long future income at Rs.3,000/- per month awarded the following compensation:- ?35. Thus, the petitioner is entitled to compensation as per details given herein below:- (i) Treatment charges Rs.20,000.00 (ii) Attendant charges Rs.2,16,000.00 (iii) Estimated future loss of income Rs.6,48,000.00 (iv) Special diet Rs.5,000.00 (v) Transportation charges Rs.5,000,00 (vi) Future treatment charges Rs.30,000.00 (vii) Pain & sufferings Rs.50,000.00 (viii) Loss of amenities, Discomfort and disability Rs.1,00,000.00 Total Rs.10,74,000.00 19. Can the amount as awarded to the claimant be termed to be excessive? It has to be remembered that while determining the compensation in accident cases some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of disability are involved, but these elements are required to be considered in an objective manner. Can the amount as awarded to the claimant be termed to be excessive? It has to be remembered that while determining the compensation in accident cases some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of disability are involved, but these elements are required to be considered in an objective manner. In Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and another (2011) 1 SCC 343 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering a large number of precedents, laid down the following principles for awarding damages and compensation in accident cases:- “General principles relating to compensation in injury cases 5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (`Act' for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The court or tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. (See C. K. Subramonia Iyer vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair - AIR 1970 SC 376 , R. D. Hattangadi vs. Pest Control (India) Ltd. - 1995 (1) SCC 551 and Baker vs. Willoughby - 1970 AC 467 ). 6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following : Pecuniary damages (Special Damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising : (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising : (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life. 7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under item (i) and under item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses - item (iii) -- depends upon specific medical evidence regarding need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary damages - items (iv), (v) and (vi) -- involves determination of lump sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decision of this Court and High Courts contain necessary guidelines for award under these heads, if necessary. What usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability - item (ii)(a). We are concerned with that assessment in this case.? 20. In light of the aforesaid principles, it has to be remembered that while determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accidents, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily, efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injuries and treatment but also for the loss of earning and inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed, but for the disability caused due to accident. The amount awarded under the head of ?loss of earning capacity? The amount awarded under the head of ?loss of earning capacity? are distinct and separate and do not overlap with the amount awarded for pains and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life or the amount awarded for medical expenses. 21. This court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation and another vs. Smt. Sangeeta 2013 (2) T.A.C. 686 (H.P.) was dealing with a case where the claimant had suffered injuries in an accident on 16.11.2009 and had been rendered totally crippled and the award had been challenged on the ground as being excessive. The tribunal therein had awarded a sum of Rs.15,42,000/- to the claimant, who was aged about 37 years and had become absolutely helpless and dependant on others. While upholding the order passed by the tribunal, this court held as follows:- ?4. The appellant challenges the award as inadequate, non award of interest which according to the appellant should and ought to have been granted from the date of institution of the claim petition paltry charges for attendant which she would require for the rest of her life, pain and suffering and loss of normal amenities in life. Parties have placed reliance on the evidence as also on the law. I first advert to the law. In Neelam Anand Vs. Manmohan Singh and others 2007 ACJ 1386 this Court awarded a sum of Rs.18,85,000/- to the claimant, who had suffered injuries on the spine as a result of which the whole body became totally paralyzed. The facts noticed by this Court were: ?2. The appellant suffered injury in the spine as a result of which her whole body below neck became totally paralysed. She is confined to a wheelchair. She has no sensation in the lower part of the body. She needs assistance and constant attendance. She cannot perform he r daily ablutions without the assistance of other person. She cannot stand. She cannot move. She cannot write. She can only thumb mark documents, that too with the help of somebody who lifts her hand to put/move her thumb. She is, however, mentally totally alert. She understands everything. Above neck, she is all there. Her fate is worse than that of the dead. 5. She cannot stand. She cannot move. She cannot write. She can only thumb mark documents, that too with the help of somebody who lifts her hand to put/move her thumb. She is, however, mentally totally alert. She understands everything. Above neck, she is all there. Her fate is worse than that of the dead. 5. Adverting to the principle applicable for assessment of damages and the evidence on record, this Court awarded a sum of Rs.18,85,000/- holding that there was sufficient evidence to show the nature of disability suffered by the claimant, was fatal. 6. In National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Hamnawaz and others, 2011 ACJ 456 , the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir awarded a sum of Rs. 18,01,484/- to the claimant, who had suffered from paraplegia due to which both his lower limbs and sphincter muscles became non-functional. The Court holds: ?9 . On account of paraplegia, claimant is unable to move like a normal man and is also not capable to earn anything in future also. The future loss of income assessed by the Tribunal at the rate of Rs.4,000/- and applied the multiplier of 18 has also been rightly done. 10. The petitioner being of 28-29 years at the time when the award was passed, the multiplier of 18 has rightly been applied in this case. In respect of medical expenses incurred, the actual bills produced and proved by the claimant/petitioner has been worked out to be Rs.3,55,484/- for which there is no dispute and the compensation has been rightly assessed?. 7. On the evidence produced on record which included medical expenses, loss of income during the trial as also future income, pain and suffering, loss of amenity of her life and future income, a sum of Rs. 15,42,000/- was awarded. 8. In New India Assurance Company Ltd. Vs. Shweta Dilip Mehta and others, 2011 ACJ 489 , a Division Bench of High Court of Bombay awarded a sum of Rs. 49,48,848/- to the claimant who was aged about 11 years. The facts noticed by this Court were: ?1.......................................... The facts in brief are that one Dilip Shah was proceeding to Kohlapur along with his family and the family of his close friend, Dilip Mehta, in a Maruti 800 car bearing Registration No. MH-01-A/122. In all, 6 persons were travelling in the car. The facts noticed by this Court were: ?1.......................................... The facts in brief are that one Dilip Shah was proceeding to Kohlapur along with his family and the family of his close friend, Dilip Mehta, in a Maruti 800 car bearing Registration No. MH-01-A/122. In all, 6 persons were travelling in the car. On 2.5.1993, at about 6- 30 a.m., the car met with an accident near Itkari Phata when a truck, bearing Registration No. MHF-6469, which was travelling in the opposite direction, collided with it. As a result, the driver, Mr. Dilip Shah, died instantaneously, while the other passengers were severely injured. Ms. Shweta Dilip Mehta (hereinafter referred to as the "appellant"), aged 11 years at the time, was rendered paraplegic i.e. her entire body from waist - down is paralysed since the day of the accident and doctors assess her permanent disablement to an extent of 80 - 90 per cent?. 9. The Court holds: 23. In the present case, the appellant was only 11 years of age at the time of the accident. However, the aforementioned table, laid down in Sarla's case, 2009 ACJ 1298 (SC), does not specify the multiplier to be applied in such a case, i.e. where the victim is below 15 years of age. We feel that this is an inadvertence rather than an intended exclusion. The Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act itself specifies a multiplier of 15' to be applied for victims who are under 15 years of age. It cannot be said that victims below the age of 15 years are to be excluded from receiving compensation under the head of 'loss of future income' merely because a multiplier has not been specified for such age group. It is obvious that 'loss of future income' as a head of compensation applies to all persons, whether earning or not at the time. A child who is rendered permanently disabled due to an accident loses the capacity to earn for himself and his family, in the same manner as a working adult, and in fact, often loses such capacity for a longer period than such adult. Courts have merely sought to interpret and clarify the Second Schedule, on account of the several errors in it, and in the interests of justice. However, no judgment of the Supreme Court explicitly suggests excluding a category or age group from receiving compensation under this head. Courts have merely sought to interpret and clarify the Second Schedule, on account of the several errors in it, and in the interests of justice. However, no judgment of the Supreme Court explicitly suggests excluding a category or age group from receiving compensation under this head. We hence find no reason to exclude calculating compensation under this head for the victim in the present matter. 24. We note the mathematical progression of the multiplier values, in the aforementioned schedule, as explained in Sarla Verma's case, 2009 ACJ 1298 : "We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 - 20 and 20 - 25 years), reduced by one unit every five years, that is M - 17 for 26 to 30 years, M -16 for 31 to 35 years, M -15 for 36 to 40 years, M - 14 for 41 to 45 years and M - 13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M - 11 for 51 to 55 years, M - 9 for 56 - 60 years, M - 7 for 61 to 65 years and M - 5 for 66 to 70 years." As per this progression, the multiplier in the present case, for a victim below 15 years of age ought to have been 19. However, we are also bound by the judgment in Trilok Chandra's case, 1996 ACJ 831 (SC), where the Hon'ble Apex Court held that even in cases under section 166 of the Act, the maximum multiplier to be applied is 18, which was an increase from the existing maximum value of 16 that was laid down earlier in Susamma Thomas's case, 1994 ACJ 1 (SC). The cap of 18' as the maximum multiplier that may be applied in any case has been reiterated in Sarla's case, as well. Hence we conclude that irrespective of the mathematical progression in the schedule, the maximum multiplier that may be applied is 18, even if the victim is below 15 years. Thus, in the present case, the multiplier to be applied for computing 'loss of future income' for the victim is 18. 25. Hence we conclude that irrespective of the mathematical progression in the schedule, the maximum multiplier that may be applied is 18, even if the victim is below 15 years. Thus, in the present case, the multiplier to be applied for computing 'loss of future income' for the victim is 18. 25. To compute the compensation, we will have to assume an annual income in this case, as the appellant did not work at the time of the accident, being only 11 years old. The Second Schedule specifies Rs. 15, 000/- per annum to be assumed as income in case of non - earning victims. However, we find this sum wholly inadequate in the present time. Moreover, the appellant was a bright student who seemed to be set for a successful future, prior to the accident. In fact, inspite of the accident, the appellant has manage d to complete her M. Com. which itself is testimony to her potential. We feel that taking all contingencies, calamities and disadvantages that may have occurred in the appellant's normal future into account, to consider an annual income of 1, 00, 000/- is reasonable. Applying the multiplier of 18 to this amount, the appellant is entitled to Rs. 18, 00, 000/- as compensation towards loss of future income, which, if deposited at standard interest rates, would accrue an interest approximately equal to the assumed annual income. (emphasis supplied). 10. In National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Geeta Nagpal and others, 2012 ACJ 611 , the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir awarded a sum of Rs.88,66,000/- to the claimant. The Court noticed the facts: ?45. The claimant Kewal Nagpal has been disabled 100 per cent because of the spinal cord injuries of D-2 level. He is, therefore, dependent for his daily chores on others. He has, therefore, lost his earning capacity. 46. To determine compensation for loss of his earning capacity, the Tribunal has taken into consideration the annual loss of Rs.11,96,540/- to his profits, which he would otherwise, on an average, earn from his business in partnership with others in Kashmir Walnut Trading Company and Rajan Trading Co. before the accident. Deducting 1/3rd there from as his personal expenses, Rs.7,97,694/- has been taken as annual loss of income to the claimant. 47. before the accident. Deducting 1/3rd there from as his personal expenses, Rs.7,97,694/- has been taken as annual loss of income to the claimant. 47. There does not appear any justification in treating the claimant's disability, though 100 per cent, as total loss to his income from the two firms, in that, even if the claimant was 100 per cent disabled to personally participate in the business of the two firms, yet the profit, which he would otherwise earn from his capital investments in the two firms, even as a sleeping partner, cannot be lost sight of while determining loss of income. 11. The assessment of damages is no longer res integra. In Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and another, 2011 ACJ 1 , the Supreme Court while considering this aspect in detail, holds: ?7. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60 per cent permanent disability of the right hand and 80 per cent permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140 per cent (that is 80 per cent plus 60 per cent). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentage of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100 per cent. 8. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45 per cent as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45 percent loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may, however, note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case of course, Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. {See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra V. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2010 ACJ 2867 : 2010 (1) T.A.C. 385 (S.C.) and Yadava Kumar V. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2010 ACJ 2713 : 2010 (4) T.A.C. 10 (SC}. 9. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so, the extent of such permanent disability. Ltd., 2010 ACJ 2867 : 2010 (1) T.A.C. 385 (S.C.) and Yadava Kumar V. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2010 ACJ 2713 : 2010 (4) T.A.C. 10 (SC}. 9. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement; (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 13. We may now summarize the principles discussed above: (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently , the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different person, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.? 12. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different person, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.? 12. This principle was later on reiterated in Govind Yadav Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2012 ACJ 28 , holding: ?10. The personal sufferings of the survivors and disabled persons are manifold. Some time they can be measured in terms of money but most of the times it is not possible to do so. If an individual is permanently disabled in an accident, the cost of his medical treatment and care is likely to be very high. In cases involving total or partial disablement, the term `compensation' used in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, `the Act') would include not only the expenses incurred for immediate treatment, but also the amount likely to be incurred for future medical treatment/care necessary for a particular injury or disability caused by an accident. A very large number of people involved in motor accidents are pedestrians, children, women and illiterate persons. Majority of them cannot, due to sheer ignorance, poverty and other disabilities, engage competent lawyers for proving negligence of the wrongdoer in adequate measure. The insurance companies with whom the vehicles involved in the accident are insured usually have battery of lawyers on their panel. They contest the claim petitions by raising all possible technical objections for ensuring that their clients are either completely absolved or their liabilities minimized. This results in prolonging the proceedings before the Tribunal. Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses' make the award passed by the Tribunal and even by the High Court (in appeal) meaningless. It is, therefore, imperative that the officers, who preside over the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal adopt a proactive approach and ensure that the claims filed under Sections 166 of the Act are disposed of with required urgency and compensation is awarded to the victims of the accident and/or their legal representatives in adequate measure. The amount of compensation in such cases should invariably include pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. The amount of compensation in such cases should invariably include pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Private Limited (1995) 1 SCC 551 , this Court while dealing with a case involving claim of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ward v. James (1965) 1 All ER 563, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 12 (page 446) and observed: ?(9) Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life?. In the same case, the Court further observed: ?(12) In its very nature when ever a tribunal or a court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards.? 13. The principles which stand settled are that the injured has to be compensated for not only the pain and suffering but also for reasonable requirement of an attendant, physiotherapy, medication for life. But what must not be lost sight of the fact that a young lady of 37 years has been totally crippled for the rest of her life. The injuries as described in Ext.PW4/A are telling. But what must not be lost sight of the fact that a young lady of 37 years has been totally crippled for the rest of her life. The injuries as described in Ext.PW4/A are telling. When coupled with the evidence of PW4 Dr. Manoj Thakur, there is no doubt in my mind that the injured would require assistance through out her life i.e. an attendant to look after, wheel chair and specialized bed.? 22. In R. Venkata Ramana and another vs. United India Insurance Co.Ltd. and others 2013 (4) T.A.C. 376 (S.C.) the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the award of Rs.18,75,800/- awarded by the tribunal, which had been reduced by the High Court to Rs.12,45,800/-. Therein, the claimant was suffering from 80% permanent disability and the Neurologist had opined that there were no changes of any improvement in the health of the injured. The Hon'ble Supreme Court then held as follows:- ?10. We have considered the facts and the injuries suffered by Rajanala Ravi Krishna, who was hardly 17 years old student at the time of the accident. We need not go into the negligence part of the driver because even in the criminal proceedings it had been held that the driver of the vehicle was guilty of rash and negligent driving. Upon perusal of the evidence, we find that the condition of Rajanala Ravi Krishna, after the accident has become very pathetic. Evidence adduced by the Neurologist and other evidence also reveal that Rajanala Ravi Krishna shall not be in a position to speak for his life and shall not be in a position to do anything except breathing for his life, unless a miracle happens. He would require care of a person every day so as to see that he is given food, bath etc. and so as to enable him even in the matter of answering natural call. It would be worth producing the reaction of the Tribunal after appreciating evidence of the doctor and the said portion of the Tribunal's order has been even reproduced by the High Court in its judgment: ?It is not in dispute that because of this accident the injured petitioner who appears to be an active and bright student from Exs.A.481 to A.487, he lost all the function of his all four limbs on account of the severe injuries sustained by him. I have myself questioned PW.2 to find out the graveness of the injuries that are sustained by the injured third petitioner. It has been the evidence of PW.2 that there is no possibility of the injured petitioner regaining normal power of all the four limbs inspite of any amount of treatment. The patient require physio therapy throughout his life and assistance of some person for all his activities. PW.2 has also stated that it is difficult to say even by the time he was giving evidence whether the patient could regain his voice, PW.2 further stated that the patient requires regular medication of at least Rs.500/- per day for his subsistence. PW.2 also stated the patient requires some bodies assistance even for taking food and finally PW.2 stated that the patient is medically described as in a ?vegitiative state? and patient is called as ?spastic quadric paresys?. 11. Looking at the aforestated facts which even the High Court had noticed, we feel that the Tribunal can not be said to have awarded more amount by way of compensation. 12. From the order of the tribunal, we find that the appellants had in fact proved that they had spent Rs.3,49,128/- towards medical expenses for treating their son. They had to purchase certain instruments worth Rs.58,642/- for making life of their son comfortable and Rs.31,000/- had been spent towards nursing and Rs.1,37,000/- had to be spent for Physiotherapist. Looking at the fact that Rajanala Ravi Krishna will have to remain dependant for his whole life on someone and looking at the observations made by the Tribunal, which have been reproduced hereinabove, in our opinion, his life is very miserable and there would be substantial financial burden on the appellants for the entire life of their injured son. At times it is not possible to award compensation strictly in accordance with the law laid down as in a particular case it may not be just also. We are hesitant to say that it is a reality of life that at times life of an injured or sick person becomes more miserable for the person and for the family members than the death. Here is one such case where the appellants, even during their retired life will have to take care of their son like a child especially when they would have expected the son to take their care. 13. Here is one such case where the appellants, even during their retired life will have to take care of their son like a child especially when they would have expected the son to take their care. 13. Though, the High Court has rightly followed the principle laid down in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), in our opinion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is more just. The Tribunal awarded a lump sum of Rs.10 lacs and the amount of expenditure incurred by the appellants for treating their son. The total amount awarded by the Tribunal was Rs.18,75,800/- which, in our opinion, is not too much and in our opinion, the said amount should be awarded to the appellants.? 23. It has to be borne in mind that the claimant here has suffered 100% disability. What is ?disability? has been lucidly explained with impeccable erudition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar's case (supra), in the following terms:- “Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability 8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (`Disabilities Act' for short). The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (`Disabilities Act' for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation.? 24. Now, how the disability has to be assessed has been further dealt with in the following manner:- "10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanently disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terns of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation (see for example, the decisions of this court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. - 2010 (10) SCALE 298 and Yadava Kumar v. D.M., National Insurance Co. Ltd. - 2010 (8) SCALE 567 ). 12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement, (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent ability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood. 14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually be hundred percent, if he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to award any compensation under the head of `loss of future earnings', if the claimant continues in government service, though he may be awarded compensation under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand. Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service, but may not found suitable for discharging the duties attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which case there should be a limited award under the head of loss of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning capacity. 19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above : (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. 19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above : (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors." 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently in Syed Sadiq and others vs. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited (2014) 2 SCC 735 held the claimant therein to be entitled to a compensation of Rs.21,65,100/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum even though there was no proof of income. The claimant therein was a vegetable vendor and had suffered functional disability estimated at 85% and held as follows:- "6. This Court in the case of Mohan Soni v. Ram Avtar Tomar & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 267 , has elaborately discussed upon the factors which determine the loss of income of the claimant more objectively. The relevant paragraph reads as under: "11. In a more recent decision in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and another, (2011) 1 SCC 343 , this Court considered in great detail the correlation between the physical disability suffered in an accident and the loss of earning capacity resulting from it. In paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 of the judgment in Raj Kumar, this Court made the following observations: (SCC pp.349-50) 10. In paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 of the judgment in Raj Kumar, this Court made the following observations: (SCC pp.349-50) 10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 254 and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Company Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 341 ). 13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 254 and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Company Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 341 ). 13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood". (emphasis in original) 7. Further, the appellant claims that he was working as a vegetable vendor. It is true that a vegetable vendor might not require mobility to the extent that he sells vegetables at one place. However, the occupation of vegetable vending is not confined to selling vegetables from a particular location. It rather involves procuring vegetables from the whole-sale market or the farmers and then selling it off in the retail market. This often involves selling vegetables in the cart which requires 100% mobility. But even by conservative approach, if we presume that the vegetable vending by the appellant/claimant involved selling vegetables from one place, the claimant would require assistance with his mobility in bringing vegetables to the market place which otherwise would be extremely difficult for him with an amputated leg. We are required to be sensitive while dealing with manual labour cases where loss of limb is often equivalent to loss of livelihood. Yet, considering that the appellant/claimant is still capable to fend for his livelihood once he is brought in the market place, we determine the disability at 85% to determine the loss of income. 8. We are required to be sensitive while dealing with manual labour cases where loss of limb is often equivalent to loss of livelihood. Yet, considering that the appellant/claimant is still capable to fend for his livelihood once he is brought in the market place, we determine the disability at 85% to determine the loss of income. 8. The appellant/claimant in his appeal further claimed that he had been earning Rs.10,000/- p.m. by doing vegetable vending work. The High Court however, considered the loss of income at Rs.3500/- p.m. considering that the claimant did not produce any document to establish his loss of income. It is difficult for us to convince ourselves as to how a labour involved in an unorganized sector doing his own business is expected to produce documents to prove his monthly income. In this regard, this Court, in the case of Ramchandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Company Limited (2011) 13 SCC 236 , has held as under: (SCC pp.242-43, paras 13-15) "13. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the Appellant was aged about 35 years and was working as a Coolie and was earning Rs.4500/- per month at the time of accident. This claim is reduced by the Tribunal to a sum of Rs.3000/- only on the assumption that wages of the labourer during the relevant period viz. in the year 2004, was Rs.100/- per day. This assumption in our view has no basis. Before the Tribunal, though Insurance Company was served, it did not choose to appear before the Court nor did it repudiated the claim of the claimant. Therefore, there was no reason for the Tribunal to have reduced the claim of the claimant and determined the monthly earning a sum of Rs.3000/- p.m. Secondly, the Appellant was working as a Coolie and therefore, we cannot expect him to produce any documentary evidence to substantiate his claim. In the absence of any other evidence contrary to the claim made by the claimant, in our view, in the facts of the present case, the Tribunal should have accepted the claim of the claimant. 14. We hasten to add that in all cases and in all circumstances, the Tribunal need not accept the claim of the claimant in the absence of supporting material. It depends on the facts of each case. 14. We hasten to add that in all cases and in all circumstances, the Tribunal need not accept the claim of the claimant in the absence of supporting material. It depends on the facts of each case. In a given case, if the claim made is so exorbitant or if the claim made is contrary to ground realities, the Tribunal may not accept the claim and may proceed to determine the possible income by resorting to some guess work, which may include the ground realities prevailing at the relevant point of time. 15 In the present case, Appellant was working as a Coolie and in and around the date of the accident, the wage of the labourer was between Rs.100/- to Rs.150/- per day or Rs.4500/- per month. In our view, the claim was honest and bonafide and, therefore, there was no reason for the Tribunal to have reduced the monthly earning of the Appellant from Rs.4500/- to Rs.3000/- per month. We, therefore, accept his statement that his monthly earning was Rs. 4500/-." 9. There is no reason, in the instant case for the Tribunal and the High Court to ask for evidence of monthly income of the appellant/claimant. On the other hand, going by the present state of economy and the rising prices in agricultural products, we are inclined to believe that a vegetable vendor is reasonably capable of earning Rs.6,500/- per month. 10. Further, it is evident from the material evidence on record that the appellant/claimant was 24 years old at the time of occurrence of the accident. It is also established on record that he was earning his livelihood by vending vegetables. The issue regarding calculation of prospective increment of income in the future of self employed people, came up in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited (2012) 6 SCC 421 , wherein this Court has held as under: ( SCC pp. 428-29, paras 14-18) 14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma vs. D.T.C. (2009) 6 SCC 121 case that where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our view, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of a person who is self-employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the same throughout his life. 15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across the board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are self-employed or who get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore, they put extra efforts to generate additional income necessary for sustaining their families. 16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and State Governments and their agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of those employed in private sectors have also increased manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could have imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Government would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lac. 17. Although, the wages/income of those employed in unorganized sectors has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries of the Government employees and those employed in private sectors but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self-employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc. 18. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc. 18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the observations in the last three lines of paragraph 24 of Sarla Verma's judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be no addition in the income of a person who is self-employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is self- employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30 per cent increase in his total income over a period of time and if he / she becomes victim of accident then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation." Therefore, considering that the appellant/ claimant was self employed and was 24 years of age, we hold that he is entitled to 50% increment in the future prospect of income based upon the principle laid down in the Santosh Devi case. 11. Further, regarding the use of multiplier, it was held in the Sarla Verma v. DTC which was upheld in Santosh Devi case (supra), as under: (Sarla Verma case, SCC p.140, para42) 42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years. Therefore, applying the principle of Sarla Verma in the present case, we hold that the High Court was correct in applying the multiplier of 18 and we uphold the same for the purpose for calculating the amount of compensation to which the appellant/ claimant is entitled to. 12. With respect to the medical expenses incurred by the appellant/claimant, he has produced medical bills and incidental charges bills marked as Exts. P-25 to P-201 and prescriptions at Exts. P-202 to P-217 on the basis of which the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.60,000/- under the head. However, considering that the appellant might have to change his artificial leg from time to time, we shall allot an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- under the head of medical cost and incidental expenses to include future medical costs. 13. Thus, the total amount which is awarded under the head of "loss of future income" including the 50% increment in the future, works out to be Rs. 17,90,100/- [ (Rs.65,00/- x 85/100 + 50/100 x 85/100 x Rs.6,500/-) x 12 x 18]. 14. Further, along with compensation under conventional heads, the appellant/claimant is also entitled to the cost of litigation as per the legal principle laid down by this Court in the case of Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha (2014) 1 SCC 384 . Therefore, under this head, we find it just and proper to allow Rs.25,000/- . 15. Hence, the appellant/claimant is entitled to the compensation under the following heads: Towards cost of artificial leg Rs.50,000/- Towards pain and suffering Rs.75,000/- Towards loss of marriage prospects Rs.50,000/- Towards loss of amenities Rs.75,000/- Towards medical and incidental cost Rs.1,00,000/- Towards cost of litigation Rs.25,000/- 16. Also, by relying upon the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy (2011) 14 SCC 481 , we find it just and proper to allow interest at the rate of 9% per annum. 17. Hence, the total amount of claim the appellant/claimant becomes entitled to is Rs. 21,65,100/- with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of payment." 26. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, the award in no manner can be said to be excessive. 17. Hence, the total amount of claim the appellant/claimant becomes entitled to is Rs. 21,65,100/- with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of payment." 26. Viewed in the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, the award in no manner can be said to be excessive. The tribunal below has not awarded any litigation expenses and moreover the interest awarded is only at 7.5% per annum when compared with 9% interest awarded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Sadiq's case (supra). (v) Claim of pillion rider not covered: 27. The petitioner would then contend that since the claimant was admittedly a pillion rider, therefore, his claim was not covered under the insurance policy as no additional premium for the risk of pillion rider had been paid so as to cover such liability. The petitioner has relied upon the statement of PW 5 Ranjit Kumar, Clerk of National Insurance Company, who in his cross-examination has stated that an amount of R. 343/- had been paid towards own damages, Rs.15/- for accessories and Rs.77/- for act liability to cover the risk of third party. Apart from this, no other risk was covered under the policy. He also stated that the risk of pillion rider was not covered under the policy of insurance because no premium qua the same was paid. However, on being further reexamined by the learned counsel for the claimant, he has categorically stated that Rs.77/- was received as against legal liability of passengers. He volunteered to state that it was an Act liability, but further explained that under the Act liability the third party claim is covered. 28. In this backdrop, in case the policy of insurance Ext. P-14 is seen then it is clear that an amount of Rs. 77/- has in fact been paid towards the legal liability to passenger/ MRPP and thus the insurance company cannot wriggle out of its liability to pay the insurance amount. 29. That apart this court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Prem Singh and others 2001 ACJ 1445 has specifically held that even in case of Act policy, the pillion rider is covered and hence insurance company is liable to indemnify the insured. 29. That apart this court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Prem Singh and others 2001 ACJ 1445 has specifically held that even in case of Act policy, the pillion rider is covered and hence insurance company is liable to indemnify the insured. This judgement in turn has been followed by the High Court of Delhi in Ramesh Chand Tripathi vs. Lily Joshi 2008 ACJ 785 wherein it has been held that irrespective of the fact that whether it is an Act policy or a comprehensive policy, the notification of Tariff Advisory Committee clearly mandates that death or bodily injury to a pillion rider would be at par with a claim of third party. 30. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Tilak Singh and others 2006 ACJ 1441 S.C. to claim that the insurance company was not liable for the injuries sustained to the pillion rider. I have gone through the judgement in the aforesaid case and find that scooter therein was insured under the Act policy only and did not contain any endorsement of payment of additional premium. While in the present case, it has been clearly proved that an amount of Rs.77/- was charged for legal liability to passenger and therefore, the risk of pillion rider stood covered under the insurance policy. 31. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no perversity on the face of the award passed by the learned tribunal below nor can it be said that the petition filed by the claimant is based on fraud. Accordingly, there no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.