Judgment S.C. Sharma, J.:- The present revision has been filed under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 against the order dated 15-10-2014 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer in Case No. 156/2013. The learned District Judge has allowed the application preferred by the non-applicant No. 1 under Order 7, Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code and has dismissed the reference petition filed by the applicant under section 30 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 being time barred. Fact of the case reveals that the non-applicant No. 1 Satinder Singh Chhabra is the son of the present applicant-Smt. Surendra Kaur. The facts further reveal that the husband of the applicant late Shri Sardar Surjeet Singh Chhabra purchased an agricultural land bearing Survey No. 175/3 admeasuring 0.340 hectare and Survey No. 176/2 admeasuring 0.300 hactare of land situated at Village Pant Piplai Tehsil and Distt. Ujjain on 13-6-1988. It has further been stated that the land was purchased from the source of HUF in the name of elder son Satinder Singh Chhabra (non-applicant No. 1), who was a minor having no source of income. The facts further reveals that for construction of a four lane road, a notification under section 4 read with section 17 of the Act of 1894 was issued and thereafter an award was passed on 4-8-2009 in the name of non-applicant No. 1. He was paid a sum of Rs. 22,43,131/- on 2-2-2010. The said amount was distributed between the non-applicant No. 1 Satinder Singh Chhabra, who is the elder brother of Tajinder Singh. It has been stated that a Memorandum of Understanding was executed between the parties on 14-2-2012 that they will be dividing the compensation in a particular ratio in case it is enhanced. It has further been stated that on account of some dispute, the non-applicant No. 1 has refused to accept the family arrangement and the applicant has filed an application before the Court for deciding the question of apportionment and the same was dismissed by the order dated 30-10-2012 on the ground that the same should be filed before the land acquisition officer. The applicant thereafter has preferred an application under section 30 of the Act of 1894 before the Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Ujjain and the same was registered as Land Acquisition Case No. 156/13. The applicant thereafter has preferred an application under section 30 of the Act of 1894 before the Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Ujjain and the same was registered as Land Acquisition Case No. 156/13. The respondent No. 1 preferred an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with sections 30 and 53 of the Act of 1894 and a ground was raised that the application was not filed within limitation. A detailed reply has been filed by the present applicant on 1-8-2014 and the learned District Judge has allowed the application vide impugned order dated 15-10-2014 filed by the non-applicant No. 1 under Order VII, Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure read with sections 30 and 53 of the Act of 1894. 2. The present revision arising out of the order dated 15-10-2014. A preliminary objection has been raised from the other side regarding maintainability of revision petition. Sections 30, 53 and 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as under: "30. Dispute as to apportionment.--When the amount of compensation has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. 53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before the Court.--Save insofar as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act. 54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.--Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court form the award, or from any part of the award of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLV thereof." 3. Section 54 of the Act of 1894 provides for an appeal. Section 54 of the Act of 1894 provides for an appeal. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rishiraj Singh and Ors. vs. Raghubar Singh and Ors., reported in 1968 MPLJ 461 while dealing with an order passed by the District Judge under section 54 has held that the decision taken by the District Judge on reference under section 30 of the Act of 1894 is a decree and an appeal therefrom is a regular first appeal on which ad-valorem Court fee on the amount claimed by the appellant in an appeal is payable. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-- "1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal from an order of Shiv Dayal J. holding that an appeal preferred by the appellants before us, against a decision of the Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act is a regular first appeal and should be registered as such and directing the appellants to state the valuation of the appeal and pay ad valorem Court fees on it accordingly. 2. The material facts are that in acquisition proceedings of certain land situated in village Patna, tahsil Baikunthpur, an amount of Rs.7,196,70/- was determined as compensation for the land acquired. In those proceedings a dispute arose between the parties to the appeal as regards the apportionment of the compensation. The respondents claimed that they were entitled to the full amount of the compensation and that the appellants had no claim to receive the compensation amount. The Land Acquisition Officer referred this dispute about apportionment to the Court of the Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for decision. The learned Additional District Judge held that the respondents were entitled to get the entire amount of Rs. 7,198,70 rejecting in toto the claim of the appellants to get any amount of the compensation. The appellants therefore, preferred an appeal in this Court in which the order before us in appeal was passed by the learned single Judge. 3. The short question that arises in this appeal is as regards the Court fee payable on the appeal preferred by the appellants. The appellants therefore, preferred an appeal in this Court in which the order before us in appeal was passed by the learned single Judge. 3. The short question that arises in this appeal is as regards the Court fee payable on the appeal preferred by the appellants. The learned single Judge, relying on Ramchandra vs. Ramchdndra held that the decision of the learned Additional District Judge on a reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act was a decree and that, therefore, the appeal preferred before him by the appellants was a regular appeal and ad valorem Court-fee was payable on the valuation of the appeal. In Ramchandra vs. Ramchandra the Privy Council has observed:-- "The award as constituted by statute is nothing, but an award which states the area of the land, the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment among the persons interested in the land of whose claims the Collector has information meaning thereby people whose interests are not in dispute but from the moment when the sum has been deposited in Court under section 32(2) the functions of the award have ceased and all that is left is a dispute between interested people as to the extent of their interest. Such dispute forms no part of the award, and it would indeed be strange if a controversy between two people as to the nature of their respective interests in a piece of land should enjoy certain rights of appeal, which would be wholly taken away when the piece of land was represented by a sum of money paid into Court." The decision in Ramchandra vs. Ramchandra was explained by the Privy Council in later case, Bhagwati vs. Ram Kali, thus:-- "In that case some question arose as to whether any appeal lay to His Majesty in Council in a case where the determination of the Judge ended in an award and not in a decree. The Board took the view that where the matter referred was not the adequacy of the amount of compensation awarded, but a dispute between the person claiming compensation, involving it may be, difficult questions of title the resultant decision was not an award but a decree. 4. In our Judgment, the learned single Judge rightly held that the decision of the learned Additional District Judge was a decree and that therefore, ad valorem Court-fee payable on the appeal. 4. In our Judgment, the learned single Judge rightly held that the decision of the learned Additional District Judge was a decree and that therefore, ad valorem Court-fee payable on the appeal. That apart, even under section 8 of the Court-fees Act the amount of Court-fee payable on the appeal preferred by the appellants was the amount they claimed as compensation. That provision lays down that the amount of Court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. No amount was awarded to the appellants and they have claimed some amount in the appeal preferred by them. Consequently they should have paid ad valorem Court-fee on the amount claimed by them in the appeal." 4. The aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench makes it very clear that the order passed under section 54 is an appealable order and a civil revision does not lie under section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Division Bench of this Court in another case i.e. in the case of Madhaorao vs. Yashwant and Ors., reported in 1972 MPLJ 1081 in paragraphs 6, 8, 10 and 11 has held as under:-- "6. The question that arises for consideration is whether the claim entertained by the learned Additional District Judge as far as Ramchandrarao is concerned is also tenable. It has already been pointed out that Ramchandrarao made his claim for the first time before the Additional District Judge. Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 confer a special jurisdiction upon the Court and it arises out of an application made to the Land Acquisition Officer by any person interested who has not accepted the award. There can be no reference except at the instance of such a person interested under section 18 unless it be a reference of a dispute under section 30 of the Act. Dealing with the special jurisdiction of the Court under the Act in Prematha Nath vs. Secretary of State, it was observed by the Privy Council thus: "Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of the section. Dealing with the special jurisdiction of the Court under the Act in Prematha Nath vs. Secretary of State, it was observed by the Privy Council thus: "Their Lordships have no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Courts under this Act is a special one and is strictly limited by the terms of the section. It only arises when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award and is confined to a consideration of that objection." If a party has not chosen to apply to the Collector for a reference under section 18 and if the Collector has not referred the matter under section 30 of the Act, then the Court hearing the reference would be powerless to entertain any fresh claim and add him as a party to the proceedings. It was, therefore, necessary to refer the question of title to compensation claimed by Ramchandrarao Waghmare and Siremal. They did not seek the assistance of the Collector in that regard. For making a reference under section 30 of the Act, the powers of the Collector are also not fettered by any limitation. But what they now seek to do is to be made parties in the reference proceedings and claim title to the compensation as against Madhaorao. If it was only desired to support the reference made by Madhaorao, there could be some justification in making them parties to the proceedings. For, in that case, they would be permitted to adduce evidence as regards the value of the land. Now, Ramchandrarao could not be added as a party by Additional District Judge for determining his title to the compensation as this dispute was not referred to him under section 30 of the Act. 8. In Mt. Bakalbaso Kher vs. Brijendra Singh reliance was placed on section 53 of the Act which provides that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code applied to all the proceedings before the Court under the Act except and so far as they are not inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. It was, therefore, held that provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 could be availed of to add new parties before the Court. It was, therefore, held that provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 could be availed of to add new parties before the Court. With great respect to the views expressed in that case, we are inclined to hold that section 53 of the Act in itself lays down that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code would apply except and so far as they may not be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. Now, when the Act itself lays down a special procedure for making a reference, this could not be by-passed by taking recourse to any provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The special procedure laid down under the Act for raising disputes before Courts under section 18 and for setting title to compensation and apportionment under section 30 would prevail and if as pointed out no such dispute was before the Court, it would not be permissible to add new parties raising new disputes. We would agree with the view taken by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta in the aforesaid cases. In this view of the matter, the claim of Ramchandrarao could not be considered by the Additional District Judge and his remedy, if, any, was by a civil suit. 10. Similarly, the application by Siremal who has raised entirely a new dispute by intervening at the appellate stage cannot be entertained. Siremal, who applied to be joined as a party before the High Court, claims compensation in respect of 73 ft. by 65 ft. land. This entirely new dispute was neither before the Land Acquisition Officer nor before the Additional District Judge. The scope of appeal from a decision of a reference under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act is limited just as the scope of reference itself is limited. The powers of the High Court under section 54 are in no way greater than the powers of the Court hearing the reference and if the reference could only be confined to matters specifically referred to it, the scope could not be enlarged in appeal. In the referring order by the Land Acquisition Officer, he indicated that there was a dispute regarding apportionment of the compensation between Madhaorao, Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao. He also indicated that these were the persons interested in the land. In the referring order by the Land Acquisition Officer, he indicated that there was a dispute regarding apportionment of the compensation between Madhaorao, Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao. He also indicated that these were the persons interested in the land. The order of the additional District Judge and that of the High Court in appeal, therefore, could not go beyond what was referred by the Land Acquisition Officer. We are of the opinion that for the reasons already discussed, provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code would not be of any assistance to Siremal for making a claim before us at this stage. We, therefore, reject the application of Siremal for consideration of his claim as to apportionment. 11. The contentions of the appellant that the claim of the legal representatives of Balkrishnarao and Gopalrao should be restricted to the compensation awarded by the Collector is without any force. When the matter as regards quantum of compensation was at large before the Court, the apportionment would undoubtedly be of the compensation finally determined as the dispute referred to by the Collector under section 30 was for apportionment after the determination." 5. Again against an order passed on an application under section 30, an appeal was preferred and the same was held to be maintainable. 6. Definition of decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads as under:-- "The term "decree" is defined in section 2(2), Civil Procedure Code as meaning "the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matter in controversy in the suit." To constitute a decree, the decision must fulfill the following conditions: 1. The decision must be arrived in a suit. 2. The decision must have been expressed on the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. 3. The decisions must be one which conclusively determines those rights. 4. There must have been a formal expression of an adjudication." 7. Not only this, section 53 of the Act of 1894 provides that Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is applicable in proceeding before the Court. 8. 3. The decisions must be one which conclusively determines those rights. 4. There must have been a formal expression of an adjudication." 7. Not only this, section 53 of the Act of 1894 provides that Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is applicable in proceeding before the Court. 8. Keeping in view the aforesaid order passed by the learned District Judge on an application under section 30 of the Act of 1894 has to be treated as a decree. The order passed under section 30 is certainly capable for execution under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and therefore, for all practical purposes it has to be treated as a decree against which an appeal is maintainable under section 54 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 9. The Apex Court in the case of A.M. Chengalvaraya Chetty vs. The Collector of Madras and Ors., reported in AIR 1965 Mad 376 (V 52 C 127) page 376 was dealing with a case where a reference was made under sections 18 and 31 of the Act of 1894. It was rejected by the Court on the ground that compensation had already been paid out of one of the claimants, in those circumstances the Apex Court has held that appeal lies not a revision lies. Paragraph 12 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-- "For the reasons indicated by us earlier, we are of opinion that where there has been a valid reference to the Court, whether under section 18, 30 or 31, any order passed by the Court finally disposing of the matter so far as it was concerned would be appealable. As an appeal would lie against the order complained of in the present case, we are unable to exercise our powers of revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. This civil revision petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs." 10. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Sunderlal vs. Paramsukh Das and Ors., reported in 1969 MPLJ 598 and his contention is that the revision is maintainable. 11. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment and the paragraph 21 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-- "Mr. 11. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment and the paragraph 21 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-- "Mr. Desai says that at any rate direction should be given that Paramsukhdas should not be entitled to challenge the compromise entered into between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. We are unable to accept this submission. Paramsukhdas is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests which were affected by the objections. It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred under section 21 should be gone into by the Court." It was a case where creditor one of the parties to reference who had attached the compensation amount in execution of his decree applied for being joined as a party to the proceeding to safeguard his interest. His application was rejected before making an award, in those circumstances the Apex Court has held that the order passed by the reference Court is not appealable and the revision lies, whereas in the present case on a specific application preferred under section 30 of the Act of 1894 an order has been passed by the learned District Judge. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel is distinguishable on facts. Resultantly, this Court is of the considered opinion that against the order passed by the District Judge under section 30 of the Act of 1894 an appeal lies under section 54 of the Act of 1894. Resultantly, the admission is declined with a liberty to the applicant to prefer an appropriate appeal in accordance with law. Certified copy of the impugned order be returned back to the applicant on substitution of a duly certified photocopy of the impugned order. C.C. as per rules.