JUDGMENT S.B. Shukre, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 13-4-2006 passed in the proceedings under section 20 of The Arbitration Act, 1940 (registered as Regular Civil Suit No. 54/74), by the 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Nagpur. The facts leading to this appeal may be stated, in brief, as follows: (i) The respondents are the original plaintiffs, and the appellants are the original defendants. There was a partnership firm consisting of partners Diwanchand, Mukundlal, Jaiprakash, Ruplal, Kulbhushan and Ashok Kumar Bhutani, which carried on the business under the name and style as "Bhutani Enterprises". Under the Deed of Partnership dated 25-1-1961, there was a clause providing for arbitration for settlement of disputes and questions which might arise in connection with the business of the partnership or partnership-deed. (ii) One of the partners Shri Diwanchand died on 21-1-1969 and upon his death the partnership firm stood dissolved. The original defendants 1 to 9 and 11 are the legal representatives of deceased Diwanchand Bhutani and the original plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 are the partners of the dissolved firm. Original defendants 2, 3 and other legal representatives of deceased Diwanchand were in possession of the assets of the partnership firm and it is alleged that instead of rendering the accounts and delivering the assets, they started selling away the firm's property. Thus, dispute and differences arose between the partners and, therefore, it became necessary to refer the same to an Arbitrator. Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act for referring the dispute to an Arbitrator to be appointed by the Court and passing of a decree in accordance with the award of the Arbitrator. (iii) The application was initially registered as MJC No. 441 of 1969 which was later on converted into Regular Civil Suit No. 54 of 1974. The original defendants 1 to 3 filed their written statement and defendant Nos. 5 and 6 also filed separately their respective written statements. They were the legal representatives of deceased Diwanchand. The written statements were more or less similar and basically they denied the averments in the petition. The Civil Court after framing of the issues and after recording of the evidence found that the suit as filed by the plaintiffs was barred by limitation and accordingly dismissed it by its judgment and order dated 26-2-1980. The written statements were more or less similar and basically they denied the averments in the petition. The Civil Court after framing of the issues and after recording of the evidence found that the suit as filed by the plaintiffs was barred by limitation and accordingly dismissed it by its judgment and order dated 26-2-1980. The said judgment and order came to be challenged before the High Court vide F.A. No. 108 of 1980, and after hearing the parties the said judgment and decree dated 26-2-1980 came to be set aside by the High Court. The matter was remanded back to the trial Court with a direction to appoint an Arbitrator as per the arbitration clause in the partnership-deed and proceed with the suit in accordance with law as per the order passed on 21-9-1989. (iv) After remand of the case, the trial Court appointed an Arbitrator for passing the Award. The Arbitrator served notices upon all the defendants and after service of notices, some of the defendants appeared personally and whereas some of them did not appear before the Arbitrator, as per the order-sheet dated 25-4-1992. The Arbitrator, after considering the statement of claim filed by the original plaintiffs and also the affidavits in support of the statement of claim, passed an award on 22-3-1993 and filed it in the Court on 26-3-1993. (v) Some of the defendants filed their objections to the award passed by the Arbitrators. However, considering the fact that those objections, in the opinion of the learned Civil Judge, were filed after the statutory period of 30 days from the date of service of notice as prescribed by law, and there being no separate application for condoning the delay, the learned Civil Judge found the objections to be unsustainable in law and, therefore, rejected them. The learned Civil Judge also did not find any reason to set aside the Award and, therefore, by the judgment and decree dated 13-4-2006 made the Award dated 22-3-1993 as a Rule of Court. It is the same judgment and decree which are under challenge in the present appeal. 2. We have heard Shri Shyam Dewani, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri R.L. Khapre, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4. It is the same judgment and decree which are under challenge in the present appeal. 2. We have heard Shri Shyam Dewani, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri R.L. Khapre, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4. Having regard to the arguments of the rival sides, at the centre of controversy is the point regarding maintainability of the present appeal, and, therefore, the point that falls for our consideration is as follows: "Whether the present appeal is maintainable in view of the provisions of section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act?" 3. Shri Dewani, learned counsel for the appellants, has forcefully argued that this appeal is very much maintainable as the learned Civil Judge has refused to set aside the Award and has adopted a novel procedure in making the Award as Rule of the Court under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. He submits that some of the defendants had filed their objections under section 30 of the Arbitration Act but they were erroneously considered to be time barred and rejected by the learned Civil Judge. He also submits that even otherwise the learned Civil Judge ought to have considered the legality and correctness of the Award on his own and set aside the Award suo motu as it was the result of irregularities committed in the procedure and illegalities and mistakes committed in applying the law correctly. 4. Shri R.L. Khapre, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 4, on the other hand, has submitted that the objections taken by some of the defendants were clearly filed beyond the period of limitation of 30 days from the date of service of the notice as prescribed under Article 119-B of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and that they were not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay and, therefore, were rightly rejected by the trial Court as not maintainable in law. He further submits that the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge in the impugned judgment for rejecting the objections would make it clear that these objections were rightly rejected having been filed after expiry of period of limitation without there being any application filed for condoning the delay. He further submits that the reasons given by the learned Civil Judge in the impugned judgment for rejecting the objections would make it clear that these objections were rightly rejected having been filed after expiry of period of limitation without there being any application filed for condoning the delay. He further submits that even though the suit was filed under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, it was kept pending for passing of the appropriate judgment and decree after receipt of the Award, as this Court in F.A. No. 108 of 1980 had directed the trial Court to appoint an Arbitrator as per the arbitration clause in the partnership-deed and to proceed with the suit in accordance with law, as per its order dated 21-9-1989 while remanding the case for further trial. Besides, he further submits that there is no provision under the law that an Award filed during the pendency of such a suit cannot be taken up for consideration for pronouncement of the judgment as per the award under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. He further submits that the grounds taken up in the objections filed by some of the defendants were the grounds as contained in section 30 of the Arbitration Act, and nothing more was shown by the Objectors and, therefore, according to the settled law, as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Madan Lal vs. Sunderlal reported in AIR 1967 SC 1233 , there was no question of the trial Court setting aside the Award suo motu. 5. In this case, the Award of the Arbitrator has been made a Rule of Court under section 17 of the Arbitration Act. The trial Court has pronounced the judgment according to the Award after considering that the objections filed to the Award were barred by law of limitation. When the judgment is pronounced according to the Award under section 17, a decree has to be drawn up and no appeal lies from such a judgment except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award. When the judgment is pronounced according to the Award under section 17, a decree has to be drawn up and no appeal lies from such a judgment except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award. The present appeal has been filed mainly on the ground that while passing the Award, the Arbitrator has committed irregularities of procedure and illegalities in applying the law to the facts of the case and in spite of that, the learned Civil Judge has refused to set aside the Award. So, this appeal would attract the provisions of section 39(1)(vi) which, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced as under: "39.(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order:-- An order-- ......... (vi) setting aside or refusing to set aside an Award." 6. From the impugned judgment and decree, one can clearly see that the objections were filed by only two defendants, namely defendant No. 2 Mukundlal and defendant No. 7 Kulwansh, after expiry of period of 30 days from the date of service of notice prescribed under Article 119-B of the Limitation Act, 1963. These objections were not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay and, therefore, they were rightly rejected by the learned trial Court. The impugned judgment and decree further shows that some legal representatives of defendant No. 3 Ashok Kumar had also filed their objection under section 30 of the Arbitration Act and it was too beyond the period of limitation and, therefore, was rightly rejected by the trial Court. Barring these objections filed under section 30, there were no other objections. Thus, the situation as obtained before the trial Court was that there was no objection validly filed and praying for setting aside of the Award, and if that was so, there was no question for the learned Civil Judge to refuse to set aside the Award. As such, no appeal under section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, much less appeal against the order refusing to set aside the Award, would be maintainable. In the case of Nilkanta Sidramappa Ningashetti vs. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti and Ors. As such, no appeal under section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, much less appeal against the order refusing to set aside the Award, would be maintainable. In the case of Nilkanta Sidramappa Ningashetti vs. Kashinath Somanna Ningashetti and Ors. reported in AIR 1962 SC 666 the Apex Court has held that when no party files an objection praying for setting aside of the award, no question of refusing to set it aside can arise and therefore no appeal is maintainable under section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act which allows an appeal against an order refusing to set aside an award. 7. Of course, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the learned Civil Judge ought to have suo motu set aside the Award as it was passed after committing irregularities and illegalities. We are not inclined to accept this argument for the reason that the suo motu power to set aside the award cannot be exercised on the grounds which fall under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, and if these grounds have been taken in an objection-petition filed more than 30 days after service of notice of filing of the award. 8. In the case of Madanlal, supra, the Apex Court has held that the Court can act suo motu in certain circumstances which do not fall within section 30 of the Arbitration Act. It also held that the power to set aside the award suo motu cannot be exercised on the grounds which fall under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, if taken in an objection-petition filed more than 30 days after service of notice of filing of the award, for, if that were so, the limitation provided for under Article 158 of the Limitation Act would be completely negatived. 9. In the case in hand, the question of limitation would not have arisen had the grounds taken in the objections travelled beyond the grounds mentioned in section 30 of the Arbitration Act. The impugned judgment and decree does not show that the grounds taken in the objections were beyond the limits of section 30 nor any material has been placed before us to show that they were also based upon the grounds other than those mentioned in section 30 of the Arbitration Act. 10. The impugned judgment and decree does not show that the grounds taken in the objections were beyond the limits of section 30 nor any material has been placed before us to show that they were also based upon the grounds other than those mentioned in section 30 of the Arbitration Act. 10. As regards the contention that the learned Civil Judge has followed a novel procedure in making the award as Rule of Court, we do not find any substance in this objection for the reason that what has been done by the learned Civil Judge was after following the mandate of the order dated 22-9-1989 passed in F.A. No. 108/80 when this Court remanded the case to the trial Court for further trial, inasmuch as there is no provision under the Arbitration Act preventing the Court from proceeding to pronounce the judgment according to the award by following the procedure prescribed under sections 14 and 17 of the Act, during pendency of proceedings under section 20 of the Act. 11. Thus, we find that since there were no objections validly filed, and that the objections having been based upon the grounds of section 30 of the Arbitration Act, there was no question of refusing to set aside the award by the trial Court and, therefore, the present appeal would not be maintainable under section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act. On this ground alone this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the notices to some of the defendants were not duly served and that legal representatives of some of the defendants were also not brought on record. However, upon perusal of the impugned judgment and decree, we do not find any substance in this argument as the learned Civil Judge has given details in the impugned judgment, particularly in para 12 about the manner in which the defendants were served, and there is nothing on record to enable us to doubt these findings of facts. These defendants in spite of being duly served either did not take any objection to the award or did not file the same within the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, pronouncing of the judgment according to award was a fait accompli in the matter. These defendants in spite of being duly served either did not take any objection to the award or did not file the same within the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, pronouncing of the judgment according to award was a fait accompli in the matter. We have also discussed as to how the question of exercising suo motu power to set aside the award did not arise in this case. Therefore, we find no substance in the said argument of learned counsel for the appellants. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to the following cases: (i) 2003 (3) Mh.L.J. 238, Ballumal A. Jaisingh vs. M/s. J.J. Builders and Ors. (ii) 2000 (4) Civil Law Journal 663, State of Karnataka vs. Samarth Constructions and Anr. (iii) AIR 1971 SC 1646 , President, Union of India vs. Kalinga Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (iv) 2011-EQ (SC) 0-490, Durga Charon Rautray vs. State of Orissa and Anr. (v) 2005 (2) Mh.L.J. 1031, State of Maharashtra vs. Nasir Chhannumal Shaikh (vi) AIR 1990 SC 1426 , Raipur Development Authority vs. M/s. Chokhamal Constructions (vii) 2006 (6) Bom. C.R. 500, Union of India vs. Swanand Engineer and Anr. (viii) AIR 1957 Allahabad 265, Ram Bharosey vs. Pearey Lal and Anr. However, we do not think it necessary to consider these cases specifically as the appeal is being dismissed for the reasons stated earlier. In the circumstances, the point is answered in terms that the appeal is not maintainable and it is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the appeal stands dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.