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Rajasthan High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 1520 (RAJ)

Atul Kuchhal v. Hem Ram

2014-09-15

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. - Aggrieved by the order dated 30.5.2014 passed by Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) and the Presiding Officer, Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan, Jaipur, whereby the learned Magistrate has dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC read with Section 21 of the Rent Control Act, 2001, the petitioner has approached this Court. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.2, Alok had filed a suit for eviction against the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground of bona fide necessity of his son for parking his Santro car in the shop which had been rented out to the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner had filed his written statement. Thereafter the issues were framed. According to the petitioner, after the issues were framed, the landlord constructed a wall in front of the shop in such a way that the wall blocked two feet of the entrance of the shop. Thus, according to the petitioner after the construction of the wall, the shop could not be used for parking the car. Since these were subsequent developments, after the submission of the written statement, the petitioner filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC for amending the written statement. But by order dated 30.5.2014 the said application was dismissed. Hence, this petition before this court. 3. Mr. Mahendra Goyal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that it is imperative that a reasoned decision should be given by the learned Magistrate. However, the learned Magistrate has failed to disclose his mind for rejecting the application. Therefore, the impugned order is a non-speaking order. Hence, it deserves to be set aside, and the case deserves to be remanded back to the learned Magistrate. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Sagarmal Mehta, the learned Senior Counsel, has raised the following contentions before this court : firstly, that according to the proviso to Order 6, Rule 17 CPC an amendment should not be allowed after the trial has commenced. According to the learned counsel the trial is said to have commenced with the framing of the issues. Therefore, according to him, the learned Magistrate was fully justified in dismissing the application as the issues had already been framed, and the trial had already commenced. Secondly, the subsequent event cannot be brought on record as it would be an endless process. Therefore, according to him, the learned Magistrate was fully justified in dismissing the application as the issues had already been framed, and the trial had already commenced. Secondly, the subsequent event cannot be brought on record as it would be an endless process. According to the learned counsel, the relevant date is the date on which the suit for eviction was filed. In order to buttress this contention the learned counsel has relied on the case of Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, 2001 WLC (SC) Civil 201 and on the case of Peer Gulam Naseer Sajjadanabin & Mutawalli v. Mohammad Arif @ Arif Hussain & Others, [2004 (5) WLC (Raj.) 799] . Thirdly, relying on the case of Vidyabai & Others v. Padmalatha & Another, AIR 2009 SC 1433 the learned counsel has pleaded that after the affidavits were filed by the plaintiff, after the issues were framed, in case the impugned order suffers neither from a jurisdictional error, nor from any error of law, then the impugned order should be sustained by this court. According to Mr. Mehta, the impugned order does not suffer from either of the twin errors. Hence, the learned counsel has supported the impugned order. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the impugned order. 6. The petitioner's challenge to the impugned order is not with regard to the power of the court to permit, or not to permit the amendment sought to be made in the written statement. The frontal attack is with regard to the fact that no reason has been given by the learned Magistrate for drawing the conclusion that the amendments are irrelevant to the main ground of bona fide necessity as claimed in the plaint. Therefore, according to the petitioner his main grievance is that since the reasons are missing, he is unable to understand what transpired in the mind of the learned Magistrate for rejecting his application. Therefore, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent dealing with the scope and ambit of Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, or dealing with the proviso thereof, are not germane to the issue raised before this court by the petitioner. The issues before this court are whether the order dated 30.5.2014 suffers from virus of being a non-speaking order or not? And if it is a non-speaking order, whether it is legally sustainable or not? 7. The issues before this court are whether the order dated 30.5.2014 suffers from virus of being a non-speaking order or not? And if it is a non-speaking order, whether it is legally sustainable or not? 7. A bare perusal of the order clearly reveals that the learned Magistrate has recorded the pleas submitted by the petitioner in his application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC. He has then gone on to record the contentions raised by the respondent in his reply to the application. He has elaborately quoted the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court pronounced in the case of Gaya Prasad [supra]. And then, he has suddenly concluded that the amendments sought by the petitioner are not germane to the main ground of bona fide necessity as pleaded by the respondent landlord. However, the learned Magistrate has not given any reasoning for jumping to this conclusion. An order which does not reveal the ground for coming to a conclusion, obviously, falls in the category of being a non-speaking order. 8. In the case of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota v. Shukla and Brothers, (2010) 4 SCC 785 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that a reasoned decision is the very life of law. The Apex Court had held as under : ".....Thus, it will not be far from an absolute principle of law that the courts should record reasons for their conclusions to enable the appellate or higher courts to exercise their jurisdiction appropriately and in accordance with law. It is the reasoning alone, that can enable a higher or an appellate court to appreciate the controversy in issue in its correct perspective and to hold whether the reasoning recorded by the court whose order is impugned, is sustainable in law and whether it has adopted the correct legal approach. To sub-serve the purpose of justice delivery system, therefore, it is essential that the courts should record reasons for their conclusions, whether disposing of the case at admission stage or after regular hearing. The Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that recording of reasons is an essential feature of dispensation of justice. A litigant who approaches the court with any grievance in accordance with law is entitled to know the reasons for grant or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. The Supreme Court has consistently taken the view that recording of reasons is an essential feature of dispensation of justice. A litigant who approaches the court with any grievance in accordance with law is entitled to know the reasons for grant or rejection of his prayer. Reasons are the soul of orders. Non-recording of reasons could lead to dual infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to the affected party and secondly, more particularly, hamper the proper administration of justice. These principles are not only applicable to administrative or executive actions, but they apply with equal force and, in fact, with a greater degree of precision to judicial pronouncements. The orders of the court must reflect what weighed with the court in granting or declining the relief claimed by the applicant. xxxxxxxxx Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty and helps in the observance of law of precedent. When reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that the process of correction is in place and working. It is the requirement of law that correction process of judgments should not only appear to be implemented but also seem to have been properly implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. The court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting the claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise they may be. The requirement of stating reasons for judicial orders necessarily does not mean a very detailed or lengthy order, but there should be some reasoning recorded by the court for declining or granting relief to the petitioner.." 9. However, in the present case, the learned Magistrate has overlooked these basic principles of adjudication. Hence, the impugned order is unsustainable. 10. Mr. Mehta, the learned Senior Counsel, has certainly raised certain contentions with regard to the scope and ambit of Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, and the proviso thereto. However, in the present case, the learned Magistrate has overlooked these basic principles of adjudication. Hence, the impugned order is unsustainable. 10. Mr. Mehta, the learned Senior Counsel, has certainly raised certain contentions with regard to the scope and ambit of Order 6, Rule 17 CPC, and the proviso thereto. However, as these issues are not germane and moreover any opinion expressed by this court may hamper the final decision of the learned Magistrate on the application filed by the petitioner, this court would not express any opinion on the contentions raised by Mr. Mehta. Of course, the respondent shall be free to raise these contentions before the learned counsel. For the reasons stated above, this court has no other option but to quash and set aside the order dated 30.5.2014, and to remand the case back to the learned Magistrate for deciding the application under Order 6, Rule 17 CPC. The application shall be decided within a period of one month from the next date assigned by the trial court in the suit. 11. With these observations, this petition is, hereby, allowed.Petition allowed. *******