JUDGMENT : Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners have called in question the orders made by the competent authority, in terms of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972 read with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980, whereby the District Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Sirmour at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh, was asked to effect the recovery as land revenue. 2. We deem it proper to dispose of all these writ petitions by this common judgment for the reason that similar questions are involved. 3. The moot question is-whether these writ petitions are maintainable? 4. We had an occasion to hear and decide a batch of writ petitions, the lead case of which was CWP No. 4779/2014, titled as M/s Indian Technomac Company Ltd. versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 4th August, 2014, whereby it was held that the writ petitions were not maintainable and came to be dismissed by providing that the writ petitioners are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy for the reason that the writ petitioners had an alternative remedy available, i.e. the remedy of appeal. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners filed the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 22626-22641/2014, before the Apex Court, was dismissed vide judgment and order, dated 22nd August, 2014 and the judgment, supra, passed by this Court came to be upheld. 6. It is apt to reproduce Section 15 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972, herein: “(1) An appeal shall lie to the appellate authority appointed by the State Government in this behalf, against any original order passed under this Act, within thirty days of the passing of such order or within such period as the appellate authority may, for sufficient cause allow: Provided that no appeal shall be entertained by such authority unless he is satisfied that the amount of tax assessed and penalty imposed has been paid; Provided further that such authority, if satisfied that an owner is unable to make such payment, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing entertain an appeal without such payment having been made” 7. While going through the aforesaid Section, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the petitioners have right of appeal, thus are having alternative remedy available. 8. We have taken note of the Apex Court judgments in the judgment passed in CWP No. 4779/2014, supra. While going through the aforesaid Section, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the petitioners have right of appeal, thus are having alternative remedy available. 8. We have taken note of the Apex Court judgments in the judgment passed in CWP No. 4779/2014, supra. It is apt to reproduce paras 12 to 16 of the said judgment herein:- 12. The Apex Court in Union of India and another vs. Guwahati Carbon Limited, (2012) 11 SCC 651 , while dealing with the similar question, has observed in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15 as under: “8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, AIR 1979 SC 1250 . In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p.88, para 23) “23. ……. when a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner and all the -other forums and modes of seeking remedy are excluded.” 9. A Bench of three learned Judges of as Court, in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 , held: (SCC p.440, para 11) "11......The Act provides for a complete-machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognized that where right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for 1 enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute must be availed...." 10. In other words, existence of an adequate alternate remedy is a factor to be considered by the writ court before exercising its writ jurisdiction (See Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCR 566 ). 11. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , this Court held: "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. 11. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , this Court held: "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justices or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged......" xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx 14. Having said so, we have gone through the orders passed by the Tribunal. The only determination made by the Tribunal is with regard to the assessable value of the commodity in question by excluding the freight/ transportation charges and the insurance charges from the assessable value of the commodity in question. Since what was done by the Tribunal is the determination of the assessable value of the commodity in question for the purpose of the levy of duty under the Act, in our opinion, the assessee ought to have carried the matter by way of an appeal before this Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944. 15. In our opinion, the assessee ought not to have filed a writ petition before the High Court questioning the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the Tribunal. The Excise Law is a complete code in order to seek redress in excise matters and hence may not be appropriate for the writ court to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in observing that since the assessee has a remedy in the form of a right of appeal under the statute, that remedy must be exhausted first. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, ought not to have been interfered with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the appeal filed by the respondent/assessee.” 13. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, ought not to have been interfered with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the appeal filed by the respondent/assessee.” 13. The Apex Court in Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular OperatorsAssociation of India and others, (2011) 14 SCC 337, after discussing its various earlier decisions, held that the High Court had committed error in entertaining the writ petition without noticing and referring to the relevant provisions of law applicable in that case, which contained statutory remedy of appeal and accordingly set aside the order of the High Court in terms of which the writ petition was entertained. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 24 and 25 hereunder: “24. Section 19 provides for remedy of appeal against an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers under sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 17. If Sections 11, 17 and 21 of the 1986 Act which relate to the jurisdiction of the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission, there does not appear any plausible reason to interpret the same in a manner which would frustrate the object of legislation. 25. What has surprised us is that the High Court has not even referred to Sections 17 and 19 of the 1986 Act and the law laid down in various judgments of this Court and yet it has declared that the directions given by the State Commission are without jurisdiction and that too by overlooking the availability of statutory remedy of appeal to the respondents.” 14. The Apex Court in a recent decision in Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 , has discussed the law, on the subject, right from the year 1859 till the date of judgment i.e. 8th August, 2013. We deem it proper to reproduce paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 hereunder: “12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 ; Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425 ; Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 ; State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 ; Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, AIR 1955 SC 425 ; Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882 ; State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 , have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for decision has not been adopted. (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422 ; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653 ; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436 ; S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572 ; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 ; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293 ; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 ; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634 ; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj); Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509 ; Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1SCC 72). 13. In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp.343-45 paras 12-14) “12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7). '7. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7). '7. … The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.’ 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) '11. … It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, 141 ER 486 in the following passage: (ER p. 495) “… There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. … But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.” The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd., 1935 AC 532 (PC) and Secy. Ltd., 1935 AC 532 (PC) and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 . It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.’ 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) '77. … So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226—or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32—is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.’” (See: G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 ; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 ; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472 ; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 ; C.A. Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765 ; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 ; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 ; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272 ; Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999) 1 SCC 209 and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569 ) 14. In Union of India vs. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., (2012) 11 SCC 651 , this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed: (SCC p.653, para 8) “8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83 . In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23). '23. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83 . In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23). '23. … when a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking [remedy] are excluded.’” xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx 15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case AIR 1964 SC 1419 , Titagarh Paper Mills case 1983 SCC (Tax) 131 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. 16. In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery for the assessment/re-assessment of tax, imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the Revenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. vs. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 this Court has noticed that if an appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar’s wife” the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. 17. In the instant case, neither has the writ petitioner assessee described the available alternate remedy under the Act as ineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent and satisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts of instant case. In light of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the Writ Court ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition filed by the assessee, wherein he has only questioned the correctness or otherwise of the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act, the reassessment orders passed and the consequential-demand notices issued thereon.” 15. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners have been discussed by the Apex Court in the decisions of Union of India and another vs. Guwahati Carbon Limited, Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India and others and Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, referred to hereinabove. 16. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that the writ petitioners-Company have remedies of appeal(s), before approaching the High Court by way of the writ petitions, for the redressal of their grievances. The petitioners ought to have exhausted the remedy of appeal before the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner or Additional Excise and Taxation Commissioner or the Excise Commissioner, as the case may be, and if the petitioners were not successful in those appeal proceedings, another remedy available to them was to challenge the said order(s) by the medium of appeal before the Tribunal, and again, if they were unsuccessful, they could have availed the remedy of revision before the High Court in terms of Section 48 of the HP VAT Act, 2005. Keeping in view the above discussion, read with the fact that the dispute raised in these writ petitions relates to revenue/tax matters, it can safely be concluded that the petitioners have sufficient efficacious remedy(ies) available.” 9. Keeping in view the above discussion, read with the fact that the dispute raised in these writ petitions relates to revenue/tax matters, it can safely be concluded that the petitioners have sufficient efficacious remedy(ies) available.” 9. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, the writ petitions are not maintainable. 10. These writ petitions are also to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioners have not questioned the main order, whereby the tax liability stands determined and the writ petitioners were held liable to pay tax. 11. With these observations, all these writ petitions are dismissed, alongwith pending applications. However, the petitioners are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy within three weeks. Till then, the interim order dated 28.05.2014 to continue. 12. It is also provided that the period spent by the petitioners for prosecuting these writ petitions shall be excluded by the Appellate Authority while computing the period of limitation. 13. A copy of this judgment be placed on each file.