JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This criminal revision under sections 397, 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the judgment dated 30.6.2014 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Chamba in Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2013, whereby he set-aside the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chamba on an application moved by the respondent under section 12 read with sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005) (for short, the Act) and directed the petitioners to provide accommodation to the respondent and till then to pay Rs.2,000/- to the respondent from the date of filing of the complaint. 2. The allegation set out by the respondent in the complaint was that her marriage had been solemnized with Doli Ram in the year 1988 as per Hindu rites and customs and one girl was born out of the said wedlock. Doli Ram died in the year 1993 and thereafter the respondent alongwith her minor child was staying in the matrimonial home, which was in her possession prior to the death of her husband. Further allegations were that after the death of her husband, his family members, who were petitioners herein started maltreating, misbehaving and abusing her with a view to compel her to leave the room and kitchen which were in her possession and thereafter about two years back, she had been thrown out of the house. 3. The petitioners filed their reply taking preliminary objections regarding maintainability, estoppel and that the respondent has suppressed material facts. On merits, it was averred that after the death of her husband, the respondent started residing at her parents house alongwith her daughter and did not reside in the matrimonial home. 4. The parties led evidence and the learned Magistrate vide order dated 24.8.2013 dismissed the application on the ground that it was very unlikely that respondent was residing in the same house after the death of her husband and therefore, her remedy lies before the civil court and no case of domestic violence was made out. 5. 4. The parties led evidence and the learned Magistrate vide order dated 24.8.2013 dismissed the application on the ground that it was very unlikely that respondent was residing in the same house after the death of her husband and therefore, her remedy lies before the civil court and no case of domestic violence was made out. 5. Against the aforesaid judgment, the respondent preferred an appeal in the court of learned Sessions Judge, who vide his order dated 30.6.2014 allowed the appeal and held the respondent to be entitled to a shared accommodation consisting of one room, one kitchen and one bath room with all ancillary facilities in the house, which was in possession of the petitioners and till such accommodation is not made available to the respondent, she was held entitled to a monthly maintenance of Rs.2,000/-. 6. The order passed by the learned Sessions Judge has been assailed before this court on the ground that the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is based on surmises and conjectures without taking into consideration that respondent had during the life time of her husband filed a divorce petition in the year 1993 and it was during the pendency of that petition that her husband died. Therefore, it was not a case to which the provisions of the Act would apply. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that a wife is entitled to accommodation only in the house, which is joint family property, while in the present case the house was owned by her father-inlaw and was his separate property in which shared accommodation could not have been granted. It was further claimed that respondent- petitioner No. 1 is 80 years old man having no source of income and is unable to pay such huge amount of maintenance. 8. In response thereto the learned counsel for the respondent has supported the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge and has claimed that respondent is a total destitute and it is not only moral duty but a legal obligation of the family members of the petitioners to maintain and provide residence to the respondent. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 9. The learned Sessions Judge in support of his conclusion that the respondent is entitled to a shared accommodation has accorded the following reasons:- “15. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records. 9. The learned Sessions Judge in support of his conclusion that the respondent is entitled to a shared accommodation has accorded the following reasons:- “15. After analyzing the entire matter, I find force in the contentions raised by the appellant, which are fully corroborated by the oral evidence produced by her. It may be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court reported as Karim Khan vs. State and anr. 2011 (4) Crimes 425 (Bom.), in which the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has held that 'continued deprivation of economic or financial resources and continued prohibition or denial of access for he shared household to the aggrieved person is a domestic violence and the protection under the Act of 2005 will be available to the respondent/ wife who was driven out from her husband’s shared household prior to coming into effect of the Act of 2005, but the deprivation continued even after the Act came into force.’ Similarly, Hon’ble Orissa High Court in Gangadhar Pradhan vs. Rashmibala Pradhan 2012(4) Crimes 580 (Ori.) has held that 'Protection of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 provides for a higher right in favour of the wife who not only acquires a right to be maintained but also thereunder acquires a right of residence. However, said right as per the legislation extends only to joint properties in which the husband has a share.’ The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Nishan Sharma and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and others 2013(1) Crimes 245 (All.) has held that 'where the husband was residing as a part of joint family in a house, which belonged to his father, it being shared household the wife aggrieved person would be entitled to claim right of residence in such house.’ 16. In view of the law cited supra, which is squarely applicable to the facts of this case, I am of the view that appellant- aggrieved person being wife of Shri Doli Ram, who had a share in joint family property, which is now in the possession of the respondents, has got right to a shared accommodation consisting of one room one kitchen and one bath room with all ancillary facilities in the house, which is presently in the possession of the respondents. Till such accommodation is made available to the appellant by the respondents, the appellant is held entitled to a monthly maintenance of Rs.2000/- from the date of this judgment.” 10. Section 2(s) of the Act describes shared household thus:- “2. (s) 'shared household’ means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household;” 11. No doubt, the definition of “shared household” aforesaid is not happily worded, but then the same cannot mean that a women can lay claim at every household where she lives or has lived at any stage in a domestic relationship. The wife is only entitled to claim a right of residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. In case it is the self acquired property of the father-in-law as is contended in the present case, then it cannot be called as shared household. 12. A similar question came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R.Batra and another vs. Taruna Batra (Smt.) (2007) 3 SCC 169 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “24. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt Taruna Batra stated that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence the said property is her shared household. 25. We cannot agree with this submission. 26. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence the said property is her shared household. 25. We cannot agree with this submission. 26. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband's father, husband's paternal grandparents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel' for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband's relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in all these houses of her husband's relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd. 27. It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted. 28. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt Taruna Batra has relied upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband's (sic) in-laws or other relatives. 29. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of Appellant 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a "shared household". 30. No doubt, the definition of "shared household" in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.” 13. Hence it cannot be called a "shared household". 30. No doubt, the definition of "shared household" in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.” 13. But would that mean that respondent cannot be held entitled to a monthly rent of Rs.2,000/- in lieu of a right to a shared accommodation? To my mind, the respondent would still be entitled to maintenance from the petitioners who are none other than the family members of her deceased husband. The petitioner No.1 is her father-inlaw and petitioner No. 2 is her mother-in-law and petitioners No. 3 to 5 are her brother-in-laws. Since the factum of marriage has not been denied the petitioners owe not only a moral obligation but a legal duty to maintain the respondent by providing her basic amenities of life i.e. food, clothing and shelter, if not anything more. 14. The law on the subject has been elaborately dealt in Kota Varaprasada Rao and another vs. Kota China Venkaiah and others AIR 1992 AP 1 , it has been held as follows:- “8. The oldest case decided on the subject is one in Khetramani Dasi v. Kashinath Das, (1868) 2 Bengal LR 15. There, the father-in-law was sued by a Hindu widow for maintenance. Deciding the right of the widow for maintenance, the Calcutta High Court referred to the Shastric law as under: "The duty of maintaining one's family is, however, clearly laid down in the Dayabhaga, Chapter II, Section XXIII, in these words: 'The maintenance of the family is an indispensable obligation, as Manu positively declares.' Sir Thomas Strange in his work on Hindu Law Vol. I page 67, says: 'Maintenance by a man of his dependants is, with the Hindus, a primary duty. They hold that he must be just, before he is generous, his charity beginning at home; and that even sacrifice is mockery, if to the injury of those whom he is bound to maintain. Nor of his duty in this respect are his children the only objects, coextensive as it is with the family whatever be its composition, as consisting of other relations and connexions, including (it may be) illegitimate offspring. Nor of his duty in this respect are his children the only objects, coextensive as it is with the family whatever be its composition, as consisting of other relations and connexions, including (it may be) illegitimate offspring. It extends according to Manu and Yajnavalkya to the outcast, if not to the adulterous wife; not to mention such as are excluded from the inheritance, whether through their fault, or their misfortune; all being entitled to be maintained with food and raiment." At page 21, the learned Judges have also referred to a situation where there is nothing absolutely for the Hindu widow to maintain herself from the parents-in-law's branch by referring to the following texts from NARADA: "In Book IV, Chapter I Section I, Art. XIII of Celebrooke's Digest, are the following texts from NARADA: 'After the death of her husband, the nearest kinsman on his side has authority over a woman who has no son; in regard to the expenditure of wealth, the government of herself, and her maintenance, he has full dominion. If the husband's family be extinct, or the kinsman be unmanly, or destitute of means to support her, or if there is no Sapindas, a kinsman on the father's side shall have authority over the woman; and the comment on this passage is : "'Kinsman on the husband's side; of his father's or mother's race in the order of proximity. 'Maintenance' means subsistence. Thus, without his consent, she may not give away anything to any person, nor indulge herself in matters of shape, taste, small, or the like, and if the means of subsistence be wanting he must provide her maintenance. 'Maintenance' means subsistence. Thus, without his consent, she may not give away anything to any person, nor indulge herself in matters of shape, taste, small, or the like, and if the means of subsistence be wanting he must provide her maintenance. But if the kinsman be unmanly (deficient in manly capacity to discriminate right from wrong) or destitute of means to support her, if there be no such person able to provide the means of subsistence, or if there be no SAPINDAS, then any how, determining from her own judgment on the means of preserving life and duty, let her announce her affinity in this mode : 'I am the wife of such a man's uncle; 'and if that be ineffectual, let her revert to her father's kindred; or in failure of this, recourse may be had even to her mother's kindered" (Emphasis supplied.) In Book III, Chapter II, Section II, Art. CXXII, of Colebrooke's Digest, we have the following texts and comments: "She who is deprived of her husband should not reside apart from her father, mother, son, or brother, from her husband's father or mother, or from her maternal uncle; else she becomes infamous." As per the above texts and comments, a Hindu widow if the parentsin- law's branch is unmanly or destitute of means to support her is entitled to be with the father or the kinsman on the father's side. 9. In Janki v. Nand Ram, (1889) ILR 11 All 194 (FB), a Hindu widow after the death of her father-in-law sued her brother-in-law and her father-in-law's widow. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the father-in-law was under a moral, though not legal, obligation not only to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law during his life time, but also to make provision out of his self-acquired property for her maintenance after his death; and that such moral obligation in the father became by reason of his self-acquired property having come by inheritance into the hands of his surviving son, a legal obligation enforceable by a suit against the son and against the property in question. While so deciding, the learned Judges at page 210 made a reference to a passage from Dr. Gurudas Banerjee's Tagore Law Lectures, thus: "We have hitherto been considering the claim of a widow for maintenance against the person inheriting her husband's estate. While so deciding, the learned Judges at page 210 made a reference to a passage from Dr. Gurudas Banerjee's Tagore Law Lectures, thus: "We have hitherto been considering the claim of a widow for maintenance against the person inheriting her husband's estate. The question next arises how far she is entitled to be maintained by the heir when her husband leaves no property and how far she can claim maintenance from other relatives. The Hindu sages emphatically enjoin upon every person the duty of maintaining the dependant members of his family. The following are a few of the many texts on the subject:-- MANU: 'The ample support of those who are entitled to maintenance is rewarded with bliss in heaven; but hell is the portion of that man whose family is afflicted with pain by his neglect: therefore let him maintain his family with the utmost care.' NARADA: 'Even they who are born, or yet unborn and they who exist in the womb, require funds for subsistence; deprivation of the means of subsistence is reprehended.' BRIHASPATI: 'A man may give what remains after the food and clothing of his family, the giver of more who leaves his family naked and unfed, may taste honey at first, but still afterwards find it poison.’ ” The text of MANU as added reads: "He who bestows gifts on strangers, with a view to worldly fame, while he suffers his family to live in distress, though he has power to support them, touches his lips with honey, but swallows poison; such virtue is counterfeit: even what he does for the sake of his future spiritual body, to the injury of those whom he is found to maintain, shall bring him ultimate misery both in this life and in the next." Having so quoted the texts, the Full Bench based its judgment on the proposition: "......under the Hindu law purely moral obligations imposed by religious precepts upon the father ripen into legally enforceable obligations as against the son who inherits his father's property." 10. In Kamini Dassee v. Chandra Pode Handle, (1890) ILR 17 Cal 373, it is held by the Calcutta High Court that the principle that an heir succeeding to the property takes it for the spiritual benefit of the late proprietor, and is, therefore, under a legal obligation to maintain persons whom the late proprietor was morally bound to support, has ample basis in the Hindu law of the Bengal School and accordingly decreed the suit for maintenance laid by a widowed brother against her husband's brothers. 11. In Devi Prasad v. Gunvati Koer, (1894) ILR 22 Cal 410, deciding an action brought for maintenance by a Hindu widow against the brothers and nephew of her deceased husband after the death of her father-in-law, the Calcutta High Court held that the plaintiff's husband had a vested interest in the ancestral property, and could have, even during his father's life time, enforced partition of that property, and as the Hindu law provides that the surviving coparceners should maintain the widow of a deceased coparcener, the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance. 12. In Bai Mangal v. Bai Rukmini, (1899) ILR 23 Bom 291, the statement of law of MAYNE that "After marriage, her (meaning the daughter's) maintenance is a charge upon her husband's family, but if they are unable to support her, she must be provided for by the., family of her father." was understood to have been one of monetary character than laying down any general legal obligation. The learned Judge, Ranede, J., after examining all the authorities has broadly laid down the law, as he understood, thus: "In fact, all the text writers appear to be in agreement on this point, namely, that it is only the unmarried daughters who have a legal claim for maintenance from the husband's family. If this provision fails, and the widowed daughter returns to live with her father or brother, there is a moral and social obligation, but not a legally enforceable right by which her maintenance can be claimed as a charge on her father's estate in the hands of his heirs." (page 295). 13. If this provision fails, and the widowed daughter returns to live with her father or brother, there is a moral and social obligation, but not a legally enforceable right by which her maintenance can be claimed as a charge on her father's estate in the hands of his heirs." (page 295). 13. However, the same learned Judge, Ranede, J., in a later case in Yamuna Bai v. Manubai, (1899) ILR 23 Bom 608, expressed his absolute concurrence with the law laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Janaki's case, (1889 ILR 11 All 194) (supra), as regards the right of the widow of a predeceased son to maintenance against the estate of the deceased father-in-law in the hands of his heirs. 14. The view of Ranede, J., in Bai Man-gal's case, (1899 ILR 23 Bom 291) (supra), was further conditioned by Ammer Ali, J., in Mokhoda Dassee v. Nundo Lall Haldar, (1900) ILR 27 Cal 555, by holding that the right of maintenance is again subject to the satisfaction of the fact that the widowed sonless daughter must have been at the time of her father's death maintained by him as a dependant member of the family. 15. But, both the views of Ranede, J., in Bai Mangal's case, (1899 ILR 23 Bom 291) (supra), and Ameer Ali, J., in Mokhode Dassee's case, (1900 ILR 27 Cal 555) (supra), did not find acceptance of A. K. Sinha, J., of the Calcutta High Court in Khanta Moni v. Shyam Chand, . The learned Judge held that a widowed daughter to sustain her claim for maintenance need not be a destitute nor need be actually maintained by the father during his life time... All that she is required to prove to get such maintenance, the learned Judge held, is that at the material time she is a destitute and she could not get any maintenance from her husband's family.” “19. In Appavu Udayan v. Nallamrnal, AIR 1949 Madras 24, the Madras High Court has to deal with the rights of daughter-in-law against her father-in-law and his estate in the hands of his heirs. In Appavu Udayan v. Nallamrnal, AIR 1949 Madras 24, the Madras High Court has to deal with the rights of daughter-in-law against her father-in-law and his estate in the hands of his heirs. There it is held that the father-in-law is under a moral obligation to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law out of his self-acquired property and that on his death if his self-acquired property descends by inheritance to his heirs, the moral liability of the father-in-law ripens into a legal one against his heirs. 20. A Full Bench of this High Court in T. A. Lakshmi Narasamba v. T. Sundaramma, AIR 1981 Andh Pra 88 held: "The moral obligation of a father-in-law possessed of separate or self-acquired property to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal obligation in the hands of persons to whom he has either bequeathed or made a gift of his property. Under the Hindu law there is a moral obligation on the fatherin- law to maintain the daughter-in-law and the heirs who inherit the property are liable to maintain the dependants. It is the duty of the Hindu heirs to provide for the bodily and mental or spiritual needs of their immediate and nearer ancestors to relieve them from bodily and mental discomfort and to protect their souls from the consequences of sin. They should maintain the dependants pf the persons of property they succeeded. Merely because the property is transferred by gift or by will in favour of the heirs the obligation is not extinct. When there is property in the hands of the heirs belonging to the deceased who had a moral duty to provide maintenance, it becomes a legal duty on the heirs. It makes no difference whether the property is received either by way of succession or by way of gift or will, the principle being common in either case." 21. It is rather pertinent to notice here that the view of Ranede, J., in Bai Mangal's case, (1899 ILR 23 Bom 291) (supra) has been dissented from specifically by the Full Bench of this High Court.” 15. In view of aforesaid exposition of law, the respondent being a destitute widow can definitely enforce her claim of maintenance including residence against her in-laws and her brother-in-laws. In view of aforesaid exposition of law, the respondent being a destitute widow can definitely enforce her claim of maintenance including residence against her in-laws and her brother-in-laws. In so far as the plea regarding petitioner No. 1 being an old aged and infirm person of 80 years having no independent source of income is concerned, the same is merit less because it is not the petitioner No. 1 alone who has been fastened with the liability to pay monthly maintenance of Rs.2000/-, but it is petitioners jointly who have been fastened with the liability. 16. With these modification, the petition is disposed of, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.