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2014 DIGILAW 1534 (HP)

Surya Parkash v. State of H. P.

2014-10-30

RAJIV SHARMA, SURESHWAR THAKUR

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JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. Annexure P-1 was rendered by the Collector, Sub Division, Nahan District Sirmaur, H.P, whereby the petitioner herein, who was arrayed as a respondent therein, on his being concluded, on the strength of material which existed before the Collector, to be in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises, was hence ordered to be evicted therefrom. The suit premises are owned by respondent No.4 herein. The petitioner was aggrieved by the order rendered by the Collector comprised in Annexure P-1 and he assailed the same by way of preferring an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla. Since the appeal preferred by the petitioner herein against the order comprised in Annexure P-1 was beyond limitation, hence, the appeal was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act comprised in Annexure P-3 for condoning the delay in filing the appeal at his instance for setting aside the impugned order comprised in Annexure P-1. However the Divisional Commissioner under an order impugned before this Court comprised in Annexure P-4 dismissed the application preferred by the petitioner for condoning the delay in preferring an appeal against the order rendered by the Collector Sub Division, Nahan. It obviously sequelled affirmation of the order comprised in Annexure P- 1. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner concerts to marshal an inference from this Court that the learned Divisional Commissioner while rendering Annexure P-4 has dealt with the averments comprised in the application for condonation of delay in a short shrift manner, in as much as even when good , sound, tenable and sufficient cause was disclosed in the application for condonation of delay comprised in Annexure P-3, in as much as the petitioner being deterred by his illness which gripped him at Delhi, to proceed to Nahan for filing earlier an appeal against it within limitation. Therefore, in the overlooking of the aforesaid good cause, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order rendered by the Divisional Commissioner comprised in Annexure P-4 is ridden with a legal infirmity of it having discountenanced a valid and sustainable explanation. The learned Additional Advocate General vindicates the impugned order by his filing a detailed response to the corresponding averments enshrined in the writ petition divulging for the reasons detailed therein the legal frailty gripping the impugned order. 3. The learned Additional Advocate General vindicates the impugned order by his filing a detailed response to the corresponding averments enshrined in the writ petition divulging for the reasons detailed therein the legal frailty gripping the impugned order. 3. The learned counsel on either side have been heard at length and the entire record has been rummaged with incision and care. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has been unable to controvert the factum as divulged in the impugned order, of the counsel for the petitioner being present on 31.12.2012 before the Collector, Sub Division, Nahan, who rendered Annexure P-1. The fact of representation then on behalf of petitioner forecloses an inference that the acquisition of knowledge by the petitioner through his counsel qua rendition of the impugned order is to be construed to be acquisition of knowledge by the petitioner too qua rendition of Annexure P-1 unless there was weighty material adduced on record that the knowledge as acquired by the learned counsel for the petitioner qua the rendition of Annexure P-1 was neither communicated nor transmitted to the petitioner. Since no material exists on record that the counsel was present at the time of rendition of Annexure P-1 never communicated it to the petitioner, the obvious corollary is that the petitioner then acquired knowledge qua its rendition. As a sequel, when he is omitted to assail it by filing an appeal earlier is estopped from availing any purported good cause having deterred him to do so. Even otherwise the presence of the counsel for the petitioner could not have been marked before the authority who rendered Annexure P-1 unless he was represented by such counsel under a Vakalatnama executed in his favour by the petitioner. The terms of the vakalatnama constituting the counsel for the petitioner as his authorized legal representative has not been placed on record so as to infer that no condition or term was contemplated therein so as to bar the institution of an appeal by the counsel on behalf of the petitioner before the Divisional Commissioner against the order comprised in Annexure P-1. For omission on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner to place on record the terms of the Vakalatnama and theirs displaying that no terms existed therein interdicting the counsel for the petitioner who was present before the authority at the time of rendition of Annexure P-4, to institute an appeal before the Divisional Commissioner constrains an inference that hence, such terms existed in the vakalatnama executed by the petitioner in favour of the counsel and as such even on the oral instructions of the petitioner the copy of impugned order comprised in Annexure P-1 could have been collected well in time by the authorized counsel and thereafter an appeal on behalf of petitioner by his counsel holding a vakalatnama on his behalf for the said purpose could have been instituted within time before the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla. In face thereof the ground as agitated in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, preferred by the petitioner before the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla for condoning the delay in filing the appeal at his instance against the order comprised in Annexure P-1 appears to be nebulous, shaky as well wholly rudderless. Consequently, even in the face of his receiving treatment at Delhi and his hence being constrained to visit his native place for instructing his counsel, too staggers and falls apart. Even otherwise the factum of the petitioner undertaking treatment at Delhi as unraveled in Annexure P-3 is in an extremely vague and nebulous expression qua his illness. It required further expression both in elaboration and in precision qua both intensity of illness as also the advice of the Doctor against his moving out from Delhi for personally imparting instructions to his counsel for collecting copy of impugned order and thereafter instituting an appeal. For lack of elaboration qua the aforesaid facet as also for lack of the petitioner not appending alongwith his application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act a medical certificate disclosing therein the magnitude of his illness or its enormity tenably constrained the learned Divisional Commissioner while rendering Annexure P-4 to hold that no good and sufficient cause has been made out for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Obviously the application under Section 5 of the limitation Act necessitated dismissal as tenably done by the Divisional Commissioner in his impugned order comprised in Annexure P-4. Obviously the application under Section 5 of the limitation Act necessitated dismissal as tenably done by the Divisional Commissioner in his impugned order comprised in Annexure P-4. Preponderantly at the outset, in as much, as, at the stage of institution of Annexure P-3 before the Divisional Commissioner the petitioner ought to have then to immediately seize the attention of the Divisional Commissioner qua the factum of the gravity of his illness, appended a medical certificate qua the aforesaid fact. His omission to do so does perse as held by the Divisional Commissioner portray the factum of the purported illness/treatment which he was undertaking at Delhi, hence its constraining him to visit his native place for imparting instructions to his counsel for preparing an appeal against Annexure P1301 1, being both flimsy as well as concocted. In view of above, present petition is dismissed, as also pending applications, if any.