JUDGMENT : 1. The Petitioner-Maharashtra State Electricity Board challenge the orders passed by the Labour Court, Satara and the Industrial Court, Satara allowing the complaint filed by the Respondent and declaring that the order of retirement of the Respondent with effect from 31 January 1998 were illegal and the Respondent deemed to have retired on 31 July 2001, with further direction to pay the monetary benefits to the Respondent. 2. The Respondent joined the services of the Petitioner-Board on 6 February 1968 as a 'helper.' Thereafter, he was working as a ‘Lineman.’ In 1993, he was promoted as 'Line Foreman.' He was drawing basic salary of Rs.3,480/-p.m. His service record showed his date of birth as 4 January 1940. On 14 December 1987, a letter was issued to the Respondent by the Executive Engineer of the Petitioner for verification of his birth date. It was stated that after perusal of the service record, it was noticed that the date of birth of the Respondent was not attested and for that purpose, within 8 days, the Petitioner should produce his school leaving certificate. It was also mentioned that service book did not contain the school leaving certificate, which needed to be on record. Another letter was issued by the Executive Engineer, Satara dated 25 May 1989 reminding the Respondent to produce school leaving certificate. On 20 September 1989, the Executive Engineer of Satara informed the Respondent to remain present in the office of the Establishment Superintendent on 22 September 1989 in respect of verification of his date of birth. The Respondent produced his school leaving certificate and his date of birth in the service record was changed from 4 January 1940 to 1 July 1943. There was an endorsement to that effect i.e. 3 November 1989 by the Establishment Superintendent that the entry was corrected as per the transfer certificate of Shree Chhatrapati Shivaji Vidhya Mandir, Sandur. On 5 July 1991, the Executive Engineer, Satara informed the Respondent that no further correspondence will be entertained as the entry in the service record has now been confirmed as 1 July 1943 based on the school leaving certificate. Nothing further was communicated to the Respondent after this letter dated 5 July 1991. 3. By the said letter dated 5 July 1991, the Respondent was informed that pursuant to the process of attestation, the date of birth has been finalised as 1 July 1943. Nothing further was communicated to the Respondent after this letter dated 5 July 1991. 3. By the said letter dated 5 July 1991, the Respondent was informed that pursuant to the process of attestation, the date of birth has been finalised as 1 July 1943. As per the earlier date of birth i.e. 4 January 1940, the date of superannuation of the Respondent was 31 January 1998. Fifteen days before this date, the Respondent received a letter dated 15 January 1998 from the Head Office of the Petitioner informing him that the date of birth has to be treated as 4 January 1940 which has been counter-signed by the Respondent and no correction in the service record was permitted by the Petitioner and accordingly, the Respondent was due to retire on 31 January 1998. The Respondent filed a Complaint (ULP) No.11 of 1998 immediately on 19 January 1998. Interim relief was not granted and the complaint proceeded on merits. 4. In the Labour Court, the Petitioner-Board examined its witness. The Respondent examined himself and the concerned official from the school, in support of the school leaving certificate. The parties produced documentary evidence. The Labour Court held that as per the school leaving certificate, the date of birth of the Respondent was 1 July 1943, and not 4 January 1940. The Labour Court also held that it was not the Respondent who initiated change of service record but the Petitioner called upon the Respondent to produce the record to attest the entry and this procedure was going on for 2 to 3 years. The Labour Court held that after this procedure was carried out, the entry was confirmed as 1 July 1943. The decision of the Head Office to treat the date of birth as 4 January 1940 was taken without giving any opportunity of being heard to the Respondent. As regards the contention of the Petitioner that there was no specific prayer for reinstatement with back wages, the Labour Court held that if the complaint is to be considered in its totality, the purpose of filing the complaint was clear and merely on this ground the Respondent cannot be non-suited. The Petitioner had also raised an issue of jurisdiction on the ground that the Respondent had retired and availed of benefits and, therefore, the complaint was not maintainable. The Petitioner had also raised an issue of jurisdiction on the ground that the Respondent had retired and availed of benefits and, therefore, the complaint was not maintainable. The Labour Court relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dadu Nagu Upashe of Aitwade Khurd Vs. Shri Warna Shahakari Sakhar Karkhana Limited, reported in 1991 II C.L.R. Page 172 to hold that the Court has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Labour Court allowed the complaint by order dated 29 March 2000 and declared that the date of retirement of the Respondent was 31 July 2001 and also directed notional reinstatement with full back wages. The Petitioner filed a Revision application in the Industrial Court, Satara which was dismissed by the order dated 8 March 2001. The Industrial Court held that birth date was not corrected at the instance of the Respondent but upon the process issued by the Petitioner itself and, therefore the action of the Petitioner to unilaterally challenging the date of birth was not proper and there was no perversity in the finding of the Labour Court. 5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Respondent had himself counter-signed the service record when initially entry was made and as per the rules governing the employees of the Petitioner, the change, if any, had to be carried out within a period of one year. She also submitted that all cases relating to alterations of date of birth of the employees to be entertained on merits, need to be referred to the Head Office for advice. The learned counsel submitted that the entry was carried out in the service record by changing the date of birth by an Officer without any authority and the Head Office had not approved of such change and, therefore it was communicated to the Respondent that since he had accepted the date of birth by countersigning upon it, after 28 years, no change was permissible. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Smt. Gulaichi, reported in 2003 (6) Supreme Court Cases 483 to contend that no right will flow from mistake committed while correcting the service record and any correction which is done contrary to the rules will confer no right upon an employee. 6. Vs. Smt. Gulaichi, reported in 2003 (6) Supreme Court Cases 483 to contend that no right will flow from mistake committed while correcting the service record and any correction which is done contrary to the rules will confer no right upon an employee. 6. Firstly, the rules governing correction in the date of birth needs to be noticed which reads as under :- “DEFINATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS : 9.(2) “Age” (a) Age shall be computed from the date of birth, evidence of which shall be produced by the employee to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority at the time of employment or within such period as the Competent Authority may direct, in any case within six months of appointment failing which his services shall automatically stand terminated after expiry of six months. (b) …… (c) …… Note(i) Normally, no application for alteration of the entry regarding date of birth as recorded in the Service Book of an employee should be entertained after a period of one year from the date of his entry in the Board’s service. Note(ii) Subject to the instruction No.(i) above, in deserving cases the correct date of birth of an employee may be determined in accordance with the directions given in the Eighteenth Schedule of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board Employees’ Service Regulations. Note(iii) All cases relating to alterations of date of birth of employees as are proposed to be entertained on merits in relaxation of instruction No.(i) above, should invariably be referred to Head Office for advice.” 7. The above rules prescribe that the evidence regarding date of birth shall be produced by the employee to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority at the time of employment and in any case within six months. Note (i) states that no application for alteration of the entry regarding date of birth as recorded in the service book should be entertained after a period of one year, Note (ii) states that correction of date of birth can be done in respect of deserving cases in accordance with the Employees' Service Regulations and Note (iii) states that change in date of birth is proposed to be entertained on merits, then it should be referred to the Head Office. 8. 8. Therefore, two aspects emerge, as to whether the date of birth entered into service record was finally settled, and secondly, when it was finally settled, whether proper procedure was carried out for its change. The letter dated 14 December 1987 shows that the process initiated by the Petitioner was on the ground that the entry in the service record was not attested, and there was nothing on record to show the date of birth. Thus, this letter itself indicates that date of birth was not finalized, which was needed to be done. The fact that date of birth was not attested and that the Respondent was called upon to produce school leaving certificate and the process of finalisation of the date of birth was initiated by the Petitioner itself, this cannot be a case of correction of date of birth but attestation of date of birth. Something which is not done at the initial stage by the Petitioner. Pursuant to this communication, the Respondent produced the school leaving certificate and showed that his date of birth is 1 July 1943. 9. It is pertinent to note that throughout in the proceedings, no material has been produced by the Petitioner to show that date of birth of the Respondent is 4 January 1940. The witness of the Petitioner has admitted that there was no such material. The witness of the Petitioner has also admitted that the Petitioner considers school leaving certificate as a basic document for the purpose of date of birth. Therefore, the present case was merely a case of attestation. Perusal of the correspondence show that the Petitioner itself had not considered the entry regarding date of birth as final, as it was not attested, and thereafter it was attested and finalized in the year 1991. 10. Even assuming that it is to be accepted that a final date of birth was corrected and as per the Rules, the authority to approve the entry of the date of birth was the Head Office of the Petitioner, the rules do permit correction of date of birth in deserving cases. Once the entry in the service record was carried out by the Executive Engineer of the Petitioner on 3 November 1989 and confirmed on 5 July 1991, the decision of the Head Office either approving or disapproving the same should have been communicated to the Respondent immediately. Once the entry in the service record was carried out by the Executive Engineer of the Petitioner on 3 November 1989 and confirmed on 5 July 1991, the decision of the Head Office either approving or disapproving the same should have been communicated to the Respondent immediately. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that after carrying out this entry in the year 1989, papers were sent to the Head Office. There is no explanation whatsoever what took the Head Office, 11 years to communicate the decision. The decision of the Head Office dated 15 January 1998 is placed on record. It gives no explanation for rejection except stating that the change should not be permitted once it is accepted by the employee. There is no mention whatsoever of the school leaving certificate on the basis of which, an entry was attested in the year 1989, especially when this is the only relevant material to determine the date of birth. The fact that the Respondent had counter-signed the service book cannot be the sole ground for rejection as the rules do permit changes in deserving cases. 11. Now to consider the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Gulaichi (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. In this case, an application was moved by the employee for correction at the fag end of his service and advantage was sought to be taken of an incorrect entry in the service record. The Apex Court in that case on facts also found that the documents placed on record by the employee to prove his case did not inspire any confidence. In the present case, as stated earlier, nothing is placed on record to show that the entry of 1 July 1943 as per the school leaving certificate is any way erroneous nor any material placed on record to show that date of birth is 4 January 1940. Furthermore, the change was initiated by the Petitioner itself. 12. In the present case, as stated earlier, nothing is placed on record to show that the entry of 1 July 1943 as per the school leaving certificate is any way erroneous nor any material placed on record to show that date of birth is 4 January 1940. Furthermore, the change was initiated by the Petitioner itself. 12. The learned counsel for the Respondent has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Dadu Nagu Upashe (supra) to contend that once the service record showed the entry of 4 January 1940 and the Respondent was communicated that this would be the final date of birth and that the Head Office did not inform its decision for 11 years, at least before giving a decision, hearing ought to have been give or the Respondent ought to have been put to the notice of the said fact. The learned Single Judge in the case of Dadu Nagu Upashe (supra) held that an opportunity of being heard should have been given to the employee therein as regards the settlement of dispute. The Petitioner at least ought to have put to the Respondent to notice that attestation was improper. 13. Even assuming that the decision to attest the date of birth taken in 1989 does not exist and the decision is taken for the first time on 15 January 1998, this decision is based on erroneous premise that no change is permissible in the date of birth. The rules do permit change in deserving cases. Furthermore, there is no reference to the only unquestionable document i.e. school leaving certificate. As stated earlier, the clinching factor in the present case is that there is unquestionable material in the form of school leaving certificate to show that the date of birth is 1 July 1943. Therefore, if both the orders are allowed to stand, no injustice will be caused. There is no allegation of collusion or improper influence by the Respondent. The Respondent was working as lineman and there is no allegation that he colluded with the Executive Engineer. 14. The learned counsel for the Petitioner then submitted that there is no prayer for reinstatement or back wages and therefore, such relief should not have been granted. For this submission, complaint needs to be noticed. The Respondent was working as lineman and there is no allegation that he colluded with the Executive Engineer. 14. The learned counsel for the Petitioner then submitted that there is no prayer for reinstatement or back wages and therefore, such relief should not have been granted. For this submission, complaint needs to be noticed. In the complaint, the Respondent has made a grievance that he was wrongfully removed from service when he ought to have continued till 31 July 2001. It was his case that his discharge from service is illegal and he should be continued till he attained the age of retirement i.e. 31 July 2001. The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Respondent has treated his discontinuance as discharge. The question whether the prayer for reinstatement with back wages can be considered is something totally different than what is stated in the complaint. The Respondent came with a case that his date of birth was 1 July 1943 and he should have been continued. The natural corollary of this case was that he should either be continued in service or should be given monetary benefits as if he had continued in service. Both the Courts have found that not to grant such relief would be against the very complaint. In any case, the Petitioner could not be said to have been taken by surprise as the case squarely is pleaded in the complaint. If a specific objection regarding lack of prayer was raised, all that the Respondent needed to do was to incorporate such prayer, which would not have been inconsistent with the pleadings. On this technical argument of the Petitioner, I am inclined to deprive the Respondent. 15. The learned counsel for the Petitioner then submitted that the Respondent had taken all the benefits and moved the complaint and made a grievance after retirement and, therefore his complaint should not have been entertained. The complaint is filed on 19 January 1998 and the date of superannuation, as per the Petitioner itself, was 31 January 1998. As far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned, reliance was placed by both the Courts below on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dadu Nagu Upashe (supra). In this decision, on identical facts and circumstances, the learned Single Judge upheld the contention that the complaint would be maintainable. As far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned, reliance was placed by both the Courts below on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dadu Nagu Upashe (supra). In this decision, on identical facts and circumstances, the learned Single Judge upheld the contention that the complaint would be maintainable. Once both the Courts have relied upon the decision of this Court to come to a particular decision, this finding cannot be termed as perverse. Furthermore, the Respondent has returned all the monetary benefits given to him. As on today, the position is that the Respondent has returned his retiral benefits and has not been granted any, in view of the interim order passed in this petition. 16. The Petitioner has approached this Court by invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The matter has arisen from the industrial adjudication where both the Courts have concurrently found that the correct date of birth of the Respondent was 1 July 1943. There is no reason to disturb the findings of both the Courts below as nothing has been produced on record to show that date of birth is 4 January 1940. Secondly, the finding that the process for attestation was initiated by the Petitioner itself is borne out by the documentary evidence and there is no reason shown to deviate from this view. Even assuming that the Head Office has the final authority, the decision of the Head Office is completely arbitrary and high handed. Petitioner is a public body. 17. In the circumstances, the question arise whether the equitable jurisdiction of this Court needs to be exercised so as to take away the benefits given to the Respondent by both the Courts. In this context a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ishwarlal Mohanlal Thakkar Vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Compnay Ltd. & Anr., reported in 2014 (5) SCALE 285 needs to be noted. This case arose from correction of date of birth in a service record. The Apex Court disapproved the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court setting aside the finding of facts and reiterated the parameters of interference. The Apex Court held as under :- “9. We find the judgment and award of the labour court wellreasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The Apex Court disapproved the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court setting aside the finding of facts and reiterated the parameters of interference. The Apex Court held as under :- “9. We find the judgment and award of the labour court wellreasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the labour court in its Award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power Under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the Appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the Award of the labour court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice. It is relevant to mention that in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction Under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that- “The power of interference Under Article 227 is to be kept to a minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.” It was also held that- “High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence Under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it.” Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise its power Under Article 227 of the Constitution judiciously and to further the ends of justice. In the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (2010) 3 SCC 192 , this Court held that, “20. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious jurisdictional error and unjustifiably interfered with the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court with compensation of Rs. 87,582 by entertaining a wholly unfounded plea that the Appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and16 of the Constitution and the Regulation.” 10. The power of judicial review of the High Court has to be alluded to here to decide whether or not the High Court has erred in setting aside the judgment and order of the labour court. In the case of Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2012) 5 SCC 443 , this Court referred to the position held on the power of judicial review in the case of Reid v. Secretary of State for Scotland, wherein it is stated that: “Judicial review involves a challenge to the legal validity of the decision. It does not allow the court of review to examine the evidence with a view to forming its own view about the substantial merits of the case. It may be that the tribunal whose decision is being challenged has done something which it had no lawful authority to do. It may have abused or misused the authority which it had. It may have departed from the procedures which either by statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have observed. As regards the decisions itself it may be found to be perverse or irrational or grossly disproportionate to what was required. It may have abused or misused the authority which it had. It may have departed from the procedures which either by statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have observed. As regards the decisions itself it may be found to be perverse or irrational or grossly disproportionate to what was required. Or the decision may be found to be erroneous in respect of a legal deficiency, as for example, through the absence of evidence, or of sufficient evidence, to support it, or through account being taken of irrelevant matter, or through a failure for any reason to take account of a relevant matter, or through some misconstruction of the terms of the statutory provision which the decision maker is required to apply. But while the evidence may have to be explored in order to see if the decision is vitiated by such legal deficiencies it is perfectly clear that in case of review, as distinct from an ordinary appeal, the court may not set about forming its own preferred view of evidence.” The Apex Court in this case not only specified the scope of interference but also the factual matrix of that case closely resembles the case at a hand. On facts the Apex Court held : 10…… The High Court has wrongly held that the Appellant was estopped from raising the issue of his date of birth as he had signed the records in 1978 but he raised this issue only in 1987. The reason for this is clear that the Respondent came out with a circular in 1987 that those employees who wished to change their date of birth in the records may do so by furnishing the necessary birth certificate and further, they can do it before they become 50 years of age. The Appellant had not attained 50 years of age at the time he raised the contention regarding mistake in his date of birth. The High Court has not applied its mind in setting aside the judgment and award of the labour court in exercise of its power of judicial review and superintendence as it is patently clear that the labour court has not committed any error of jurisdiction or passed a judgment without sufficient evidence. The High Court has not applied its mind in setting aside the judgment and award of the labour court in exercise of its power of judicial review and superintendence as it is patently clear that the labour court has not committed any error of jurisdiction or passed a judgment without sufficient evidence. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court deserves to be set aside and the award and judgment of the labour court be restored. 18. Thus the Apex Court approved belated change in date of birth when it was initiated at the instance of the employer. Once the decision rendered by both the Courts below is in consonance with the approach indicated by the Apex Court, considering the parameters of writ jurisdiction, no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. Petition is dismissed. 19. The Respondent who is now at the age of 75 years is deprived of the retiral benefits. He has returned all his benefits and has not been given any in view of the interim order. The petition of the year 2001 has reached today for hearing. The petitioner shall pay all the monetary benefits granted to the Respondent under the impugned order within a period of 8 weeks from today. If the amount is not paid within a period of 8 weeks from today, it will carry interest @ 8 % p.a.