Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—Petitioner-defendant has laid this writ petition challenging the order dated 20th March, 2009 (Annex.7) passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.7, Jodhpur (for short, 'learned trial Court'), whereby the learned trial Court decided Issue No.6 in favour of respondents/plaintiffs and against the petitioner-defendant. The learned Court below on adjudicating Issue No.6 has found that the suit property is not a wakf property and as such suit of respondent-plaintiffs is not barred by virtue of Section 85 of the Wakf Act, 1995 (for short, 'Act of 1995'). 2. The bare necessary facts for adjudication of the lis involved in the matter are that the respondent-plaintiffs instituted a civil suit for perpetual injunction against the petitioner and other proforma respondents for not interfering in their peaceful possession of the disputed property situated at Babanadi, Samsan Road, Bhika Piou, outside Siwanchigate. It is, inter alia, pleaded by the respondents that suit property is in possession of the parents of respondent-plaintiffs and respondents since last more than 50 years and Urban Improvement Trust has also issued patta in their names. Against the respondent-UIT, injunction was also sought for restraining it from cancelling the patta issued in the name of respondent-plaintiffs. 3. The suit was contested by the petitioner-defendant and a written statement was filed. In the written statement, the petitioner has raised specific objection questioning the jurisdiction of civil court by asserting that suit property is a wakf property, and therefore, on the strength of Section 85 of the Act of 1995, suit is barred by law. Besides the preliminary objection, the suit was also contested on merits by the petitioner. The proforma respondents also contested the suit. 4. On the basis of pleadings of rival parties, learned trial Court framed issues for determination and Issue No.6 was framed in the following terms :- ^^vk;k oknxzLr lEifÙk oDQ lEifÙk gksus ls bl U;k;ky; dks okn dh lquokbZ djus dk vf/kdkj ugha gS\** 5. After settling of the issues, respective parties led their evidence and the learned trial Court thereafter proceeded to decide above quoted Issue No.6 as preliminary issue. After settling of the issues, respective parties led their evidence and the learned trial Court thereafter proceeded to decide above quoted Issue No.6 as preliminary issue. While deciding Issue No.6, the learned trial Court has considered the evidence of the rival parties and examined the matter in the background of the provisions contained under Section 85 of the Act of 1995 and on overall analysis found that there is no semblance of proof that suit property is a wakf property and consequently decided the said issue against the petitioner and in favour of respondent-plaintiffs. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jitendra Chopra has argued that suit property is a wakf property and the learned trial Court has seriously erred in deciding Issue No.6 against the petitioner. Mr. Chopta has strenuously argued that, while deciding Issue No.6, the learned Court below has committed a jurisdictional error, which is apparent on the face of record, therefore, it is a fit case wherein supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to be exercised for upsetting the same. Laying stress on the document i.e. Gazette Notification wherein, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the suit property was shown as wakf property. Mr. Chopra has argued that in view of clear recitals in the Gazette Notification, the suit is not maintainable. Elaborating this submission, learned counsel contends that by not properly construing the gazette notification, the learned Court below has committed manifest error of law and fact, which warrants interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his contentions, leaned counsel has placed reliance on following legal precedents : (i) Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana committee vs. P.V. Ibrahim Haji & Ors. (2013 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 340) and (ii) Haryana Wakf Board vs. Mahesh Kumar ( AIR 2014 SC 501 ). 7. Per contra, Mr. Ashok Bhansali, learned counsel for the respondents, has argued that the learned trial Court has decided Issue No.6 after construing the evidence and other materials on record, and therefore, the said order calls for no interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Bhansali has submitted that the learned trial Court has examined the gazette notification in proper perspective and thereafter has reached to a definite conclusion that the suit property is not part of the said gazette notification. Mr. Bhansali has submitted that the learned trial Court has examined the gazette notification in proper perspective and thereafter has reached to a definite conclusion that the suit property is not part of the said gazette notification. Defending the impugned order, learned counsel has urged that in the impugned order the learned Court below has observed that no documentary evidence has been produced by the petitioner to prove that suit property is part of wakf property, and therefore, this finding of fact, which is based on proper appreciation of evidence, cannot be upset in the limited scope of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 9. There remains no quarrel that, under certain circumstances, after coming into force of the Act of 1995, jurisdiction of civil court is barred in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any wakf, wakf property or other matter, which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal. Thus, for invoking bar under Section 85 of the Act of 1995, the prerequisite is that dispute is concerning a wakf, wakf property or other matters, which are to be determined by the Tribunal. From the tenor of the impugned order, it is crystal clear that the petitioner has miserably failed to prove that suit property is a wakf property and the lis involved in the suit is having any nexus with the wakf or other matter, which is required to be determined by the Tribunal under the Act of 1995. 10. Section 83 of the Act of 1995 postulates the provisions for constitution of Tribunal etc and on conjoint reading of Sections 83 and 85, it becomes crystal clear that the tribunal constituted under the Act of 1995 has jurisdiction on matter relating to wakf or wakf property. 11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana Committee (supra) has held that a suit for injunction restraining defendant from interfering with management and peaceful enjoyment of wakf property is triable by Wakf Tribunal and not by civil court. 12. 11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana Committee (supra) has held that a suit for injunction restraining defendant from interfering with management and peaceful enjoyment of wakf property is triable by Wakf Tribunal and not by civil court. 12. In case of Haryana Wakf Board (supra), a suit for possession after coming into force of the Act of 1995 in relation to wakf property, was held to be barred by virtue of Sections 7 and 85 of the Act of 1995. 13. The legal position, in this behalf, is no more res integra in view of authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to supra. However, in the present case, there is no semblance of proof that the dispute, which was subject matter of suit, was related with the wakf, wakf property or any matter incidental to it and the learned Court below has also recorded definite finding in the impugned order to the effect. For recording this finding of fact the learned court below has examined the pit falls in the evidence of the petitioner threadbare and considered all the factors, which were relevant and germane with bird's eye view. Therefore, the legal precedents on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel cannot render any assistance. 14. Jurisdiction of the civil court is precisely contentious issue encompassing Issue No.6 and the rival parties have addressed on this crucial question, therefore, I deem it appropriate to examine true scope of Section 9 CPC. The language employed under Section 9 CPC is clear and unequivocal to conclude that civil court has jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature. In common parlance, presumption is in favour of jurisdiction of a civil court and exclusion of its jurisdiction is not be readily inferred. 15. Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Most. Rev. P.M. A. Metropolitan and Others etc. vs. Moran Mar Marthoma & Anr. etc. ( AIR 1995 SC 2001 ), while examining the jurisdiction of civil court under Section 9 CPC has held that section is of expansive nature and ultimately held as under :- 27. To begin with the objection to the maintainability of the suit under Section 9, of the Civil Procedure Code was probably not raised in 1954 and 1959 and if raised was not pressed. To begin with the objection to the maintainability of the suit under Section 9, of the Civil Procedure Code was probably not raised in 1954 and 1959 and if raised was not pressed. But that by itself may not preclude defendant-appellant from raising it, even in this Court as the bar or lack of jurisdiction can be entertained, at any stage, since an order or decree passed without jurisdiction isnon estin law. What then is the scope of the Section? Does it comprehend suits for declaration that the Syrian Churches are episcopal? Could the respondent-plaintiff claim declaration that Malankara Association had become autocepha-lous and no priest could refuse to recognise the authority of the Catholico? Could the plaintiff seek injunction, restraining the priests or Deacon from performing any other sacramental services and prohibits the defendants from interfering with the administration of the Malan-kara Church? How would the bar of jurisdiction operate if only part of relief is cognisable? To appreciate these aspects it is necessary to set out the Section itself and examine its scope and then advert to facts: "9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation I - A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation II - For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place." One of the basic principles of law is that every right has a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remediemis the well known maxim. Every civil cuit is cognisable unless it is barred, 'there is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue' Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue' Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar. AIR 1974 SC 1126 .The expansive nature of the Section is demonstrated by use of phraseology both positive and negative. The earlier part opens the door widely and latter debars entry to only those which are expressly or impliedly barred. The two explanations, one existing from inception and latter added in 1976 bring out clearly the legislative intention of extending operation of the Section to such religious matters where right to property or office is involved irrespective of whether any fee is attached to the office or not. The language used is simple but explicit and clear. It is structured on the basic principle of a civilised jurisprudence that absence of machinery for enforcement of right renders it nugatory. The heading which is normally key to the Section brings out unequivocally that all civil suits are cognizable unless barred. What is meant by it is explained further by widening the ambit of the Section by use of the word 'shall' and the expression, all suits of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred. 28. Each word and expression casts an obligation on the Court to exercise jurisdiction for enforcement of right. The word 'shall' makes it mandatory. No Court can refuse to entertain a suit if it is of description mentioned in the Section. That is amplified by use of expression, 'all suits of civil nature'.The word 'civil' according to dictionary means, 'relating to the citizen as an individual; civil rights'. In Black's Legal Dictionary it is defined as, 'relating to provide rights and remedies sought by civil actions as contrasted with criminal proceedings.' In law it is understood as an antonym of criminal. Historically the two broad classifications were civil and criminal. Revenue, tax and company etc. were added to it later. But they too pertain to the larger family of 'civil'. There is thus no doubt about the width of the word 'civil'. Its width has been stretched further by using the word 'nature' along with it. That is even those suits are cognisable which are not only civil but are even of civil nature. In Article 133 of the Constitution an appeal lies to this Court against any judgment, decree or order in a 'civil proceedings'. Its width has been stretched further by using the word 'nature' along with it. That is even those suits are cognisable which are not only civil but are even of civil nature. In Article 133 of the Constitution an appeal lies to this Court against any judgment, decree or order in a 'civil proceedings'. The expression came up for construction in S. A. L. Narayan Row vs. Iswarlal Bhagwandas, AIR 1965 SC 1818 . The Constitution Bench held 'a proceeding for relief against infringement of civil right of a person is a civil proceeding'. In Arbind Kumar Singh vs. Nand Kishore Prasad, AIR 1968 Sc 1227 it was held to extend to all proceedings which directly affect civil rights'. The dictionary meaning of the word 'proceedings' is 'the institution of a legal action, 'any step taken in a legal action.' In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained as, 'In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a Court or judicial officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. Term also refers to administrative proceedings before agencies, tribunals, bureaus, or the like.' The word 'nature' has been defined as 'the fundamental qualities of a person or thing; identity or essential character; sort; kind; character.' It is thus wider in content.The word 'civil nature' is wider than the word 'civil proceeding'. The Section would, therefore, be available in every case where the dispute has the characteristic of affecting one's rights which are not only civil but of civil nature. 16. Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kama Rao (D) by Lrs & Ors. ( AIR 2000 SC 2220 ) has held that jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 9 CPC is very wide and exclusion of its jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. While examining the jurisdiction of Civil court under Section 9 CPC, the Court held as under :- 5. ( AIR 2000 SC 2220 ) has held that jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 9 CPC is very wide and exclusion of its jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. While examining the jurisdiction of Civil court under Section 9 CPC, the Court held as under :- 5. The normal rule of law is that civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislature intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ), it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special Tribunals jurisdiction of the civil Courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 17. In ITI Ltd. vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd. ( (2002) 5 SCC 510 ), Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining jurisdiction of civil court under Section 9 CPC, held as under :- 11. 17. In ITI Ltd. vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd. ( (2002) 5 SCC 510 ), Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining jurisdiction of civil court under Section 9 CPC, held as under :- 11. It has been held by this Court in more than one case that the jurisdiction of the civil court to which a right to decide a lis between the parties has been conferred can only be taken by a statute in specific terms and .such exclusion of right cannot be easily inferred because there is always a strong presumption that the civil courts have the jurisdiction to decide all questions of civil nature, therefore, if at all there has to be an inference the same should be in favour of the jurisdiction of the court rather than the exclusion of such jurisdiction and there being no such exclusion of the Code in specific terms except to the extent stated in Section 37(2), we cannot draw an inference that merely because the Act has not provided CPC to be applicable, by inference it should be held that the Code is inapplicable. This general principle apart, this issue is now settled by the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Bhatia International vs. Bulk Trading S.A. wherein while dealing with a similar argument arising out of the present Act, this Court held: (SCC p.116, para 15) “While examining a particular provision of a statute to find out whether the jurisdiction of a court is ousted or not, the principle of universal application is that ordinarily the jurisdiction may not be ousted unless the very statutory provision explicitly indicates or even by inferential conclusion the court arrives at the same when such a conclusion is the only conclusion.” 18. In case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2) ( (2009) 4 SCC 299 = 2009(1) RLW 452 (SC)), Hon'ble Apex Court has held that ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred unless the jurisdiction is barred expressly or impliedly by a statute. The Court, in this behalf, held as under:- 12. Section 9 of the Code is in enforcement of the fundamental principles of law laid down in the maxim Ubi jus Ibi remedium. The Court, in this behalf, held as under:- 12. Section 9 of the Code is in enforcement of the fundamental principles of law laid down in the maxim Ubi jus Ibi remedium. A litigant, thus, having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit in a competent civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by any statute. Ex facie, in terms of Section 9 of the Code, civil courts can try all suits, unless bared by statute, either expressly or by necessary implication. 13. The civil court, furthermore, being a court of plenary jurisdiction has the jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction upon considering the averments made in the plaint but that would not mean that the plaintiff can circumvent the provisions of law in order to invest jurisdiction on the civil court although it otherwise may not possess. For the said purpose, the court in given cases would be entitled to decide the question of its own jurisdiction upon arriving at a finding in regard to the existence of the jurisdictional fact. 14. It is also well settled that there is a presumption that a civil court will have jurisdiction and the ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where jurisdiction of a civil court is sought to be barred under a statute, the civil court can exercise its own jurisdiction in respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction. 19. Present writ petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is restricted to interference in case of grave miscarriage of justice, dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law by the subordinate court and same has to be exercised most sparingly as it cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. It goes without saying that it is not permissible for this court on a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to review or reweigh the evidence upon which inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision. It goes without saying that it is not permissible for this court on a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to review or reweigh the evidence upon which inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision. Essentially, the supervisory jurisdiction is confined only to see whether an inferior Court has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of record much less an error of law. 20. Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. ( (2003) 6 SCC 675 = RLW 2003(4) SC 523), while considering the effect of amendment of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, vide 1999 (Amendment) Act redefine the yardsticks and parameters for exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction enshrined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Speaking for the Court, Hon'ble Justice R.C. Lahoti held as under :- 38(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result, in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. 21. Upon examining the matter, in its entirety, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Court has not committed manifest error of law in deciding Issue No.6 against the petitioner on evaluation of evidence and other materials on record. 22. 21. Upon examining the matter, in its entirety, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Court has not committed manifest error of law in deciding Issue No.6 against the petitioner on evaluation of evidence and other materials on record. 22. Moreover, there is no jurisdictional error committed by the Court below in deciding Issue No.6, I feel dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order. 23. Before parting I may hasten to add that the suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiffs as back as in the year 2004, and therefore, it is expected from the learned trial Court to expedite the trial of the suit and to decide the same as early as possible. 24. Resultantly, I find no merit in this writ petition and same is, accordingly, dismissed.