Judgment Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The substantial questions of law formulated and to be answered in plaintiffs' second appeal are as under:- "(i) Whether the suit was barred under Section 257 of the M.P. (C.G.) Land Revenue Code? (ii) Whether the Courts below were justified in not passing decree for possession especially when the Trial Court has recorded finding vide issue No. 1 that a portion of 0.14 RA ¼vkjs½ of land bearing Khasra No. 527 was under encroachment of the defendants?" (For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status shown in the suit before the Trial Court). 2. Sans unnecessary details, the facts, which are essential to be stated for the purpose of disposal of the present second appeal are as under:- 2.1. Plaintiffs, herein filed a suit for recovery of possession, permanent injunction and damages of the suit land bearing: Khasra No. Area 527 0.24 vkjs (hectare) 525 0.12 vkjs (hectare) 522 0.27 vkjs (hectare) situated at Village Likhama, Tehsil Nagri, District Raipur claiming to be Bhumiswami and in which, the defendants illegally dispossessed them/encroacher upon them. 2.2. The defendants filed their written statement opposing the aforesaid allegation and took the specific defence that they are title holder of land bearing Khasra Nos. 523, 51, 359, 362, 343, 382, 431, 437, 440, 442, total area 4.90 acres and further challenged the demarcation report slating that they were not duly noticed in the demarcation proceedings and, therefore, suit is liable to be dismissed. 2.3. Upon consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 29-11-2003, dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs recording following findings that:- (i) Present suit is barred by Section 257(x) of the C.G. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (henceforth "the Code"). (ii) Though the defendants have encroacher upon plaintiffs land bearing Khasra No. 527, area 0.14 vkjs , but identity of encroached portion is not established. 2.4. On appeal being preferred by the plaintiffs under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short "the CPC"), the First Appellate Court by its impugned judgment and decree dated 28-1-2006, affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs. 3. 2.4. On appeal being preferred by the plaintiffs under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short "the CPC"), the First Appellate Court by its impugned judgment and decree dated 28-1-2006, affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs. 3. Questioning the legal acceptability and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated 28-1-2006 passed by Additional District Judge Dhamtari, District Dhamtari in Civil Appeal No. 142-A/2004, this instant second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs under Section 100 of the CPC, in which, substantial questions of law have been formulated as mentioned in opening paragraph of this judgment. 4. Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs would submit that the judgment and decree passed by two Courts below holding that the suit to be barred by Section 257(x) of the Code is perverse being contrary to well-settled law in that regard and finding with regard to identity of the land is perverse and judgment and decree of two Courts below are liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, Mr. Y.C. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants would submit that concurrent finding recorded by two-Courts below is based on evidence available on record and instant second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below with utmost circumspection. Answer to first substantial question of law: 7. In order to answer first substantial question of law, it would be profitable to quote Section 257(x) of the Code:- "257. Exclusive jurisdiction of Revenue Authorities.--Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter, which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters:- (x) any decision regarding reinstatement of a Bhumiswami improperly dispossessed under Section 250." 8. A bare perusal of Section 257(x) of the Code would show that Revenue Authorities has exclusive jurisdiction against any decision regarding reinstatement of a Bhumiswami improperly dispossessed under Section 250 of the Code and Civil Court have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit, which the Revenue Authority by this Code is empowered to determine, decide and disposed off. 9. The short question for determination by this Court is whether Section 250 of the Code read with Section 257(x) bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for recovery of possession based on title of an agricultural land for which plaintiff/Bhumiswami has been dispossessed? 10. In case of Nathu Vs. Dilbande Hussain and others, AIR 1967 MP 14 , the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that aggrieved Bhumiswami is not bound to resort to the remedy provided by Section 250 of the Code and he has a remedy of filing of the civil suit for establishing his title and recovery of possession and held as under:- "8. Even after the Revenue Court makes an order under Section 250, the aggrieved party has the remedy of filing a civil suit for establishing his title to the land and for obtaining possession of the same. The decision of the Revenue Court cannot operate as res judicata in the civil suit; nor can Section 257(x) of the Code stand in the way of the institution of a suit for possession of a land founded on title. What is excluded from the cognizance of a Civil Court under clause (x) of Section 257 is a suit of the type of one under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act for restoring possession of land to a dispossessed Bhumiswami. 9. It must be noted that an aggrieved Bhumiswami is not bound to resort to the remedy provided by Section 250. This is clear from the provision in Section 250(1) that 'the Bhumiswami or his successor-in-interest may apply to the Tehsildar for restoration of the possession.....'. The word 'may' means that the aggrieved Bhumiswami is not bound to avail himself of the summary and speedy remedy provided by Section 250 of the Code. He may, if he likes, straightway bring a suit in a Civil Court for the establishment of his title to the land and to recover possession thereof. The word 'may' means that the aggrieved Bhumiswami is not bound to avail himself of the summary and speedy remedy provided by Section 250 of the Code. He may, if he likes, straightway bring a suit in a Civil Court for the establishment of his title to the land and to recover possession thereof. The word 'may' does not mean that the aggrieved Bhumiswami can at his option launch proceeding in a Civil Court under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act or in a Revenue Court under Section 250 of the Code for recovery of possession of the land. But, if wishes to have the land restored to him, then he has two courses open. He can either approach the Tehsildar under Section 250 of the Code or he may bring a suit in a Civil Court founded on title. But so far as the recovery of possession of land after summary enquiry is concerned, the aggrieved Bhumiswami has no option. For that remedy, he must approach the Tehsildar under Section 250 of the Code. The remedy of a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is clearly not available to him in view of Section 257(x) of the Code." 11. The correctness of the Division Bench decision rendered in Nathu (supra), was doubted and matter was referred to the Full Bench. The Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramgopal Kanhaiyalal Vs. Chetu Batte, AIR 1976 Madhya Pradesh 160(1), after consideration has held that determination of the question of title is the province of the Civil Court and unless there is any express provision to the contrary, exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be assumed or implied and held as under:- "9. In the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, the provisions are not analogous to those of the Delhi Act. The remedy provided in Section 250 of this Code can be resorted to by a Bhumiswami by an application to the Tehsildar. He has to show either (a) that he was dispossessed by the non-applicant otherwise than in due course of law, or (b) that he was dispossessed within two years from the date on which the possession of such person became unauthorised (although initially the possession of that person may be authorised). He has to show either (a) that he was dispossessed by the non-applicant otherwise than in due course of law, or (b) that he was dispossessed within two years from the date on which the possession of such person became unauthorised (although initially the possession of that person may be authorised). Thus, clearly enough, this section provides for a remedy at the hands of the Tehsildar for restoration of possession, when a Bhumiswami is improperly dispossessed, that is without due process of law. Clause (x) of Section 257 excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to challenge 'any decision regarding reinstatement of a Bhumiswami, properly dispossessed under Section 250'. In both these provisions, the subject-matter of enquiry is possession riot title. [See: Abdul Waheed Khan Vs. Bhawani, 1966 Jab. LJ 1022 : AIR 1966 SC 1718 , under the Delhi Act if the question of title is raised, it is referred to the Civil Court for decision. These is no analogous provision in the Madhya Pradesh Code. 10. Determination of the question of title is the province of the Civil Court and unless there is any express provision to the contrary, exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be assumed or implied, AIR 1966 SC 1718 . 12. The scheme of the Code consistently preserves the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide questions of title and that jurisdiction is not excluded. For instance, in the Chapter relating to mutation and record of rights (Chapter IX), Section 111 enacts:- 'The Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide any dispute to which the State Government is not a party relating to any right, which is recorded in the record-of-rights'. Again, in a proceeding for partition, under Section 178, if any question of title is raised, the Tehsildar shall not make any partition until the question of title has been decided by the Civil Court." 12. The Full Bench finally answered the reference by holding that a party aggrieved is entitled to maintain civil suit to establish his title and held as under:- "17. We, therefore, hold that a Bhumiswami is not bound to avail himself of the speedy remedy provided in Section 250 of the Code. The Full Bench finally answered the reference by holding that a party aggrieved is entitled to maintain civil suit to establish his title and held as under:- "17. We, therefore, hold that a Bhumiswami is not bound to avail himself of the speedy remedy provided in Section 250 of the Code. It is open to him to take recourse to the summary remedy under Section 250, or even without it straightway bring a suit in the Civil Court for declaration of his title and possession. Even if there has been a decision under Section 250 by a Revenue Court, the party aggrieved may institute a civil suit to establish his title to the disputed land. We further hold that Nathu Vs. Dilbande Hussain, AIR 1967 Madh Pra 14: 1964 Jab. L.J. 707, was correctly decided. The Civil Court can take cognizance of a suit. This is our answer to the questions referred to us." 13. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Rohini Prasad and others Vs. Kasturchand and another, 2000 (4) M.P.H.T. 5 (SC) : (2000) 3 SCC 668 , noticed the Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court with approval in Ramgopal (supra), and held that the civil suit for possession based on title is triable by the Civil Court and held as under:- "8. ......In three different appeals coming to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Hon'ble Judges sitting singly have consistently held that the civil suit of possession based on title is triable by the Civil Court. That being the law laid by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh while interpreting the Code, which applies to the State of Madhya Pradesh and having held the field for all these years, it is not desirable for the Supreme Court to give a different interpretation and to upset the settled law. Merely, because a different view is possible and that on that ground the decision of the High Court is erroneous, in our view, should not be a ground to interfere. Law should be certain and parties should know where they stand." 14. Thereafter, Hukam Singh (dead) by L.Rs. and others Vs. State of M.P. (2005) 10 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court noticed Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court rendered in Ramgopal (supra), and followed the decision of Rohini Prasad (supra). Para 8 of the report states as under:- "8. Thereafter, Hukam Singh (dead) by L.Rs. and others Vs. State of M.P. (2005) 10 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court noticed Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court rendered in Ramgopal (supra), and followed the decision of Rohini Prasad (supra). Para 8 of the report states as under:- "8. The view taken by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court is affirmed by the Court in Rohini Prasad Vs. Kasturchand, 2000 (4) M.P.H.T. 5 (SC) : (2000) 2 SCC 668. This being the position, the first substantial question of law is wrongly decided by the High Court. Under the circumstances, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Consequently, the civil appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside. The second appeal is remitted to the High Court for disposal afresh on merits accepting that the suit is maintainable, having regard to the law laid down by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramgopal as affirmed by this Court in Rohini Prasad." 15. Thus, it is now well-settled by the Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court as approved by Supreme Court in case of Rohini Prasad (supra), and further in case of Hukum Singh (supra), that aggrieved Bhumiswami has remedy of filing a civil suit for establishing his title on the land of his Bhumiswami right and for recovery of possession and he is not bound to resort to the remedy provided by Section 250 of the Code. 16. Having examined the legal position with regard to the maintainability of the suit, the two Courts have recorded a finding that the plaintiffs' suit for recovery of possession based on title on Bhumiswami land is not maintainable is clearly unsustainable in law. The said finding is hereby set aside and it is held that the plaintiffs suit for recovery of possession based on title is maintainable in law. Answer to second substantial question of law: 17. The determination of first substantial question of law brings me to the next substantial question of law, as to whether the two Courts below were justified in not granting the decree for possession after recording finding, while answering the issue No. 1 that the defendants are on unauthorised possession of a portion of 0.14 vkjs sift of land bearing Khasra No. 527, on the ground that identity is not established. 18. The short question that needs consideration by this Court is whether plaintiff has not described the suit land sufficiently to identify. Plaintiff in his plaint has clearly stated that he is title holder bearing Khasra No. 527, area 0.24 vkjs and out of which, 0.14 has been encroached by the defendant No. 1-Samara unauthorisedly. The Trial Court on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, particularly taking into consideration Exh. P-3, followed by Map (Exh. P-4), came to the categorical conclusion that the defendant No. 1-Samara has unauthorisedly encroached 0.14 vkjs of the land. But apart from the other reason, the Trial Court has declined to grant decree in favour of the plaintiff holding that identity of encroached portion is not identifiable. Order 7 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code states about the description, which provides as under:- "7(3). Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property.--Where the subject matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers." 19. A close reading of the Order 7 Rule 3 would show that where the subject-matter of the suit is immovable property, the plaint shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, and, in case such property can be identified by boundaries or numbers in a record of settlement or survey, the plaint shall specify such boundaries or numbers. 20. Thus, requirement of rule shows that giving a boundary of the land is not essential, if the survey number, which make the plot identifiable is given and therefore, a suit cannot be dismissed merely because boundaries not stated though identifying survey number (Khasra number) is given. 21. A bare perusal of the plaint would show that the plaintiff has clearly given Khasra No. 527, area 0.24 vkjs and out of which, 0.14 vkjs has been encroached by the defendant No. 1 in the Village Likma, Patwari Halka No. 100, Tehsil Nagri, District Raipur. Thus, indefinable survey number has already been given, in which, the Trial Court has clearly recorded a finding that the 0.14 vkjs of plaintiff's land has been encroached by the defendant No. 1. 22. Thus, indefinable survey number has already been given, in which, the Trial Court has clearly recorded a finding that the 0.14 vkjs of plaintiff's land has been encroached by the defendant No. 1. 22. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is no difficulty in identifying the land encroached by defendant No. 1, particularly in view of Exh. P-4, Map, attached with the demarcation report. 23. The Trial Court has clearly recorded a finding that defendant No. 1 has encroached 0.14 vkjs of land, which has been affirmed by the First Appellate Court and the same attained finality, as there is no challenge by the defendant No. 1. Thus, the defendant No. 1 is aware of the same that he has encroached upon 0.14 of land, as he has not proceeded to challenge the finding recorded therein and there is no difficulty at all in identifying the property of the plaintiff encroached by the defendant No. 1. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the suit property described in the plaint by its survey (Khasra) No. 527, which is sufficient to identify and merely because the boundaries not stated. 24. The Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court has committed error in not granting the decree in favour of the plaintiffs. The said finding is perverse and contrary to the record and I hereby set aside the judgment and decree so recorded by two Courts below. 25. Resultantly, the judgment and decree passed by two Courts below are set aside. The plaintiffs' suit is decreed in part and it is held that the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of Khasra No. 527, area 0.14 zs of land situated at Village Likma, Tehsil Nagri, District Raipur from the defendant No. 1/defendants. The defendant No. 1/defendants shall deliver the possession of Khasra No. 527, area 0.14 vkjs of land to the plaintiffs. 26. Consequently, the second appeal is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. No order as to costs. 27. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal Partly Allowed.