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2014 DIGILAW 1554 (BOM)

Ashok Bhaurao Sardar v. State of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Ministry of Revenue, Mantralaya

2014-07-17

A.P.BHANGALE

body2014
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard submissions at the bar. 2. The Petitioner was facing the eviction proceedings initiated at the instance of respondent no.4/Trust to evict the petitioner from the agricultural land bearing Survey No.52/2, Gat No.10, admeasuring 3 Hectares, 76 R situated at Mouza Sukali, Tq. Daryapur, District Amravati the land owned by the Trust. The proceedings were dismissed on 15.7.2002. As the Trust did not apply for restoration, the dismissal order had attained finality. The Trust filed fresh eviction proceedings being Tenancy Case No.59/27/Sukali/3/2009-2010 under Section 120C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the BTAL Act”) on the same grounds as in earlier eviction case. Respondent no.2, despite this objection, decided the case on merits and allowed the case for summary eviction. The petitioner had challenged the order in Revision No.Ten/B/78/2012. The revision was dismissed by the Maharshtra Revenue Tribunal by judgment, dated 8.1.2014. 3. The question posed is as to whether the suit dismissed on the ground of default in appearance of the plaintiff bars a fresh suit on the same cause of action in view of the Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question was under consideration of learned Single Judge of this Court in the ruling Premachand Lakhanji Jain vs. Smt. Lilabai Krishnath Surve, 1998 (3) Mah LJ 252. In that Civil Revision application, suit was dismissed for default in terms of the Order IX, Rule 8 of Civil Procedure Code and it was held that respondent no.1 was not entitled to file fresh suit on the same cause of action, it being for the same relief, taking shelter of Order IX, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. In Ramesh Sitaram vs. Pandurang 2012, (6) Mh.L.J. 360, the Single Judge of this Court held that fresh suit was barred once it is found that previous suit was dismissed. 5. In the case of Collector of Bilaspur vs. Ajit P.K. Jogi, (2011) 10 SCC 357 , it was held that dismissal of the Writ Petition without hearing on merits does not amount to resjudicata in subsequent proceedings. To attract the principle of res judicata, the previous decision must have been on merits and not for the default of the party. Reference is also made to the ruling reported in AIR 2008 Patna 5, Mrs. To attract the principle of res judicata, the previous decision must have been on merits and not for the default of the party. Reference is also made to the ruling reported in AIR 2008 Patna 5, Mrs. Niloufer Siddiqui and another vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others ( para 11) to argue that previous decision in the suit on title must be on merits to attract principle of res judicata. 6. Thus, the principle of res judicata cannot be attracted to the case which was not decided on merits earlier. Approach of the competent Court must be to decide the case on merits than considering sheer technicality that the previous eviction case was dismissed long back on account of default of appearance by the landlord/Trust. To my mind, eviction of the defaulting tenant or his representative who refuses to vacate do furnish continuing periodical cause of action for the landlord to evict the tenant refusing to vacate the tenement i.e. subject matter of tenancy. 7. Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with appearance of parties and consequences of disappearance. The objective of procedural provision is that parties are expected to attend the Court punctually on the date fixed for their appearance/attendance, at least through their pleaders when appointed, if not in person. Provisions are intended to ensure that the party who filed the suit take diligent steps to pursue progress of the suit instituted. Rule 3 indicates that if none of the party appears, the Court is empowered to dismiss the suit. Rule 4 permits the plaintiff whose suit is dismissed at preliminary stage on account of failure to serve summons or when defendant, who is served alone, appears and suit is dismissed to get the suit restored upon showing sufficient cause for the absence. In such case, Rule 4 permits the fresh suit subject to the law of limitation or self contained remedy of restoration of the suit when sufficient cause is made out to restore the suit. Rule 8 contemplates the procedure that when the defendant appears but not the plaintiff and the defendant has not admitted the suit claim, the suit would be dismissed. If the defendant admits the suit claim partly or wholly, in that event, decree would follow accordingly. Rule 8 contemplates the procedure that when the defendant appears but not the plaintiff and the defendant has not admitted the suit claim, the suit would be dismissed. If the defendant admits the suit claim partly or wholly, in that event, decree would follow accordingly. Rule 9 bars fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action because the remedy is self contained in the Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enable the plaintiff to apply for setting aside dismissal of the suit and/or restoration of the suit. The cause of action for eviction of the tenant when based on valid continuing cause of action i.e. the case which was not decided on merits earlier is distinguishable from the bar applicable for the fresh suit brought on the same cause of action. This being so, I do not find any serious infirmity in the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dismissing the revision preferred against the eviction order on merits by the Sub-Divisional Officer, District Amravati. More so when the larger interest of justice demand that eviction order made final on merits in accordance with law in favour of the landlord ought not be allowed to be defeated by taking shelter of procedural rule of technicality. It has to be borne in mind that the procedure is handmaid of justice rather than a mistress. Rules of procedure are means for the trial Court to regulate the trial proceedings before it. The impugned Judgment and Order on merits has attained finality and appears sustainable on all fours. I do not find serious infirmity in the impugned Judgment and Order to justify interference in exercise of extra ordinary Writ jurisdiction. 8. The Writ Petition is, therefore, found without merits. Hence, it is dismissed. Rule is discharged accordingly. JUDGE 9. Mr. R.D. Bhuibhar, learned Counsel for the petitioner prays of continuance of ad interim relief, which was granted by this Court vide order dt.30.1.2014, for a further period of four weeks. Learned Counsel for the respondents oppose the prayer so made. However, in the interest of justice, the ad interim order dt.30.1.2014 passed by this Court shall continue to operate for a further period of four weeks and the same shall stand vacated thereafter automatically.