JUDGMENT Anuja Prabhudesai, J. 1. The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment dated 25.9.1992 in Sessions Case No. 270 of 1991, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune has held the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced her to undergo imprisonment for life. The brief facts necessary to decide this appeal are as follows: Shantabai was married to Raju Manvel, resident of Ashok Nagar Zopadpatti, Yerwada, Pune. Said Raju Manvel had developed illicit relationship with the appellant herein and as a consequence thereof he used to visit the house of the appellant at Ashok Nagar Zopadpatti. On 11.11.1990 at about 19.00 hours, whilst the deceased-Shantabai had gone to the house of the appellant Sonabai to call her husband, the appellant quarreled with her and thereafter poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. As a result, the deceased sustained 100% burn injuries and she was admitted in Sasoon Hospital Pune. On 12.11.1990 at about 12.30 am P.W. 1. Kamalakar Adhav, the Special Executive Magistrate visited the hospital and after P.W. 9 Dr. Vinay Tekwane, the doctor on duty certified that Shevantabai was fit to make a statement, PW. 1, recorded her statement. 2. On the same day at about 1.15 am PSI Jagtap visited the hospital and confirmed from P.W. 9. Dr. Tekwane that Shantabai was fit to make a statement and thereafter recorded the statement of Shantabai. Based on the said statement at Exhibit 21, P.W. 7 PSI Jagtap registered Cr. No. 433 of 1990 against the appellant initially under section 307 I.P.C., which upon the death of Shantabai on 12.11.1990 was converted to one under section 302 I.P.C. Further investigation was conducted by P.W. 8 PSI Deoram Gaikwad and P.W. 10 Marutrao Deshmukh. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant before JMFC Pune. 3. Upon committal of the case, the learned Session Judge, framed charge against the appellant for committing offence under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Prosecution in support of its case examined 10 witnesses. Statement of appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. defence of the appellant was of total denial. 4. The trial court found the dying declarations to be reliable and relying on the evidence of P.W. 1 Kamalakar Adhav and P.W. 9 Dr. Prosecution in support of its case examined 10 witnesses. Statement of appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. defence of the appellant was of total denial. 4. The trial court found the dying declarations to be reliable and relying on the evidence of P.W. 1 Kamalakar Adhav and P.W. 9 Dr. Tekwane and the other corroborative evidence, held the appellant guilty of the offence and recorded the conviction and sentenced as stated above. Aggrieved by this conviction and sentence as stated above, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 5. Learned Advocate Mr. Abhaykumar Apte has argued on behalf of the appellant and learned APP argued on behalf of the State. We have perused the record and considered the arguments advanced by the respective parties. 6. The evidence of P.W. 9 Dr. Vinay Tekwane reveals that on 11.11.1990 at about 11.30 p.m. Shantabai was admitted in ward No. 27, Sasoon Hospital, Pune with 100% burn injuries. Said Shantabai expired on 12.11.1990 at 8.50 p.m. Postmortem over the body of Shantabai was conducted by P.W. 5 Dr. Laxmikant Bade on 13.11.1990 between 8.30 to 9.30 a.m. The testimony of P.W. 5 Laxmikant Bade and the postmortem report indicates that that Shantabai had following injuries: i) Superficial burn injury over face, neck, chest, abdomen and upper extremities upto wrist joint. ii) Superficial burn injury over lower extremities upto ankle and whole back except buttocks. iii) Surgical wound or verinection on right and left ankle. 7. The evidence of P.W. 5 Dr. Bade indicates that the total area of burn was about 90%. He has opined that the injuries were ante mortem and that the death of Shantabai was due to shock as a result of the burn injuries. The medical evidence therefore leaves no doubt that Shantabai had expired due to the burn injuries. 8. The prosecution case primarily centers around dying declarations at Exhibit 21, recorded by P.W. 1 Kamalakai Adhav and evidence of P.W. 7 PSI Jagtap. Since the main thrust of argument is on the credibility of the Dying declaration, we deem it appropriate to reiterate the settled principles with regard to the dying declaration. 9. 8. The prosecution case primarily centers around dying declarations at Exhibit 21, recorded by P.W. 1 Kamalakai Adhav and evidence of P.W. 7 PSI Jagtap. Since the main thrust of argument is on the credibility of the Dying declaration, we deem it appropriate to reiterate the settled principles with regard to the dying declaration. 9. In the case of Smt. Shakuntala vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2007 SC 2709 : (2007 ALL MR (Cri) 2066 (S.C.)) the Apex Court has summarized the law on the dying declaration as under: "..Though the dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the appellant has no power of his cross examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of other could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after the clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as a absolute rule of law that the dying declaration in form of sole basis of conviction unless it corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujrat ( AIR 1992 SC 1817 ). (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. [See Munna Raja & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 7640] (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors. [See Munna Raja & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 2 SCR 7640] (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ors. [ AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramavati Devi v. State if Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 1640] (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramchandra Reddy & Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor ( AIR 1976 SC 1994 )] (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( 1974 (4) SCC 264 )] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1982 SC 1021 )]. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P. ( 1981 (2) SCC 654 )] (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu ( AIR 1981 SC 617 )] (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors. v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1979 SC 1505 )]. (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Ann v. State of Madhya Pradesh. ( AIR 1988 SC 912 )] (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. V/s. Madan Mohan & Ors. [See Nanahau Ram and Ann v. State of Madhya Pradesh. ( AIR 1988 SC 912 )] (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. V/s. Madan Mohan & Ors. ( AIR 1989 SC 1519 )] (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1982 SC 839 )]." 10. In the case of Shaikh Bakshu and Ors. v/s. State of Maharashtra 2007 (11) SCC 269 : (2007 ALL SCR 2407), the Apex Court has emphasized the requirement of reading over and explaining the contents of the statement to the victim/deceased. 11. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh V/s. Dal Singh and Others AIR 2013 SC 2059 : (2013 ALL SCR 2161), the Apex Court has reiterated the law on the dying declaration as under: "The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that law does not provide who can record a dying declaration, nor is there any prescribed form, format, or procedure for the same. The person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making such a statement. Moreover, the requirement of a certificate provided by a Doctor in respect of such state of deceased, is not essential in every case. Undoubtedly, the subject of the evidentiary value and acceptability of a dying declaration, must be approached with caution for the reason that the maker of such a statement cannot be subjected to cross-examination. However, the court may not look for corroboration of a dying declaration, unless the declaration suffers from any infirmity." 12. The law is therefore well settled that the dying declaration, which is admissible in evidence on the principle of 'nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire' - a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth' can form basis of conviction if after careful scrutiny, the court finds it to be true, voluntary, reliable and inspires full confidence. The law is therefore well settled that the dying declaration, which is admissible in evidence on the principle of 'nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire' - a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth' can form basis of conviction if after careful scrutiny, the court finds it to be true, voluntary, reliable and inspires full confidence. Keeping in mind these principles, we have considered the evidence on record in the present case. 13. The evidence of P.W. 7 Maruti Jagtap, indicates that on receipt of the information from the head constable attached to Sasoon Hospital, he had visited Ward No. 27 of Sasoon Hospital where deceased Shantabai was admitted. He has stated that he had confirmed from the doctor on duty that Shantabai was in fit condition to give her statement. He has stated that Shantabai was conscious and was in a position to speak. On enquiry with Shantabai, she told him that on 11.11.1990, while she had visited the house of Sonabai to take her husband Raju home, there was a quarrel between her and Sonabai and that Sonabai i.e. the appellant herein had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. He had recorded the said statement and obtained thumb impression of Shantabai on the same. 14. It is to be noted that though P.W. 7 has deposed that the contents of the said statement were read over to Shantabai and that she had admitted the same to be correct, no such statement was recorded in the dying declaration at Exhibit 21. Therefore in view of the judgment of the Apex court in the case of Shaikh Bakshu, (2007 ALL SCR 2407) (supra), the said dying declaration at Exhibit 21 is of no avail to the prosecution. 15. Exhibit 21 is the dying declaration recorded by P.W. 1 Kamalakar Adhav, the Special Executive Magistrate. The testimony of P.W. 1 indicates that on 12.11.1990 at about 12.30 a.m., on receipt of the requisition from Bund Garden Police Station to record the dying declaration of the deceased Shantabai, he had visited ward No. 27 of Sasoon Hospital, Pune. He contacted P.W. 9. Dr. Vinay, the doctor on duty, and confirmed that the victim Shantabai was in a fit condition to give her statement, and thereafter recorded the dying declaration of said Shantabai. He contacted P.W. 9. Dr. Vinay, the doctor on duty, and confirmed that the victim Shantabai was in a fit condition to give her statement, and thereafter recorded the dying declaration of said Shantabai. His evidence indicates that none of the relatives of Shantabai was present at the time of recording the said dying declaration. He has stated that said Shantabai was fully conscious and after he had disclosed his identity to her and asked her about the cause of the injury sustained by her, she had stated that the appellant was the mistress of her husband. She had further stated that on 11.11.1990 at about 7.00 p.m. when she had visited the house of the appellant at Ashok Nagar to bring her husband home, the appellant quarreled with her and thereafter poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. P.W. 1 Kamalakar recorded the said dying declaration, read over and explained the contents of the same to Shantabai and thereafter obtained her thumb impression on the said dying declaration. He has stated that Dr. Vinay, who was present at the time of recording the dying declaration, had made an endorsement on the dying declaration certifying that the patient was in a fit condition to make a statement. He has stated in his cross-examination that the dying declaration was as per the narration of the deceased Shantabai. 16. P.W. 9. Dr. Vinay has confirmed that on 12.11.1990 he was on duty in ward No. 27 of Sasoon Hospital, Pune. He has deposed that Shantabai was admitted in the said hospital on 11.11.1990 at about 11.10 p.m. with 100% burns. The Magistrate was called for recording her dying declaration. He has stated that the patient was well oriented and was in a fit condition to give statement. He has confirmed the endorsement made by him on the dying declaration at Exhibit 21. P.W. 9 has deposed that he was present at the time of recording statement of the patient by the Magistrate. 17. The evidence of P.W. 1 Kamalakar clearly indicates that on receipt of the requisition from the police he had visited the hospital and had recorded the dying declaration of the deceased Shantabai. The contents of the said dying declaration, which were as per the narration of the deceased Shantabai, were read over and explained to her and her thumb impression was obtained on the same. The contents of the said dying declaration, which were as per the narration of the deceased Shantabai, were read over and explained to her and her thumb impression was obtained on the same. His testimony further indicates that the deceased Shantabai was fully conscious and well oriented. Moreover, P.W. 9 Dr. Vinay Tekwane who was present at the time of recording the dying declaration, had declared her fit to make the statement and had made a requisite endorsement to that effect on the dying declaration. The evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 9 further indicate that none of the relatives of the deceased Shantabai was present when her dying declaration was being recorded, which fact obviates the possibility of the deceased being tutored or pressurized by the relatives to make a false statement against the appellant. The above facts and circumstances render the dying declaration voluntary, trustworthy, and reliable. 18. P.W. 1 has stated that the police had reported to him that the patient had sustained Injury due to bursting of stove. It is however to be noted that the requisition to the Executive Magistrate was made before registration of the crime. There is absolutely no material on record to even remotely suggest that the deceased or any of her relatives had given the history of burns due to bursting of the stove. On the contrary, the testimony of P.W. 2 Muktabai, who is a neighbour of the appellant, also indicates that Raju used to visit the house of the appellant and that some days prior to the incident there was a squabble between the appellant and the deceased over the said issue. She has stated that on the day of the incident, at about 8.30 to 9.00 p.m., while she was getting ready to sleep, she had seen fire outside her house. She came out and saw that Shantabai was engulfed in flames and that she was running around the courtyard. She has deposed that when Shantabai came near her door, the curtain of her house caught fire. Apprehending that her house would catch fire, she pushed Shantabai and in the process sustained burn injuries on her hand. Sometime later, Raju came and took Shantabai to the hospital. 19. The testimony of P.W. 2 Muktabai Shinde amply proves that the incident had occurred outside the house of the appellant. Apprehending that her house would catch fire, she pushed Shantabai and in the process sustained burn injuries on her hand. Sometime later, Raju came and took Shantabai to the hospital. 19. The testimony of P.W. 2 Muktabai Shinde amply proves that the incident had occurred outside the house of the appellant. The medical certificate at Exhibit 12 also proves that P.W. 2 had sustained burn injuries on her right finger, which fact fortifies her statement that she has pushed the deceased in order to prevent the fire spreading to her house. The scene of offence panchanama at Exhibit 9, the genuineness of which is not disputed, also indicates that a burnt piece of a saree was seized from the open space in front of the hut of the appellant. The panchanama further indicates that the curtain of the house of P.W. 2 was burnt and some burnt clothes were recovered from the open space in front of the house of PW 2. The CA Report at Exhibit 40 proves that kerosene was detected on the said clothes. All these circumstances prove beyond reasonable doubt that the incident had occurred outside the house of the appellant. The panchanama does not show any signs of stove burst either outside the house of the appellant or outside the house of P.W. 2 Muktabai and thus rules out the possibility of the deceased having sustained the injuries due to bursting of the stove. We are therefore of the opinion that the statement in the requisition was nothing but a mere speculation. We do not find any infirmity in recording the dying declaration at Exhibit 21 and consequently, the said dying declaration, which is otherwise reliable and trustworthy cannot be disbelieved or discarded merely because the police had presumed it to be the case of accidental burns due to bursting of a stove. 20. It is also to be noted that the testimony of P.W. 3 Bhau Sathe, brother of the deceased Shantabai, indicates that Shantabai and the appellant were leaving as husband and wife. He had learnt about the incident on the next morning and thereupon he had visited the hospital at about 10 am. He has stated that Shantabai was conscious and could talk. He had learnt about the incident on the next morning and thereupon he had visited the hospital at about 10 am. He has stated that Shantabai was conscious and could talk. He has stated that on being asked, the deceased Shantabai had told him that her husband Raju was staying with the appellant and that on the relevant date she had gone to the house of the appellant to bring her husband home. The deceased had told him that the appellant had quarreled with her and set her on fire. 21. The testimony of P.W. 4 Yamunabai Sathe, who is the sister-in-law of the deceased also indicates that she had learnt about the incident on 12.11.1990 at about 9 a.m. She visited the deceased at Sasoon Hospital at about 12 p.m. Her testimony indicates that Shantabai could talk and that she had told her that on the relevant date she had gone to the house of her husband's mistress at Ashok Nagar. The said lady picked up quarrel with her and poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. 22. The testimony of P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 proves that the deceased had told them that the appellant had set her ablaze. On careful examination of the evidence, we find that the evidence of these witnesses is reliable. Apart from bare denials, nothing has been elicited in cross-examination to impeach the credibility of these witnesses. Moreover, the oral dying declaration is coherent and consistent with the dying declaration at Exhibit 21. Thus, in our considered view there is overwhelming evidence in the form of dying declaration made to the Executive Magistrate, which is duly corroborated by the oral dying declaration made to P.W. 3. Bhau, brother of deceased and P.W. 4 Yamunabai, coupled with the testimony of P.W. 2 Muktabai, to prove that the appellant had set Shantabai on fire. On careful scrutiny of the evidence, we see no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court. In view of the above, Criminal Appeal No. 618 of 1992 is dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant. Twelve weeks time is granted to the appellant to surrender to her bail. The bail bond of appellant stands canceled. Appeal dismissed