JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner/complainant, Laxminarayan, being dissatisfied with the order dated 06.12.2001 passed by the Civil Judge [Senior Division] & Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur District Jaipur, whereby he has acquitted the accused/ respondent in Criminal Case No.107/2001 (54/99) registered for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B I.P.C., has approached this Court by way of preferring instant revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. The respondent/accused, namely Chhitarmal, along with his father, Kanaram was sent for the trial. Co-accused, namely Kanaram died during the course of the trial. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the complainant/petitioner, Laxminarayan [PW-6] presented a complaint on 26.06.1993 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur stating therein that he along with his baba, Laduram was staying in Village Kukas. Laduram was not having any child, therefore, he had adopted the petitioner. It is further stated in the complaint that Baba Laduram got married the petitioner and in the old age also, the petitioner had looked after Laduram. Complainant/petitioner claims himself to be only adopted son and legal heir of Laduram. It is also stated in the complaint that Chhitarmal, Kanaram, Prabhat and Dallaram were having grudge against the petitioner and Laduram and for usurping their property, they hatched conspiracy and had prepared a false Will dated 26.08.1986 purported to be of Laduram. 3. The above said complaint was sent to the Police under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and First Information Report bearing No.124/1993 was registered. 4. In pursuance of said F.I.R., investigation was carried and charge-sheet was submitted. Respondent/accused along with Kanaram was charged for various offences. 5. Prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses. Thereafter, the statement of accused/respondent, Chhitarmal was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. No witness was examined in defence. 6. The trial Court has observed that even though Ramnarayan [PW-2] and Gyarsi [PW-4] have stated that the Will presented by the accused/respondent is forged and they have nowhere stated that on Will [Exhibit-P/1] disputed thumb impression was not of Laduram. 7. The trial Court further observed that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the Will [Exhibit-P/1] was not having thumb impression of Laduram. 8. The trial Court has held that even no evidence has been led that somebody else had appended thumb impression of Laduram. 9. 7. The trial Court further observed that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the Will [Exhibit-P/1] was not having thumb impression of Laduram. 8. The trial Court has held that even no evidence has been led that somebody else had appended thumb impression of Laduram. 9. The trial Court further held that since prosecution has failed to prove that the Will was forged and fabricated document, accused/respondent cannot be held to be guilty. 10. The view formulated by the trial Court is one view, which is possible on the facts of the case. The judgment rendered by the trial Court is neither perfunctory nor perverse. Furthermore, it is to be noted here that in the present case, no appeal against acquittal has been preferred by the State. The powers of the revisional Court to disturb the acquittal are very limited. 11. It was held in AIR 1968 Supreme Court 707 Mahendra Partap Singh v. Sarju Singh and another , relying upon D.Stephens v. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 , as under:- "Only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polajlal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 ( AIR 1951 SC 316 ) , this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = ( AIR 1962 SC 1788 ) , it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court, was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 12. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 12. In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 2145 (V 60 C 352) , Hon'ble apex Court observed as under:- "This Court then proceeded to observe that the High Court is certainly entitled in revision to set aside the order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but it was emphasised that this jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases when "there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice." In face of prohibition in Section 439(4), Cr.P.C., for the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court, no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court's power of ordering re-trial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision: (i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused; (ii) Where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been over-looked only (either?) by the trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law. These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 = ( AIR 1968 SC 707 ) (supra) the position was again reviewed and the rule laid down in the three earlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of the judgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This court pointed out that it was not the duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with an acquittal on revision, when the Government had not chosen to file an appeal against it. "In other words" said this Court, "the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them." 13. Similar view was reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in Bansi Lal and others v. Laxman Singh, (1986) 3 SCC 444 . 14. Again, Hon'ble apex Court, in Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others, 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 181, held that it is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it has been invoked by a private complainant. In Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh and another, (1998) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1574 and in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2002 AIR (SC) 2907 , the High Court has been reminded of its very limited jurisdiction in revision against acquittal. 15. It is well settled that unless any legal infirmity in the procedure or in the conduct of trial or patent illegality is pointed out, the revisional Court will not interfere. 16. I find no merit in the instant revision petition to interfere while exercising revisional jurisdiction as learned counsel for petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity. 17. Hence, there is no merit in the present revision petition and same is, hereby, dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******