JUDGMENT : D. DASH, J. The appellant from inside the jail has called in question the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 26.03.2004 passed by the learned Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in S.T. Case No. 185/62 of 2002 convicting the appellant for the offence under Sections 302/376(2)/511/201 IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life; rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year thereunder respectively. 2. When the matter came up for hearing, Mr. Samarendra Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the appellant filed a petition under Section 389 of Cr. P.C. for suspension of execution of sentence and release of the petitioner on bail pending appeal. It is worthwhile to mention here that an earlier petition filed for suspension of execution of sentence and release of the petitioner on bail had been rejected by order dated 01.12.2012. In the subsequent petition, a specific ground was taken that the appellant was juvenile as on the date of commission of alleged offence i.e. on 18.11.2001. So the question of juvenility of the appellant for the first time was raised in the said petition. In support of the claim, learned counsel for the appellant also filed a copy of the school leaving/transfer certificate issued by the Headmaster, Sareshbud Primary School Sadar, Sundargarh. The said petition being numbered as Misc. Case No. 43 of 2013 came up for hearing and this Court on 02.07.2013 disposed of the same by the order which runs as under: "xxxx Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel appearing for the Additional Government Advocate, This Misc. case has been filed by the learned counsel for the appellant in Court today to determine the age of the appellant contending that the appellant, was a juvenile on the date of occurrence. In support of his plea, he has filed a true copy of School Leaving Certificate. Let it be registered as a misc. case. It appears that the appellant has raised the aforesaid question for the first time. He is inside the Sundargarh Jail being convicted by the learned Ad hoc Addl. Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in ST Case No. 185/62 of 2002. Let it be registered as a misc. case. It appears that the appellant has raised the aforesaid question for the first time. He is inside the Sundargarh Jail being convicted by the learned Ad hoc Addl. Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in ST Case No. 185/62 of 2002. Hence, this Court directs the Superintendent, Sundargarh Jail to produce the appellant before the District Juvenile Justice Board to determine his age and the learned C.J.M., who is the Chairman, shall submit a report before this Court by the next date. Misc. Case is disposed of. Put up this matter after four weeks. Free copy of this order be supplied to the learned Addl. Government Advocate for compliance. xxxx" 3. In view of the aforementioned direction, the District Juvenile Board under the Chairmanship of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sundargarh conducting an enquiry as provided under Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rule 2007 and other procedures, concluded that the age of the appellant as on the date of commission of alleged offence, i.e. 15.11.2001, was below 16 years i.e. 15 years 4 months 27 days. A report to that effect has been submitted to this Court vide letter No. 166 dated 15.02.2014. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant Mr. S. Mohanty and learned Additional Standing Counsel, Mr. Zafarulla at length. 5. Before coming to the fact of the present case and the developments, we may note that the issue with regard to the date relevant for determining juvenility for applicability of the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (in short, the Act of 2000) is no longer res integra, so also the issue regarding the date relevant for determining the applicability of the Act of 2000 in so far as the age of the accused is concerned. On account of divergence of views in case of Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1992 AC 1057 and Arnit Das v. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2264 , the matter was referred to Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh v. Jharkhand and another AIR 2005 SC 2731 . On account of divergence of views in case of Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1992 AC 1057 and Arnit Das v. State of Bihar AIR 2000 SC 2264 , the matter was referred to Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh v. Jharkhand and another AIR 2005 SC 2731 . Affirming the view taken by a Bench of three Judges in Umesh Chandra's case (supra), the Constitution Bench held that the relevant date for determining age of the accused who claims to be a juvenile/child would be the date on which the offence has been committed and not the date when he is produced before the authority or the Court. It may not be out place to mention here that in the said decision, the apex Court also dealt the question as to whether the Act of 2000 will be applicable in a case where proceedings were initiated under the 1986 Act and were pending when the Act of 2000 was enacted with effect from 1st April, 2001. Taking into consideration the provisions of Section 3 and 20 along with the definition of "Juvenile-in-Conflict with Law" (in short, JCL) in Section 2 (k) of the Act of 2000, as contrasted with the definition of a male juvenile in Section 2 (h) of the 1986 Act, by majority, it was held that the Act of 2000 would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any Court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the Act of 2000 came into force and the person concerned had not completed 18 years of age as on 1st April, 2001. In other words, it was held that a male offender, against whom proceedings had been initiated under the 1986 Act in any Court/Authority and had not completed the age of 18 years as on 1st April, 2001, would be governed by the provisions of the Act of 2000. The decision in Pratap Singh's case (supra) led to substitution of Section 2(l); the insertion of Section 7A with proviso and Explanation of Section 20 of the Act of 2000 by Act No. 33 of 2006, as also introduction of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 containing Rule 12 with effect from 22nd August, 2006 which lays down the procedure to be followed for determination of age of a child or a juvenile. 6. 6. Adverting to the case in hand, here there remains no dispute with regard to the juvenility of the appellant in view of the report of the competent authority being the outcome of an enquiry duly conducted under the rule and it is not challenged by the State. The position of law has been well settled in case of Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, Criminal Appeal No. 1193/2006 decided on 10th October, and batch cases by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on a reference to Larger Bench in view of substantial discordance in the approach of the matter on the question of juvenility in Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B.; 1984 (Supp.) SCC 228 on the one hand and the two decisions in Akbar Seikh and others v. State of W.B.; (2009) 7 SCC 415 and Hariram v. State of Rajasthan and another; (2009) 13 SCC 211 . It has been held that: "A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even after final disposal of the case. It may be raised for the first time before this Court and as well after final disposal of the case. The delay in raising the claim of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. The claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal even if not pressed before the trial Court and can be raised for the first time before this Court though not pressed before the trial Court and in appeal Court." In summarizing the position, it has been also said that the Court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time should always be guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and be alive to the position that the beneficent and salutary provisions contained in 2000 Act are not defeated by hyper-technical approach and the persons who are entitled to get benefits of 2000 Act get such benefits. In view of aforesaid, we find no hesitation to accept the report as regards the juvenility and we thus hold that the appellant was a juvenile as on the date of commission of alleged offence and, therefore, he is required to be dealt with under the provisions of 2000 Act. In view of aforesaid, we find no hesitation to accept the report as regards the juvenility and we thus hold that the appellant was a juvenile as on the date of commission of alleged offence and, therefore, he is required to be dealt with under the provisions of 2000 Act. Thus now it is clear that this question of juvenility if would have been raised before the Committing Court, the appellant then would have faced an enquiry under the provision of the Act of 2000 culminating with the consequential result and of late even had it been raised at any time during trial, the appellant would have been dealt accordingly. Now here before this Court for the time claim of juvenility was made in an application filed on behalf of the appellant for suspension of execution of the sentence and his release on bail. The trial stood concluded way back on 26.03.2004 and the appeal having been presented on 14.07.2004 and admitted on 28.09.2004 is pending as on date. We have already accepted the claim of juvenility and accordingly he is to be dealt within the four corners of 2000 Act and for the purposes of hearing of this appeal, the appellant has to be said to be continuing as JCL. 7. In such a situation, the question that vexes us is as to what course should we charter in this appeal. It is no doubt the settled law as is provided in Section 17 of the Act that no proceeding can be instituted and no order shall be passed under Chapter-VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 18 of the Act forbids a joint trial of a juvenile who has committed an offence with a person who is not a juvenile. Next Section 19 makes it clear that a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provision of the Act shall not suffer disqualification if any, attached to a conviction of offence. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 is a step ahead which states that in case of conviction, the Board shall make an order directing that the records of such conviction shall be removed after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 is a step ahead which states that in case of conviction, the Board shall make an order directing that the records of such conviction shall be removed after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may be. Next Section 20 is another important provision in the Act which states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any Court in any area on the date on which the Act comes into force in that area shall be continued in that Court as if the Act had not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile had committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of juvenile forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass order in respect of the juvenile in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Act, as if it had passed an order upon enquiry under the Act that the juvenile has committed the offence. The explanation to Section 20 makes it further clear that in all pending cases which would include not only trial but even subsequent proceedings by way of revision or appeal, the determination of juvenility would be in terms to Clause (1) to Section 2, even if the juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on or before 01.04.2001, when the Act came into force, the provision of Act would apply as if the said provision had been in force for all purposes and for all material times when the alleged offence was committed. As regards explanation to Section 20 of the Act, it would be appropriate to straightway quote the observations of the Apex Court in case of Hariram v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2009) 13 SCC 211 . 39. As regards explanation to Section 20 of the Act, it would be appropriate to straightway quote the observations of the Apex Court in case of Hariram v. State of Rajasthan and another, (2009) 13 SCC 211 . 39. The Explanation which was added in 2006, makes it clear that in all pending cases, which would include not only trials but even subsequent proceedings by way of revision or appeal, the determination of the juvenility of a juvenile would be in terms of Clause (I) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceased to be juvenile on or before 1.4.2001, when the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 came into force and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and for all material times when the alleged offence was committed. In fact Section 20 of the Act enables the Court to consider and determine the juvenility of a person even after conviction by the regular Court and also empowers the Court, while maintaining the conviction, to set aside the sentence imposed and forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing sentence in accordance with the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000." 8. It may be kept in mind that the Act is extended to protect the juvenile from the rigours of a trial by a Criminal Court. It prohibits sentencing of a juvenile and committing him to prison. As its preamble suggests, it seeks to adopt a child friendly approach in the adjudication and disposition of matters in the best interest of children and for their ultimately rehabilitation to bring them to mainstream as a responsible future citizen of the nation. 9. The instant case has the flavour of its own peculiarity. The case has been initiated for the commission of alleged offence after the Act of 2000 came into force. So when the juvenility is established certainly the final outcome cannot sustain in eye of law even if we find that the trial Court has rightly arrived at the conclusion favouring the accusations levelled against JCL upon proper appreciation and analysis of evidence in the touchstone of settled provision of law. So when the juvenility is established certainly the final outcome cannot sustain in eye of law even if we find that the trial Court has rightly arrived at the conclusion favouring the accusations levelled against JCL upon proper appreciation and analysis of evidence in the touchstone of settled provision of law. So it stares for next the answer as to whether the matter would be remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board to deal with the juvenile in connection with the commission of alleged offence under the provisions of the Act and the Rules, when present age of the juvenile is more than 28 years from the very inception or not. 10. At this juncture, we feel it the need to place few cases decided by the apex Court: (a) Babban Rai and another v. State of Bihar; (2007) 13 SCC 88 - In this case, two of the appellants later on during pendency of Criminal Appeal before the Apex Court were found to be JCLs on the date of alleged occurrence. They had been convicted by trial Court under Section 302 and 302/149 IPC besides being convicted under Section 147 IPC and one also under Section 341 IPC followed by order of sentence of imprisonment for life and other sentences. An appeal being preferred, the High Court had confirmed the conviction and sentences. The Apex Court found the High Court to have rightly upheld the convictions. Next in view of finding of juvenility the Apex Court, felt it just and expedient to set aside the sentence and as they had by then attained majority ordered for their release as they could not be sent to the remand home. (b) Satish alias Dhanna v. State of M.P. and others; (2009) 14 SCC 187 – The JCL had faced a joint trial with other accused persons. The Apex Court following the course adopted in cases of "Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar", (1997) 8 SCC 720 , "Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B."; (1984) Supp SCC and "Bhoop Ram v. State of UP"; (1989) 3 SCC 1 , at the distinct point of time sustained the conviction rendered by trial Court as confirmed by High Court and while restricting the sentence to the period undergone ordered for release of JCLs. (c) Raju and another v. State of Haryana; (2010) 3 SCC 235 – The JCL faced trial jointly with other accused persons and was convicted for offence under Sec. 302/34 IPC and was sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. The apex Court, on re-appreciation, convicted the JCL and another for offence under Sec. 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC. In respect of JCL, the case was referred to the Board in terms of Section 20 of the Act directing the JCL to be dealt under the provisions of the Act in keeping with the provisions of Section 15 thereof and having particular regard to the period of detention already undergone during the investigation and trial. (d) Dharam Bir v. State (NCT Delhi); AIR 2010 SC 1801 – The appellant for the first time before the apex Court raised the claim of juvenility as on the date of alleged occurrence which upon enquiry was found in his favour. The appellant had been convicted for offence under Sec. 302/307/34 IPC after trial. Appeal being preferred, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for a term of seven years and fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation. The apex Court then straightway went to analyse the provisions of Section 15 and 16 of the Act and then taking into account the actual period of sentence of 2 years 4 months and 4 days as well as the then age of JCL being 35 years felt that it may not be conducive to the environment in special home and to the interest of other juveniles housed in the special home, to refer the JCL to the Board for passing orders for sending the appellant to special home or for keeping him at some other place of safety for the remaining period of eight months, too maximum period for which he could have been then kept in either of two places. So while quashing the sentence awarded to him, direction was given for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. (e) Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar; (2011) 2 SCC 251 – The appellants were convicted for offence under Sec. 302/34 IPC when they were not juvenile under 1986 Act and accordingly they were sentenced to imprisonment for life. (e) Lakhan Lal v. State of Bihar; (2011) 2 SCC 251 – The appellants were convicted for offence under Sec. 302/34 IPC when they were not juvenile under 1986 Act and accordingly they were sentenced to imprisonment for life. The High Court on appeal confirmed the conviction and sentence. The apex Court holding that the appellants would be entitled to the benefit of the Act of 2000 since they were under the age of 18 as on the date of commission of offence, gave their anxious thought as to what order of sentence would be passed. The appellants by then had crossed the age of 40 years. Having taken the view that it would not be conducive to the environment in special home when they had undergone actual sentence of more than three years by then and as the maximum period provided under Section 15 of the 2000 Act is three years, while sustaining the conviction they were directed to be released. (f) Kalu @ Amit v. State of Haryana; (2012) 53 OCR (SC) 448 – In respect of one of the appellants, first time issue of juvenility was raised and decided in favour. The apex Court, held in that connection that had the defence of juvenility been raised before the High Court, it would have had to record its finding that accused was guilty, confirm the conviction, sets aside the sentence and forwarded the case to the Board and the Board would have passed any appropriate order permissible under Section 15 of the Act. It has been further held that as the appellant had undergone more than nine years of imprisonment and as the appellant could have been kept in protective custody for 3 years under provision of Section 16 as the offence is serious and he was above 16 years of age when the offence was committed and as he could not have been sent to jail, the sentence deserves quashment. Finally, the appellant was directed to be released. Finally, the appellant was directed to be released. (g) Bharat Bhusan v. State of H.P.; AIR 2013 SC 2018 – In the said case, conviction was upheld and taking a view that when the appellant was 36 years of age and had already undergone nearly three years imprisonment, no reference to the Board was made as it would serve no purpose and direction for his release was passed as at that stage of life, it was felt that it would serve no purpose. 11. In all the aforestated cases, the trial Court's conviction and sentence had been confirmed by High Court and before the Apex Court, the issue of juvenility having been raised for the first time, had found favour with. When we turn again to give a plain reading to the provisions of Section 20 with explanation of the Act in the backdrop of the aim and objective of the enactment, legislative intent is clearly culled out that the said section has been engrafted in the statute also to meet these eventualities and situations which had been well realized having insight into the realities of life in the country i.e. illiteracy and its cause that is poverty; the poor economic condition, poor educational attainment due to lack of opportunity. The explanation makes it abundantly clear when the speaks of trial, revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of JCL in any Court. So on a conjoint and harmonious reading of the said section with explanation, this Court in seisin of the appeal in view of the finding of juvenility as on the date of commission of offence, is called upon to find out as to if JCL has committed the offence. In view of the above discussion therefore and in the best interest of juvenile instead of remitting the mater to the Board for conducting any enquiry afresh, we feel it proper as also in accordance with law to proceed to examine the evidence as to if a finding can be rendered that the JCL has committed the offences or not. 12. The factual matrix of the case is the following: On 16.11.2001, Laxman first reported about the missing of his daughter since previous evening at Bhasma Police station. On 17.11.2001 it came to be known about some foul smell emanating near a straw heap of one Gulbadan Kisan, Who is a neighbour of JCL. 12. The factual matrix of the case is the following: On 16.11.2001, Laxman first reported about the missing of his daughter since previous evening at Bhasma Police station. On 17.11.2001 it came to be known about some foul smell emanating near a straw heap of one Gulbadan Kisan, Who is a neighbour of JCL. So Laxman with others went there and initially detected one hand and the frock, extending out which were identified to be that of the deceased. The dead body of Laxman's daughter was then recovered from there in a putrefied condition. So, on 18.11.2001 evening these facts were again reported at the police station. At that time Laxman went on narrating that on 15.11.2001 evening his daughter was playing with her friends when JCL came, joined them and had taken his daughter. It was also stated that hearing about the same, when JCL was asked about it, he confessed to have committed the crime of rape and murder. The matter was then investigated and finally charge sheet was submitted. 13. The prosecution has examined 15 witnesses in order to establish the accusation. P.W.1 is the father of the deceased and informant. P.Ws. 2, 3, 11, 13 and 14 are co-villagers. P.Ws. 4 to 7 are the friends of the deceased. The doctors conducting post-mortem examination have been examined as P.Ws. 8 and 9. JCL being examined during investigation, the doctor who had examined him has been cited as P.W.10. P.W.12 is the police constable and witness to the seizure of the wearing apparels and other samples like pubic hair, etc. of the accused. The Investigating Officer at the end has been examined as P.W. 15. Besides the above, the FIR has been admitted in evidence and marked as Ext. 1. The post-mortem examination report is Ext. 3 and the corresponding opinion later on sought for is Ext. 4, Exts. 5 and 6 are the seizure lists. Ext. 11 is the statement of P.W. 13 recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C. 14. On carefully going through the records, it appears that the case is based on extra judicial confession of the JCL coupled with some other circumstances. As culled out, the circumstances are the followings: 1. 4, Exts. 5 and 6 are the seizure lists. Ext. 11 is the statement of P.W. 13 recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C. 14. On carefully going through the records, it appears that the case is based on extra judicial confession of the JCL coupled with some other circumstances. As culled out, the circumstances are the followings: 1. On 15.11.2001, the deceased was playing with her friends when JCL came, played for some time with them and took the deceased with him and since then, the deceased was no more seen alive; 2. The dead body of the deceased was recovered in a putrefied condition beyond the straw heap on 17.11.2001; 3. The death of the deceased is due to asphyxia resulting from suffocation and strangulation. 4. The doctor had found vaginal injury and also injuries on other parts of the body of the deceased. 15. It is settled position of law that extra judicial confession is ordinarily a weak piece of evidence, but if the same has been made freely and voluntarily before the persons/person on whom there remains good reasons for the person so confessing to repose confidence and in absence of any such suspicious feature so as to entertain doubt in it, there is no bar to even to base a conviction upon its acceptance. 16. To examine the evidence on that score, it is to find out whether the same passes through the acid test and if as such is acceptable. It has been deposed by P.W.4 that after recovery of the dead body, he and others asked JCL and his cousin brother Udit whose house is close to the place where the straws were heaped from where the dead body was recovered as to how the dead body could come there and kept concealed. The question was asked by Aswini, P.W.14. It has been deposed by P.W.3 that JCL confessed before them that the deceased and her friends while were playing, he went there, played with the deceased and allowed her to climb over his body and then took her away placing her on his shoulders. The question was asked by Aswini, P.W.14. It has been deposed by P.W.3 that JCL confessed before them that the deceased and her friends while were playing, he went there, played with the deceased and allowed her to climb over his body and then took her away placing her on his shoulders. It is stated that JCL further confessed before them that he carried the deceased to the straw heap of Gulbadan, raped her there and when the deceased tried to raise alarm, he had no other alternative, but to close her mouth and nose, which ultimately resulted her death on account of suffocation, when the only option remained with him to conceal the dead body underneath the straw heap and leave the place. P.W.11 even during his cross examination has stated that JCL had so confessed on being asked by Aswini. It is also the evidence of P.W.14. There surfaces no such material to entertain any doubt in respect of the testimonies of all these witnesses, who had absolutely no animosity with JCL nor his family members when there remains very good justification for the JCL at that point of time to repose confidence upon those persons at that stage. Furthermore, in view of the age of JCL as determined, it is but very natural to accept such type of confession. It is common experience that a child when tells something as regards his own activity, either he tells total falsehood and blatant lies or nothing but the absolute truth and never chooses any middle path like elders. So we find that the prosecution has been able to establish the fact that it is the JCL who had confessed to have committed rape and murder of the deceased. Moreover this receives corroboration from the medical evidence. When confession is on the score of rape, it has been deposed by the doctor P.W.10 that JCL then was capable of going for sexual intercourse and the doctor who had conducted post mortem examination has also stated to have found vaginal injuries with blood clots. It has also been proved from the side of the prosecution that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of suffocation along with strangulation, i.e. homicidal, which fully coincide with the version of JCL as stated to have been made before the co-villagers. It has also been proved from the side of the prosecution that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of suffocation along with strangulation, i.e. homicidal, which fully coincide with the version of JCL as stated to have been made before the co-villagers. The evidence of P.W.8 with regard to the lapse of time since death till the post mortem examination, more or less coincide with the version of the JCL. Further corroboration also comes from the evidence of P.Ws. 4 to 7, the friends of the deceased. All those children have stated that when in the evening they were playing with the deceased, JCL arrived there, joined with them for some time and then took with him the deceased where after they stated to have not seen the deceased any more. The conduct of the children in not informing anybody about the same cannot also be viewed adversely when they had nothing to doubt with regard to the said conduct of the JCL, who is neighbour and almost like an elder brother to them. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion of evidence and conclusion arrived therefrom, we hold that JCL has committed the offence under Sections 302/376(2)(f)/511/201 IPC. With the finding as stated above, we hereby set aside the sentence imposed and in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of Act, 2000 the case is forwarded to District Juvenile Justice Board, Sundargarh for passing orders in accordance with the provision of Act of 2000 as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under the Act that the JCL has committed the offence. It is, however, observed that the Board in the said exercise shall take into consideration the present age of the JCL and the factum of his period of actual custodial detention and bear in mind all the relevant factors. 18. Before parting, as we experience in many a matters the deficiencies of the Boards in passing appropriate order after holding JCL to have committed offence in an inquiry held under the provisions of the Act, we feel to place the followings which appeal to our judicial mind for providing guidance to the Boards. 18.1. The provision of Section 15 of the Act provides as to what orders that may be passed regarding juvenile who on enquiry has been found to have committed an offence. 18.1. The provision of Section 15 of the Act provides as to what orders that may be passed regarding juvenile who on enquiry has been found to have committed an offence. In these cases Social Investigation reports of the juveniles are to be called for as per the requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. It is provided therein that said findings of the report shall be taken into consideration. 18.2 The law mandates that the social investigation report must indicate the relationship of JCL with the parents, other members of the neighbourhood and the effect if so citing the instances as regards to the bad company and also the reasons thereof. Therefore, it may be kept in mind that in order to repel the recommendation made in the said report if based on due findings, the Board is under legal obligation to assign good and satisfactory reason bearing in mind that provisions of Section 15 of the Act no where refers to the nature and gravity of the offence nor the facts and circumstances concerning the accusation established upon enquiry. 18.3. However, mostly it is seen that the Board is first taking into consideration the nature and gravity of the offences and then accordingly considering not to extend the benefits as provided in the said section without passing other appropriate orders if any permissible in law. 18.4 Under the scheme of the Act, there is an enquiry followed by a finding on commission of offence and next comes the consequential order in respect of the said juvenile which are two distinct aspects. Once the juvenile is found to have committed the offence on an enquiry, then the paramount consideration arises as to what order that would be passed in the matter so as to sub-serve the objective set-forth in the Act and then the prime consideration only remains, the welfare, well-being, developmental needs and restoring the path of life of the juvenile so as to see that he ultimately stands as a responsible citizen of the country considering for a moment that he had been detracted from that path by an accidental situation or under compelling circumstances in an environment not conducive for him. The purpose is to bring the juvenile to mainstream and his rehabilitation by way of correction of his conduct, behaviour, attitude, etc. by exploring all the possibilities as prescribed under the law. The purpose is to bring the juvenile to mainstream and his rehabilitation by way of correction of his conduct, behaviour, attitude, etc. by exploring all the possibilities as prescribed under the law. That is the reason the Legislature has provided in Section 15, a number of measures that the Board may resort to for the purpose as it think fit and proper. Keeping this in mind even the Legislature has taken every care with regard to the constitution of the Juvenile Justice Board. Thus, while providing in Section 4(2) of the Act that the Board shall consist of the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of First Class, besides other two social workers out of whom at least one shall be woman, in Sub-section (3) a rider has been put that such Magistrate who has special knowledge or training in child psychology or child welfare can be appointed as the Magistrate of the Board. So, here the role of the Board is twofold and its function is dual. The first for conducting an enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Act in arriving whether the juvenile has committed the offence or not and thereafter the role as a person having special knowledge or a trained one in respect of child psychology and welfare. This has been purposely made so as to see that even if the juvenile is found to have committed the offence, all possible attempts have to be taken to bring him to the mainstream in seeing that he stands in the society as a good and responsible citizen, considering for a moment that such commission of offence was a normal aberration. In fact finding of commission of the offences by a juvenile has not much to do or weigh in the mind of the Board while passing the order thereafter which is to be only governed by provision of Section 15 of the Act. Section 16 provides the orders which may not be passed against juvenile. If we go further deep into the matter, it has to be presumed that such orders stated in Section 16 of the Act have not been permitted as those have the effect of completely shattering the idea or hope behind the enactment for achievement of its objectives as stated above. That is the reason Section 15 of the Act contains the non-obstinate clause. That is the reason Section 15 of the Act contains the non-obstinate clause. The general sentencing principles and as settled in law that the sentence must commensurate with the offence is not given that much of adherence to under the scheme of this Act Here, the orders as enumerated in Section 15 of the Act basically aim at disposition of matters in the best interest of juveniles aiming at their ultimate rehabilitation exploring all such possibilities and by tracking it from time to time till that point as it can be and till that time as possible. Therefore, if the general principle of sentencing that it is the nature and gravity Of the crime but not the criminal which are germane for consideration of appropriate sentence in a criminal trial is adhered to with rigidity here then in that event it may tend to frustrate the avowed objects sought to be achieved by the enactment Rather under the Act, and adherence to the reverse appears to have been intended. This in view of ours derives further support when we see that in Section 15 of the Act only in the proviso to clause (g) of Sub-section (1), the power is given to take into consideration the nature of the offence and circumstances of the case so as arrive at a satisfaction that period of detention of the juvenile in the special home as prescribed in clause (g) as three years if needs reduction being expedient to do so. So only for reduction in that order of detention the nature of crime and circumstances of the case are permissible to be looked into. But nowhere the severity of the crime alone is permissible to be considered for passing any order under Section 15 of the Act We find that the section opens with 'Board may if it so thinks fit.....'; it certainly means that thinking must be confined in the light and direction of sub-serving the aims and objectives of the enactment and not otherwise. Children are the future assets of Nation. Children are the future assets of Nation. When an asset for some silly reason or other such as poverty, illiteracy, ill advice, lack of proper understanding; etc., which at that age is not an unnatural phenomenon and for that the society and state have not been able to take due care, has started diminishing in its value, till it is reduced to zero, there remains all the possibility for its restoration so far as its value is concerned and that is the reason the State under the enactment has taken all the burden in that light of attempts for avoidance of the blame or washing away the sins whatever we may say, in discharge of its duty to prevent the wastage and further damage of assets in taking proper care and protection and to see that ultimately they do not stand as liability but as real assets. 19. In the light of aforesaid, thus there must exist sufficient justification in respect of the ultimate order which the Board is called upon to pass in respect of the JCL after finding him to have committed offence by properly appreciating and applying the provisions of law in the backdrops of the aims and objectives of the enactment 20. Although we have made the attempt in providing above for the guidance of Board in passing the order at the end of the proceedings in respect of the JCL, still we feel that these are hot exhaustive. 21. We place on record our appreciation for the invaluable and dispassionate assistance rendered by Mr. Zafarulla, learned Additional Standing Counsel and we hope that in future he would be continuing with such sincere endeavour in the aid of and in furtherance of the cause of justice. 22. JCRLA stands accordingly disposed of. The LCR with our judgment be immediately dispatched to the Juvenile Justice Board, Sundargarh under intimation to the Sessions Judge, Sundargarh, for completion of the exercise at the earliest from the receipt of the record. 23. The case in hand in our view is an exposition of a sad scenario, because of the manner, the JCL has been dealt with for all these years since the time of his arrest and forwarding to the Court and thereafter. 23. The case in hand in our view is an exposition of a sad scenario, because of the manner, the JCL has been dealt with for all these years since the time of his arrest and forwarding to the Court and thereafter. Its more so when we view as to how the State with its statutory functionaries have allowed such carelessness and insensitivity throwing the statutory duty cast upon them to the winds possibly harbouring the attitude of utter indifference and adopting cavalier fashion. It is also shocking to note that when 2000 Act has been enacted by replacing the 1986 Act to carry forward the constitutional philosophy engrafted in Article 15(3), 39(e) and (f), 45 and 47 of the Constitution and also incorporates the standards prescribed in the Convention of the Rights of the Child, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 1985, the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990) and all other relevant international instruments, the authorities here have all acted being total oblivious of the same. Their wooden approach has led to the piquant situation where advantage of the beneficial legislation provided with emphatic terms seems to have been denied to the unfortunate JCL at the earliest. With this expression of ours, we however refrain from further elaboration of the flawed action of all concerned and stop here with a hope that no such instance would per-haps occur in future with due and sincere efforts of all concerned in discharging their statutory duty bestowing proper and appropriate approach in consonance with the aims and objectives of the enactment and as suggested in the preamble. This judgment in our considered view is required to be circulated to all those functionaries for chalking out action plan accordingly enriched with further enlightened views and ideas in preventing recurrence of such instance and also having a thorough survey if any such matter still remains for being remedied/dealt at the earliest in accordance with law. The Registry is directed to send copies of the judgment to – (i) Chief Secretary, Odisha; (ii) Principal Secretary, Home, Govt. of Odisha; (iii) Principal Secretary, Woman & Child Welfare Govt. The Registry is directed to send copies of the judgment to – (i) Chief Secretary, Odisha; (ii) Principal Secretary, Home, Govt. of Odisha; (iii) Principal Secretary, Woman & Child Welfare Govt. of Odisha; (iv) Chairperson, Odisha State Commission for Protection of Child Rights; (v) Secretary, Odisha State Legal Services Authority; (vi) Chairman of District Legal Services Authorities of the State; (vii) Principal Magistrate of District Juvenile Justice Boards of the State of Odisha for necessary action. Secretary, Odisha State Legal Services Authority is hereby directed to monitor and have periodical review through Chairpersons of D.L.S.A. and other functionaries. PRADIP MOHANTY, J. I agree. JCRLA disposed of.