Judgment (per the Honble the Chief Justice Sri Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta) This appeal is preferred against the judgment and order of the Honble Single Judge dated 19.12.2014, by which, His Lordship has been pleased to allow the writ petition. Before we go into the merits of the matter, we find the writ petition has been filed amongst others, against the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the order has been passed thereon. Without entering into the merits of the matter, we think that the impugned judgment and order has been passed on a proceeding which has not been legally instituted at all. According to us, the Government of Andhra Pradesh is not a sui juris. If any action has to be brought against either the Central Government or the State Government, it has to be brought against the Union of India and the State not in the names of respective Government and in this case, the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Telangana, would have been necessary parties. The provision of Article 300 of the Constitution of India clearly mandates as follows: 300. Suits and proceedings.-- (1) The Government of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union of India and the Government of a State may sue or be sued by the name of the State and may, subject to any provisions which may be made by an Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of such State enacted by virtue of powers conferred by this Constitution, sue or be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Dominion of India and the corresponding Provinces or the corresponding Indian States might have sued or been sued if this Constitution had not been enacted. (2) If at the commencement of this Constitution-- (a) any legal proceedings are pending to which the Dominion of India is a party, the Union of India shall be deemed to be substituted for the Dominion in those proceedings; and (b) any legal proceedings are pending to which a Province or an Indian State is a party, the corresponding State shall be deemed to be substituted for the Province or the Indian State in those proceedings." Moreover, by virtue of Rule 24 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 framed by this Court for institution of the writ proceedings, the provision of Section 79 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short the C.P.C.) is followed notwithstanding the provision of explanation under Section 141 of the C.P.C. Section 79 of the C.P.C., provides as follows: "79. Suits by or against Government.-- In a suit by or against the Government, the authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall be- (a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, the Union of India; and (b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government, the State." However, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-writ petitioner submits that this defect is not an incurable one, it is merely a technical one and in support of this contention, he has relied on a judgment of the learned single judge of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Pusha Ram vs. Modern Construction Company. In paragraph-13 of the said judgment, His Lordship has ruled as follows: Moreover, the alleged defect is one with regard to mis- description of the parties, and is not fatal. The mere description of the parties can be corrected by the Court at any time. We are not in full agreement with His Lordship as we think when the provision of Constitution mandates in a particular way a proceedings is to be instituted, no one can change it and it has to be done in that manner alone. If it is allowed to be done in a different manner, that would amount to re-writing the Constitution. If it is allowed to be done in a different manner, that would amount to re-writing the Constitution. No Court of law can afford to change the constitutional provision by judicial prescription, particularly, Article 300 of the Constitution of India is an original provision of Constitution and it cannot be struck down nor be read down by any Court, for, there is no ground of such challenge. It is for the Parliament to amend with amending power and the language of Article 300 is a mandatory one and the Court cannot overlook it. The Court is bound to follow the same. According to us, the aforesaid finding of the Honble trial Judge without reading the provision of Article 300 and without any discussion whatsoever is per incuriam to the highest degree and we are therefore of the view that this judgment is not a good law as it is contrary to the Constitution. Moreover, Section 79 of the C.P.C., also mandated before the Constitution came into force, the same way. The Court cannot change it. But, we are in agreement with His Lordship that it is a curable defect. But the stage of curing in our view is time bound viz., before final disposal. Had this matter been pending before His Lordship, then we would have permitted the writ petitioner to apply for amendment. After the matter is disposed of finally with defect, it cannot be cured at all. Here, final order has been passed. This order, in our view, has been passed on an incompetent proceeding. Therefore, the order is a nullity because the same has been passed as against a non-existent party. Hence, we set aside this judgment and on that ground alone, we restore the writ petition for fresh hearing enabling to remove the defect. In the event, the 1strespondent-writ petitioner takes suitable steps for amendment of the cause title in accordance with the provision of Article 300 of the Constitution read with Section 79 of the C.P.C., and the Writ Rules of this Court within seven days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, the Honble trial Judge shall decide the matter afresh in accordance with law, uninfluenced and without being swayed by earlier decision and observations. The Honble trial Judge shall decide the matter in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of production of this order. The writ appeal is accordingly allowed. Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand closed. No costs.