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2014 DIGILAW 1576 (RAJ)

Bhagwan Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2014-09-23

P.K.LOHRA

body2014
Hon'ble LOHRA, J.—Petitioner, Bhagwan Lal, by the instant writ petition has impugned the order dated 24th of December 1996 passed by the District Collector, Rajsamand, whereby sale of a piece of land measuring 100 x 80 at village Tikkad by Gram Panchayat Khakharmala to him on 30.01.1990 was annulled. The learned District Collector passed the said order on a revision petition of the fourth respondent under Section 27A of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act 1953 read with Section 124(1) of the Panchayati Raj Act 1994 (for short, ‘Act of 1994’) taking note of violation of the mandatory provisions of Rule 262 to 265 contained under the Rajasthan Panchayat (General) Rules 1961 (for short, ‘Rules of 1961’). 2. The bare necessary facts, for the purpose of this writ petition are that Gram Panchayat, Khakharmala auctioned/allotted certain residential plots pursuant to its resolution dated 23rd of December 1989 and a plot measuring 100 x 80 was purchased by the petitioner at the cost of Rs.500. In the auction proceedings undertaken by the Gram Panchayat, in all 15 persons were sold plots of different denominations. Being aggrieved from the auction of plots, more precisely auction of plot in favour of petitioner, the fourth respondent preferred a revision petition under Section 27A of the Act of 1953 read with Rule 272 of the Rules of 1961 before the District Collector, Rajsamand. In the revision petition, it was inter-alia averred by the fourth respondent that the entire auction proceedings were undertaken by the Gram Panchayat in utter disregard of Rule 262 to 265 of the Rules of 1961 and no prior 30 days auction notification was issued for the same. It is also alleged in the revision petition that the sale pursuant to auction was not approved by the competent officer. With all these averments, the fourth respondent craved for cancellation of the auction of plot in favour of petitioner. 3. The revision petition was contested by the petitioner. While referring to the other incumbents, to whom plots were sold in auction, the petitioner has averred that those plots were allotted to some of the individuals belonging to the privileged class of the society free of cost and the plot was sold to the petitioner after undertaking all requisite formalities envisaged under the Rules of 1961. While referring to the other incumbents, to whom plots were sold in auction, the petitioner has averred that those plots were allotted to some of the individuals belonging to the privileged class of the society free of cost and the plot was sold to the petitioner after undertaking all requisite formalities envisaged under the Rules of 1961. As regards the inadequate consideration of the land, petitioner has submitted in reply that land was situated at a far off distance from Abadi area and therefore at the relevant point of time its value was worth Rs.500 only. Questioning the locus of the fourth respondent, petitioner has also averred that the revision petition is outcome of political vengeance and therefore it is liable to be rejected. 4. The learned District Collector, after hearing the rival parties and scanning relevant file of Gram Panchayat, found that although there is an order for issuance of auction notification but date of notification is not traceable from the record. The District Collector has recorded a categorical finding that there is no date of the auction notification and requisite compliance of Rule 133(2) and Rule 262 of the Rules of 1961 is also not discernible from the perusal of the record. It is also noticed by the learned District Collector that requisite proof/ material is not available on the file to show that proceedings of the auction was sent for approval to the competent authority. Non-availability of resolution of Gram Panchayat for auction with requisite Coram was also considered by it as a serious flaw. In that background, the learned District Collector found that the entire auction proceedings is farce and contrary to rules. Taking note of the fact that auction was not approved by the competent authority under Rule 255 of the Rules of 1961, within the prescribed period, it eventually concluded that auction proceedings were dehors the law. With all these findings the learned District Collector allowed the revision petition and set aside the auction made in favour of petitioner for the plot in question. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. With all these findings the learned District Collector allowed the revision petition and set aside the auction made in favour of petitioner for the plot in question. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. D.R. Bhandari, has argued that after repealing of the Act of 1953 as well as Rules of 1961, the learned District Collector was not competent to adjudicate upon the revision petition of the fourth respondent under the provisions of the old Act and the Rules, therefore, on this anvil, learned counsel has submitted that order impugned is without jurisdiction. Mr. Bhandari has submitted that fourth respondent was a busy body and had no locus to challenge the auction proceedings and this vital aspect was not examined by the learned District Collector, therefore, on this count alone the impugned order cannot be sustained. For this proposition, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ram Janam Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. ( AIR 1994 SC 1722 ). 6. Learned counsel Mr. Bhandari has also submitted that revision was filed after an inordinate delay of more than five years, and this vital issue was not examined by the learned District Collector which is a serious jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. Mr. Bhandari has submitted that when no period of limitation is prescribed, ordinarily period of three years is to be treated as the period of limitation and not beyond period of three years. In support of this contention, Mr. Bhandari has placed reliance on a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors. vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale & Ors. (AIR 2009 SCW 6305). Lastly, Mr. Bhandari has submitted that a registered instrument cannot be annulled by an executive fiat and the remedy for the same is a regular civil suit for cancellation of auction sale. 7. Per contra, Mr. Manish Patel, learned Government Counsel, has submitted that in view of categorical finding of the learned District Collector that in the auction proceeding the relevant mandatory rules were thrown to winds, no interference with the impugned order in exercise of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction is called for. In support of his contention, Mr. 7. Per contra, Mr. Manish Patel, learned Government Counsel, has submitted that in view of categorical finding of the learned District Collector that in the auction proceeding the relevant mandatory rules were thrown to winds, no interference with the impugned order in exercise of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction is called for. In support of his contention, Mr. Patel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in case of LRs of Dalchand vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., reported in 1996 DNJ (Raj.) 144. Mr. Patel has submitted that the learned District Collector has taken cognizance of the violation of the mandatory rules for annulment of auction proceedings and therefore the revisional authority has done substantial justice in the matter which cannot be subject matter of judicial review for exercise of writ jurisdiction as setting aside of the same would result in perpetuation of illegality. For substantiating his arguments, Mr. Patel has relied on a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Roshan Deen vs. Preeti Lal ( (2002) 1 SCC 100 ), and Ashok Kumar & Ors. vs. Sita Ram ( (2001) 4 SCC 478 ). 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and scanned the materials available on record. 9. For adjudicating legality and propriety of the order impugned in this petition, some important questions have cropped up which require judicial scrutiny. The question touching the revisional jurisdiction of the District Collector, Rajsamand, which is very vociferously canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, deserve examination in the light of promulgation of Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act 1994, and repeal of Rajasthan Panchayat Act 1953 and rules made thereunder. In the light of fact relevant and germane to the matter, more particularly, the date of institution of the revision petition, which is admittedly after repealing of the Act of 1953, the question has acquired significance. There remains no quarrel that transfer of the land in question allegedly through auction to the petitioner was made in the year 1990 purportedly pursuant to resolution of Gram Panchayat dated 23rd of December 1989. As such, the entire proceedings were undertaken by the Gram Panchayat under the Act of 1953 and the Rules made thereunder. There remains no quarrel that transfer of the land in question allegedly through auction to the petitioner was made in the year 1990 purportedly pursuant to resolution of Gram Panchayat dated 23rd of December 1989. As such, the entire proceedings were undertaken by the Gram Panchayat under the Act of 1953 and the Rules made thereunder. The crucial date on which the revision petition was laid is 7th September 1995 when Act of 1994 was in vogue as the same came into effect from 23rd of April 1994 and by virtue of Section 124 of the Act of 1994 the Act of 1953 was repealed. If the provisions contained under Section 124 of the Act of 1994 under the caption “Repeal and Savings” are properly construed then it will ipso facto reveal that by virtue of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 124 of the Act of 1994 rights or interest of any person in respect of any movable or immovable property and all interests of whatever kind therein have been saved. Section 124 is reproduced as under: 124. Repeal and savings.-(1) On the date of commencement of this Act, hereinafter in this section referred to as "the date of commencement", the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act 21 or 1953) and the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 37 of 1959) shall stand repealed and the following consequences shall ensue, that is to say- (a) all property, movable and immovable, and all interests of whatsoever kind therein, which vested in an existing Panchayati Raj Institution, immediately before the date of commencement, shall be deemed to be transferred to and shall vest in the successor Panchayati Raj Institution, subject to all limitations, conditions and rights or interests of any person, body or authority in force or subsisting immediately before the date of commencement; (b) all rights, liabilities and obligations of an existing Panchyati Raj Institution, (including those arising under any agreement or contract) shall be deemed to be the rights, liabilities and obligations of the successor Panchayati Raj Institution. (c) all functions of the existing Panchayati Raj Institutions, whether under the Acts repealed as aforesaid or under any other law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have transferred to the successor Panchayati Raj Institutions under this Act; (d) all sums due to an existing Panchayati Raj Institution, whether on account of any tax or otherwise, shall be recoverable by the successor Pacnahayati Raj Institution and for the purposes of such recovery the successor Panchayati Raj Institution shall be competent to take any measure of institute any proceedings which it would have been open to an existing Panchayati Raj Institution or any authority thereof to take or institute before the date of commencement; (e) the unexpended balance in the funds of the existing Panchayati Raj Institutions and all sums due to such Institutions and such sums of any other body or bodies as the State Government may direct shall form part of, and be paid into, the funds of the corresponding successor Panchayati Raj Institution; (f) all contracts made with, and all instruments executed by or on behalf of an existing Panchayati Raj Institution shall be deemed to have been made with, or executed by or on behalf of the successor Panchayati Raj Institution, and shall have effect accordingly; (g) all proceedings and matters pending before an exiting Panchayati Raj Institution or any authority of an existing Panchayati Raj Institution under the repealed Acts immediately before the commencement shall be deemed to have been instituted and to have been pending before the successor Panchayati Raj Institution or such authority as the successor Panchayati Raj Institution may direct; (h) in all suits and legal proceedings pending on the date of commencement in or to which an existing Panchayati Raj Institution, is a party, the successor Panchayati Raj Institution, shall be deemed to be substituted therefor: (i) any appointment, notification, tax, free, order, scheme, license permission, rule byelaw, regulation or form made, issued, imposed or granted in respect of any existing Panchayati Raj Institution or the local area thereof under the repealed Acts, and in force immediately before the date of commencement, shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, continue to be in force as if made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act in respect of the successor Panchayati Raj Institution or the corresponding local area thereof until suspended or modified by any appointment, notification, notice, tax, fee, order, scheme, license, permission, rule, bye-law, regulation or form made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act. (j) all budget estimates, assessments, assessment lists, valuations of measurements made or authenticated by or in respect of an existing Panchayati Raj Institution under the repealed Acts and in force immediately before the date of commencement shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been made or authenticated by the successor Panchayati Raj Institution; (k) all officers and servants in the employment of an existing Panchayati Raj Institution immediately before the date of commencement, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to be transferred to the service of the successor Panchayati Raj Institution; and (l) any reference in any law or in any instrument to any provision of the repealed Acts, or any authority constituted, elected or appointed thereunder shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as a reference to the corresponding provision of this Act, or as the case may be, to the corresponding authority constituted, elected or appointed under this Act. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section-(a) "an existing Panchayati Raj Institution" means a Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad existing immediately before the date of commencement and, where any such Panchayati Raj Institution has been superseded or dissolved or the term thereof has expired, includes the person or persons appointed to exercise the powers or to perform the functions of such; Panchayati Raj Institution; and (b) "the successor Panchayati Raj Institution" means a Panchayat, a Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad constituted under this Act for such local area as corresponds to the respective local area of the existing Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad. Thus, asserting his right, the fourth respondent has invoked the revisional jurisdiction to question allotment of land to the petitioner under Section 27A of the Act of 1953 read with Section 124(1) of the Act of 1994 and that being so it can very well be inferred that the District Collector, Rajsamand has exercised its powers of revision by calling the record of the Gram Panchayat for its examination under Section 97 of the Act of 1994. This being the position, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner questioning the jurisdiction of the revisional authority is merely ornamental and cannot be sustained. This being the position, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner questioning the jurisdiction of the revisional authority is merely ornamental and cannot be sustained. In general, the language employed under Section 27A of the Act of 1953 and Section 97 of the Act of 1994 are pari-materia. Similarly, if the provisions for auction of land by Panchayat under the heading “Sale of Abadi land” under Rule 255 to 265 under the Rules of 1961 are examined in the light of Chapter IX under the caption “Immovable properties” under the Rajasthan Panchayat Rules of 1996, then it will ipso facto reveal that Rule 140 to 156 are pari-materia to old rules prescribing the same procedure for sale of immoveable property by Panchayat through auction. 10. Now adverting to the issue relating to locus of the fourth respondent to challenge the allotment of land to the petitioner by auction, suffice it to examine the language employed under Section 97 of the Act of 1994. A bare reading of Rule 272 of the Rules of 1961 and Sec. 97 of the Act of 1994 makes it amply clear that revisional authority either of its own motion or on an application from any interested person call for and examine the record of a Panchayati Raj Institution or of a Standing Committee or sub Committee thereof in respect of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order or decision or order passed therein. The language employed under the aforesaid provisions is clear and unambiguous and it has furnished a right to an individual who is interested in the functioning of the Panchayat Raj institution to invoke revisional jurisdiction on the subject matter. Being resident of the village, in these circumstances, it cannot be said that fourth respondent was not interested person to invoke revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, in the factual background of the case, the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Janam Singh’s case (supra), on which the learned counsel for the petitioner is relying, cannot render any assistance to him to question the locus of the revision petitioner before learned District Collector, Rajsamand. In fact, ratio decidendi of the verdict is favouring locus standi of an incumbent to maintain SLP against the judgment adversely affecting his rights. 11. In fact, ratio decidendi of the verdict is favouring locus standi of an incumbent to maintain SLP against the judgment adversely affecting his rights. 11. In the aforesaid judgment, wherein issue relating to seniority of officers in U.P. Non-technical (Class II) services was involved, the Court found that an incumbent appellant who has joined the services before respondent can maintain a SLP to challenge verdict of High Court even if he was not party to the litigation. Thus, Hon’ble Apex Court acknowledged locus standi of the appellant. The Court made following observations in Para 8 of the verdict. 8. The appellant, admittedly, was not impleaded as a party to the said writ application, but as he is directly affected like many other officers, who had entered into the State Civil Service before the respondent, filed the connected Special Leave Petition, challenging the validity of the judgment aforesaid. In view of the fact that the appellant had entered into Civil Service of the State Government before the respondent, it is not in dispute that he is affected in the matter of seniority by the impugned judgment. It was held by this Court in the case of Prabodh Varma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 167 : (1984) 4 SCC 251 , that a writ application in which the necessary parties likely to be affected have not been impleaded, the High Court should not proceed with such writ application, without insisting, on such persons or some of them in representative capacity being made respondents. It was further held that if petitioner refuses to join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for nonrejoinder of necessary parties. Admittedly, none was impleaded even in a representative capacity, But, it can be urged on behalf of the respondent that he had not sought any relief against any individual. He had sought the intervention of the High Court to declare Rule 3 (1) of 1973-Rules and Rule 3(b) of 1980-Rules as ultra vires, so far they made applicable the benefit of those Rules to only specified class of persons and restricted to others who were similarly situated. As such respondent was not required to implead private respondent, who might be affected by the verdict of the Court. As such respondent was not required to implead private respondent, who might be affected by the verdict of the Court. Even if this stand is accepted, can it be said that persons who have been affected by the judgment of the High Court in the connected writ application, cannot challenge the correctness thereof either by filing a Review Petition before the High Court or by filing a Special Leave Petition before this Court? According to us, the answer is in negative. The appellant has a locus standi to challenge the said judgment, although he was not party to the same and the Special Leave Petition filed on his behalf cannot be rejected on that ground. The delay in filing the Special Leave Petition has also been fully explained in the facts and circumstances of the case, which is condoned. Therefore, the objection of the learned counsel on the question of locus of the fourth respondent is hereby overruled. 12. Now I propose to deal with the issue relating to delayed presentation of the revision petition. 13. It is an admitted fact that pursuant to the alleged auction requisite instrument of transfer was issued to the petitioner on 30th January 1990 and for assailing the same, fourth respondent has preferred revision after a lapse of five years. The legislature in its wisdom has not prescribed any period of limitation for invoking revisional jurisdiction either under the Act of 1953 or under the Act of 1994. Therefore, now the question remains whether revisional jurisdiction can be exercised after expiry of five years. In the factual background of the case, on examining the impugned order from that standpoint, it emerges out that the alleged auction proceedings were carried out by the Panchayat Raj institution in utter disregard to the relevant rules governing the said province. In absence of proper resolution for auction of the land, publication of auction notification for fetching fair price and confirmation of sale by the competent authority, legal flaw in the proceedings are writ large and all these infirmities have been noticed by the revisional authority while passing the impugned order. Therefore, in substance, the revisional authority has exercised its jurisdiction for doing substantial justice, may be by exercising the said jurisdiction after a lapse of five years. Therefore, in substance, the revisional authority has exercised its jurisdiction for doing substantial justice, may be by exercising the said jurisdiction after a lapse of five years. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil’s case (supra). Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if no period of limitation is prescribed for exercising revisional powers, ordinarily it may be exercised within three years. In that background, the Court made these observations while setting aside the order of the revisional authority which was passed after 17 years. The Court has also held that it was not a case of obtaining the order of Tehsildar by fraud so as to render the same infirm. The Court held as under: 16. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March 30, 1976 and he was alive upto 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated March 30, 1976. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March 30, 1976 and he was alive upto 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated March 30, 1976. There is no finding by the Sub-Divisional Officer either that order dated March 30, 1976 was obtained fraudulently. 14. Well, the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the background of peculiar facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case refers to ordinarily limiting the period of limitation where no limitation is prescribed is trite and generally followed by writ Courts where no period of limitation is prescribed. But the Hon’ble Apex Court has not mandated that this rule is to be followed without deviation in appropriate cases to meet ends of justice. Therefore, on examining glaring facts of the case wherein SDO invoked revisional jurisdiction after 17 years without finding any fault that the order under challenge was obtained by fraud and noticing that the incumbent aggrieved individual was alive four 14 long years after passing of the order but he did not challenge the same and subsequently challenge was laid on behalf of his legal heir, the Hon’ble Court was constrained to make these observations. 15. As the order impugned is challenged by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court enshrined under Article 226 of the Constitution, it has become imperative for this Court to examine the core issue as to whether this jurisdiction is to be exercised in the backdrop of facts of the instant case. On thorough evaluation of the materials available on record, the Court feels persuaded that the revisional jurisdiction has rightly been exercised by the learned District Collector, Rajsamand setting aside an illegal order and upset-ing the said order in exercise of writ jurisdiction would revive an illegal order. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court, way back in the year 1955, in case of Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurelal Bhaiya ( AIR 1955 SC 425 ), examined jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Speaking for the Court, Hon’ble Justice Vivian Bose, held: That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised wherever there is an error of law. Speaking for the Court, Hon’ble Justice Vivian Bose, held: That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised wherever there is an error of law. The High Courts do not, and should not, act as Courts of appeal under article 226. Their powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognised lines and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of case unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily as may be. Therefore, writ petitions should not be lightly entertained in this class of case. 17. A Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath Bora & Anr. vs. Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals, Assam & Ors. ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ), held that if on examining the facts of an individual case a particular view is taken by the quasi-judicial authority, which may not be acceptable, cannot be set out a ground for interference with the order under Article 226 of the Constitution. While considering the nature of error, which can be said to be an error apparent on the face of record, the Court held as under: 19. That leads us to a consideration of the nature of the error which can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record which would be one of the grounds to attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The ancient writ of certiorari which now in England is known as the order of certiorari, could be issued on very limited grounds. These grounds have been discussed by this Court in the cases of: Parry & Co. The ancient writ of certiorari which now in England is known as the order of certiorari, could be issued on very limited grounds. These grounds have been discussed by this Court in the cases of: Parry & Co. vs. Commercial Employee's Association, Madras, 1952 S.C.R. 519: ( AIR 1952 SC 179 )(H), Veerappa Pillai vs. Raman and Raman Ltd., 1952 S.C.R. 583: ( AIR 1952 SC 192 )(I), 1952 S.C.R. 696 ( AIR 1952 SC 319 )(E), T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa 1955 1 SCR 250 : ( AIR 1954 SC 440 (J). All these cases have been considered by this Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others 1955 1 SCR 1104 at p.1121: (S) AIR 1955 SC 233 at p.243)(K). Venkatarama Ayyar J., speaking for the full Court, laid down four propositions bearing on the character and scope of the writ of certiorari as established upon the authorities. The third proposition out of those four, may be stated in the words of that learned Judge, as follows: "The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous." While considering the fourth proposition whether the writ can be issued in the case of a decision which was erroneous in law, after considering the recent Authorities, the same learned Judge, in the course of his judgment, at p. 1123 (of SCR):(at p. 244 of AIR), has observed as follows: "It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error: it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record." 18. In Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 16 , Hon’ble Apex Court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to upset an order if it would revive an illegality. In this verdict, the Court held as under: 38. In Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 16 , Hon’ble Apex Court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised to upset an order if it would revive an illegality. In this verdict, the Court held as under: 38. For what has been stated above we hold that the order of the learned Member of Board of Revenue directing action to be taken for refund of the excess compensation was valid and proper though he had no jurisdiction to pass the order. In the event it is set aside it would amount to reviving an invalid order of payment of excess compensation to the appellant. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar & Ors. vs. Sita Ram ( (2001) 4 SCC 478 ) examined the scope of judicial review under Article 226 vis-à-vis orders passed by the statutory authority vested with power to act quasi judicially. The Court held in this behalf as under: 17. The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate Authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the Statutory Authority vested with power to act quasijudicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the Statutory Authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case. 20. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another Appellate Court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case. 20. In Roshan Deen vs. Preeti Lal ((2002)1SCC100), speaking for the Court, Justice K.T. Thomas eluciadated with clarity the scope of judicial review under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution and observed that it is to advance justice and not to thwart it. The Court held: 12. We are greatly disturbed by the insensitivity reflected in the impugned judgment rendered by the learned single Judge in a case where judicial mind would be tempted to utilize all possible legal measures to impart justice to a man mutilated so outrageously by his cruel destiny. The High Court non-suited him in exercise of a supervi-sory and extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution. Time and again this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it. (vide State of Uttar Pradesh vs. District Judge, Unnao and Ors.). The very purpose of such constitu-tional powers being conferred on the High Court is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The look out of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. 21. On the issue of limitation, where legislature has not prescribed the same, Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ajaib Singh vs. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 , in relation to raising an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that relief cannot be denied to a workman merely on the ground of delay and further held that prescribing the period of limitation is within the domain of legislature. Para 10 of the judgment reads as under: 10. Para 10 of the judgment reads as under: 10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent management on the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya vs. State of Haryana is also of no help to him. In that case the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically held “neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine as to what shall be the period of limitation in such cases”. However, it went on further to say that “reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of reference or dispute by appropriate Government to labour tribunals will be five years after which the Government can refuse to make a reference on the ground of delay and laches if there is no explanation to the delay”. We are of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made or an application under Section 33-C of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where the legislature in its wisdom had thought it fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law and do not make laws. Personal views of the Judges presiding over the Court cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the legislature. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this Court as noted hereinabove and thus is not a good law on the point of the applicability of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts/boards and tribunal under the Act. Thus, in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, where there is no iota of proof that auction proceedings were undertaken by the Panchayat Raj institution in adherence of the mandatory provisions of law, and wide scope of judicial review to the revisional authority including broad horizon of the locus of an individual, I am unable to subscribe the view that impugned order is to be set aside solely on the ground of delay in launching of revision petition by the fourth respondent. Reliance in this behalf can be placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in LRs of Dalchand vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1996 DNJ (Raj) 144), wherein the Court observed: “The Additional Collector has considered in details the facts and cir-cumstances of the case and after due consideration of the procedure and the record of the case held that while granting the Patta in favour of the appellant-petitioner, the compliance of Rules 256 to 265 of the Rules has not been made; neither a proper notification inviting objections was issued nor a proper map was prepared; the site was, also, not inspected by the three Panchas as required under Rule 258 of the Rules; proper compliance of Rule 262 for issuance of the notice for auction atleast for a period of one month, was not complied with and whether the notice has been affixed on the proper place, has not been proved. As there were the non-compliance of the provisions of the rules in the sale of the plot in question, the learned Additional Collector was justified in allowing the revision petition and the revision petition was maintainable as no limit for filing the revision petition u/Sec. 27-A is prescribed under the law and the Dy. DDO was competent to file the same. The order was passed by the learned Additional Collector after due consideration of the relevant material on record and we see no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Additional Collector. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant on this count.” 22. The learned District Collector has also examined that aspect and has found that as no period of limitation is prescribed and there is patent illegality and irregularity in allotment of the land in question to the petitioner by way of auction, in my considered opinion, upsetting of the impugned order of the revisional authority would amount to revival of an illegal order of the Panchayat Raj institution which is not permissible in exercise of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction. The Court is to impart substantial justice and not to thwart the same. Thus, in totality, viewed from any angle, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned revisional authority. 23. Resultantly, the writ petition lacks in merit and the same is hereby dismissed.