JUDGMENT : K. Harilal, J. The appellant herein is the defendant in O.S. No.3/2002 on the files of the Munsiff’s Court, Vadakara as well as the respondent in A.S. No.30/2004 on the files of the court of Subordinate Judge, Vadakara. The above suit was filed by the respondent/plaintiff for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property, on the allegation that the defendant is a lessee in possession of the property. The defendant contended that he is not liable to be evicted from the plaint schedule property as he is entitled to get the protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short, 'the Act'). The trial court accepted the contentions raised by the defendant and dismissed the original suit. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff had preferred the above appeal suit and, after re-appreciating the entire evidence on record, the appellate court reversed the findings arrived at by the trial court and decreed the suit. This Regular Second Appeal is filed challenging the judgment and decree, reversing the findings of the trial court, passed by the first appellate court. The plaint averments, in brief, are as follows: 2. The defendant is in occupation of an immovable property having an extent of 946 m2 in area corresponding to 19.177 sq.ft. and building. The last payment of rent by the defendant to the plaintiff is Rs.625/- for the period from November 2000 to November 2001. The defendant has illegally put up one thatched shed and another tiled shed in the property. The immovable property and the building were shown in the schedule to the plaint. The plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendant over the plaint schedule property by notice dated 23/10/2001 with effect from 11/12/2001 with an option clause, terminating the tenancy on such day in the month of December. The said notice was acknowledged by the defendant on 29/10/2001. The defendant has sent a reply setting up incorrect averments to bolster a false claim of tenancy under the Act. 3. The defendant filed a written statement contending that he is not liable to be evicted as the tenancy cannot be terminated in view of the provisions of the Act. The said notice was acknowledged by the defendant on 29/10/2001. The defendant has sent a reply setting up incorrect averments to bolster a false claim of tenancy under the Act. 3. The defendant filed a written statement contending that he is not liable to be evicted as the tenancy cannot be terminated in view of the provisions of the Act. It is admitted that the lease was a land with a Pandikasala, Chapra and Kalam in the property known as Vallaparambu in Chorode amsom Erapuram desom, having an extent of approximately 24 cents leased to the defendant more than 50 years back and the defendant is still in possession of the property as a lessee and he has constructed structures with the permission of the plaintiff. At the time of this, there was a Pandikasala only in the property and within years of lease, the defendant company had put up structures for which he was given right. The structures said to have been constructed by the defendant are not unauthorised constructions as pleaded in the plaint and the same were constructed with the consent of the plaintiff's predecessor in possession of the property. That apart, the defendant has constructed a wall surrounding the plaint schedule property. According to the defendant, since the matter in dispute involved in the suit pertains to right conferred under the Act, the suit is liable to be referred to the Land Tribunal under Section 125(3) of the Act. At any point of view, the suit is not maintainable before the civil court and the plaintiff is not entitled to get the decree granting the relief’s as prayed for. No oral evidence was adduced by the plaintiff, but produced and marked Exts.A1 to A4. DW1 and DW2 were examined as defendant's witnesses and Exts.B1 to B8 were marked for the defendant. Exts.C1 to C4 were marked as Court Exhibits. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the courts below miserably failed to appreciate the facts, evidence and law in its correct perspective. The lower appellate court should have accepted the evidence of DW1 and should have held that the subject matter of the lease is an immovable property with the right to make constructions for commercial and industrial purposes. The lower appellate court should have accepted the evidence of DW1 and should have held that the subject matter of the lease is an immovable property with the right to make constructions for commercial and industrial purposes. The court below ought to have drawn adverse inference against the plaintiff in the absence of any kind of oral evidence from the part of the plaintiff. The court below ought to have found that the defendant is entitled to get protection under Section 106 of the Act and he is not liable to be evicted. The appellate court went wrong in appreciating the evidence of DW1 and DW2. If the court finds that the lease was a land with a building, he is not liable to be evicted in a suit before the civil court and the petition ought to have been filed under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. When the courts below found that the defendant is liable to be evicted and he is not entitled to get the protection under Section 106 of the Act, the courts below ought to have found that he is entitled to get value of improvements and he shall not be evicted unless value of improvements is not paid. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant cited the decisions in Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and Another [ AIR 1999 SC 1441 ], Sreedharan Namboodiri v. Devaki Antharjanam [2004 (2) KLT Case No.66], Sathiyadevan v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. [2010 (3) KLT SN 2 (C.No. 2)] and Krishna Pillai Govinda Pillai v. Sankara Pillai Govinda Pillai [1971 KLT 87 (F.B.)]. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the defendant advanced arguments to justify the findings arrived at by the first appellate court and also assailing the findings of the trial court. According to the learned counsel, the defendant himself, in his pleadings, admitted that the original lease was a land with a building known as "Pandikasala". In chief examination also, he admitted that at the time of commencement of lease, the lease was land with the Pandikasala, a Chapra and Kalam. So also, the defendant, though pleaded that the original lease was with a permission to make constructions in the property, no evidence was adduced to substantiate that such a right was also conferred to the defendant at the time of commencement of the lease. So also, the defendant, though pleaded that the original lease was with a permission to make constructions in the property, no evidence was adduced to substantiate that such a right was also conferred to the defendant at the time of commencement of the lease. According to the learned counsel, the rights and obligations of a lessor and lessee in a lease transaction have to be determined on the basis of the rights and obligations of respective parties at the time of commencement of the lease. According to him, subsequent constructions are unauthorised constructions without the permission of the plaintiff. Since the original lease was land with building, the defendant is not entitled to get protection under Section 106 of the Act for the act done in violation of the terms and conditions of the original lease. In order to fortify the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, he placed reliance on Jacob v. Joseph [1987 (1) KLT Case No.16]. The trial court has not considered the evidence of DW1 and DW2. But the appellate court has considered the same and reversed the findings on the basis of the evidence available on record. Even if the constructions are unauthorised constructions, there is no reliable evidence to prove that those constructions were made with the consent of the then land lord before 20/5/1967. If that be so, the defendant is not entitled to get protection under Section 106 of the Act. 7. I have bestowed my anxious considerations to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both parties at the Bar. First of all, let us have a look at the relevant law applicable to the instance case. According to Section 106 of the Act, where on any land leased for commercial or industrial purpose, the lessee has constructed buildings for such commercial or industrial purpose before 20/05/1967, he shall not be liable to be evicted from such land, but shall be liable to pay rent under the contract of tenancy and such rent shall be liable to be varied every 12 years. The postulates under the said Section can be enumerated as follows: (1) The lease must be land alone. (2) The said lease must be for commercial or industrial purpose. (3) The lessee has constructed building for such commercial or industrial purpose before 20/05/1967. 8. The postulates under the said Section can be enumerated as follows: (1) The lease must be land alone. (2) The said lease must be for commercial or industrial purpose. (3) The lessee has constructed building for such commercial or industrial purpose before 20/05/1967. 8. Needless to say, unless these 3 postulates are satisfied, a tenant is not entitled to get protection under Section 106 of the Act. In Jacob v. Joseph [1987 (1) KLT Case No.16], this Court held as follows:- "S.106 only operates as an exemption on the exemption provided under Section 3(1)(iii) of the Act. Among three categories of lease transactions exempted from the provisions of Chap.II under Section 3 (1)(iii), only one category has been brought under the provisions of Section 106 in order to provide that such tenants are not liable to be evicted if certain conditions are satisfied. The operation of Section 106 is only in cases where land alone was leased out for commercial or industrial purposes. Leases of buildings and leases of lands and buildings included in the exemption under Section 3(1)(iii) of the Act were not brought within the exemption under Section 106 of the Act. Therefore evidently leases of lands alone satisfying the requirements of Section 106 of the Act will come within the purview of that section for the purpose of enabling the lessee to claim immunity from eviction." 9. Coming to the facts, certain facts are admitted. The defendant has admitted that he was in possession of the plaint schedule property with Pandikasala, Chapra and Kalam by virtue of the lease arrangement as alleged by the plaintiff. He has no case that the above constructions were made by him. This is also revealed from Exts.B1 to B3 which show that the company had been paying rent for the leased property from 1963 onwards. The rent deed shows that rent was being paid for land with Pandikasala, Chapra and Kalam, as a lessee. So also, these documents show that there was an oral lease arrangement between the company and the predecessor of the plaintiff with respect to 24 cents of property and the structures referred above. So, needless to say, he has no claim under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act on the basis of Pandikasala, Chapra and Kalam. 10. So also, these documents show that there was an oral lease arrangement between the company and the predecessor of the plaintiff with respect to 24 cents of property and the structures referred above. So, needless to say, he has no claim under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act on the basis of Pandikasala, Chapra and Kalam. 10. But, it is the case in the written statement that he had made certain additional constructions with the consent of the then land Lord before 20/05/1967. But coming to the evidence, both oral and documentary, there is no evidence to show that such a permission was granted to the defendant company for making additional constructions in the property more than Pandikasala, Chapra and Kalam. So, the defendant cannot claim protection under Section 106 of the Act on the basis of the original lease commenced at the very inception of the transaction, though it was before 20/05/1967. 11. Then the question to be considered is, can he claim protection under Section 106 of the Act on the basis of the additional constructions said to have been made subsequently after the commencement of the lease transactions? I have already noted that though, in the pleadings, they contended that the original lease agreement was one with permission to make further constructions in the property for commercial or industrial purpose also, no evidence has been adduced to prove the said consent said to have been given for further constructions. Needless to say, the burden is on the lessee, who claims protection under Section 106 of the Act. So, the remaining question to be considered is, can he claim protection under Section 106 of the Act, on the basis of the additional constructions said to have been made by him? 12. Going by the commission report, it is seen that the Commissioner had reported that there are three structures in addition to the Pandiakasala, Chapra and Kalam. There was a cattle shed on the northern side of the Kalam. On the western side of that cattle shed there is another tiled room with shutter. On the western side of the said one room, there is another structure having four rooms and that structure was also having asbestos roofing. Needless to say, in appearance, those structures are only temporary constructions. On the western side of that cattle shed there is another tiled room with shutter. On the western side of the said one room, there is another structure having four rooms and that structure was also having asbestos roofing. Needless to say, in appearance, those structures are only temporary constructions. So, the question is, whether the defendant is entitled to get protection under Section 106 of the Act, on the basis of the above said constructions? The Commissioner has also reported that those structures are not having the numbers provided by the local authorities. So, it could be reasonably presumed that those constructions were made without permission from the local authorities. So, there cannot be any document evidencing the date of construction of those structures and no document has been produced for the same. 13. In Jacob v. Joseph [1987 (1) KLT, Case No.16], this Court held that conferment of a benefit under the provisions of a statute consequent on the performance of an act indicates that the act must be one which was done lawfully. The legislature cannot be intended to have conveyed the benefit in favour of a person who committed some act in violation of the provisions of law or valid agreement binding on him. Therefore, the construction of a building contemplated under Section 106 of the Act could only be the construction within the competency of the lessee under the provisions of law or contract. It cannot, at any rate, refer to anything prohibited by law or valid agreement. The non-obstante clause under Section 106 of the Act has nothing to do with the illegality of the construction, which brings the action out of the purview of Section 106 of the Act. 14. In view of the above decision, I have no hesitation to hold that the construction mentioned in Section 106 of the Act must be authorised construction and not unauthorised construction. All rights and obligations are to be determined on the basis of the nature of right accrued at the time of commencement of tenancy. If the original lease was for land and building therein, the subsequent unauthorised constructions, even if it is for industrial or commercial purpose, will not get any protection under Section 106 of the Act. All rights and obligations are to be determined on the basis of the nature of right accrued at the time of commencement of tenancy. If the original lease was for land and building therein, the subsequent unauthorised constructions, even if it is for industrial or commercial purpose, will not get any protection under Section 106 of the Act. Those constructions made subsequently, and have neither the permission of the lessor nor the permission of the local statutory authority shall be deemed to be unauthorised construction, for which no protection can be given under Section 106 of the Act. Coming to the instance case, the additional constructions allegedly made after the commencement of the original lease transaction, have neither the permission of the lessor nor that of the statutory authorities under law. It follows that, those three additional constructions referred to in Ext.C1 commission report are unauthorised constructions, for which protection under Section 106 of the Act cannot be given. 15. Let us examine the evidence on record. According to Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof as to any particular fact that lies on that person, who wishes the court to believe its existence, and according to Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden of proof, in a suit or proceedings, lies on the person, who would fail, if no evidence at all were given on either side. On a combined reading of Sections 102 and 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, in jexta position, it can be held that as far as a claim under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is concerned, the burden of proof absolutely lies on the lessee who claims protection under Section 106 of the Act. In the instance case, DW1 and DW2 were examined to prove the said claim. It is to be borne in mind that a lessee, who claims right under Section 106 of the Act, must adduce evidence to the effect that the land alone was leased to him and he had made constructions in that property for industrial or commercial purpose before 20/05/1967. So, the evidence of DW1 must be tested with the standard prescribed above. So, the evidence of DW1 must be tested with the standard prescribed above. Going by the evidence of DW1 in chief examination, he claimed that at the time of adducing evidence he was the partner of the firm and he joined in the partnership firm in the year 1978. But, he added that, earlier before 1966 he was employed as a writer in the company and the constructions were made before 1966. But he left the company in the year 1966 and started the very same business independently. He has adduced evidence for and on behalf of the company, not as an independent witness. In his chief examination, so also, he claimed that the defendant company is entitled to get protection under Section 106 of the Act. But, in the cross examination, he deposed that he joined the company in 1978 at first. Even though he deposed that he at first joined the company in the year 1978 only, no attempt was made in re-examination to make any clarification as to whether he had employed in the company during the period 1966 or prior to that period. Even if his evidence is taken at its face value, it can be taken as the evidence of the defendant and it cannot be taken as an independent evidence to prove that the additional constructions were made before 20/05/1967. It follows that no value can be attributed to the evidence of DW1 as to the question who had effected those additional constructions. Similarly, had he employed in the company during the period of 1966, as claimed in the chief affidavit, certainly the defendant company could have better documentary evidence to show that he was employed in the Company as claimed by him in the chief examination. 16. Next, DW2, the mason, who claims that he had made the additional constructions, was examined so as to speak about the period in which those additional constructions were made. At the time of examination he was aged 68. He deposed that at the time when he was 23 years, he had worked as a mason for the said construction. But, when he was cross examined, he deposed that he had made more than 1000 constructions after the above said construction and he was unable to speak anything about those constructions. He deposed that at the time when he was 23 years, he had worked as a mason for the said construction. But, when he was cross examined, he deposed that he had made more than 1000 constructions after the above said construction and he was unable to speak anything about those constructions. Obviously, the evidence of such a man cannot be relied on to prove that those constructions were made before 20/05/1967. 17. Going by the judgment passed by the trial court, it could be seen that the learned Munsiff has not made any effort to look into the depositions of DW1 and DW2. But the learned District Judge has meticulously evaluated the evidence of DW1 and DW2 and arrived at a conclusion that the evidence of DW1 and DW2 cannot be relied on to arrive at a conclusion that the additional constructions found in the plaint schedule property were made before 20/05/1967. I do not find any kind of perversity in the appreciation of evidence of DW1 and DW2 by the first appellate court. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the court below ought to have found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and the trial court ought to have found that the matter in issue involved in the suit comes under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. I am afraid that the defendant had no such specific case in the pleadings in the written statement. So also, there is no specific contention as to any challenge of jurisdiction. 18. The learned counsel further submits that there is a denial that the suit is not maintainable either in law or in facts. But I am of the opinion that such vague and evasive denial is not sufficient to formulate the issue of jurisdiction in view of Section 21 of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 19. Going by Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I find that there must have a specific denial as to jurisdiction so as to consider the matter as a preliminary issue at the earliest opportunity itself. It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff; but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact, of which he does not admit. It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff; but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact, of which he does not admit. Therefore, the challenge of jurisdiction in appeal is also unsustainable in view of the absence of pleadings. 20. The learned counsel for the appellant cited the decision in Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao and Another [ AIR 1999 SC 1441 ], and drew my attention to paragraphs 15 and 16. In paragraph 16, the court held that where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and state his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, the presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in various cases. The above proposition is held while interpreting Section 114 of the Evidence Act. But it is to be remembered that the above proposition can be applied to the party on whom the burden of proof lies in a suit under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act; but did not enter into witness box. Needless to say, the burden of proof lies on the basis of pleadings and rights claimed. There is no rule that all parties in a suit must enter into the box by offering himself to be cross examined. In short, this decision can be applied against the party on whom the burden of proof lies; but did not adduce evidence. In the instance case, the burden of proof absolutely lies on the defendant who claims protection under Section 106 of the Act. Therefore, the non-examination of the plaintiff is not fatal and no adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiff, where the lease arrangement is admitted as such by the defendant, and the entire burden of proof lies on the defendant. 21. I have considered all the other decisions referred above and cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. But I find that those decisions do not render any aid or assistance to determine the question in controversy involved in this case. There is no illegality or impropriety in any of the findings in the impugned judgment under challenge. 21. I have considered all the other decisions referred above and cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. But I find that those decisions do not render any aid or assistance to determine the question in controversy involved in this case. There is no illegality or impropriety in any of the findings in the impugned judgment under challenge. I do not find any kind of perversity in the appreciation of evidence, from which those findings have been arrived at. Hence this Regular Second Appeal fails. In the result, This Regular Second Appeal is dismissed.