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2014 DIGILAW 158 (TRI)

Laxman Debbarma v. State of Tripura

2014-05-02

U.B.SAHA

body2014
JUDGMENT Utpalendu Bikas Saha, J.:- This writ petition is filed by the petitioner, Sri Laxman Debbarma, who was an Accountant, Central Jail, Agartala, for quashing the order of punishment of reduction of his rank from the post of Accountant to the post of UDC, passed by the Inspector General of Prisons, Tripura being disciplinary authority, vide order dated 01.12.2006 (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition) and also the order of the appellate authority, the Commissioner and Secretary, Home (Jail) Department. dated 08.03.2007 (Annexure-P/11 to the writ petition), wherein the appellate authority affirmed the order of the disciplinary authority and dismissed the appeal. 2. Heard Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. S. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State-respondents. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner while working as Accountant in the Central Jail, Agartala, one Smti. Parbati Debbarma, a 47 years old lady, a Female Warder of Female Jail, Agartala at Central Jail complex, made complaints/applications (Exbt.-S/1 and Exbt.-S/2) to the Superintendent of Female Jail, Agartala through proper channel alleging that on 13.01.2005, at about 08-15 pm in the night, while she was alone in her quarters the petitioner entered into her quarters and came to physical contract with her and embraced her for outraging modesty her in sexual harassment. Upon receipt of the said complaints, a preliminary inquiry was ordered and the said preliminary enquiry was done by the Superintendent of Central Jail, Agartala, Shri S. Sarkar. Being satisfied with the preliminary inquiry, it was decided to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner under Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 (for short ’Rules, 1965’) and consequent thereto the petitioner was charged for committing gross misconduct and misbehaviour with said Smti. Parbati Debbarma as he had violated Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services(Conduct) Rules, 1988 and also Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code as extended to the State of Tripura. 4. The charges framed against the petitioner are reproduced herein below:- Article-I That the said Shri Laxman Debbarma, Accountant, District Jail, Kailashahar, North Tripura while functioning as Accountant, Central Jail, Agartala entered into the Quarters of Smti. 4. The charges framed against the petitioner are reproduced herein below:- Article-I That the said Shri Laxman Debbarma, Accountant, District Jail, Kailashahar, North Tripura while functioning as Accountant, Central Jail, Agartala entered into the Quarters of Smti. Parbati Debbarma, Female Warder, Female Jail, Agartala at about 8-15 P.M. in the night on 13.01.05 and embraced for outraging modesty in sexual harassment to her while she was alone in her quarters as has been alleged by her. This is gross misconduct & misbehaviour of Shri Debbarma, Accountant being a Government servant under the Home(Jail) Department and violated of Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code, Vol.-I, Part-I, and Notification No. F.3(6)-ARD/98 dated 14th December, 1998 of Administrative Reforms Department, Government of Tripura in Tripura Civil Services(Conduct) Rules, 1988. Article-II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Shri Laxman Debbarma, Accountant being a Government Servant shall indulge himself in such act sexual harassment with an women at her Government Quarters in the night at about 8-15 P.M. on 13.01.05 when she was alone in her quarters being utilized his official capacity illegally. This act of Shri Debbarma was in violation of Rule 162 of Bengal Jail Code and Rule 3(1)(iii) of Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. 5. As the petitioner denied all the charges levelled against him, the disciplinary authority appointed one Shri K. Chakraborty, Additional Commissioner of Departmental Inquiries, Government of Tripura as the inquiring authority to enquire into the aforesaid charges framed against the petitioner. The prosecution adduced evidence of various witnesses including the evidence of victim Smti. Parbati Debbarma to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner. The inquiring authority after assessment of the evidence as adduced before him came to the conclusion that the petitioner-accused officer entered into the quarters of the victim Smti. Parbati Debbarma and outraged her modesty intentionally. Thus, violated the provision of Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services(Conduct) Rules, 1988 as well as Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code. As the inquiring authority found the petitioner delinquent officer guilty, he sent his report to the disciplinary authority, respondent No. 2, who upon receipt of the enquiry report issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why the finding of guilt of the inquiring authority should not be accepted. As the inquiring authority found the petitioner delinquent officer guilty, he sent his report to the disciplinary authority, respondent No. 2, who upon receipt of the enquiry report issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause as to why the finding of guilt of the inquiring authority should not be accepted. The petitioner vide communication dated 30.06.2005 raised his objection stating, inter alia, that the incident of sexual harassment as stated in the charge had not taken place in the work place and the inquiring authority failed to consider the evidences on record and acted beyond his jurisdiction. 6. On receipt of the reply to the show cause, the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order dated 01.12.2006 as stated supra (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition). Being aggrieved by the said order of reduction of rank, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Home (Jail) Department and the appellate authority after examining the grounds taken by the petitioner in his appeal dismissed the appeal holding inter alia that:- ......no proposal was made of any provisional punishment in the said Memorandum dated 05.09.2006. The amended provisions in Sub-Rule 4 of Rule 15 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, it is clearly mentioned that if the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. The earlier provisions in this regard was substituted vide G.I.M. of Home Affairs (Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms) Notification No. 11012/2/77-Ests. A, date the 18th August, 1978 and S.O. No. 2465, dated 2nd September, 1978. .......... 7. Being dissatisfied with the orders of the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority as stated supra, the petitioner preferred the instant writ petition. 8. A, date the 18th August, 1978 and S.O. No. 2465, dated 2nd September, 1978. .......... 7. Being dissatisfied with the orders of the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority as stated supra, the petitioner preferred the instant writ petition. 8. The respondents by way of filing counter affidavit denied almost all the averments made by the petitioner in his writ petition and contended that the inquiring authority came to the conclusion and gave his findings after careful examination of the deposition of the witnesses, the statements and also the other relevant records and, thus, putting of wrong question and coming to a wrong decision do not arise. In paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit the respondents stated inter alia as under:- 15. That, in regard to the statement made in paragraph 9 of the writ petition it is stated that the Inquiring Authority came to conclusion and given his findings after careful examination of the deposition of witnesses, statements and other relevant records. Therefore, putting a wrong question and coming to a wrong conclusion does not arise. From the complaint of Smt. Parbati Deb Barma it appears that Smt. Parbati Deb Barma given 3(three) statement namely Exhibit. S/1 (Report of Parbati Deb Barma to Superintendent Female Jail date 14.01.2005) Exhibit. S/2 (Statement of Report of Defendant on 15.01.2005 to the Superintendent of Female Central Jail) Exhibit. S/3 (Statement by Smt. Parbati Deb Barma before Shri S. Sarkar, I/C Supdt. of Central/Female Jail who conducted preliminary enquiry). The Enquiring Authority considered all the evidences in the proceeding. The Enquiring Authority considered that version given by the witnesses in the Court of Inquiry are not different from the statement made before the preliminary Inquiry Officer (P.W. 5). In proceedings 2(two) witnesses deposed that the concerned officer (Petitioner) went to the house of complainant. 9. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel while urging for setting aside the impugned order of reduction of rank (Annexure-P/9 to the writ petition) and the order of the appellate authority (Annexure-P/11 to the writ petition) would contend that the victim/informant made the complaints after some delay and on the basis of the said complaints the disciplinary authority before initiating a disciplinary proceeding ordered for preliminary enquiry. In the said preliminary enquiry the victim/informant made some statements where she only proved her signature and not the contents therein. In the said preliminary enquiry the victim/informant made some statements where she only proved her signature and not the contents therein. Thus, those statements cannot be used against the accused officer, but the inquiring authority considered those statements, though the same were not made before him, rather before some other authorities. He has further contended that the evidence which is inadmissible cannot be the basis for coming to the conclusion that the charges are proved and the accused officer is guilty. His another contention is that the quarters provided by the office to the victim/informant cannot be said to be the "Office precinct". According to him, the alleged incident took place outside the jail premises, i.e. in the quarters provided for the employees. He has also contended that the inquiring authority came to his conclusion of guilt on the basis of no evidence. Thus, this Court should set aside the impugned orders. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Deb has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in State of U.P. V. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , a judgment of the Constitutional Bench, and in Union of India V. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 . 10. In H.C. Goel (supra) the Apex Court, particularly in paragraph 23, observed as under:- 23. That takes us to the merits of the respondent’s contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by the appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent’s case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent’s case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him. In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent’s grievance is well-founded, because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant’s order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence. 11. The decision of the Apex Court in Mohammad Nooh (supra), as relied upon by Mr. Deb, has no application in the instant case as in the aforesaid case the question came up before the Apex Court whether the High Court has any power under Article 226 to deal with the order of dismissal of an employee which had been passed at a time when the Constitution of India had not come into force. The said question was answered by the High Court in affirmative as the order of dismissal passed by the District Superintendent of Police on December 20, 1948, and the order of dismissal of the appeal passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on June 7, 1949, had not become final until the Inspector General of Police on April 22, 1950, made his order dismissing the revision application filed by the respondent under Regulation 512 and that the last order had been passed after the Constitution had come into force. Against the aforesaid order of the High Court an appeal was preferred by the State of U.P., which was ultimately allowed by the Apex Court disagreeing with the findings of the High Court. Therefore, the said case has no application in the instant writ petition. 12. Mr. Chakraborty, learned Additional Government Advocate while refuting the contention of Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, referred to second paragraph of Article-I of the charge, wherein it is mentioned that this is gross misconduct & misbehaviour of Shri Debbarma, Accountant being a Government servant under the Home(Jail) Department and violated the Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code, Vol.-I, Part-I and Notification No. F.3(6)-ARD/98 dated 14th December, 1998 of Administrative Reforms Department, Government of Tripura in Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 and would contend that even one of the charges is proved, then the impugned orders do not require to be interfered with. He has also submitted that the writ Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution an action of the disciplinary authority unless the accused officer makes out a case of procedural defects or of no evidence. 13. Before considering the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, it would be proper to survey the report of the inquiring authority on the basis of which the disciplinary authority has passed the order of punishment as impugned and the appellate authority affirmed the same. The inquiring authority considering the prosecution and defence case and after assessing the evidences came to the findings which are as under:- On the above as well as on perusal of the evidence on record, let us to see whether the plea of the Accused Officer of false implication is proved. At this juncture, the A.O. could not make it clear as to why he has been falsely implicated in the alleged charge. Though burden of proof lies upon the prosecution to prove the charge but the Accused Officer ought to have come forward to rebut the allegation brought against him whereas the defence could not shake the prosecution witnesses including victim under stress of cross-examination. On further perusal of evidence on record as well as on perusal of written brief of argument of both sides, it also appears that there is nothing in my hand to disbelieve the statement of the victim alone as well as the Exbt. S/3/1, Exbt. S/4/1, Exbt. On further perusal of evidence on record as well as on perusal of written brief of argument of both sides, it also appears that there is nothing in my hand to disbelieve the statement of the victim alone as well as the Exbt. S/3/1, Exbt. S/4/1, Exbt. S/5/1, Exbt. S/6/1 & Exbt. S/8. Here, suffice it to say that generally criminal cannot come forward to commit/constitute any crime by calling witnesses in the scene of crime. Therefore, in that circumstances, I have to consider the manner of giving evidence, surrounding circumstances, probabilities and motive for giving evidence since the prosecution case only rests on single eye witness. And it is settled that if the single testimony of the eye witness along appears to be reliable and convincing there is no ground to disbelieve such testimony of the single witness. In the instant case, PW. 1 has been supported by PW. 2, PW. 3, PW. 4 & PW. 6. Though PW. 2, PW. 3, PW. 4 & PW. 6 were not the eye witnesses to the occurrence but out of them PW. 3 had seen the delinquent officer when he (A.O.) was leaving from the scene of crime and rest other PWs heard the incident just after occurrence. So, from their statements, I find that the version given by them in the Court of inquiry are not different from that in the statements made before the preliminary inquiry officer (PW. 5) and I also find better smell that when the PW. 1 was alone in her quarter taking such advantage, the Accused Officer entered into the quarters of the PW. 1 and thereafter he outraged her modesty intentionally. Naturally, it is also proved that there was a motive of the Accused Officer not only for outraging the modesty of the victim, rather there was a clear motive of the Accused Officer for satisfying his lust with the victim (Parbati) but luckily the victim (Parbati) was saved due to entry of her son (PW. 3) all on a sudden in the scene of crime. As regards standard of proof, obviously it is a settled law that the technicalities of criminal Law cannot be invoked in disciplinary proceedings and the strict mode of proof prescribed by the Evidence Act may not be applied with equal vigour. 3) all on a sudden in the scene of crime. As regards standard of proof, obviously it is a settled law that the technicalities of criminal Law cannot be invoked in disciplinary proceedings and the strict mode of proof prescribed by the Evidence Act may not be applied with equal vigour. It is not a criminal case and the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It would, however, be ensured that mere suspicion should never be allowed to take the place of proof. The defence had given much stress in the contradiction of the statement of the PW. 1 as well as Exbt. S/1 & Exbt. S/2. Accordingly, it is a fact that there is some minor discrepancy in the statement of the PW. 1 as well as in the Exbt. S/1 & Exbt. S/2 and such discrepancy clearly proved that the PW. 1 being the victim of this case made no statement either in his deposition or in the Exbt. S/1 & Exbt. S/2 like parrot fashion. Therefore, such minor discrepancy does not touch the core of the case in as-much as such discrepancy does not create any suspicious in the prosecution case, rather it strengthened the prosecution to bring the allegation. Here, I also find that preliminary report (Exbt. S/7) submitted by the PW. 5 is also more fruitful in support of the prosecution case for taking into the consideration and therefore, the prosecution leaves no room for doubt basing on the statement of the victim alone as well as on strong circumstantial evidences as discussed above for which again I find no difficult to accept the version of the victim (Parbati) on its face value since plea of A.O. of false implication is not proved. Accordingly, I do not feel impressed to the line of argument adopted by the defence. Therefore, I find force to give the answer on this point in favour of the prosecution and this point is decided in affirmative. Point No. (ii):- This point is taken up for discussion and decision. In view of the discussion and decision arrived at in the aforesaid point, I find force to give the answer on this point in favour of the prosecution. Therefore, this point is also decided in affirmative. Point No. (ii):- This point is taken up for discussion and decision. In view of the discussion and decision arrived at in the aforesaid point, I find force to give the answer on this point in favour of the prosecution. Therefore, this point is also decided in affirmative. Viewed in the above perspective, I find and hold that the prosecution has proved the article of charges brought against the Accused Officer. Therefore, the Accused Officer viz. Shri Laxman Debbarma, Accountant under the Prisons Directorate is found guilty for violation of rule of 3(1)(iii) of TCS(Conduct) Rules, 1988 read with rule 162 of Bengal Jail Code. 14. As the charges framed against the accused officer for violation of Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code as well as Notification dated 14.12.1998 and also Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, it would be proper for this Court to reproduce the aforesaid Rules, which are as under:- 162. All persons employed in a jail must be persons of respectable character; disreputable conduct, even outside the jail, will render an officer or servant liable to dismissal. No person who has been punished for any offence with imprisonment, or with flogging, shall be employed in any jail without the previous permission of the Inspector-General." 3(1) Every Government Employee shall at all times- (i) ..... ...... ...... (ii) ..... ...... ....... (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government employee. 15. The relevant portion of the Notification dated 14.12.1998 is also reproduced herein below:- Notification In exercise of the power conferred by the provision of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Government of Tripura is pleased to make the following rules to amend the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1988:- 16. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel mainly challenged the impugned orders on the ground that the inquiring authority found the petitioner guilty on the basis of the statement made by the victim-complainant at the time of preliminary enquiry, which is not admissible and in absence of said statement, the finding of the inquiring authority is based on no evidence and the disciplinary authority awarded punishment on the basis of the said finding, which is to be interfered with and it would be proper for this Court to consider as to whether the inquiring authority has the right to consider the evidence given at the time of preliminary enquiry. There is no doubt that the inquiring authority was supposed to consider the oral evidence recorded by himself in presence of the parties. But when the statements of the other witnesses made at the time of preliminary enquiry are tendered by prosecution and proved by the complainant-victim and also corroborated with her statement before the inquiring authority, then such statements can be relied upon by the inquiring authority. It also appears from the report of the inquiring authority that witness, Sri S. Sarkar, In-charge Superintendent of Central Jail, who had done the preliminary enquiry, in his deposition before the inquiring authority corroborated the statement of the victim and not only that he has also proved his report in preliminary enquiry before the inquiring authority which was exhibited as Exbt-S/7 and those documents were not challenged by the accused officer while cross-examined the said witness. 17. It further appears from the record that the inquiring officer relied upon the statements of the witnesses taken at the time of preliminary inquiry as the copy of those statements were supplied to the petitioner-accused officer and marked as exhibit on their admission and an opportunity was also provided to the accused officer for cross-examine the witnesses on their statements at the time of preliminary inquiry. In State of U.P. V. Om Prakash, AIR 1970 SC 679 , the respondent-delinquent officer raised a contention that the enquiry was vitiated because the enquiry officer had relied on the statements given by some of the witnesses behind his back and that he had not been given the true copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Deputy Commissioner. The Apex Court while dealing with the aforesaid contention of the respondent therein stated as under:- 12. This Court has repeatedly laid down that the fact that the statements of the witnesses taken at the preliminary stage of the enquiry were used at the time of the formal enquiry does not vitiate the enquiry if those statements were made available to the delinquent officer and he was given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in respect of those statements-see State of Mysore V. Shivbasappa, (1963-2 SCR 943 : AIR 1963 SC 375 ). It is clear from the records of the case that the respondent had been permitted to go through the statements recorded from the witnesses by the Deputy Commissioner and prepare his own notes; he was supplied with the English translations of those statements and that he was permitted to cross-examine those witnesses in respect of those statements. It may be that there were some mistakes in the translations. In our opinion those mistakes could not have vitiated the enquiry. They were quite trivial mistakes. We agree with the trial court that the enquiry officer had given reasonable time to the respondent to prepare his case. 18. Now, let us examine whether the inquiring authority came to his finding on no evidence. Normally, the writ Court should not re-appreciate the evidence as it does not discharge its function as a Court of appeal over the findings of the inquiring authority. But where the finding is absolutely perverse and based on no evidence, then obviously the Court can see the evidence to come to a proper conclusion and to see as to whether the inquiring authority acted beyond his jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court has gone through the evidence as exhibited by the petitioner himself in his writ petition. 19. On examination of the record including the evidence exhibited by the petitioner, it appears that in the instant case the statement recorded by the In-charge Superintendent of Central Jail, Exbt.-S/3, is proved by the Superintendent himself as the same was recorded by him and the victim/informant also proved her signature and not only that even in her statement made (Annexure-P/5 to the writ petition) before the inquiring authority she had specifically stated that while she was staying at her quarters alone, taking such advantage the accused officer entered into her quarters and he caught hold of her from her back side and outraged her modesty. Somehow she managed to escape by applying her force and came out from her quarters complex. After ten minutes when she returned to her quarters she found that door of her quarters was open. She entered into her quarters and took the key and thereafter she closed the door by fixing lock. Immediately after locking the door, the accused officer again caught hold her from her back side. After ten minutes when she returned to her quarters she found that door of her quarters was open. She entered into her quarters and took the key and thereafter she closed the door by fixing lock. Immediately after locking the door, the accused officer again caught hold her from her back side. Somehow again she managed to escape from his grip by applying her force and thereafter she went to the shop for purchasing some materials. She further contended that the accused officer first entered into the quarters of the victim and then caught hold her from backside. Again the accused officer came to the gate of her quarters and was standing there. Thereafter, from outside he knocked to open the door of the quarters. On that day at about 8.30/8.45 pm when her elder son, namely, Sri Debasish Debbarma was returning to her quarters by motor cycle, on hearing the sound of the motor cycle the accused officer hurriedly concealed himself under the barai (Plum) tree at the back side of her quarters. So far Exbt.-S/1 and S/2 are concerned, the victim specifically stated that these were her reports which bore her signatures. Therefore, it cannot be said that she did not prove the contents of those exhibits. Her such statement made before the inquiry authority was also corroborated by other witnesses, namely, Sri Debasish Debbarma, her son, Sri Ashim Ghosh, a Jail Warder, Smti. Mallika Reang, a Female Jail Warder as well as Mr. S. Sarkar, the Superintendent of Central Jail, Agartala, who had conducted the preliminary enquiry. 20. In M.V. Bijlani V. Union of India, (2006) 5 SCC 88 , the Apex Court held as under:- 25. ...... Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. (emphasis supplied) 21. The aforesaid principle has also been approved in Roop Singh Negi V. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 and Krushnakant B. Parmar V. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 . 22. In Zora Singh V. J.M. Tandon, (1971) 3 SCC 834 , the Apex Court held as under:- 10. .... .... The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior Court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior Court would not interfere if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of evidence. (emphasis supplied) 23. Thus, it cannot be said that this is a case of no evidence. In a disciplinary proceeding, strict proof like the criminal case is not required, rather preponderance of probability towards the imputation of misconduct itself is enough to establish the charge. Even if this Court considers the charge as framed does not cover the ingredients as prescribed in Rule 3A of the Notification dated 14.12.1998 (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition), then also the other two charges, i.e. Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code and Rule 3(C) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 relating to misconduct are proved. Even if this Court considers the charge as framed does not cover the ingredients as prescribed in Rule 3A of the Notification dated 14.12.1998 (Annexure-P/7 to the writ petition), then also the other two charges, i.e. Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code and Rule 3(C) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 relating to misconduct are proved. Thus, it would not be proper for the Court to quash the impugned orders as prayed for. 24. Mr. Deb, learned senior counsel, referring to the Notification dated 14.12.1998 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) relating to Rule 3A of Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) (Third Amendment) Rules, 1988 contended that the alleged misconduct was not committed within the work place, which cannot be wholly ruled out. But the charge framed against the accused officer was not only on the basis of the aforesaid Notification dated 14.12.1998 alone. It was also under Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code as well as Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988. The Rule 162 of the Code specifically stated that all persons employed in a jail must be persons of respectable character; disreputable conduct, even outside the jail, will render an officer or servant liable to dismissal and in Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 stated that every Government employee shall at all times do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government employee. 25. Thus, even if for the argument sake it is accepted that the Government quarter is not a work place, then also the finding of the inquiring authority cannot be said to be wrong as the inquiring authority considered conjointly the charges framed against the petitioner under Rule 162 of the Bengal Jail Code and Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 as the alleged conduct of the accused officer comes very much within the term ’misconduct’. The word ’misconduct’ though not defines in the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 as well as in any other statute, the Court has to consider a general meaning of the word ’misconduct’. 26. The word ’misconduct’ though not defines in the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988 as well as in any other statute, the Court has to consider a general meaning of the word ’misconduct’. 26. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, at page 999, the word ’misconduct’ is:- a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior, its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or carelessness. 27. In Law Laxicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at page 821 defines ’misconduct’ thus: The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected. 28. In the instant case, it appears from the Article of charges that the delinquent officer entered into the quarters of the victim, Smti. Parbati Debbarma, a Female Warder of Female Jail in the night of 13.01.2005 at about 08-15 pm and embraced her for outraging her modesty in sexual harassment while she was alone in her quarters. Thus, such a conduct of the accused officer comes within the purview of misconduct. 29. In Baldev Singh Gandhi V. State of Punjab & ors., (2002) 3 SCC 667 , the Apex Court also considered the word ’misconduct’ and noted in para-9 of the said Report that ’misconduct’ has not been defined in the Act. Thus, such a conduct of the accused officer comes within the purview of misconduct. 29. In Baldev Singh Gandhi V. State of Punjab & ors., (2002) 3 SCC 667 , the Apex Court also considered the word ’misconduct’ and noted in para-9 of the said Report that ’misconduct’ has not been defined in the Act. The word ’misconduct’ is antithesis of the word ’conduct’. Thus, ordinarily the expression ’misconduct’ means wrong or improper conduct, unlawful behavior, misfeasance, wrong conduct, misdemeanor etc. There being different meanings of the expression ’misconduct’, we, therefore, have to construe the expression ’misconduct’ with reference to the subject and the context wherein the said expression occurs, regard being had to the aims and objects of the statute....." 30. Considering the above position law, this Court is also of the considered opinion that a Government servant is supposed to maintain the absolute integrity and devotion to duty and not only that he shall not do anything which is unbecoming of a Government employee. 31. By this time it is settled that judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merits by re-appreciating the evidence as an appellate authority. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. The adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. (See. State of Tamil Nadu V. S. Subramaniam, (1996) 7 SCC 509 , R.S. Saini V. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90 and Government of Andhra Pradesh V. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 ). 32. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner fails to make out a case for interference with the order of the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority as impugned herein. 33. In the result, the instant writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merits. No order as to costs.