JUDGMENT Mrs. Anita Chaudhry, J.: - Challenge in this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is the order dated 24.12.2013 passed by Judicial Magistrate Ist Class and order dated 13.05.2014 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh in a complaint filed by the petitioner under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘the Act’). 2. The issue for examination is whether the petitioner is entitled to stay in the main house, which is owned by the in-laws. The petitioner was claiming a right of residence since it was a shared household as enshrined under Section 15 of the Act. 3. For examination of the issue raised by the petitioner only the brief facts are being narrated. Ravinder Kaur was married to Charanjit Pal Singh. The petitioner claimed that she and her children were living in Sector 36-B alongwith her husband and parents-in-laws. The children are now in the age group of 5 and 8 years. Differences arose between the couple and petition for divorce was filed by the husband. Subsequently, a petition under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was filed in which the petitioner moved an application for interim direction to the respondent to allow her and minor children to stay in the main house. The petitioner claimed that she was occupying the Annexe portion and it was getting difficult for her to live. 4. The respondents stand was that the petitioner had left the matrimonial home and DDR entry was made in this regard on 30.10.2013. The petitioner then alongwith her brothers started threatening the husband and his family and one day she forced her entry into the house on 08.12.2013 and occupied the Annexe room. The husband is stated to have taken house on rent in another Sector. A civil suit for mandatory injunction had been filed by parents-in-laws against the petitioner which is pending. 5. The trial Court refused to issue any interim direction in order to avoid breach of peace and particularly in view of the conduct of the petitioner in gaining forcible entry in the premises in question. 6. An appeal was preferred against the order which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh on 13.05.2014. Aggrieved by the same, this petition has been filed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. 6. An appeal was preferred against the order which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh on 13.05.2014. Aggrieved by the same, this petition has been filed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that wife had a right to have a roof on her head and the right is protected under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. It was urged that the object and reason for framing this Act was to ensure a secured house and this right is to be secured by a residence order. It was urged that the definition of the shared household entitled the petitioner to live in the main building and Section 17 of the Act contains a non obstante clause and the word used there is ‘shall’. It was urged that the petitioner is entitled to live with her children with dignity. 9. On the other hand, it was urged that the relations between the couple had deteriorated as the petitioner was caught with another man and photographs were taken and a divorce petition was filed and the petitioner had left the matrimonial home with her brother and a DDR entry was made with the police. It was urged that after the divorce petition was filed, the petition under the Prevention of Women from Domestic Violence Act was filed and the petitioner broke the lock and forcibly entered the house which is owned by the in-laws. It was contended that the husband was living in the rented accommodation and the petitioner is quarrelsome and the atmosphere of the house would get polluted and would be unbearable for the aged parents and she had no right to live in that house and a suit for mandatory injunction had already been filed. It was contended that a sum of Rs.11,000/- per month were being paid and school fees was being paid by husband and he is ready to get her rented accommodation as it would lead to frayed nerves. It was contended that the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.R. Batra and another vs. Taruna Batra, [2007(1) Law Herald (SC) 93] : 2007(1) RCR(Civil) 378 had set aside the order passed by the High Court as the estranged wife can not as a matter of right claim right of residence in the property which is owned by the in-laws. 10. It was contended that the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.R. Batra and another vs. Taruna Batra, [2007(1) Law Herald (SC) 93] : 2007(1) RCR(Civil) 378 had set aside the order passed by the High Court as the estranged wife can not as a matter of right claim right of residence in the property which is owned by the in-laws. 10. On a query posed to the petitioner if she was ready to live in a rented accommodation, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that petitioner was not ready to reside in any other place. 11. Admittedly, the property belongs to the in-laws. The husband is living in a rented accommodation in Sector-38, Chandigarh. The husband is paying maintenance and the school fees of the children. A petition for divorce is pending and serious allegations have been levelled. The petitioner had forced her entry into the property. The trial Magistrate found that in the given circumstances it would not be possible for them to stay in the main house. 12. The Apex Court in S.R. Batra’s case (supra) examined Section 2(s), Section 17 and 19 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and rejected the argument that the household where the aggrieved persons lives or at any stage lives in domestic relationship would always be a ‘shared household’. 13. Para 22 to 30 of the judgment are relevant and reproduced as under:- “22. Apart from the above, we are of the opinion that the house in question cannot be said to be a ‘shared household’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’). Section 2(s) states: “‘shared household‘ means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household”. 23. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batra has relied upon Sections 17 and 19(1) of the aforesaid Act, which state: “17. (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. (2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. 19. (1) While disposing of an application under subsection (1) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order— (a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed against any person who is a woman”. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt. Taruna Batgra stated that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence the said property is her shared household. 25. We cannot agree with this submission. 26. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. He contended that since admittedly the respondent had lived in the property in question in the past, hence the said property is her shared household. 25. We cannot agree with this submission. 26. If the aforesaid submission is accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the husband’s father, husband’s paternal grand parents, his maternal parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces etc. If the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted, all these houses of the husband’s relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living in the all these houses of her husband’s relatives merely because she had stayed with her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to chaos and would be absurd. 27. It is well settled that any interpretation which leads to absurdity should not be accepted. 28. Learned counsel for the respondent Smt Taruna Batra has relied upon Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and claimed that she should be given an alternative accommodation. In our opinion, the claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband’s in-laws or other relatives. 29. As regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a ‘shared household’ would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him nor is it a joint family property of which the husband Amit Batra is a member. It is the exclusive property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared household’. 30. No doubt, the definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.” 14. Hence it cannot be called a ‘shared household’. 30. No doubt, the definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.” 14. The wife has a right to be maintained and also a right of residence but the said right extends to joint properties in which the husband has a share. The petitioner has forcibly occupied the Annexe for which civil proceedings have been initiated. The petitioner is not entitled to any interim direction in view of the factual position. No indulgence can be shown to the petitioner. 15. There is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————