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2014 DIGILAW 159 (GAU)

Dimapur District Autorickshaw Drivers' Union (Ddadu) v. State of Nagaland and Ors.

2014-02-07

P.K.SAIKIA

body2014
1. Heard Mr. Taka Masa, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K. Sema, Learned Addl. Advocate General, Nagaland assisted by Ms. V. Chishi and Mr. Keviphotsu appearing for the State respondents. 2. Since in all these proceedings are structured on more or less similar facts and circumstances and since these proceedings give rise to some common questions of law and facts, I propose to dispose of all these proceedings by common judgment and order. 3. Since the facts, stated in WP(C) No. 88(K)/2009, WP(C) No. 04(K)/ 2011 and WP(C) No.l48(K)/2012, nearly cover facts and circumstances, narrate in other aforesaid proceedings, I would first narrate the facts and circumstances staled in those proceedings. WP(C) No.88(K)/2009 4. The petitioner is a registered union known as Petroleum and Land Transport Labour Federation represented by its President Mr. A.S. Nangsha (PLTWFI). It has been stated that the petitioner was registered as above on 11.4.1994 under the Trade Union Act, 1926 and same was done by Registrar of Trade Union, Assam, Guwahati. The area of operation of the said trade union was stated to be whole of North East India. In due course, it established its offices/union/centers all over Nagaland after obtaining proper permission from competent authority. 5. The main aim and object of the petitioner's society is to protect the interest of its members from any kind of illegal and illogical interference from any quarter whatsoever and also to render help and assistance to its members whenever necessary. The mode of collecting of fund, necessary to discharge its assigned duty as well as the procedures as to how one can become a member of said union, etc., have been also spelled out in the constitution itself. Over the years, the petitioner has once been discharging its duties strictly in accordance with the aims and objects, spelled out in its constitution. 6. It may be stated that in 1998, the respondent authorities had issued series of orders, more particularly, order dated 9.7.1998, 21.7.1998 and 28.7.1998 whereby and where under the normal activities of the petitioner was drastically interfered with infringing their constitutional right under article 19(1)(C) of the Constitution of India. 6. It may be stated that in 1998, the respondent authorities had issued series of orders, more particularly, order dated 9.7.1998, 21.7.1998 and 28.7.1998 whereby and where under the normal activities of the petitioner was drastically interfered with infringing their constitutional right under article 19(1)(C) of the Constitution of India. Being aggrieved by these orders, they approached this court by way of filing Civil Rule No.76(K)/ 1999 and this court after hearing the parties was pleased to set aside those orders holding those orders to be unconstitutional vide order dated 23.9.1999 at Annexure D to the petition and allowed the petitioner to carry on its activities strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions stated in their constitution. 7. In compliance to direction, rendered by this court in its order dated 23.9.1999, the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, Nagaland issued the order allowing the petitioner and other to carry on their activities in accordance with the terms and conditions stated in their constitutions, vide order dated 30.7.2002. In the meantime, the State respondents issued the order dated 26.5.2000 interfering with the right of the petitioner conferred on it under article 19(1)(C) of the Constitution of India. 8. While doing its duties, as above, the State respondents issued further order dated 13.6.2008 whereby the petitioner was not allowed to collect membership fees through its office, situated near the National highways/ State highways/other places and such order was passed under the direction of Home Department vide order dated 26.5.2000. 9. Being highly aggrieved by the order dated 13.6.2008, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 10.7.2008 alleging that the order dated 13.6.2008 was not in tune with permission, accorded to the petitioner under which the respondent authorities allowed the petitioner to be registered under the Registration Act and also to carry out the functions stated therein. The petitioner also contends that the order dated 13.6.2008 is repugnant to various orders passed by the Government in the meantime allowing the later to carry out business strictly in accordance with aims and objects of the aforesaid Federation. 10. Though they have filed the said representation immediately after the notification dated 13.6.2008, the same was not disposed of by the respondent authorities. 10. Though they have filed the said representation immediately after the notification dated 13.6.2008, the same was not disposed of by the respondent authorities. Therefore, the petitioner having found no other way out but approach this court by way of WP(C) No.l28(K)/08 and this court by its judgment dated 6.2.2009 directed the petitioner to submit fresh representation before the competent authority and till then petitioner was allowed to work as per notification dated 30.7.2002 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur. 11. Pursuant to the order dated 6.2.2009 passed in WP(C) No.128/08, the petitioner submitted representation dated 16.2.2009 before the competent authority but respondents being the competent authority had rejected the representation by its order dated 21.5.2009. It has been alleged that the order dated 26.5.2000, order dated 13.6.2008 and order dated 21.5.2009 are all issued with the sole object of circumventing the operation of judgment dated 23.9.2009 passed in Civil Rule No. 76(K)/99 alleging, of course, quite falsely, that under disguise of exercising their lawful objects, they, in fact, resorted to activities of enormously criminal nature. 12. Unfortunately, such order(s) which were passed whimsically, drastically interfered with the right of the petitioner guaranteed under the Constitution. Having found no other way out, the petitioner approached this court by filing WP(C) No.88(K)/09 seeking quashment of order dated 26.5.2000, 13.6.2008 and order dated 21.5.2009 and also seeking a direction requiring respondents to allow the petitioner to carry out work in accordance with the constitution and the mandate given in the judgment dated 23.9.1999 passed in WP(C) No.76/99. WP(C)No.4(K)/2011 13. While WP(C) No.88/09 was still waiting disposal., the respondent authorities issued order dated 7.7.2010 restraining the petitioner from collecting contributions from its members using any part of National/ State highway and also requiring the petitioner to establish its office away from National and State highways. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has come up with WP(C) No.4/2011 seeking quashment of order dated 7.7.2010. WP(C)No.l48(K)/2012 14. Unfortunately, the matter did not end there since during pendency of WP(C) No.88(K)M and WP(C) No.4(K)/11, the respondents, issued order dated 31.5.2012, corrigendum dated 4.6.2012, order dated 1.6.2012 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur and order dated 20.7.2012 passed by the Chief Secretary, Nagaland asking the petitioner to close down all its offices. Being greatly aggrieved at the aforesaid order(s), the petitioner has approached this court once again by way of filing WP(C) No.l48(K)/20l2 seeking setting aside of aforesaid order(s). Being greatly aggrieved at the aforesaid order(s), the petitioner has approached this court once again by way of filing WP(C) No.l48(K)/20l2 seeking setting aside of aforesaid order(s). WP(C)No.l70(K)/2012 15. Here the petitioner is a registered association under name and style "the Dimapur Truck Owners Association" (the DTOA) with its head office at Golaghat Road;, Dimapur and is represented by its Vice-President Visheto Aye. The said Association was registered on 1.10.1991 under The Registration of Societies Act, 1860 and same was done by Registrar of Societies, Nagaland, Kohima. According to the averments, made in the writ petition, the petitioner's Association is to operate all over the district of Dimapur. The aim and object of the Association is to organize transport worker for unity and also for economic and social up-liftment and to help them whenever they are in distress for any reasons whatsoever. 16. While discharging its duties strictly in accordance to the constitution and rules framed therein and guidelines issued from time-to-time, the State respondents issued the order dated 9.7.1998, 21.7.1998 and 28.7.1998 which profoundly interfered with the normal activities of the Truck Owners Association for which the petitioner approached this court by way of Civil Rule No.75(K)/98. The said petition was allowed and all the orders aforesaid were quashed requiring the State respondents to allow the petitioner to carry out its function strictly in accordance to its constitution and guidelines issued from time-to-time. 17. However, in order to circumvent the liberty granted by this court in Civil Rule No.75(K)/1998, the State respondents started issuing a series of orders which drastically interfered with in carrying out the lawful aims and object of the Truck Owners Association. Having found no other way out, the petitioner approached this court by way of filing the present proceeding seeking quashment of all those orders. WP(C)No.l49(K)2012 18. The petitioner, herein, is the Motor Workers Association, Dimapur which is a registered Association registered under the Registration of Societies (Nagaland First Amendment) Act, 1869 read with the Registration of Societies (Nagaland First Amendment) Act, 1969 and represented by its President Mr. Daniel. It was registered as above on 15.5.1998. The aims and objects of this association are similar to the other Associations aforementioned. 19. Daniel. It was registered as above on 15.5.1998. The aims and objects of this association are similar to the other Associations aforementioned. 19. It has been stated that it has always been discharging its duties strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions stated in their constitution as well as all the lawful guidelines issued by the authorities from time-to-time. However, in 1998, some unreasonable restrictions were imposed upon them drastically interfering with the very lawful activities of the petitioner's Association. Since the restrictions imposed on it were highly unconstitutional, arbitrary and oppressive in nature, the petitioner approached this court by way of Civil Rule No.77(K)/1998. This court on hearing the parties was pleased to set aside the said orders requiring respondents to allow the petitioner to discharge its duties strictly in accordance with the constitution and lawful order given by respondent authorities from time-to-time. 20. However, in order to circumvent the aforesaid direction passed by this court in Civil Rule No.77(K)/1998, the respondent authorities started issuing series of orders once again interfering with the execution of lawful rights and duties of the petitioner for which the petitioner approached this court by way of WP(C) No.160/04. Meanwhile the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur allowed the petitioner to function in accordance with the terms and conditions, stated in the constitution. 21. While things were rested at that stage, the respondents have again issued order dated 31.5.2012, corrigendum dated 1.6.2012, order dated 4.6.2012 and order dated 20.7.2012 whereby the petitioner was asked to close down all its office and was not allowed to function. Such an order not only violates the direction of the court rendered in Civil Rule No.77(K)/88 but also trampled down the constitutional right guaranteed to the petitioner under article 19(1) of the constitution of India. The petitioner, therefore, approached this court seeking quashment of the aforementioned orders. WP(C)No.l63(K)/2012 22. The Dimapur Truck Drivers Union (the Union) is a registered trade union represented by its President. Hereinafter, the petitioner would be referred to as DTDU. The DTDU had adopted their constitution as per Trade Union Act of 1926. Since 1992, the petitioner has been performing its duties strictly in accordance to its constitution, thereby safeguarding the interest of its members and also rendering necessary help whenever its members required such assistance. 23. However, respondents by order dated 26.5.2000 restricted the normal functions of the trade Unions/Associations/Societies including the petitioner's trade union. Since 1992, the petitioner has been performing its duties strictly in accordance to its constitution, thereby safeguarding the interest of its members and also rendering necessary help whenever its members required such assistance. 23. However, respondents by order dated 26.5.2000 restricted the normal functions of the trade Unions/Associations/Societies including the petitioner's trade union. However, the Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur district by its order dated 25.2.2009 and order dated 9.5.2009 allowed the petitioner's trade union to function from its head office, situated at Golaghat road with certain restrictions. Being aggrieved, they have approached the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Dimapur praying for allowing them to function smoothly without any hindrance. 24. The office of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Dimapur by its letter dated 21.12.2009 forwarded the said application to the Deputy Commissioner requesting the later to grant the DTDU permission to re-open its office. The Deputy Commissioner, however, allowed the petitioner to open their office on the same terms and conditions as has been mentioned in the order dated 25.2.2010. Being aggrieved, Union has approached the court seeking quashment of order dated 26.5.2000, order dated 25.2.2009, order dated 9.5.2009 and order dated 18.5.2009. WP(C) No.l56(K)/2013 25. The petitioner herein is the Dimapur Motor Workers Trade Union (the DMWTU) with its headquarter at Golaghat road and it is represented by its President Ghoshito Sumi. It was registered under the Indian Trade Union Act, 1926 on 11.11.1986 by the Registrar of Trade Union, Kohima Nagaland. It has around 500 members and had its constitution duly approved by the Labour Commissioner and Registrar, Trade Union Nagaland. The main aims and objects of the trade union is to bring all round developments to its members and to safeguard them from any illegal activities from any quarter whatsoever. 26. It is never engaged in anti-social activities since it has been functioning within the limits fixed by its constitution. It has been stated that for convenience of its members the DMWTU had set up its office at New Field gate in Assam-Nagaland border on National Highway 37 and also at Dillai gate and some other places on the National highway. But the Deputy Commissioner Dimapur issued an order directing the petitioner to close down its office. It has been stated that for convenience of its members the DMWTU had set up its office at New Field gate in Assam-Nagaland border on National Highway 37 and also at Dillai gate and some other places on the National highway. But the Deputy Commissioner Dimapur issued an order directing the petitioner to close down its office. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, they have filed a writ petition before the High Court which was numbered as WP(C) No.l86(K)/99 and hon'ble High Court was pleased to dispose of the same vide order dated 31.7.2000. 27. While enjoying the benefit of the order passed by this court in WP(C) No.l86(K)/99, the respondents have passed a series of orders drastically interfering with the right conferred on it by article 19(1)(C) of the Constitution! of India. The orders aforesaid are the orders dated 1.6.12 issued by the Deputy Commissioner Dimapur and order dated 20.7.2012 issued by the Chief Secretary, Nagaland. Since those orders interfered with the right of the petitioner which is guaranteed by the Constitution, the DMWTU approached this court by way of present proceeding seeking quashrnent of the order dated 1.6.2012 and 20.7.2012. WP(C) No.47(K)/2013 28. The petitioner here is Dimapur District Autorickshaw Drivers Union, in short, the DDADU which is said to be registered under Trade Union Act of 1926 with its head office at Ellora lane, Dimapur and is represented by its president. The constitution of DDADU was duly approved by the Labour Commissioner and the Registrar of trade union, Nagaland. At the time of filing this proceeding, the Union had about 2,900 persons as members. The aims and object of the union is to give all kinds legal protection to its members and to safeguard their interest in all possible ways. 29. However, this union too is subjected to series of illegal orders issued by the respondent authorities drastically interfering with its functioning. In that connection, the order dated 20.7.2012 passed by the Chief Secretary Nagaland has been referred to. DDADU also approached this court by way of present proceeding seeking to set aside and quash the aforesaid order. WP(C) No.l59(K)/2012 30. The petitioner here is the Dimapur Auto Rickshaw Owners Union, represented by its president Mr. Khakeho Achumi with its headquarter at Burma Camp, Dimapur Nagaland. According to the petitioner, the said Union is also registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926 and was registered on 8.2.1996. WP(C) No.l59(K)/2012 30. The petitioner here is the Dimapur Auto Rickshaw Owners Union, represented by its president Mr. Khakeho Achumi with its headquarter at Burma Camp, Dimapur Nagaland. According to the petitioner, the said Union is also registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926 and was registered on 8.2.1996. Its constitution was approved by the Labour Commissioner and Registrar of Trade Union, Nagaland. According to its constitution, its main object is to safeguard the interest its members, help them in time of distress and also to help its members and is to discharge its duties strictly in accordance to the constitution of the rules framed therein. However, the State respondents has been issuing several orders which drastically interfered with the function of the union aforementioned for which they have approached this court by way of present proceeding seeking annulment of the order dated 31.3.2012. WP(C) No.39(K)/2011 31. The petitioner here is the Dimapur Land Transport Workers Union (the DLTWU) represented by its President Ghokiye. The DLTWU is a registered trade union and was registered on 11.4.2005 under the Trade Union Act, 1926. Its constitution was approved by the Labour Commissioner and the Registrar of Trade Union, Kohima Nagaland. The aims and object of the union is to organize transport workers for unity, economic and social upliftment, and also to impart training to them and look after their welfare and also give assistance as and whenever such assistance is necessary. 32. Though they were discharging their duties strictly in accordance to the conditions stated in their constitution and bye-laws framed therein, the State respondents started issuing several illegal orders thereby interfering with their constitutionally guaranteed rights. In that connection, order dated 8.12.2009 has been issued by the Chief Secretary, Nagaland prohibiting collection of taxes at various check posts on the highways all over Nagaland has been referred to. The DLTWU, therefore, approached this court seeking quashing order dated 8.12.2009. WP(C)No.l61(K)/2012 33. While things were rested as above, the State respondents continued to issue some other illegal orders such as order dated 31.5.2012., 4.6.2012, 1.6.2012 and 20.7.2012 thereby interfering with the constitutional guaranteed rights of the petitioner. The DLTWU, therefore, approached this court seeking annulment of all those orders. 34. The notices of those proceedings were served on the State respondents. While things were rested as above, the State respondents continued to issue some other illegal orders such as order dated 31.5.2012., 4.6.2012, 1.6.2012 and 20.7.2012 thereby interfering with the constitutional guaranteed rights of the petitioner. The DLTWU, therefore, approached this court seeking annulment of all those orders. 34. The notices of those proceedings were served on the State respondents. The State respondents entered appearance in all those proceedings and having filed counter affidavit in WP(C) No.l48(K) of 2012, common to all those proceedings, the State respondents contested the claims of the petitioners in those proceedings. At the very outset, it questioned the locus standi of the PLTWFI to file the proceedings which were registered as WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2011 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012. 35. In that connection it has been stated that the petitioners in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 are all one and dame and is a registered Federation. It, according to its constitution, is to operate in the entire North-Eastern Region of India meaning thereby that such a Federation is to operate in States more than one. 36. In mat context, it has been stated that the law holding the field on this count requires that any Union/Societies/Federation/Association which is to operate in States more than one is to be registered - not under the Trade Union Act, 1926 - but - under the Central Trade Union Regulations, 1938, for short, the Regulations of 1938. However, despite operating in states more than one, the petitioner in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012, was registered - not under the Regulations of 1938 - but - under the Trade Union Act, 1926. Therefore, on this count alone, WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 are all liable to be dismissed. 37. The Official respondents further contend that the main aim and object of the Associations/Unions/Federations of the petitioners herein is to ensure the welfare of its members and for that purpose, they are allowed to open Head Offices at the places stated in their Constitution. 37. The Official respondents further contend that the main aim and object of the Associations/Unions/Federations of the petitioners herein is to ensure the welfare of its members and for that purpose, they are allowed to open Head Offices at the places stated in their Constitution. Some of them, such as, the petitioners in WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012, WP(C) No. 149(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 170(K) of 2012 were also allowed to open branch offices/Sub-offices at some other places too. However, since their main purpose is to protect the genuine and legal interest of their members, they can discharge their functions from the Head Office and from their branch offices/Sub-offices where such permission is accorded. 38. However, instead of conducting their activities from head offices and from Sub-offices whenever they are so permitted to do so, they started operating from National Highway/State Highway, market places and other busy publk places, and that too, not for the purposes for which they come into existence but to extort money most illegally not only from the members but from public in general and drivers and owners of commercial vehicles in particular causing enormous difficulties, not only to the users of National Highways/State Highways/market places or other public places but posing enormous problems to the administration since such illegal activities severely obstructed the free flow of vehicles on the roads and public places. 39. Worse still, their illegal activities grow to such extent when public in general and people connected with transport industry in particular got annoyed and exasperated so much so that they could no longer remain the mute spectators and sufferers in silence to what have been going on over a long period of time in their State and in their cities and towns which is evident from the facts they now started complaining to the administration about the illegal activities of the goons and hooligans on the roads. 40. Equally important, public, now, started to ventilate their grievances in a big way through media as well. To what extend public got annoyed and disturbed can be easily imagined from the documents attached as Annexure 4 to 9 to the counter-affidavit, more particularly, Annexures 5 and 6 which vividly demonstrate the magnitude of illegal activities, resorted to by the petitioners and other similarly situated Associations/ Unions, etc. 41. To what extend public got annoyed and disturbed can be easily imagined from the documents attached as Annexure 4 to 9 to the counter-affidavit, more particularly, Annexures 5 and 6 which vividly demonstrate the magnitude of illegal activities, resorted to by the petitioners and other similarly situated Associations/ Unions, etc. 41. Since the collection of illegal taxes and fees continued unabated despite issuance of several directions/orders in that regard, the State respondents, as the eventual authority, responsible for good governance of the society, was forced to issue a series of orders prohibiting all Associations/Unions etc from collection of taxes and fees operating from the National Highways/State Highways/market places and other public places which are, now, questioned in the present proceedings. 42. Simultaneously, State respondents also initiated a number of criminal cases against some of the petitioners and such cases are at various stages of investigations and trial, the details of which are stated in paragraph 11 of the counter-affidavit. According to the State respondents, the extortions on the road and other public places become so rampant, State respondents were forced to raise to the occasion and to issue the orders aforementioned and as such, one must not find fault with any of the orders under challenge in these proceedings. 43. Drawing the attention of this court to various orders, it has also been stated that those orders, which are, now, questioned in these proceedings, never/ever prevented the petitioners from action in accordance with the terms and conditions stated in their Constitution. However, if the petitioners want to expand their activities by Operating from more and more places, which are found to be in tune with aims and objects, stated in the constitutions of the petitioners, then they need to obtain permission from the State respondents. 44. However, without ever obtaining permission, most of the petitioners expanded their activities which have no sanction - not only of the State respondents - but - of their own Constitution as well. According to learned Additional Advocate General, (AAG) all these speak loud and clear that the allegations that the State respondents by issuing the orders, under challenge, try to circumvent the order, passed in CR No. 75/1998 to CR No.77/1998 is nothing but a pack of lies only. On the above contentions, the State respondents argued this court to dismiss all those proceedings. 45. On the above contentions, the State respondents argued this court to dismiss all those proceedings. 45. A suave perusal of the pleadings of the parties reveals that the parties are at conflict on very many points. One of the contentions of the petitioners was that in issuing some executive orders which are in question in these proceedings, the State respondents chose to curtail the fundamental rights of the petitioners which is guaranteed under the article 19(1)(C) of the Constitution of India which is, however, not permissible under the law. 46. According to Mr. Taka Masa, learned counsel for the petitioners in WP(G) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012, such right can be interfered with only through a legislation and not otherwise. In support of such contention, he relied on the decision of hon'ble Apex Court of the country rendered in the case of OM Kumar and Am. v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 , learned AAG, however, did not dispute such proposition of law. 47. But he contends that orders, under challenge, no way interfere with the fundamental rights of the petitioners. What the orders in question wanted to do is to curb the crime and criminal conducts of unheard proportion, indulged in by some unscrupulous elements in the State of Nagaland who most illegally collected enormous amount of money from the people connected with transport industry in particular, in the disguise of collecting membership fees on operating from the National/State highway/Market place/other strategic places. 48. Learned AAG contends that the atrocities, committed by the antisocial become so rampant, so widespread and so extensive, they started harming the interest of the State and its people alike and a time has come when the State, as ultimate protector of lives, liberties and properties of the people living within its jurisdiction was forced to act to contain such criminals and crimes of appalling proportion. It was in that context, the state respondents had to issue the orders which the petitioners have called into question in all these proceedings. Therefore, the argument that such crimes and criminal activities can be curbed only through legislation, and not by executive order, is not only outrageous but is fraught with implications of enormously evil nature. 49. However, before one could address above contention, he needs to address some other controversies too. Therefore, the argument that such crimes and criminal activities can be curbed only through legislation, and not by executive order, is not only outrageous but is fraught with implications of enormously evil nature. 49. However, before one could address above contention, he needs to address some other controversies too. I have found that learned the AAG strenuously contends that the petitioners in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2011 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 had no Locus Standi to institute those proceedings since the petitioners therein for not being registered under the appropriate law, become an non-entity in the eye of law and on this count alone, those proceedings are liable to be dismissed. 50. I have noticed that the petitioners in those proceedings were also the petitioners in Civil Rule No. 76(K) of 1999. In such proceedings, the State respondents took the stand that the petitioners in Civil Rule No. 75(K) of 1999 to Civil Rule No. 77(K) of 1999 were registered in accordance with the requirement of law and as such, there was no infirmity in those petitioners insofar their registrations are concerned. More important, this court too accepted such a proposition, vide its order dated 23.9.1999. The relevant part is reproduced below : "The fact that the petitioners are registered associations/unions is not controverted by Mr. E.Y. Renthungo, learned Government Advocate and in fact it is also fairly submitted by him that the petitioner's association/unions do exist. The only submission made by the learned Government Advocate is that the activities of the writ petitioner association/unions are against the interest of society." 51. Since in the earlier round of litigations, the State respondents had admitted the petitioners in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 to be a duly registered Federation, they, now, cannot be allowed to take a stand different from the stand, they had taken in CRP No. 77s(K) of 1998. Being, so, in my considered opinion, the petitioner in WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 [which happens to be petitioners in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 as well] is a duly registered Federation and, therefore, WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 cannot be rejected at the threshold as desired by the respondents. 52. 52. One may note here that at no point of time, the State respondents made any attempt to request the authority concerned to recall the registration, rendered in favour of the petitioner, aforesaid. Quite contrary to it, the State respondents even allowed the petitioner in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 to open more and more offices/sub-offices as is evident from letter dated - at annexure I and annexure K to the petition in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009. This further shows the futility of the claim of the State respondents that the petitioners in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012 has no locus standi to prefer those proceedings for not registering under the appropriate law. 53. This brings us to very crucial chapter of these proceedings. The petitioners arduously contend that orders which are challenged in these rounds of ligations are, in fact, manifestations of a mischievous attempt to circumvent the decision, rendered by this court in earlier round of ligations over the same matter which the petitioners are forced to agitate in the present round of proceedings as well. Since the allegation, above, has serious ramifications and repercussions, I find it necessary to address the above contention before we consider the other aspects of the dispute in these proceedings. 54. In my very considered opinion, one cannot address the above controversy unless he ascertains if the disputes in the present round of litigations as well as the disputes in earlier round of litigations were of same nature, feature and character. This can be done only when one considers both the disputes side by side. Therefore, I want to know what exactly is/are the dispute(s) in the present round of litigations. In that connection, I find it necessary to have a look at the orders in question, the order dated 31.5.2012, order dated 1.6.2012 and order dated 20.7.2012 in particular. 55. This can be done only when one considers both the disputes side by side. Therefore, I want to know what exactly is/are the dispute(s) in the present round of litigations. In that connection, I find it necessary to have a look at the orders in question, the order dated 31.5.2012, order dated 1.6.2012 and order dated 20.7.2012 in particular. 55. For ready reference, those orders are reproduced below : "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARMENT: POLITICAL BRANCH Dated Kohima, the 31st May, 2012 ORDER No. CON-l/G/41/2011: Whereas, it has come to the notice of the Government that despite various orders issued in the past to stop collection of taxes or case or money in any other form, the practice of such collections continues unabated specially in the district of Dimapur. And whereas, such unauthorized collection of money is taking place on national highways/state highways as well as in market places by various unions/associations/NGOs registered or otherwise. And whereas, the above collection of money causes immense inconvenience to the traveling public and traffic on the roads, puts additional burden on the consumers by way of increased prices and harasses commercial traffic, transporters as well as business establishments. And whereas, many unions/associations are operating their offices or sub-offices or welfare centers or information centers or Kiosks on or very near to the national highways and whereas commercial vehicles are forced to pay unauthorized membership or subscription or monetary contribution or levy or tax or money in any other form by stopping vehicles on the way near authorized check gates or even without check gates. And whereas, such collection of money is not authorized by any laws are statutes or rule of the Government. Now, therefore, after careful consideration and keeping in view the general public interest, it is hereby ordered that no unions, or associations, or NGOs or any other private or community organizations by whatever name shall be allowed to collect any form of taxes membership fee of collection of money on state highways/national highways or market places except those expressly authorized by an order of the by an order of the Government issued by the concerned Secretary of the Department. Any person or organizations or unions or association or NGOs found collecting such money shall be prosecuted under relevant sections specially under section 88 and 184 of IPC. Any person or organizations or unions or association or NGOs found collecting such money shall be prosecuted under relevant sections specially under section 88 and 184 of IPC. No union or associations or NGOs or any other organizations connected with the welfare of transporters or with any business interest shall be allowed to operate any main office or sub-offices or information centre or welfare centre or Kiosk or nay other structure in the name of the organizations at state highways or national highways. Any person or organizations aggrieved by this order shall make a request for exemption from the purview of this order in writing in the Chief Secretary, Nagaland with necessary documentary evidence in support of the grounds on which exemption is sought. The Chief Secretary shall get the request duly examined by concerned department which shall decide the matter expeditiously after due consultations and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the aggrieved party. During the pendency of such request before the Government, no such organization shall be allowed to operate or function or carry out its activities as expressly prohibited by this order. Issued and in the name of the Government of Nagaland. Sd/- LALTHARA,IAS Chief Secretary, Nagaland." "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HEADOUATERS CHUMUKEDIMA CAMP::DEVIAPUR No. CON/L & O/200 Dated 1st June, 2012 ORDER In compliance to Home Department Political Nagaland Kohima Order No. CON-l/G/41/2011 Dated 31st May 2012, it is hereby ordered that all the union or associations or NGOs or any other organizations connected with the welfare of transporters or with any business interest who have set up their main offices or sub-offices or information centers or welfare centers or Kiosks or any other structure in the name of organizations at state highways or national highways as well as in the market places are hereby directed to closed down their business establishment on or before 3rd June, 2012. Failure to comply the order shall be prosecuted under relevant sections specially sections 88 and 384 of IPC." "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARMENT:: (GAB-I) Kohima: Nagaland No. GAB-1 /Misc/284/2011 (Pt-1) Dated Kohima, the 20th July, 2012 ORDER 1. Failure to comply the order shall be prosecuted under relevant sections specially sections 88 and 384 of IPC." "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HOME DEPARMENT:: (GAB-I) Kohima: Nagaland No. GAB-1 /Misc/284/2011 (Pt-1) Dated Kohima, the 20th July, 2012 ORDER 1. The Government of Nagaland, in the Home Department, under the signature of the Chief Secretary, Nagaland, had issued order No. CON- 1 /G/41/2011 dated 31.5.2012, whereby collection of any form of taxes, case, fees or donations by organizations, associations, societies or unions on the state and national highways or market places, was prohibited. By the same order, operating of offices, information center or Kiosks or any structure in the name of such organizations/union/sotieties on the highway area was also prohibited. The necessity for issuing this order arose from the fact that many organizations, associations, unions or societies are in the habit of collecting money at Government's check posts, or at any part of such highways in the name of taxes, membership fees or donations, etc., and that such practice badly hampers the free flow of traffic on the highways, and also adversely affects free trade and business in the state, leading to increase in the cost of goods and services, which in turn adversely affects the living standard of the common people. 2. Although the order was not addressed to, or directed against any particular organization, societies, associations or unions, etc. representing against the above said order dated 31.5.2012 had been receive from the following: (1) Dimapur Municipal Council, Dimapur (2) Petroleum and Land Transport Workers' Federation of India, Dimapur (3) Truck Owners Association, Dimapur (4) Dimapur Motor Worker's Trade Union, Dimapur (5) Dimapur Auto Rickshaw Driver's Union, Dimapur (6) Dimapur Land Transport Workers' Union, Dimapur (7) Motor Workers Association, Dimapur (8) Nagaland Oil Tanker and Vehicular Association, Dimapur. 3. Since all the above eight representations are against the same order dated 31.5.2012 and since the issues raised in these representations are more or less similar, all the representations are hereby being disposed off through this common order. 4. After having gone through all the eight representations against the above Government order dated 31.5.2012,1 found mat none of them had made out a valid ground to assail the legal validity of the order, or to justify modification of the order, or to exempt any particular organizations from the purview of the said order. 4. After having gone through all the eight representations against the above Government order dated 31.5.2012,1 found mat none of them had made out a valid ground to assail the legal validity of the order, or to justify modification of the order, or to exempt any particular organizations from the purview of the said order. Most of the organizations who had represented against the order had said something to the effect that the said order had infringed on their right to form associations/unions/ societies etc. But a careful study of the said order would reveal that such allegations are far from true. The said order had not, in any manner, infringed on anyone's right to form associations/unions/societies. The said order had simply prohibited use of national highways or state highways, or market areas for setting up of offices or camps for collection of any form of taxes, fees or donations by any organizations/societies/ unions etc. As per existing rules for registration of societies, any society seeking registration/recognition must have an official address. They can also have any manner of regional or sub-offices anywhere, and do their business there, including collection of membership fees or donations, etc. But no association/society can claim the right to have their offices or collection centre or camps on the highway areas, or to stop vehicles on the highways, or take advantage of legally erected Government's check gates on the highways to collect their membership fees, or donations, etc. 5. Therefore, since the said order dated 31.5.2012 had not, in any manner, infringed on the right of anyone/any society to form unions/societies, and to transact their business in their respective registered offices/ establishments I find no substance in the said representations against the said order. I also find no reason justifying or necessitating the modification of the said order dated 31.5.2012, or exempting any of the above 8 entities from the operation of the said order. Accordingly, I hereby dispose off and reject all the above eight representations listed under para 2 above. Sd/- LALTHARA,IAS Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland." 56. Before ascertaining the nature of the dispute(s) is in the present round of litigations, I would also like to know the exact nature of dispute(s) in the earlier round of litigations. Accordingly, I hereby dispose off and reject all the above eight representations listed under para 2 above. Sd/- LALTHARA,IAS Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland." 56. Before ascertaining the nature of the dispute(s) is in the present round of litigations, I would also like to know the exact nature of dispute(s) in the earlier round of litigations. The order dated 23.9.1999, rendered in CR No. 75(K)/1998 to CR No.75(K)/1998, would give a clear idea as to what the dispute(s) was/were in between the parties in previous round of proceedings. 57. For ready reference the relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below : "6. On 9.7.1998, the Deputy Commissioner of Dimapur issued another order directing the petitioner association to, charge membership fees of Rs. 10 instead of Rs.50. It is contended that the said order is unreasonable and unsustainable inasmuch as it is interference with the smooth running of a duly formed association. By another order issued on 21st July, 1998, the activity of the petitioner Association has been drastically restricted inasmuch as collection of fee by the petitioner association has been cancelled. It is contended that, that order by which the petitioner association has been directed not to collect fee is illegal, unconstitutional and unreasonable. Another order impugned in the present petition is dated 28th July, 1998 by which the petitioner association was directed to close down its office at New-filed Gate, Dilai gate and other places where such office has already been established by the petitioner association for the purpose of smooth functioning of the petitioner association." 58. However, conjoint reading of order dated 31.5.2012, order dated 1.6.2012 and order dated 20.7.2012 demonstrates that under those orders, the I petitioners and other similarly situated Unions/Associations, etc., stood prevented from collecting taxes/fees on operating from National highways/State highways/Market places and other busy public places. But then, the State was not all averse to their collecting taxes/fees etc. from their members or doing other normal duties operating from their respective office or other places wherefrom they were already allowed to operate or function, off course, strictly in accordance to the terms and conditions, stated in their constitutions as well as in the terms of permission rendered by the State respondents. 59. Was the position under the earlier batches of litigations same? My emphatic answer to such a query is a clear "NO". 59. Was the position under the earlier batches of litigations same? My emphatic answer to such a query is a clear "NO". A careful perusal of the order dated 23.9.1999 would make it abundantly clear. On perusal of the order dated 23.9.1999, rendered in CR No. 75(K) of 1998 to CR No. 77(K) of 1998, I have found that (i) when the State respondents reduced the membership fees from Rs. 50 to Rs. 10, (ii) when the State respondents prevented the petitioners therein and some others from collecting membership fees and (iii) when the State respondents asked the petitioners therein to close down their offices in Dillai gate, New field gate and other places, they approached this court by the way of proceedings aforementioned and on hearing the parties thereto, this court was pleased to quash those orders vide order dated 23.9.1999. 60. To appreciate the disputes in earlier round of litigations better, I also find it necessary to reproduce here the relevant part of the judgment is as follows : 61. It was in those backdrops, this court was forced to quash the orders which were questioned in CR No.75/1998 to CR No.77/1998. The relevant part is reproduced below : "18. The admitted position is that the writ petitioners are validly registered associations/unions. Registrations issued in respect of the writ petitioners still remain intact. No particular action alleged to be illegal carried out by the writ petitioners or by any of the members of the writ petitioners has not been enquired into in accordance with law. In fact no criminal action has also been launched against any of the alleged offender. 19. On careful perusal of the various Government documents I am of the view that the writ petitioners associations/unions cannot be said to be bogus associations or unions inasmuch as they are duly registered unions and associations even as it is admitted in the Government affidavit. If that be so, there is no reason why the impugned orders should have been issued against the writ petitioners. It is also contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that no notice was issued to the writ petitioners that no notice was issued to the writ petitioners nor was any opportunity of being heard was given before the impugned orders were issued. 20. It is also contended on behalf of the writ petitioners that no notice was issued to the writ petitioners that no notice was issued to the writ petitioners nor was any opportunity of being heard was given before the impugned orders were issued. 20. It may also be stated that though bogus associations/unions are said to have resorted to extortion, illegal and rampant collection of fees. It seems no action as such has been taken against such bogus associations or unions. In fact nowhere it has been specified in the Government affidavit as to which are the bogus unions or associations out of the 55 unions or associations operating in Dimapur as per Annexure I of Government affidavit. It is the grievance of the writ petitioners that impugned orders have been passed only against 12 associations including the above 3 writ petitioners. In the result, in the premises aforesaid, the above writ petitioners are allowed. The impugned orders dated 5th July, 1998,21st July, 1998 and 28th July, 1998 are set aside as far as the aforesaid 3 writ petitioners are concerned." 62. Thus, it is found well evident that the nature, features and character of the disputes in present round of litigations and that of earlier round of litigations are not similar in contents and substances. Since the subject-matters in the present set of proceedings and the subject-matters in earlier round of proceedings are constitutionally and fundamentally different, I am constrained to hold that the decisions, rendered in earlier round of decisions, cannot come in the way of the State respondents taking appropriate action in accordance with law against someone who is found contravening the system on which an orderly society subsists, regardless who he might be. 63. But then, Mr. Taka Masa, appearing for petitioners in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009, WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2011 and WP(C) No. 148(K) of 20.12, quite arduously claims that the order(s) under challenge are bad in law since such orders run counter to what they have actually been permitted to do under their respective constitution. In that context, it has been submitted that under their respective constitution, the petitioners were authorized to do all th£ legal activities including collection of membership fees from their members - not only from their Head Office - but -from their sub-offices and other places including places very close to highways/market places as well. 64. In that context, it has been submitted that under their respective constitution, the petitioners were authorized to do all th£ legal activities including collection of membership fees from their members - not only from their Head Office - but -from their sub-offices and other places including places very close to highways/market places as well. 64. In that connection, it has been pointed that since the head offices or even tile sub-offices pf most of the petitioners are situated far away from National Highway/State Highways/other main street and since the members of most of the petitioners play through the National Highway/State Highways/other main street, it becomes enormously impossible for the office bearers and other staff of Unions/Associations/ Federations, aforementioned to collect the fees or to render their members necessary help and support when they are in distress for any reasons whatsoever. Under such compelling circumstances, the petitioners were forced to operate from places very close to Highways. Viewed from such angle, the order(s) in question cannot escape being found illegal, arbitrary, capricious and illogical. 65. Does such a claim stand to reason? In that context, I have very carefully perused the constitutions of the petitioners and have found that in their constitutions, the petitioners have specified the places where their head offices would be located. They also stated therein that they would operate from their branch off ices/sub-offices as well. However, on a careful scrutiny of the constitutions of the petitioners and other documents filed therewith, I have found that except petitioners in WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012, WP(C) No. 149(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 170(K) of 2012, no other petitioners were ever permitted to operate from any place other than their head offices. 66. However, on a careful scrutiny of the constitutions of the petitioners and other documents filed therewith, I have found that except petitioners in WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012, WP(C) No. 149(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 170(K) of 2012, no other petitioners were ever permitted to operate from any place other than their head offices. 66. Even in case of the petitioners in WP(G) No. 148(K) of 2012, [which happens to be petitioners in WP(C) No. 88(K) of 2009 as well as in WP(C) No. 4(K) of 2011 and WP(C) No. 156(K) of 2012], WP(C) No. 149(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 170(K) of 2012, it cannot be held that under the permit dated 23rd, February 1995 and the NOC dated 9th July 2007, granted in favor of the petitioners in 148(K)of 2012 and under the order dated order No. TPT-4/91-D/Part-III/dated 13.12.2007, accorded in favor of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 149(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 170(K) of 2012, they were allowed to function from the National Highways/State Highways/market places /other places of strategic importance. 67. On reading those orders in between the lines, I have found that under the permit dated 23rd February, 1995 and the NOC dated 9th July 2007, the petitioner in 148(K) of 2012 had been allowed to function from Kohima in the district of Kohima and Purana Bazaar sub-office respectively whereas under the order No. TPT-4/91-D/Part-IH/dated 13.12.2007, the petitioners in WP(C) No. 149(K) of 2012 and WP(C) No. 170(K) of 2012 were allowed to function from New Field Check Gate, Golaghat Road, Burma Camp, Dillai Gate and Old Khatkati Road Check Gate. 68. Consequently, the permission, so granted under permit dated 23rd, February 1995 and the NOC dated 9th July 2007 as well as the permission, accorded under the order No. TPT-4/91-D/Part-III/dated 13.12.2007, under no circumstances be stretched to mean that under those orders, the petitioner in WP(C) No. 148(K) of 2012, the petitioner in WP(C) No. 149(K) of 2012 and the petitioner in WP(C) No. 170(K) of 2012 were allowed to operate from National high ways/State highways/Market places from other public places of strategic importance. 69. Any attempt to expand the permissions, so granted under the constitutions of the petitioners or under the documents, referred to above, so as to allow the petitioners to collect membership fees etc. 69. Any attempt to expand the permissions, so granted under the constitutions of the petitioners or under the documents, referred to above, so as to allow the petitioners to collect membership fees etc. on operating from the National highways/State highways/Market places would not only defeat all the principles of interpretation but would lead to anarchism of extreme nature. In the face of above revelations, one cannot find fault lyith the orders under which the petitioners and other similarly situated Unions/Associations/Federations stood debarred from operating from the National highways/State highways/ Market places and other public places. 70. Here, it may be stated that learned counsel for the petitioners had contended that even if the petitioners are found operating from the National highways/State highways/Market places/other public places, yet then, the State respondents cannot issue fihe order(s) in question unless they could show that they have appropriate authority to issue those orders to deal with the petitioners in the way as had been done in the present case. Unfortunately, the State respondents could not show the sources of power under which they issued the orders in question and, therefore, it is inevitable for this court to quash all those orders -argues Mr. Taka Masa, learned counsel for the petitioners. 71. This contentions was hotly disputed by learned AAG, Nagaland, contending that the petitioners and other similarly situated institutions are indulging in activities of profoundly criminal nature which not only make the lives and living of peace loving citizens in the State of Nagaland enormously difficult but they also make the existence of a duly elected Government perilous, apart from weakening the backbone of the economy of the State. Since the conducts of the petitioners and others become awfully criminal, it alone gives massive authority to the State respondents to deal with those antisocial elements by issuing orders of the nature which are questioned in the present proceedings. 72. In support of such contentions, Learned AAG refers me to a series decisions. Those decisions are: In support of such contention, learned AAG refers me to the decisions, rendered in (i) State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala and Anr., AIR 1957 SC 699 , (ii) Railway Board New Delhi and Anr. v. Niranjan Singh, 1969 SC 966, (iii) Ram Awatar Agarwal and Ors. v. Corp. of Calcutta and Ors., AIR 1982 Cal 314 (DB), (iv) N.N. Jagadeesan and Ors. v. Dist. v. Niranjan Singh, 1969 SC 966, (iii) Ram Awatar Agarwal and Ors. v. Corp. of Calcutta and Ors., AIR 1982 Cal 314 (DB), (iv) N.N. Jagadeesan and Ors. v. Dist. Collector, North Arcot, (1997) 4 SCC 508 and (v) Dharam Dutt and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 712 . 73. In State of Bombay (supra), respondent therein were given license under the relevant Act to conduct crosswords prize competitions, however, in view of subsequent legislation, namely, the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax Act, 1952, their right stood interfered for which they approached the court seeking reliefs. Such dispute ultimately landed in the Apex Court of the Country. On concluding that the gambling activities cannot be regarded as trade, business and commerce, the hon'ble Apex Court held as follows : "On this argument it will follow that criminal activities undertaken and carried on with a view to earning profit will be protected as fundamental rights until they are restricted by law. Thus there will be guaranteed right to carry on a business of hiring of gundas to commit assault or even murder, of housebreaking, of selling obscene picture, of trafficking in women and so on until the law curbs or stops such activities. This appears to us to be completely unrealistic and incongruous." 74. In Railway Board New Delhi (supra), the respondent therein was served with charge sheet alleging amongst other things that he convened a meeting of the Trade Union of which he was a member within the Railway premises. He stood convicted of such a charge for which he approached the court and the matter was ultimately taken up to hon'ble Supreme Court of the Country. His contention that the trade union has a right to convene meeting in railway premise was replied to by hon'ble Supreme Court in the following mariner : "There is no fundamental right for anyone to hold meeting in government premises, if it is otherwise there is bound to be chaos in our offices. The fact that those who work in a public office can go there does not confer on them the right of holding a meeting at that office even if it be the most convenient place to do so. The fact that those who work in a public office can go there does not confer on them the right of holding a meeting at that office even if it be the most convenient place to do so. The fact that citizen of this country have freedom of speech, freedom to assemble peaceably and freedom to form associations or unions does not mean that they can exercise those freedom in whatever place they please. The exercise of that freedom will come to an end as soon as the right of someone else to hold his property intervenes." 75. In Bachan Singh (supra), Bachan Singh was convicted of offence under section 302, IPC and was sentenced to death. When the matter was taken to Supreme Court and when it was contended that death penalty is unconstitutional since it interferes with the right to life and thereby interferes with all other fundamental rights, hon'ble Supreme Court on reiterating its decision in State of Bombay (supra), replied such argument as follows : "Thus, considered can anyone say that he has a legal right or a fundamental freedom under article 19(1) to practice the professional of a hired assassin or to form association or unions to engage in a conspiracy with the object of committing murders or dacoities." 76. In Ram Awatar Agarwal (supra), appellants therein approached the court claiming tenancy right over the building in question which was constructed without permission and which was therefore, ordered to be demolished by the competent authority. When the matter was brought before the Calcutta High Court, the later dismissing the appeal before it held as follows : "The further contention of the appellants is that they are not trespassers but they have lawfully acquired their tenancy right in the building and that such right to property of the appellants cannot be interfered with save by authority of law as provided in article 300(A) of the Constitution." "We are unable to accept the above contentions of the appellants. The fundamental rights cannot be availed of in justification of an unlawful act or in preventing a statutory authority from lawfully discharging its statutory duty." 77. Similar view has been rendered in the case of N. Jagadeesan (supra) as well as James Martin (supra). The fundamental rights cannot be availed of in justification of an unlawful act or in preventing a statutory authority from lawfully discharging its statutory duty." 77. Similar view has been rendered in the case of N. Jagadeesan (supra) as well as James Martin (supra). Since the activities of the petitioners in realizing money from the transporters in particular and public in general by operating from National Highways/State Highways/Market Place/ other strategic places are out and out criminal in nature, it is ludicrous to contend that the State respondents can contain such illegal activities only through legislation - not by an executive order - contends learned AAG. 78. Now, it needs to be seen how far such contention advanced from the side of State respondents is found tenable in view of materials. On the perusal of the affidavit- in-opposition submitted by the State respondents in the light of documents attached therewith, I have found that various Associations/Unions/Federations, supposedly connected with the welfare of their members, have extorted huge money from public in general and people connected with the transport industry in particular and such criminal activities of terrible proportion go on unabated despite some restrictions imposed by State and its apparatus from time-to-time. 79. The counter affidavit of the State respondents further shows that the conduct of the petitioners and other Associations, etc., had gone to that far when it annoyed, infuriated and enraged the public in general and people connected with the transport industry in particular so much so that they started showing the sign of impatience and irritation for the purported inaction, indifference and unresponsiveness on the part of the Government in containing the alleged offensive conduct of some unscrupulous elements. The various complaints and representations submitted to the different authorities as well as news bulletins annexed with the counter affidavit are the proof of such state of affairs. 80. In that connection, I have also perused the paragraph 11 of the Counter affidavit submitted by the State respondents having regard to the documents attached therewith as Annexures 4 to 9 to the counter-affidavit, more particularly, Annexures 5 and 6. On making such an exercise, I have found that State respondents have already initiated several criminal cases which are said to be different stages of investigation and trial. On making such an exercise, I have found that State respondents have already initiated several criminal cases which are said to be different stages of investigation and trial. Though the petitioners in WP(C) No.l48(K)/2012 tried to refute such allegations, I have noticed that such counter allegations are too feeble to hear and to accept. 81. On the contrary, averments in paragraph 11 coupled with Annexure 4 to Annexure 9 to the counter-affidavit - not only give more and more authenticity to the allegations, made against the petitioners - but -demonstrate very vividly how dangerous, how deep and how dreaded the activities of the Associations like petitioners were or how angry and annoyed the public had been for such atrocities perpetuated on them by some antisocial elements in the State, masquerading themselves as saviors of some weaker sections of society. 82. Since the conducts of the petitioners are found to be crime out and out, since such criminal activities cause widespread resentment among the public, since such situations show the real the possibility of society slipping to anarchic state and since the law, laid down in the decisions, aforementioned, give the State respondents necessary authority to tackle the situations, as described above, in my firm opinion, the State respondents, having issued the orders in question, had done what exactly was expected of it in the given situations. 83. In such scenario, to say that the State has no power to deal with such disquieting, disturbing, distressing situations arising out of very harmful activities of the petitioners and some other similar organizations or to say that such criminal activities can be contained only through the legislation, would tantamount to' repudiating all arrangements made under the various apparatus of the State including fundamental law of the country which is not other than the Constitution of the country. 84. In view of above, I am in full agreement with the learned Addl. Advocate General, Nagaland that in issuing the order(s) in question in these proceedings, the State respondents acted within the limits, fixed by law and as such they cannot be quashed and set aside as prayed for by the petitioners. 85. Even otherwise, according to official respondents, the State respondents have the authority to deal with the menace arising out of illegal activities of the petitioners and other similarly situated organization/institution. 85. Even otherwise, according to official respondents, the State respondents have the authority to deal with the menace arising out of illegal activities of the petitioners and other similarly situated organization/institution. Such authority can be traced to the Rules of Executive Business framed under article 166 of the Constitution of India, more particularly, rules 11 and 12 thereof. 86. For ready reference rules 11 and 12 are reproduced below : "11. All order or instruments made or executed by or on behalf of the Government of Nagaland shall be expressed to be made or executed in the name of the Governor of Nagaland. 12. Orders or instruments of the Government of the State shall be expressed to be made in the name of the Governor and shall be signed either by the Chief Secretary, Additional Secretary, a Secretary, Special Secretary and Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary a Deputy secretary an Government and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authorization of such order or instrument." 87. The learned Additional Advocate General, Nagaland has submitted that while the order dated 31.5.2012 was issued by Home Department in the name of the Governor under the signature of Chief Secretary, Nagaland, the order dated 1.6.2012 and 20.7.2012 were issued by Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur and Chief Secretary, Nagaland on the basis of order dated 31.5.2012. 88. Since those orders were issued in accordance with procedure prescribed under the Rules of Executive Business, more particularly, rules 11 and 12 thereof, it needs to be held that such orders were issued strictly in accordance with requirement of law and it sufficiently answers the allegations that the official respondents issued the orders in question without there being any authority to do so. 89. Consequently, the proceedings initiated by the petitioners are found to be without any merit and accordingly, all the proceedings aforementioned are dismissed. Stay order, if any, also stands dismissed. 90. Before I part with the record, I want to make it clear that in the event of the petitioners conducting their functions strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions, stated in their constitutions, so also in the terms of permission, granted by the State respondents, such activities of the petitioners shall not be interfered with by the State respondents. No cost.