JUDGMENT : Heard. 2. By this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the order of confirmation of detention dated 23.08.2014 passed by the Under Secretary, Home Department, Government of Madhya Pradesh and order dated 29.06.2014 passed by the District Magistrate, Mandsaur under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 on the ground that the aforesaid orders are defective and passed arbitrarily without following the due procedure of law. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been detained under the National Security Act, 1980 for a period of more than three months and as per the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mohaseen Kureshi s/o Nasir Kureshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh & others, decided on 01.09.2014 (Writ Petition No.1158/2014), considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in ( AIR 2014 SC 2090 ) : 2014 Criminal Law Journal 2748, has held that the State Government cannot at one time pass an order of detention for a period of more than three months and since by the impugned order, the petitioner has been ordered to be detained for a period of twelve months at one stroke, set aside the order of detention, which is for twelve months at first instance and allowed the writ petition. 3. As per the report of the Superintendent of Police, District Mandsaur, number of criminal cases were registered against the petitioner. He was also convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. On earlier occasion, he was arrested under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code at Crime No.489/1996, wherein he completed his sentence and thereafter the petitioner was again involved in Crime No.525/2014 for offence punishable under Sections 436 and 506/34 of the IPC. The District Magistrate, on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Mandsaur, passed the detention order on 29.06.2014. He was taken under custody on 29.06.2014 at 09.25 and has been sent to the Central Jail. The District Magistrate, on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Mandsaur, passed the detention order on 29.06.2014. He was taken under custody on 29.06.2014 at 09.25 and has been sent to the Central Jail. As per the report/ letter dated 27.06.2014, the petitioner is an anti-social element, who indulges in anti-social activities, gundaism, murder, abusing and threatening to general, disturbing communal harmony, which is detrimental to the peace and harmony of the society, his terror is prominently persistent among the general public of the society. As per the reply, there is a long list of illegal work done by the petitioner since 1994 till date. It is also submitted that Mandsaur city is the city of mixed population i.e. Hindus and Muslims and in this city, this act of the petitioner can create a large communal incidence. 4. Learned Deputy Government Advocate has submitted that the Apex Court while passing the order in the case of Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh (2014 Cri LJ 2748) (supra) has not considered the earlier view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Abhay Shridhar Ambulkar v. S.V. Bhave, Commissioner of Police & another, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 500 : ( AIR 1991 SC 397 ); paragraphs Nos. 3 and 7 to 10 of the aforesaid decision are relevant, which reads as under: '3. This takes us to the Writ Petition in which an additional question has been raised. The question relates to the validity of the Government Order dated January 6, 1990 pursuant to which the Commissioner of Police made the detention order. It would be convenient to set out that order hereunder: ORDER Dated 6/01/1990 59. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1980 NO. This takes us to the Writ Petition in which an additional question has been raised. The question relates to the validity of the Government Order dated January 6, 1990 pursuant to which the Commissioner of Police made the detention order. It would be convenient to set out that order hereunder: ORDER Dated 6/01/1990 59. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1980 NO. NSA2390/ 1/SPL3( B) Whereas the Government of Maharashtra is satisfied that having regard to circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in the Greater Bombay Police Commissionerate, it is necessary that during the period commencing on 30/01/1990 and ending on the 29/04/1990, the Commissioner of Police and the said Commissioner should also exercise the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to as ' the said Act) Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of the Section 3 of the said Act, the Government of Maharashtra hereby directs that for the period commencing on the 30/01/1990 and ending on 29/04/1990 the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay may also if satisfied as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act exercise the powers conferred on the State Government by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act. By order and in the name of Governor of Maharashtra.' 7. The power to make an order of detention primarily rests with the Central Government or the State Government. The State Government, however, being satisfied with certain circumstances may order that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police may also make an order of detention in respect of matters relating to the security of the State or Public Order or maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community against any person within their respective areas. The State Government can make such an order which shall not in the first instance exceed three months but it may extend such period from time to time making fresh order for a further period again not exceeding three months at one time. It may be noted that the conferment of this power on the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police is not to the exclusion of but in addition to the powers of the government to exercise its own power. 8. It may be noted that the conferment of this power on the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police is not to the exclusion of but in addition to the powers of the government to exercise its own power. 8. The first paragraph of the order dated January 6, 1990 states that government was satisfied that having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in Greater Bombay Police Commissionerate it is necessary that during the period commencing on January 30, 1990 to April 29, 1990 the Commissioner should also exercise the powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. This is indeed no more than a reproduction of the terms of sub-section (3) of Section 3. But sub-section (3) refers to two independent circumstances namely: (i) the prevailing circumstances, (ii) the circumstances that are likely to prevail. The former evidently means circumstances in praesenti that is prevalent on the date of the order and the latter means the anticipated circumstances in futuro. If the government wants that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police should also exercise the powers for the current period, it has to satisfy itself with the prevailing circumstances. If the government wants that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police should also exercise the powers during the future period, it must be satisfied with the circumstances that are likely to prevail during that period. This seems to be the mandate of sub-section (3). 9. The subjective satisfaction for the exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section 3 must be based on circumstances prevailing at the date of the order or likely to prevail at a future date. The period during which the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, as the case may be, is to exercise the power provided by sub-section (2) of Section 3 is to be specified in the order which would depend on the existence of circumstances in praesenti or at a future date. If the subjective satisfaction is based on circumstances prevailing at the date of the order, the choice of period, which must not exceed three months, would have to be determined from the date of the order. If the conferment of power is considered necessary because of circumstances likely to prevail during the future period, the duration for exercise of power must be relatable to the apprehended circumstances. If the conferment of power is considered necessary because of circumstances likely to prevail during the future period, the duration for exercise of power must be relatable to the apprehended circumstances. Therefore, the specification of the period during which the District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police is to exercise power under sub-section (2) of Section 3 would depend on the subjective satisfaction as to the existence of the circumstances in praesenti or futuro. Since very drastic powers of detention without trial are to be conferred on subordinate officers, the State Government is expected to apply its mind and make a careful choice regarding the period during which such power shall be exercised by the subordinate officers, which would solely depend on the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail. The subjective satisfaction cannot be lightly recorded by reproducing both the alternative clauses of the statute. The subjective satisfaction on the prevailing circumstances, or circumstances that are likely to prevail at a future date is the sine qua non for the exercise of power. The use of the word ' or— signifies either of the two situations for different periods. That, however, is not to say that the power cannot be exercised for a future period by taking into consideration circumstances prevailing on the date of the order as well as circumstances likely to prevail in future. The latter may stem from the former. For example, there may be disturbances on the date of the order and the same situation may be visualized at a future date also in which case the power may be conferred on the subordinate officers keeping both the factors in mind; but in that case the two circumstances would have to be joined by the conjunctive word ' and— not the disjunctive word ' or— . The use of the disjunctive word ' or— in the impugned government order only indicates non-application of mind and obscurity in thought. The obscurity in thought inexorably leads to obscurity in language. Apparently, the government seems to be uncertain as to the relevant circumstances to be taken into consideration, and that appears to be the reason why they have used the disjunctive word ' or— in the impugned order. 10. In the result, we allow the writ petition, quash the Government Order dated January 6, 1990. Apparently, the government seems to be uncertain as to the relevant circumstances to be taken into consideration, and that appears to be the reason why they have used the disjunctive word ' or— in the impugned order. 10. In the result, we allow the writ petition, quash the Government Order dated January 6, 1990. Consequently, the detention order of the petitioner is also quashed as being without authority of law.' 5. She submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Five Judges of this Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators Association & others v. State of M. P. and another, reported in 2003 (1) MPHT 226 : ( AIR 2003 MP 81 ), the earlier view of the Supreme Court will prevail. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that he is not challenging the order on the aforesaid ground and drew our attention to the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate along with the reply on 18.11.2014 and submitted that at the time of passing of the detention order, Shri Shashank Mishr was the District Magistrate of District Mandsaur whereas the affidavit has been filed by Shri Sanjeev Singh, District Magistrate, Mandsaur; paragraph Nos. 1 and 2 are relevant, which reads, as under: '1. That, I am the District Magistrate and swearing this affidavit and I am well conversant with the facts of the case. 2. I say that, I had passed the order of detention against the petitioner herein after taking into consideration the report of the Superintendent of Police and after perusal of the record.' 7. Thus, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent has taken filing of the affidavit in a casual manner and an incorrect affidavit has been filed. 8. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the impugned detention order deserves to be set aside on the ground that no affidavit of District Magistrate, who has passed the order of detention, has been filed. 9. In view of the aforesaid, we find that there is no affidavit of the District Magistrate, who has passed the order of detention against the petitioner. 9. In view of the aforesaid, we find that there is no affidavit of the District Magistrate, who has passed the order of detention against the petitioner. In the circumstances, in view of the judgment passed by this Court on 20.03.2012 in the case of Usman s/o Gani Khan v. State of M. P. & others (Writ Petition No.903/2012), the order impugned is not sustainable. As a result, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. 10. Resultantly, the order of detention and the order of confirmation are hereby set aside. The petitioner be set free, if not required in any other case. Petition allowed.